Proponents of moral particularism have often sought support for their negative claim about moral principles in a doctrine called holism in the theory of reasons. According to holism, a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or even the opposite reason, in another. The aim of this thesis is to investigate and elucidate the supposed connection between holism and particularism. This is done by considering the particularistic position embraced by Jonathan Dancy in his book Ethics without Principles and the arguments against the argument from holism recently put forth by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge in their book Principled Ethics: generalism as a regulative ideal. In conclusion it is argued that holism does provide at least some support for the form of particularism which Dancy defends.

This thesis will revisit the debate between moral particularists and moral generalists in the field of meta-ethics. The general aim of this project will be to come to a better understanding of the status and role of moral principles in a reasons-holistic moral landscape. The specific aim will be to develop a viable position within the particularism-generalism debate that will combine elements from both theories. My central argument will be threefold: (a) I will argue that, in a reasons-holistic moral landscape, exceptionless moral principles are not sufficient to ground the possibility of moral thought and judgement; (b) that the possibility of moral thought and judgement depends in part on a determinate set of exceptionless moral principles and an indeterminate set of defeasible moral principles; and (c) that moral principles are insufficient to codify all or most moral truths in finite and manageable terms. My position therefore is a modified version of Principled Particularism. In this thesis, despite defending a version of particularism, I will not shy away from employing generalist terminology or from accepting certain generalist assumptions. Furthermore, unlike some particularists, I will stress the necessity and utility of moral principles. This thesis will also incorporate research about moral thought and judgement from the fields of moral psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience.

Morální principy v současném šíitském islámu , zvl. Íránu a Iráku Moral Princips in contemporey Shi'a islam (esp. in Iran and Iraq) Šárka Popluhárová In my work I dealt with principles of Shiite Muslim fundamentalism and their reasons in the second half of the 20th century. According to my knowledge, the Shiite faith, I came to the view that morality is really dependetnt on religion and politics too. If politics and religion do not work together, discrepancy occurs in society. Even in secular states are people governed with moral values, without demonstranting their faith in God. Then the questin becomes, where the state takes over the observance of certain laws. The answer is that morality comes from God of the people. Thus, there is the claim that morality has no authority. Thus belief in God and his knowledge of laws the 20th century as a reaction positioned itself fundamentalism of Islam. The solution I see the approach of the two cultures, Western and East. Islam their observance of moral principles represent their religious attitudes.

Morální principy v současném šíitském islámu, zvl. Íránu a Iráku Moral Princips In contemporey Shi'a islam (esp. In Iran and Iraq) Šárka Ambrosio In this body of work we look at the moral principles of the Shiite Muslims faith and their reasons for fundamentalism in the second half of the 20th century. The morality of the Shiite faith is a delicate balanced between religion and politics. If the political and the religious institutions do not work in harmony, the typical results are society and economical disruption. Even in a secular state, non-believing citizens who have a basic moral value to live a peaceful co- existences can be disarrayed by conflicts within government and church. What then comes into question is the role the state takes in compliance with certain laws that effect the populous. The answer often defaults to the moral beliefs people have about their understanding of their Creator. There is the claim that morality has no authority. Thus, peoples faith in God and the knowledge of His law ensures a harmony in a social structure. It is no co-incidence that a growing Western pressure in the second half of the 20th century has equated to a growth in Eastern Islam fundamentalist. There is a cause and effect. The solution is not simple but peace can only be founded if the Eastern...

This thesis addresses the conflict traditionally found within moral philosophy between deontological and utilitarian schools of thought. Using the example of the serious moral ambivalence experienced by individuals who are deciding whether to end or continue a difficult pregnancy, it is argued that this ambivalence is the result of both absolute principles (such as the intrinsic value of human life) and outcome based considerations (such as the desire to avoid causing pain and suffering) appearing to be morally reasonable, while also being fundamentally opposed: Each course of action is at once morally defensible on the basis of its own reasonableness, and, conversely, reprehensible due to the reasonableness of the other. This lived experience of moral ambivalence is directly reflected by the tension between deontology and utilitarianism as it occurs at the moral philosophic level, where the deontological emphasis on the unconditional rightness of certain principles is seen to be at irreconcilable odds with the utilitarian emphasis on the attainment of certain ends. The thesis’ central claim is that such ambivalence strongly indicates that human morality is neither exclusively one type or the other, and that both types of moral property are in fact reasonable, and thus have moral value. It is theorised that accounting for this dual reasonableness would lead to the most accurate and helpful representation of the human moral experience – but that the philosophic ‘divide’ between the two types of principle has led to an either/or situation, which has largely prevented this sort of understanding from being developed. The thesis argues that Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick developed a view in which neither deontological nor utilitarian principles can be fully realised without reference to the other, precisely on the basis that both can be found to be ultimately rational. This thesis aims to revitalise that theory – represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’ - to show that Sidgwick reconciled the divide between absolute and end based principles in such a way that the relationship between them becomes a ‘synthesis’. In this synthesis, deontological and utilitarian concepts are both seen as essential components of morality, that combine to form a dynamic whole in which the value of each principle is both indicated and naturally limited by the value of the other, on account of their respective rationalities. It is argued that this provides a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of the human moral experience, and better moral justification for either course of action in situations of complex and sensitive ethical decision making.