This paper examines the popular philosophical theory of moral relativism. Traditionally, the theory argues that communities have their own conceptual frameworks of morality that are inaccessible to those outside of the community. Thus, one community cannot give another community a moral reason to change a practice. In this paper, I will examine David Velleman’s version of the theory presented in his book Foundations for Moral Relativism. This version posits that the drive towards mutual interpretability is a universal drive among human communities. From this drive stem all the practices and moral values of communities. However, Velleman does not believe that this implies that communities can understand each others’ conceptual frameworks. In this way, his account remains a normal version of moral relativism. I will argue that there are some cases in which a person can understand a different community’s conceptual framework enough to provide a reason for that community to change a practice. Importantly, my argument will not say that the reasons for change are moral reasons. They will be practical reasons based on the normative fact that human communities should strive towards mutual interpretability. Thus, my account will also maintain the crucial tenets of moral relativism. If accomplished, this argument will add a great power to the theory.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1605850 bytes, checksum: 7406bf5dcbbfb18cfedb2d6f20e0d675 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11-13 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The following research refers to an interpretation of Kant s texts about history, and politics as a philosophy of the humanity emancipation. This paper proposes, thus, to establish an intersection point between philosophy of history and political philosophy of Kant. The thesis to be defended is: The man is part of nature, as so many other beings, but their choices are free actions, because they are made from an uncaused principle of freedom. In this sense, the humanity emancipation is a responsibility of each man, as a being is not only belonging to the nature but also culture. The hypothesis is: breaking with the state of rudeness reveals to man the meaning of his life, which is, to become free. This direction is given by culture, which refers to a constant process that apart, in an increasingly way, man from rough state. This process can be called moral progress of humanity, understanding morality by the progress made by mankind in every way, so enabling the improvement increasing human sociability. To develop this hypothesis, the research was divided into three parts: a) the first part corresponds to the first chapter, in which is developed the rational base of human action from the Kantian solution to the problem of freedom in the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason and moral reasoning through the categorical imperative. This foundation is necessary, because it establishes a conformation between the laws of nature and man s free act. From this, it is possible to think of others, such as the state of nature and the civil state, the intractability, which is result from constitution of human nature, with sociability, which is result of overcoming of the state of nature, b) The second part is formed by chapters two and three, which is presented the escape of the man from state of rudeness, entry in the moral world, the construction and development of culture and the possibility of achieving a cosmopolitan civil society that guarantees the human condition of universal citizenship, c) the third part refers to the fourth and final chapter, in which is presented an update of Kantian cosmopolitanism to the present days. This update is realized from a reading of Habermas and Bobbio cosmopolitanisms, who, when making a critique of Kantian philosophy, end up doing an update of this thought. Through this structure, we find that the initial hypothesis is plausible and through it the thesis holds itself. Hence, Kant 's texts about the history and politics can be read as a philosophy of human emancipation according as which man recognizes himself as a being who is part of nature, but his life is the result of your choices. The political and moral progress of humanity is thus for Kant, a real possibility, because it has a sense of a categorical imperative for all mankind. / O trabalho que segue refere-se a uma interpretação dos textos de Kant sobre a história e a política como uma filosofia da emancipação da humanidade. Propõe, dessa forma, estabelecer um ponto de interseção entre a filosofia da história e a filosofia política de Kant. A tese a ser defendida é a de que o homem é parte da natureza, como outros tantos outros seres, mas suas escolhas são ações livres, porque são feitas a partir de um princípio não causado, de liberdade. Nesse sentido, a emancipação da humanidade é uma responsabilidade de cada homem, enquanto é um ser não somente da natureza, mas também de cultura. A hipótese de leitura é a seguinte: o rompimento com o estado de rudeza revela ao homem o sentido da sua vida, a saber, tornar-se livre. Este sentido é dado pela cultura, que se refere a um processo constante que distancia o homem cada vez mais do estado de rudeza. Este processo pode ser chamado de progresso moral da humanidade, entendendo-se por moralidade os avanços realizados pela espécie humana em todos os sentidos, de maneira que permitam o aprimoramento cada vez maior da sociabilidade humana. Para o desenvolvimento dessa hipótese, a pesquisa foi dividida em três partes: a) a primeira parte corresponde ao primeiro capítulo, no qual é desenvolvido o fundamento racional do agir humano a partir da solução kantiana ao problema da liberdade na Terceira Antinomia da razão pura e a fundamentação da moral através do imperativo categórico. Este fundamento é necessário, porque estabelece uma conformação entre as leis da natureza e o agir livre do homem. A partir dessa conformação, é possível pensar outras, tais como: o estado de natureza e o estado civil; a insociabilidade, que é fruto da constituição da natureza humana, com a sociabilidade, que é resultado da superação do estado de natureza; b) a segunda parte é formada pelos capítulos dois e três, na qual é apresentada a saída do homem do estado de rudeza, a entrada no mundo da moral, a construção e desenvolvimento da cultura e a possibilidade de alcançar uma sociedade civil cosmopolita que garanta ao homem a condição da cidadania universal; c) a terceira parte refere-se ao quarto e último capítulo, no qual é apresentada uma atualização do cosmopolitismo kantiano para os dias de hoje. Essa atualização se dá a partir de uma leitura dos cosmopolitismos de Habermas e Bobbio, os quais, ao apresentarem uma crítica à filosofia kantiana, acabam por fazer uma atualização desse pensamento. Através dessa estrutura, verificamos que a hipótese inicial é plausível e que através dela a tese se sustenta. Portanto, os textos de Kant que tratam da história e da política podem ser lidos como uma filosofia da emancipação humana a medida em que o homem se reconhece como um ser que faz parte da natureza, mas sua vida é resultado de suas escolhas. O progresso moral e político da humanidade é assim, para Kant, uma possibilidade real, porque tem um sentido de um imperativo categórico para toda a humanidade.

In this essay, I examine the interplay between history, progress, and morality, as it is discussed explicitly or implicitly in the metaethical literature. At first sight, it is perhaps intuitive that these three are necessarily intertwined and mutually dependent, as if they were casually connected. For instance, few would deny that moral progress has occurred throughout history. The abolishment of slavery and the political emancipation of certain groups are seen as obvious signs that morality does indeed progress. Those who believe in de facto moral progress would point to such 'facts' by comparing two states of affairs according to their moral status. Moral progress thus occurs when we move from a "worse" state of affairs to a "better". However, this simple algorithm becomes increasingly untenable once we ask what it means for something to be "better". Better by what measure, better according to whom, better in what sense? Some – moral realists– will argue that as we become increasingly aware of moral truths and as these truths steadily accumulate, progress occurs. Others will argue that there are no moral truths and no moral facts, and a comparison between different states of affairs is impossible because it involves a sort of moral 'historical imperialism' in which we assert our convictions and prejudices upon a time and culture with completely different beliefs. Taken to the extreme, this view gives rise to the idea that moral progress is nothing but a mirage, a psychological necessity without justification. I conclude the essay by arguing that several positions fall short when addressing questions regarding moral progress, and that there are other ways of discussing it which might be more fruitful.

L’empathie est une faculté émotionnelle et cognitive précoce, universelle et modulable, qui nous permet d’être affecté, de reconnaître et de répondre de manière appropriée à la subjectivité d’autrui. L’empathie nous permet, ainsi, de ressentir les émotions et les sentiments de l’autre mais également de comprendre, de connaître et de prévoir son comportement afin de mieux adapter notre comportement intersubjectif. Ce comportement peut aller de la simple coordination sociale à un comportement véritablement éthique. L’objectif de ce travail est celui de présenter et de réfléchir aux conditions de possibilité d’une nouvelle éthique : une éthique de l’empathie qui considère cette faculté comme son fondement (contagion, détresse empathique, imitation), son moyen (simulation, imagination, mémoire, souci empathique) et sa fin (partage, confiance, coopération, respect). L’éthique de l’empathie est une éthique hybride, cognitivo-affective, à la fois réaliste et idéaliste ; une éthique minimaliste du point de vue du rapport à soi et à autrui car elle privilégie la relation à autrui aux devoirs envers soi-même ; une éthique qui concilie l’universalité et les cas particuliers ; qui concilie la nature humaine (l’être) avec les valeurs et les normes (le devoir être) tout en laissant une place au dépassement de l’être par la prise en compte de la perfectibilité humaine, notamment à travers l’éducation empathique. Nous proposons ainsi une recherche moderne interdisciplinaire qui prend en compte, non seulement, les dernières études dans les domaines des sciences naturelles et humaines sur notre capacité d’empathie, mais encore le nouveau monde global dans lequel nous vivons aujourd’hui. / Empathy is an emotional and cognitive early faculty which is universal and flexible, which allows us to be affected, to recognize and to respond properly to the subjectivity of others. Empathy allows us, therefore, to feel the emotions and feelings of the others but also to understand, to know and to predict their behavior in order to better adjust our intersubjective conduct. This behavior can range from simple social coordination to a true ethical conduct. The objective of this work is to present and reflect on the conditions of possibility of a new ethics: an ethics of empathy that considers this faculty as its foundation (contagion, empathic distress, imitation), its means (simulation, imagination, memory, attention empathic concern) and its goal (sharing, trust, cooperation, respect). The ethics of empathy is a hybrid ethics, cognitive-affective, realistic and idealistic, minimalist from the point of view of the relation to itself and with others because it prefers relationships with others to own duties. It is an ethics that combine universality and particular cases; that reconciles human nature (is) with values and principles (ought) while leaving space to be exceeded by taking into account human perfectibility, including through an empathetic education. We propose a modern interdisciplinary research that takes into account not only the latest studies in natural sciences and humanities on our ability to empathize, but also the new global world in which we live today.

Trata-se de mostrar que Rousseau formula, ao longo de seus escritos, em especial no conjunto de seus Discursos, no Contrato Social e no Emílio, uma filosofia da história onde figura um movimento dialético e a ideia de um sentido último para o desenrolar dos eventos humanos. A sucessão de eventos que liga a natureza humana intocada pelos males sociais a seu destino - a qual Rousseau quer chamar de história - traria em seu bojo a possibilidade do progresso moral, consubstanciada na volta ao ordenamento natural. Assim como, frente ao espetáculo e as aparências de seu tempo, Rousseau retrocede ao homem natural, constrói a expectativa de que os tempos vindouros tragam a reconciliação do homem consigo mesmo e com a natureza, tendo o Estado, nos termos em que é proposto pelo Contrato Social, um papel fundamental para esse acontecimento. Por fim, pretende-se desenvolver a ideia de que, a partir de uma noção de história como marcha da natureza, que engendra os meios para emancipação humana, Rousseau aproxima-se do pensamento religioso, produzindo, a partir de sua filosofia da história, uma teodicéia. / This essay aims to show that Rousseau formulates, through his writings, specially in his Discourses, Social Contract and Emile, a Philosophy of History, depicting a dialectic movement and the idea of an ultimate goal or sense for the unraveling of humanity\'s events. The succession of all the events that binds an untouched by social iniquities human nature to its destiny - that Rousseau wants to name history - would bring in its bowels the possibility of moral progress, con-substantiated on the return of a natural order. As in which, facing the spectacle and appearances of his time, Rousseau leans back to this natural man; he also builds an expectation for a reconciliation for man with itself and with nature, playing the State, in the terms laid by the Social Contract, a fundamental role for this to happen. Finally, it is intended to develop the idea that, from a notion of history as a march of nature, engendering the means for human emancipation, Rousseau leans towards the religious thinking, producing in his philosophy of history, a theodicy.

Trata-se de mostrar que Rousseau formula, ao longo de seus escritos, em especial no conjunto de seus Discursos, no Contrato Social e no Emílio, uma filosofia da história onde figura um movimento dialético e a ideia de um sentido último para o desenrolar dos eventos humanos. A sucessão de eventos que liga a natureza humana intocada pelos males sociais a seu destino - a qual Rousseau quer chamar de história - traria em seu bojo a possibilidade do progresso moral, consubstanciada na volta ao ordenamento natural. Assim como, frente ao espetáculo e as aparências de seu tempo, Rousseau retrocede ao homem natural, constrói a expectativa de que os tempos vindouros tragam a reconciliação do homem consigo mesmo e com a natureza, tendo o Estado, nos termos em que é proposto pelo Contrato Social, um papel fundamental para esse acontecimento. Por fim, pretende-se desenvolver a ideia de que, a partir de uma noção de história como marcha da natureza, que engendra os meios para emancipação humana, Rousseau aproxima-se do pensamento religioso, produzindo, a partir de sua filosofia da história, uma teodicéia. / This essay aims to show that Rousseau formulates, through his writings, specially in his Discourses, Social Contract and Emile, a Philosophy of History, depicting a dialectic movement and the idea of an ultimate goal or sense for the unraveling of humanity\'s events. The succession of all the events that binds an untouched by social iniquities human nature to its destiny - that Rousseau wants to name history - would bring in its bowels the possibility of moral progress, con-substantiated on the return of a natural order. As in which, facing the spectacle and appearances of his time, Rousseau leans back to this natural man; he also builds an expectation for a reconciliation for man with itself and with nature, playing the State, in the terms laid by the Social Contract, a fundamental role for this to happen. Finally, it is intended to develop the idea that, from a notion of history as a march of nature, engendering the means for human emancipation, Rousseau leans towards the religious thinking, producing in his philosophy of history, a theodicy.