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Yes / Audio recordings of meetings of two community groups in a deprived inner-city area were analysed, using discursive psychological and conversation analytic techniques to explore situated enactments of ‘community’. Participants situated themselves as members; of a geographical community; of an “imagined” community; and, of other constitutive communities. A sense of community was enacted through five interactional strategies: affirming moral codes, ‘defending’ other members, distinguishing insiders from outsiders, enacting empowerment and challenging institutions. Participants regularly employed emotional displays and affirmed moral positions, both to constitute ‘community’ and to take action in it. In so doing they worked up social capital and positioned community concerns in ways more reflective of their own situated values than of criminal law or government policy.

The seven deadly sins are a popular theme, but they are often brushed off as antiquated, the product of stringent moral rules, or just arbitrary. In this thesis, I explain morality from a different perspective: evolutionary psychology. Using the Seven Deadly Sins as an example, I provide a user-friendly understanding of why we have the moral rules that we have. Boyd and Richerson (1992) demonstrated that, through the use of punishment, any rule---no matter how capricious---can be upheld. What I seek to explain is that moral rules, in this case the Seven Sins, are not arbitrary---or, at least, they were not arbitrary in the environment in which our innate moral faculties developed, though these rules may seem ascetic today. I suggest that much of what falls under the conceptual umbrella of morality can be better understood when framed as problems of cooperation. The Seven Sins are a useful example of the usefulness of moral rules, and psychopathy provides a comparison for understanding the importance of conscience.

The normative moral code is considered to be such that it applies universally to all or at least to all who can understand and govern their behavior by it. All or almost all common folk think of and use their own moral codes as them being normative in that for example there simply seem to them to exist “oughts” that apply to all and that there simply, straightforwardly are “things” that are right and wrong, good and bad. Gert Bernard and Gert Joshua have written an article on the topic of defining morality, with the title of “The Definition of Morality”. The authors suggest that the terms ‘normative morality’ refer to a code of conduct that, given some specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons. The authors take this formulation as entailing true and important definitional features of what normative morality is, although the authors think of this basic definition, conception as not being complete and that some additional feature hence is lacking but that any such candidate addendum to the definitional basic schema that they surveyed within the article seemed to be controversial, contested. Normative morality seems apt to investigate by creating thought-experiments wherein the participants are for example, envisioned choosing to endorse, put forward or act in accordance with a moral code. Within this large investigative project into normative morality with the help of thought-experiments it seemed to me that there was an under-representation of thought-experiments exhibiting some worthwhile and relevant features and I felt that it was a warranted project to create a thought-experiment which concurrently exhibited these features. Such an experiment could be thought of as an unusual “puzzle-piece” which could be valuable in contributing to furthering the completion of the “puzzle”, i.e. what normative morality is and its moral code. These three features were: i) a high degree of aptness for investigating a major part of or the complete normative moral code and ii) a high degree of freedom pertaining to the participants, e.g. their actions, thoughts etc., as well as iii) a high degree of confidence or warrant concerning what the participants would do, think, feel etc. within the thought-experiment. A thought-experiment, the Normative Moral Codes Workshop (NMCW) was hence created, which was aimed at investigating normative morality and its code and which exhibited these features. It is a thought-experiment mimicking an actual empirical study wherein the participants are given the task to together put forward the moral code for them, that would apply to them and that would cover a major or complete part of what they consider their moral codes to entail. The participants employed within my run of the NMCW thought-experiment were all currently living adult persons who I knew well. The core or main aim of this essay was to investigate whether it would or would not be the case that most or all participants within my run of the thought-experiment the NMCW would decide to put forward the code together with the chosen formulation of the thesis being, that it would not be the case that most or all participants would put forward the code within my run of the NMCW thought-experiment. Part of the core aim was also to elucidate why the thesis was supported or not supported as well as how strong the support was for the outcome of the experiment, i.e. the outcome of a code being put forward or not. The essay also has some minor aims which radiate out from the core aim (see below). As the thought-experimenter, I then reported on the events that I envisioned as happening within my run the NMCW thought-experiment as my selected participants grappled with the task and their decision to put or not put forward the code together that would apply to them. The finding was that the thesis was supported and that the support was robust in that I could identify several reasons the participants had against putting forward the code and I found very little in terms of reasons among the participants for putting forward the code. The essay also had some minor aims to selectively discuss a few further relevant and interesting issues radiating out from the core aim. These minor aims revolved around discussing some selected salient features of the NMCW including how they could relate to the outcome. One such selected salient feature was the feature of the employed participant sample of my run of the NMCW. I for example, discussed the potential extension of it not being the case that most or all participants would decide to put forward the code, if the participant sample would have been modified but still employed currently living5adults and I ended up being of the opinion that pertaining to most potential samples a similar outcome as the one envisioned within my run of the NMCW would be expected. I also wanted to discuss some further selected salient features of the NMCW within the context of addressing whether the NMCW, given its features ought to be considered an unsound, inapt experiment for investigating normative morality, given Gert’s and Gert’s conception of normative morality, since if this was the case the outcome of the experiment ought to be disregarded, given no weight. Although, I did find potential targets for criticism of the NMCW experimental design I did not find any reasons strong enough to disqualify the NMCW experiment as an experiment inapt, unsound for investigating normative morality, given the features of normative morality entailed within the suggested basic definition provided by Gert and Gert. Finally, I also aimed to selectively discuss some aspects of what it could mean pertaining to the conception of normative morality, according to Gert and Gert, that the thesis was supported. For example, given one interpretation the outcome could be taken to provide support for the non-existence of a normative moral code, but given another be taken to mean that addenda has to be identified and added to the basic conception of normative morality and that such addenda would be such that they would disqualify the NMCW (and its outcome) as a sound and apt thought-experiment to be employed in investigating normative morality. I also attempted to briefly illustrate how the NMCW thought-experiment could be used as a substratum facilitating the identification and clarification of such potential addenda to the basic conception of normative morality, suggested by Gert and Gert, and I also suggest some potential candidate features of the NMCW that further potential specifications added to the basic conception of morality ought to be able to disqualify, exclude as acceptable features of experiments aimed at investigating normative morality. In this way, an unusual, under-represented kind of thought-experiment, “puzzle-piece” when it comes to the large investigative project of employing experiments in order to acquire further insight into normative morality, i.e. “the puzzle”, can regardless of whether it seems to fit or does not seem to fit the “puzzle”, still be employed in such a way as to potentially provide further insight into “the puzzle”. This since even when a “puzzle-piece” does not seem to fit the “puzzle”, “seeing” and understanding how and why could provide us with information about the “puzzle”. / Den normativa moraliska koden anses vara sådan att den gäller universellt för alla eller åtminstone för alla som kan förstå den och reglera sitt beteende i enlighet med den. Alla eller nästan alla vanliga människor tänker och använder sig av sina moraliska koder som om dessa koder vore normativa, normerande genom att det t. ex. för dem helt enkelt verkar finnas ”måsten” som gäller alla och att det ”rakt upp och ner” verkar finnas ”saker” som helt enkelt är rätt och fel, gott och ont. Gert Bernard och Gert Joshua har skrivit en artikel kring ämnet hur man kan definiera moralen med titeln “The Definition of Morality” (sv. ”Moralens Definition”). Författarna föreslår att termen ’normativ moral’ (eller den ’normativa moralen’ i bestämd form) gäller en kod som reglerar hur man bör uppföra sig som givet vissa specificerade förhållanden är sådan att alla rationella personer skulle omfamna och förespråka den. Författarna anser att denna formulering innehåller viktiga och sanna egenskaper hos definitionen kring vad normativ moral är, även om författarna anser att denna basala, grundläggande definition, konception inte är fullständig och att därför vissa ytterligare definitions egenskaper, specifikationer saknas men att alla granskade kandidat-tillägg till denna basala definition som undersöktes inom artikeln verkade vara kontroversiella, enligt författarna. Normativ moral verkar lämplig för att undersökas genom att skapa tankeexperiment inom vilka deltagarna tex kan föreställas stödja, lägga fram eller agera i enlighet med en moralisk kod. Inom detta stora undersökande projekt av normativ moral med hjälp av tankeexperiment så verkade det enligt mig som om det fanns en under-representation av tankeexperiment som uppvisade vissa värdefulla och relevanta egenskaper och jag ansåg att det var ett rättfärdigat projekt att skapa ett tankeexperiment som uppvisade dessa värdefulla och relevanta egenskaper. Ett dylikt experiment kunde anses vara en ovanlig ”pusselbit” som kunde vara ett värdefullt bidrag till slutförandet av ”pusslet”, dvs vad normativ moral är och dess kod. De tre under-representerade egenskaperna var i) en hög grad av lämplighet för att undersöka en stor del av den normativa moraliska koden6eller den kompletta koden och ii) en hög grad av deltagarfrihet, exempelvis avseende deltagarnas handlingar, tankar osv samt iii) en hög grad av förtroende eller rättfärdigande avseende vad deltagarna skulle göra, tänka, känna osv inom tankeexperimentet. Tankeexperimentet, den Normativa Moraliska Kods Workshoppen (NMKW) skapades därför med målsättningen att undersöka den normativa moralen, dess kod samt att experimentet då skulle uppvisa de ovan nämnda egenskaperna. Det är ett tankeexperiment som liknar, ”speglar” en riktig empirisk studie inom vilka deltagarna ges uppgiften att tillsammans stödja och lägga fram den moraliska kod som skulle gälla för dem, reglera deras uppförande och som till en stor del eller fullständigt skulle täcka, innehålla det som de ansåg att deras moraliska koder innehöll. Deltagarna som användes inom min körning av tankeexperimentet var alla nu levande vuxna person som jag ansåg att jag kände väl. Kärn- eller huvudmålsättningen med uppsatsen var att undersöka huruvida det skulle eller inte skulle vara fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare inom min körning av NMKW tankeexperimentet skulle bestämma sig för att tillsammans lägga fram och stödja en kod, med den valda formuleringen för tesen enligt, det skulle inte vara fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare skulle lägga fram och stödja koden inom min körning av NMKW experimentet. Som en del av kärnmålsättningen var det att utreda varför tesen var eller inte var stödd samt utreda hur starkt stödet var för utfallet av experimentet, dvs utfallet att en kod lades fram eller inte lades fram. Uppsatsen har även mindre eller bi-målsättningar som strålar ut från uppsatsens huvudmålsättning (se nedan). I min roll som tanke-experimenteraren så rapporterade jag sedan kring vilka händelser som jag föreställde mig, som jag ”såg” uppträda inom tanke-experimentet NMKW då mina valda deltagare tog sig an uppgiften som de ombads att utföra, dvs att tillsammans lägga fram och stödja den kod som skulle komma att gälla dom själva, att appliceras på dom själva. Fyndet var att tesen stöddes och att detta stöd var robust eftersom jag kunde identifiera flera skäl hos deltagarna mot att lägga fram koden medan jag fann mycket litet i form av skäl hos deltagarna för att lägga fram koden. Uppsatsen hade även en del mindre målsättningar att selektivt diskutera några ytterligare relevanta och intressanta spörsmål som strålade ut från uppsatsens huvud-målsättning. Dessa mindre målsättningar kretsade kring att diskutera vissa valda tydliga, centrala egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet samt hur dessa kunde tänkas vara relaterade till experimentets utfall. En sådan egenskap vara den specifika deltagargruppen som användes vid min körning av experimentet. Jag diskuterade till exempel, den potentiella extensionen av utfallet att det inte var fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare valde att lägga fram koden, ifall deltagargruppen modifierades men fortfarande bestod enbart av nu levande vuxna människor och min värdering var att ett liknande utfall, som vid min körningen av NMKW, verkade troligt för de flesta potentiella grupper av deltagare. Jag ville också diskutera vissa valda tydliga, centrala egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet inom kontexten kring huruvida NMKW experimentet givet dessa egenskaper, borde anses vara ett osunt, olämpligt experiment för att undersöka den normativa moralen, givet Gerts och Gerts konception av denna. Detta, eftersom om detta vore fallet så borde utfallet av experimentet förkastas och inte ges någon vikt. Trots att jag hittade potentiella saker att kritisera hos den experimentella designen hos NMKW så hittade jag inte några tillräckligt starka skäl för att diskvalificera NMKW experimentet som ett olämpligt, osunt experiment för att undersöka den normativa moralen, givet den normativa moralens egenskaper beskrivna, täckta inom Gerts och Gerts föreslagna basala, grundläggande definition av denna. Slutligen så ville jag även selektivt diskutera vissa aspekter kring vad det kunde betyda för konceptionen av den normativa moralen, enligt Gert och Gert, att tesen stöddes. Exempelvis, så givet en tolkning så kunde utfallet ses som ett stöd för icke-existensen hos den normativa moraliska koden, medan givet en annan tolkning så kunde utfallet anses betyda att ytterligare addenda till den basala definitionen av den normativa moralen måste identifieras och adderas till definitionen och att dylika addenda skulle komma att vara sådana att de skulle diskvalificera NMKW experimentet och dess utfall som ett sunt och lämpligt experiment att användas för att studera den normativa moralen, nu med dess extenderade specifikation. Jag försökte sedan att illustrera hur NMKW tankeexperimentet kunde användas som ett substrat för att underlätta identifieringen och förtydligandet av dylika potentiella tillägg till den basala konceptionen av den normativa moralen enligt Gerts och Gerts förslag, och jag föreslog även vissa potentiella kandidat egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet som dylika ytterligare tillägg till den basala konceptionen borde kunna diskvalificera, exkludera som acceptabla egenskaper hos experiment designade för att undersöka den7normativa moralen. På detta sätt så kan en ovanlig, underrepresenterad typ av tankeexperiment, ”pusselbit” när det gäller det stora undersökningsprojektet som använder sig av experiment för att erhålla ytterligare insikter inom den normative moralen, dvs ”pusslet”, oberoende om det verkar passa eller inte passa in i ”pusslet”, ändå användas på ett sådant sätt så att det potentiellt kan leda till ytterligare insikter kring ”pusslet”. Detta eftersom även när en ”pusselbit” inte verkar passa in i ”pusslet” så kan ”seendet”, förtydligandet och förståelsen kring hur och varför, ändå potentiellt förse oss med information om ”pusslet”.

Il y a 150 ans, John Stuart Mill dénonçait l'emprise tyrannique de la morale publique sur la vie des individus et affirmait que le principe du préjudice à autrui constitue l'unique critère en vertu duquel l'État peut légitimement interférer avec la liberté individuelle. Près d'un siècle plus tard, en réaction au rapport Wolfenden, Lord Devlin articulait une version de la thèse du moralisme juridique en faveur du maintien de l'interdiction criminelle des pratiques homosexuelles en privé entre adultes consentants. Cette thèse du moralisme juridique a fait l'objet de nombreuses critiques. Selon deux des plus influents philosophes et théoriciens du droit du XXe siècle, Herbert L.A. Hart et Ronald Dworkin, le rôle légitime des valeurs de la communauté, dans la justification de l'intervention coerctive de l'État dans la vie des individus, doit être déterminé du point de vue de la morale critique. Ces débats philosophiques ont profondément influencé le discours judiciaire au Canada. La jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada depuis l'avènement de la Charte témoigne de deux tendances dans l'interprétation et l'application du principe du préjudice lors de l'examen de la légitimité des objectifs législatifs à la première étape du test Oakes. Selon une première approche, qui légitimise souvent un activisme judiciaire, la justification des mesures attentatoires doit reposer sur la démonstration d'un préjudice aux valeurs officiellement reconnues. Selon une deuxième approche, qui préconise plutôt une attitude de déférence envers les choix moraux du législateur, la démonstration d'un préjudice n'est pas un prérequis : l'existence de considérations morales objectives suffit. / 150 years ago, John Stuart Mill denounced the tyrannical hold of public morality on the life of individuals and asserted that the principle of harm to others constituted the sole criterion under which the State may legitimately interfere with individual liberties. A century later, in response to the Wolfenden report, Lord Devlin developed a version of the legal moralism thesis which supported the criminal prohibition of homosexual practices made in private between consenting adults. This thesis of legal moralism has been widely criticized. According to two of the most influent legal philosophers and theorists of the twentieth century, Herbert L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, the legitimate role of community values in the justification of coercive intervention of the State in the lives of individuals must be determined according to the principles of critical morality. These philosophical debates have profoundly influenced the judicial discourse in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada decisions rendered since the entrenchment of the Charter show two trends in the interpretation and application of the harm principle in the examination of the legitimacy of the legislative objectives at the first stage of the Oakes test. According to the first trend, that often legitimizes judicial activism, the justification of an infringement must rely on the demonstration of a prejudice to values officially recognized. According to the second trend, which favours deference towards the legislator's moral choices, the harm principle is not a requisite: The existence of objective moral considerations suffices.

Il y a 150 ans, John Stuart Mill dénonçait l'emprise tyrannique de la morale publique sur la vie des individus et affirmait que le principe du préjudice à autrui constitue l'unique critère en vertu duquel l'État peut légitimement interférer avec la liberté individuelle. Près d'un siècle plus tard, en réaction au rapport Wolfenden, Lord Devlin articulait une version de la thèse du moralisme juridique en faveur du maintien de l'interdiction criminelle des pratiques homosexuelles en privé entre adultes consentants. Cette thèse du moralisme juridique a fait l'objet de nombreuses critiques. Selon deux des plus influents philosophes et théoriciens du droit du XXe siècle, Herbert L.A. Hart et Ronald Dworkin, le rôle légitime des valeurs de la communauté, dans la justification de l'intervention coerctive de l'État dans la vie des individus, doit être déterminé du point de vue de la morale critique. Ces débats philosophiques ont profondément influencé le discours judiciaire au Canada. La jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada depuis l'avènement de la Charte témoigne de deux tendances dans l'interprétation et l'application du principe du préjudice lors de l'examen de la légitimité des objectifs législatifs à la première étape du test Oakes. Selon une première approche, qui légitimise souvent un activisme judiciaire, la justification des mesures attentatoires doit reposer sur la démonstration d'un préjudice aux valeurs officiellement reconnues. Selon une deuxième approche, qui préconise plutôt une attitude de déférence envers les choix moraux du législateur, la démonstration d'un préjudice n'est pas un prérequis : l'existence de considérations morales objectives suffit. / 150 years ago, John Stuart Mill denounced the tyrannical hold of public morality on the life of individuals and asserted that the principle of harm to others constituted the sole criterion under which the State may legitimately interfere with individual liberties. A century later, in response to the Wolfenden report, Lord Devlin developed a version of the legal moralism thesis which supported the criminal prohibition of homosexual practices made in private between consenting adults. This thesis of legal moralism has been widely criticized. According to two of the most influent legal philosophers and theorists of the twentieth century, Herbert L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, the legitimate role of community values in the justification of coercive intervention of the State in the lives of individuals must be determined according to the principles of critical morality. These philosophical debates have profoundly influenced the judicial discourse in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada decisions rendered since the entrenchment of the Charter show two trends in the interpretation and application of the harm principle in the examination of the legitimacy of the legislative objectives at the first stage of the Oakes test. According to the first trend, that often legitimizes judicial activism, the justification of an infringement must rely on the demonstration of a prejudice to values officially recognized. According to the second trend, which favours deference towards the legislator's moral choices, the harm principle is not a requisite: The existence of objective moral considerations suffices.

A construção de uma sociedade livre, justa e solidária, capaz de promover o bem comum, indistintamente, assim como a erradicação da pobreza e da marginalidade, além da redução da desigualdade social, são objetivos de nossa República e com certeza, vontade de quase todos os brasileiros. Isto significa que as ações do Estado têm que ser realizadas visando a concretização de uma justiça social. É para isto que deve estar a serviço o Estado, e é para corroborar com o alcance desta finalidade, que contribuímos por meio dos tributos que pagamos. O tributo advém de uma obrigatoriedade social, que ocasiona a saída do dinheiro da esfera particular e passa a integrar o que conhecemos por recurso público, o qual será administrado pelo Estado, através dos seus agentes estatais. Estes devem gerenciar e empenhar este recurso, única e exclusivamente para cumprir os fins sociais, para o que a honestidade e a probidade são exigências irrenunciáveis. Para ofertar esta garantia é que se presta o princípio da moralidade, o qual está na centralidade de nosso trabalho. Na prática, devido a nossa tradição positivista e a nossa cultura patrimonialista, observamos a dificuldade em se lidar com a moralidade no interior do Direito e especialmente na administração do recurso fruto do esforço coletivo. A consignação do princípio da moralidade em nossa Constituição faz com que a sua observância seja obrigatória no manejo da coisa pública, sendo que a mínima suspeita sobre o seu desrespeito pode e deve ser judicialmente controlado. Para isto é imprescindível que se aprimore cada vez mais os mecanismos de controle. A sociedade civil tem um papel fundamental neste exercício democrático, e para isto, formas dialógicas e interativas entre os cidadãos e o Estado têm que ser constantemente aperfeiçoadas, pois, se a imoralidade na administração tributária favorece somente alguns, a moralidade, por sua vez, vem atender aos interesses da maioria da população. / The construction of a free, fair and solidary society, capable of promoting the common good, indistinctly, such as the eradication of poverty and crime, as well as the decrease in social inequality, are the objectives of our Republic, and without a doubt, the will of nearly all Brazilians. This means that the actions of the State must be executed, bearing in mind the effective implementation of a social justice. This is the role of the State, and it is in order to corroborate within the means of this end that we contribute as taxpayers. Taxes derive from a social obligation in which money leaves the personal sphere and becomes part of what is known as a public resource, which will be administered by the State via its government agents. These agents must manage and make effective use of this public resource, solely and exclusively for the purpose of accomplishing social means, in order for honesty and integrity to be fundamental requirements. This guarantee is ensured by the principal of morality, which is found at the core of our work. In practice, due to our positive law tradition and our patrimonial culture, we observe the difficulty in dealing with morality inside the Law and mainly in the administration of resources which are the product of public efforts. The consignment of the principal of morality in our Constitution makes its observance mandatory in the dealings of public affairs, since a minimal suspicion about its nonobservance may and should be judicially controlled. In order to accomplish this, it is of utmost importance that the control mechanisms are improved continuously. Civil society has a fundamental role in this democratic exercise and therefore, interactive and conversational forms among citizens and the State must be perfected constantly. For, if immorality in the tax administration favors only a few, morality, in its turn, serves the interests of the majority of the population.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T13:54:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 WagnerPT_DISSERT.pdf: 3026127 bytes, checksum: cd73583c18049950ee160a90ad2cd853 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-28 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / This participative research interested in the social praxis attempts to understand the moral principles that set the magic rituals and the places of worship of three jurema centers of the potiguar region of Canguaretama. Among other inner particularly aspects of each focused catimb?-jurema center, it is being discussed the collective standards involved in the reliance and fellowship values assumed in the private magical gatherings by the juremeiras leaders and their partners, in contrast to the prestige seeking and the individualism that influence both the symbolic competitions and the witchcraft works that link these agents to the broader catimbozeiro universe of this region. Finally, the moral practices which make part of the juremeiro left-right dualism are investigated based on the understanding that the referred native pantheonic-ritual dichotomy does not necessarily express two moralities substantially adversed in terms of benefits or harms, but a series of moral actions subject to the specular logic of the tit-for tat. Thus, this research seeks to prove that this moral structure of symbolic reciprocity, as well as the witchcraft centrality in the catimbozeiro world, finds a certain causal link in a world view which guiding principle is the ontological evil of the catholic cosmology / Mediante pesquisa participante interessada na pr?xis social, busca-se compreender os princ?pios morais que regem os atos m?gicos e o ambiente de culto de tr?s n?cleos juremeiros do munic?pio potiguar de Canguaretama. Dentre outros aspectos internos e particulares a cada n?cleo de catimb?-jurema enfocado, discute-se os padr?es coletivos envolvidos nos valores de confian?a e cumplicidade pressupostos nas associa??es m?gicas privadas das l?deres juremeiras com seus pares, em contraposi??o ? busca por prest?gio e ao individualismo que permeiam as competi??es simb?licas e os ataques feiticeiros a enla?ar estas agentes com o universo catimbozeiro mais amplo do munic?pio. Ao final, investiga-se as pr?ticas morais contempladas no dualismo esquerda-direita juremeiro, para, a partir da compreens?o de que a referida dicotomia pante?nica-ritual nativa n?o manifesta duas moralidades substancialmente adversas e contrastivas em benevol?ncias e malef?cios (mas um conjunto de a??es morais sujeitas ? l?gica especular do olho por olho, dente por dente ), buscar comprovar que tal estrutura moral de reciprocidade simb?lica, assim como a centralidade da feiti?aria no mundo catimbozeiro, encontra alguma raz?o causal numa vis?o de mundo cujo princ?pio norteador ? o mal ontol?gico da cosmologia cat?lica