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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Assessing the constitutionality of section 56A of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act, 2011 (Act 7 of 2011)

Mhlahlo, Zimkhitha January 2018 (has links)
Magister Legum - LLM / In the South African local government context, municipalities are operationally governed through two arms: the political arm and the administrative arm. Both arms work simultaneously in ensuring that the municipality ‘move[s] progressively towards the social and economic upliftment of communities and the provision of basic services. Even though these arms work together, there has to be a separation of powers and adherence to the rule of law. Each arm must operate within its functions and do so without any favour or prejudice. Municipal managers head the administrative arm of the municipality. They are appointed by the political structure, known as the municipal council, of each municipality. Their role includes accountability and responsibility for, inter alia: the formation and development of an economical, effective, efficient and accountable administration; the management of municipal administration in accordance with the law; the appointment of staff and managing the communications between the municipality administration and its political structures. In consultation with the municipal manager, the municipal council appoints managers directly accountable to the municipal managers. The managers are referred to as section 56 managers (managers). Municipal managers and section 56 managers are the glue that holds the administrative side of municipalities together and are custodians of municipal finances.
2

Insulating municipal administration from instability caused by coalitions: a case study of the Western Cape

Baatjes, Mario Ricardo January 2011 (has links)
<p>Instability in the administration of municipalities is a particularly serious problem in the Western Cape because of its large number of coalition councils. Coalitions have led to<br /> frequent changes in local governance and to constant changes in political and administrative leadership. Due to the fluidity in local government, the politics of the day have become synonymous with back-stabbing, secret agreements and arrangements between politicians and political parties wishing to align themselves in such a way as to gain control of the councils.1 A municipality is required by the Constitution2 to structure and manage its administration and budgets, budgeting and planning processes so as to give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the community.3 Legislation further prescribes that &ldquo / a municipality must within its administrative and financial capacity establish and organize its administration in a manner that would enable the municipality to establish clear relationships, facilitate coordination, cooperation and communication between (i) its political structures and political office bearers and its administration / (ii) its political structures, political office bearers and administration and the local community&rdquo / .4 It may therefore be argued that a municipality subscribing to the abovementioned prescripts should be functioning effectively. However, in practice continuous administrative and political instability adversely impacts on a municipality‟s capacity to provide service delivery to the community. The 2006 local government elections resulted in only four out of 30 municipalities in the Western Cape having a single party with more than 50% of the seats (outright majority). The remaining 26 municipalities were governed by coalitions of two or more parties. In 2001, Parliament introduced floor-crossing legislation which allowed Members of Parliament, Members of Provincial Legislatures and local government councillors to change their political party (or form a new party) and retains their seats when they did so.5 As a result of the 2007 floor-crossing legislation, the number of municipalities with an outright majority increased to 7. Power changes continued to occur even after the 2007 floor-crossing as a result of by-election outcomes or new internal coalition arrangements. Coalition government in the Western Cape remains a reality following the 18 May 2011 local government elections: the Democratic Alliance won 12 municipalities outright, the African National Congress won 1, and in 12 municipalities there was no outright winner. Of the 12 last-mentioned municipalities, 7 municipalities produced hung municipalities, i.e. Bitou, Witzenberg, Laingsburg, Hessequa, Theewaterskloof, Matzikama and Prince Albert.</p>
3

Insulating municipal administration from instability caused by coalitions: a case study of the Western Cape

Baatjes, Mario Ricardo January 2011 (has links)
<p>Instability in the administration of municipalities is a particularly serious problem in the Western Cape because of its large number of coalition councils. Coalitions have led to<br /> frequent changes in local governance and to constant changes in political and administrative leadership. Due to the fluidity in local government, the politics of the day have become synonymous with back-stabbing, secret agreements and arrangements between politicians and political parties wishing to align themselves in such a way as to gain control of the councils.1 A municipality is required by the Constitution2 to structure and manage its administration and budgets, budgeting and planning processes so as to give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the community.3 Legislation further prescribes that &ldquo / a municipality must within its administrative and financial capacity establish and organize its administration in a manner that would enable the municipality to establish clear relationships, facilitate coordination, cooperation and communication between (i) its political structures and political office bearers and its administration / (ii) its political structures, political office bearers and administration and the local community&rdquo / .4 It may therefore be argued that a municipality subscribing to the abovementioned prescripts should be functioning effectively. However, in practice continuous administrative and political instability adversely impacts on a municipality‟s capacity to provide service delivery to the community. The 2006 local government elections resulted in only four out of 30 municipalities in the Western Cape having a single party with more than 50% of the seats (outright majority). The remaining 26 municipalities were governed by coalitions of two or more parties. In 2001, Parliament introduced floor-crossing legislation which allowed Members of Parliament, Members of Provincial Legislatures and local government councillors to change their political party (or form a new party) and retains their seats when they did so.5 As a result of the 2007 floor-crossing legislation, the number of municipalities with an outright majority increased to 7. Power changes continued to occur even after the 2007 floor-crossing as a result of by-election outcomes or new internal coalition arrangements. Coalition government in the Western Cape remains a reality following the 18 May 2011 local government elections: the Democratic Alliance won 12 municipalities outright, the African National Congress won 1, and in 12 municipalities there was no outright winner. Of the 12 last-mentioned municipalities, 7 municipalities produced hung municipalities, i.e. Bitou, Witzenberg, Laingsburg, Hessequa, Theewaterskloof, Matzikama and Prince Albert.</p>
4

Insulating municipal administration from instability caused by coalitions: a case study of the Western Cape

Baatjes, Mario Ricardo January 2011 (has links)
Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / Instability in the administration of municipalities is a particularly serious problem in the Western Cape because of its large number of coalition councils. Coalitions have led to frequent changes in local governance and to constant changes in political and administrative leadership. Due to the fluidity in local government, the politics of the day have become synonymous with back-stabbing, secret agreements and arrangements between politicians and political parties wishing to align themselves in such a way as to gain control of the councils.1 A municipality is required by the Constitution2 to structure and manage its administration and budgets, budgeting and planning processes so as to give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the community.3 Legislation further prescribes that “a municipality must within its administrative and financial capacity establish and organize its administration in a manner that would enable the municipality to establish clear relationships, facilitate coordination, cooperation and communication between (i) its political structures and political office bearers and its administration; (ii) its political structures, political office bearers and administration and the local community”.4 It may therefore be argued that a municipality subscribing to the abovementioned prescripts should be functioning effectively. However, in practice continuous administrative and political instability adversely impacts on a municipality‟s capacity to provide service delivery to the community. The 2006 local government elections resulted in only four out of 30 municipalities in the Western Cape having a single party with more than 50% of the seats (outright majority). The remaining 26 municipalities were governed by coalitions of two or more parties. In 2001, Parliament introduced floor-crossing legislation which allowed Members of Parliament, Members of Provincial Legislatures and local government councillors to change their political party (or form a new party) and retains their seats when they did so.5 As a result of the 2007 floor-crossing legislation, the number of municipalities with an outright majority increased to 7. Power changes continued to occur even after the 2007 floor-crossing as a result of by-election outcomes or new internal coalition arrangements. Coalition government in the Western Cape remains a reality following the 18 May 2011 local government elections: the Democratic Alliance won 12 municipalities outright, the African National Congress won 1, and in 12 municipalities there was no outright winner. Of the 12 last-mentioned municipalities, 7 municipalities produced hung municipalities, i.e. Bitou, Witzenberg, Laingsburg, Hessequa, Theewaterskloof, Matzikama and Prince Albert. / South Africa
5

Hur ett antal chefer inom Kalmar kommun uppfattar hälsofrämjande ledarskap : Attityder, kunskaper och förväntningar

Karlholm, Anja, Svensson, Jakob January 2012 (has links)
Karlholm, Anja. Svensson, Jakob. Hur ett antal chefer inom Kalmar kommun uppfattar hälsofrämjande ledarskap. Attityder, kunskap och förväntningar. Kandidatuppsats. Akademin för utbildning och ekonomi. Avdelning Pedagogik Högskolan i Gävle, 2011. Sammanfattning Syftet med denna studie var att undersöka attityder, kunskap och förväntningar på hälsofrämjande ledarskap bland chefer inom Kalmar kommun. Kvalitativ metod användes genom telefonintervjuer med tio chefer på olika nivåer i kommunen. Genom en induktiv tematisk analys bearbetades och kategoriserades intervjumaterialet efter relevanta teman. Studiens resultat visar att samtliga chefer har positiva attityder till hälsofrämjande ledarskap även om deras uppfattningar om begreppet skiljer sig åt. Intressant vad gäller kunskap om hälsofrämjande ledarskap är att det är många chefer med lång erfarenhet av ledarskap som kopplar ihop den med erfarenhet av hälsofrämjande ledarskap. Detta till skillnad mot chefer med kort erfarenhet av ledarskap där uppfattningen är att de saknar kunskap för att kunna leda hälsofrämjande och känna sig trygga i det. Gemensamt för alla chefer är att de inte har fått någon formell utbildning i hälsofrämjande ledarskap. Det finns en grupp av chefer som menar att det i de ledarskapsutbildningar de genomfört har ingått element som de kan koppla till hälsofrämjande ledarskap. Förväntningar hos cheferna på ett hälsofrämjande ledarskap är förbättrade relationer i arbetsgruppen, medarbetare som känner sig hörda, delaktiga och att det kommer finnas en väl fungerande kommunikation på arbetsplatsen. Cheferna uttrycker även förväntningar på ökad måluppfyllelse för organisationen. De tänker att hälsofrämjande ledarskap skulle kunna bidra med att ge friskare medarbetare vilket i sin tur skulle kunna leda till effektivitet och produktivitet i organisationen. En del chefer menar att brist på administrativt stöd och ekonomiska resurser skulle kunna utgöra ett hinder för att utveckla hälsofrämjande ledarskap i organisationen. Samtliga chefer uttrycker ett behov av utbildning och informationsinsatser för att kunna utveckla sitt ledarskap mot ett mer hälsofrämjande ledarskap inom kommunen. Nyckelord: Kommunchefer, hälsofrämjande ledarskap, attityder, kunskap, förväntningar, organisation

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