This thesis studies the poor development performance of resource-rich developing economies, known as the resource curse. In the first chapter we provide a comprehensive literature review of the topic and the channels through which resource abundance can result in the resource curse. Issues of corruption and governance have been emphasised to be the main driver of the resource curse. This has been illustrated by a negative relationship between resource abundance and corruption control in the literature. However, there is a gap in how natural resources facilitate corruption. In the second chapter, using empirical analysis, we study the role of taxation in the relationship between natural resources and corruption. Taxation is usually seen as a social contract between citizens and government -- people pay taxes and in return they hold their government accountable for efficient allocation of their taxes. Resource abundance shifts the reliance of government from tax incomes to resource rents. People therefore, have no sustainable mechanism to hold their government responsible for corruption and wrongdoings inside public institutions. Using different econometric methods, Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects and 3SLS, our results show that natural resource revenues crowd out incomes from tax revenues. Meanwhile, taxation has a positive and significant impact on the control of corruption throughout our analysis. The results suggest that resource-rich developing countries should invest in building their tax systems to increase their non-resource tax revenues. This will increase state capacity and demand for accountability in the public sector among citizens and hence decreases corruption. Related to our second chapter, in the third chapter we study a cash transfer programme, known as oil-to-cash, which has gained support as a tool to re-establish taxation and fight corruption. Under such a plan, resource revenues are distributed directly among the public and then each citizen is taxed optimally. Through this, government relies directly and fully on its citizens for its income. Hence, taxation is reinstated and the social contract is revived. Within a general equilibrium model we show how this happens and what the implications are of the oil-to-cash programme for economic growth. Our results clearly show how corruption results in a resource curse. Furthermore, the model explains the variation that is seen in the degree of the resource curse across countries. The study also analyses the practical barriers of the oil-to-cash plan. The study suggests that parallel to (or even prior to) such a plan countries need to invest in building their tax system and increasing their administrative capacities.

La richesse naturelle est-elle un gage de prospérité ou se révèle-t-elle être une malédiction? Comment le pétrole a-t-il façonné l'évolution économique des pays producteurs ? Dans le prolongement de ces interrogations, l'objectif de cette thèse est de progresser dans la compréhension des mécanismes qui font que le pétrole est, pour les pays exportateurs, aussi souvent une malédiction qu'une bénédiction. Les travaux empiriques qui constituent notre thèse permettent ainsi de répondre à trois questions distinctes : (i) quelle est la contribution du pétrole en tant que ressource énergétique (ou source d'énergie) au processus de croissance économique ? (ii) quels sont les effets directs et indirects de la dépendance aux revenus pétroliers sur la croissance économique et (iii) la malédiction pétrolière n'est-elle pas une question qui renvoie à la stabilité macroéconomique?Notre analyse met ainsi en évidence les résultats suivants : (i) une richesse pétrolière abondante et la surconsommation de pétrole observée dans une large majorité de pays exportateurs de pétrole contribuent positivement au processus de croissance économique. Ce résultat n'est toutefois valable que sur le court terme. En effet, sur le long terme, la consommation de pétrole s'avère être une conséquence de la croissance économique ; (ii) le pétrole en tant que source de revenus impacte la croissance économique directement et indirectement via ses effets sur le montant et la qualité des dépenses publiques ainsi que sur l'ouverture commerciale. Au regard de ces mécanismes de transmission, nos résultats montrent qu'au-delà d'un certain seuil de dépendance aux revenus pétroliers, la croissance économique est entravée par les effets directs et indirects de la rente pétrolière. Toutefois, ces effets peuvent être contenus, tout d'abord, en réduisant la dépendance aux revenus pétroliers, en améliorant, ensuite, la gouvernance et, enfin, en allant vers davantage de stabilité politique ; (iii) les revenus pétroliers, de part leur extrême instabilité peuvent nuire à la croissance économique en induisant des distorsions macroéconomiques. Cette instabilité se traduit plus précisément par une appréciation du taux de change réel, une hausse des dépenses publiques et de l'inflation. Les pays les plus tributaires de la rente pétrolière sont les plus exposés à cette instabilité macroéconomique. De même, les pays où l'efficacité et la crédibilité du gouvernement sont moindres sont ceux où la croissance économique pâtit le plus de cette instabilité macroéconomique.Le pétrole est ainsi un atout pour les économies des pays exportateurs de pétrole dont il faut maitriser les effets indésirables sur l'économie. Une première solution consisterait alors à réduire le niveau de dépendance de l'économie aux revenus pétroliers pour diminuer le risque d'exposition à la volatilité des prix du pétrole et en réduire le risque de contagion à l'économie. Une autre solution nécessiterait d'améliorer la capacité des gouvernements à mettre en place des politiques économiques efficientes. / Is natural wealth a guarantee of prosperity or is it a curse? How has petroleum shaped growth economic process in oil producing countries? To the extent that these questions have to be raise, the purpose of this thesis is to move towards a better understanding of the mechanisms that make oil becoming a curse as often as a blessing, in oil exporting countries. The empirical studies conducted in this thesis help answer three main questions: (i) What is the contribution of oil as energy (or an energy source) in the process of economic growth? (ii) What are the direct and indirect effects of dependence to oil revenues on economic growth? (iii) Is the oil curse a question of macroeconomic stability?Our contributions thus highlight the following results. (i) Abundant oil wealth and overconsumption observed in the vast majority of oil exporting countries contribute positively to the economic growth process. This result is, however, valid only in the short term. Indeed, in the long term, oil consumption appears to be a consequence of economic growth. (ii) Oil as a source of revenue impacts economic growth directly and indirectly through its effect on the amount and quality of public spending as well as on trade openness. Given these mechanisms, our results show that beyond a certain threshold of dependence on oil revenues, economic growth is constrained by the direct and indirect effects of oil revenues. However, these effects can be contained, first, by reducing dependence on oil revenues; then, by improving government effectiveness; and finally by increasing political stability. (iii) Oil revenues, due to their extreme instability may harm economic growth by inducing macroeconomic distortions. This instability results more precisely by an appreciation of the real exchange rate, a rise in public spending and inflation. The most dependent are countries, the most they are exposed to macroeconomic instability. Similarly, countries with an efficient and credible government are the one which suffer economic growth suffers the less from macroeconomic instability.Oil is, thus, a vantage for oil exporting countries but the adverse effects of such a natural resource on the economy must be mastered. One solution would, then, be to reduce the level of dependence of the economy on oil revenues to reduce the exposure to volatile oil prices and to reduce the risk of contagion to the economy. Another solution would be to improve the ability of governments to implement efficient economic policies.

Submitted by Evelyn Edith Contreras Medrano (contrerasmedrano@gmail.com) on 2017-03-10T21:05:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 EContreras 2016 - Local Institutions and Natural Resources vf.pdf: 2289932 bytes, checksum: 3e134974c30ddcb38184183d421e24e7 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2017-03-20T13:10:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 EContreras 2016 - Local Institutions and Natural Resources vf.pdf: 2289932 bytes, checksum: 3e134974c30ddcb38184183d421e24e7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-22T18:33:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 EContreras 2016 - Local Institutions and Natural Resources vf.pdf: 2289932 bytes, checksum: 3e134974c30ddcb38184183d421e24e7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-08 / After decades of research, there is still no consensus in the literature regarding the effects of natural resource abundance on the economic and political performance of a territory. This research aims to contribute to this discussion, by analyzing the role of institutions on explaining the relationship between natural resource-based revenues and the provision of public goods at the local level. In order to do so, I test the mechanisms previously proposed in the literature for explaining the natural resource curse effect at the national level (mediation and moderation effects of institutional quality), using cross-sectional data of Peruvian municipalities located in the Andean highlands, for the 2011-2014 period. The identification strategy proposed uses as source of exogenous variation for revenues, the location of natural resources and its value among the territory, and a set of rules established by law for the redistribution of natural resource-based revenues to the local governments. In order to deal with the endogeneity of institutional quality, I include 2SLS estimations, using the presence of 'Peasant Communities' (Comunidades Campesinas) as an instrumental variable. The results show some evidence of a positive effect of natural resource-based revenues on the provision of local public infrastructure (water, public lightning and rural roads), a null effect on education results, and a negative effect on health campaigns. However, regarding the role of institutional quality on explaining these effects, I find no significant effects for all of the outcomes and samples analyzed.

本篇論文透過國家脆弱程度與資源依賴之間的關係之研究以檢視資源詛咒。本論文寫作之目的在於探究即便國際社會逐漸增加對於透明性之訴求的情況下，撒哈拉以南非洲地區之非法自然資源貿易仍存在之緣由。文章主要討論三個問題：第一、國家脆弱程度是否對撒哈拉以南非洲地區國家之非法自然資源剝削造成影響？第二、在剛果的鈳鉭鐵礦貿易對於非法自然資源貿易透露出什麼訊息？第三、中國是如何對剛果開採的鈳鉭鐵礦之國際貿易造成影響？為找出上述問題之答案，本文運用了綜合的研究方法。以跨時間序列的回歸研究設計套用於49個撒哈拉以南非洲地區國家，用以解釋下述兩個變項之關係：IV代表脆弱國家指數、DV代表出口與服務占國內生產毛額之百分比。一項與波札那鑽石產業有關之剛果鈳鉭鐵礦貿易之個案研究，為非法貿易、來源、路線以及生存工具提供了更深入的觀察視野。最後，本文認為衰弱的中央政府，以及國際的漏洞使得自然資源的非法貿易成為可能。 / This thesis examines the resource curse through a study of the relationship between state fragility and resource dependency. The purpose of this thesis is to uncover why illegitimate trade of natural resources occur in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite greater international push for transparency. 3 main questions are posed; 1. Does state fragility impact illegitimate natural resource exploitation in SSA countries? 2. What information does the coltan trade in Congo reveal about illegitimate trade of natural resources? 3. How has the Chinese Gateway impacted the international trade of Congolese mined coltan? To answer these set of questions, a mixed methods research approach is employed. A cross times series regression research design with a data set of 49 SSA countries is used to identify and explain the relationship between two variables IV: Fragile State Index and DV: Exports and Services (% of GDP). A case study on the coltan trade in Congo in relation to Botswana’s Diamond Industry, provides a closer look at illegitimate trade, its sources, routes and means of survival. Ultimately this thesis argues that weakened central governments, along with international loopholes enables the illegitimate trade of natural resources.

The main part of this thesis is composed of three separate chapters, each using an innovative approach to analysing externalities from economic activity. The general introduction and overall conclusion sections complete the structure of the thesis. Chapter one examines the value of statistical life, an essential parameter used in ascribing monetary values to the mortality costs of air pollution in health risk analyses. This willingness to pay estimate is virtually non-existent for most developing countries. In the absence of local estimates, two major benefit transfer approaches lend themselves to the estimation of the value of statistical life: the value transfer method and the meta-regression analysis. Using Nigeria as a sample country, we find that the latter method is better tailored than the former for incorporating many characteristics that vary between study sites and policy sites into its benefit transfer application. It is therefore likely to provide more accurate value of statistical life predictions for very low-income countries. Employing the meta-regression method, we find Nigeria’s value of statistical life estimate to be $489,000. Combining this estimate with dose response functions from the epidemiological literature, it follows that if Nigeria had mitigated its 2006 particulate air pollution to the World Health Organisation standards, it could have avoided at least 58,000 premature deaths and recorded an avoided mortality related welfare loss of about $28 billion or 19 percent of the nation’s GDP for that year. The second chapter applies the quantile fixed effects technique in exploring the CO2 environmental Kuznets curve within two groups of economic development (OECD and Non-OECD countries) and six geographical regions – West, East Europe, Latin America, East Asia, West Asia and Africa. A comparison of the findings with those of the conventional fixed effects method reveals that the latter may depict a flawed summary of the prevailing income-emissions nexus depending on the conditional quantile examined. We also extend the Machado and Mata decomposition method to the Kuznets curve framework to explore the most important explanations for the carbon emissions gap between OECD and Non-OECD countries. We find a statistically significant OECD-Non-OECD emissions gap and this contracts as we ascend the emissions distribution. Also, had the Non-OECD group the incomes of the OECD group, the former would pollute 26 to 40 percent more than the latter ceteris paribus. The decomposition further reveals that there are non-income related factors working against the Non-OECD group’s greening. We tentatively conclude that deliberate and systematic mitigation of current CO2 emissions in the Non-OECD group is required. The final chapter employs the Arellano-Bond difference GMM method in investigating the oil curse in OECD and Non-OECD oil exporting countries. Empirical studies investigating the natural resource curse theory mostly employ cross-country and panel regression techniques subject to endogeneity bias. Also, most of these studies employ GDP in its aggregate or per-capita terms as the outcome variable in their analyses. However, the use of GDP measures of income for resource curse investigations does not portray the true incomes of resource intensive economies. Standard national accounts treat natural resource rents as a positive contribution to income without making a corresponding adjustment for the value of depleted natural resource stock. This treatment, inconsistent with green national accounting, leads to a positive bias in the national income computations of resource rich economies. Our paper deviates from most empirical studies in the literature by using the Arellano-Bond difference GMM method. We test the robustness of the curse in the predominantly used measures of national income, GDP, by investigating the theme in genuine income measures of economic output as well. We employ two alternative measures of resource intensity in our explorations: the share of oil rents in GDP and per-capita oil reserves. Our results provide evidence of the curse in Non-OECD countries employing aggregate and per-capita measures of genuine income. On the other hand, we find oil abundance to be a blessing rather than a curse to the OECD countries in our sample.

No description available.

Cette thèse est composée de trois essais; dans le premier essai je traite les questions de la détermination, de la variance et des répercussions de la corruption. J’ai montré que la corruption est déterminée par la part des travailleurs non qualifiés sur la population. Si cette part est large alors il existe une corruption, si elle est faible la corruption est inexistante, et pour des niveaux intermédiaires, il existe une multiplicité d’équilibres. La corruption augmente les inégalités salariales entre travailleurs qualifiés et non qualifiés, et une perte de bien-être. Dans le deuxième essai je traite la question de lutte contre la corruption à travers l’incitation salariale. Avec une technologie de contrôle endogène, je montre que le gouvernement peut mieux accepter la corruption lorsqu’il est coûteux de contrôler. Lorsqu’il est optimal de combattre alors le gouvernement peut le faire soit à travers des salaires d’efficience ou soit par le contrôle. Néanmoins le rôle des salaires d’efficience dans la lutte contre la corruption est moindre dans les sociétés avec un niveau de malhonnêteté élevé. Le troisième essai traite la malédiction des ressources naturelles. Je montre que l'éducation et la corruption sont déterminées conjointement ; les ressources naturelles affectent l’incitation à investir en éducation et en ‘rent-seeking’ ce qui en retour affecte la croissance. En outre, la relation entre une abondance et la malédiction des ressources naturelles n’est pas monotone. Pour un niveau d’inégalité d’accès à l’éducation faible et un coût élevé de participation dans la vie politique, un niveau de croissance élevé et la trappe à la pauvreté coexistent. / This dissertation consists of three essays. The topics cover determination, variance and repercussions of corruption (essay one), corruption deterrence through wage incentives (essay two), and natural resource curse (essay three). In the first essay, I show that for a larger population of unskilled labor, there is a widespread corruption and for a smaller population there is no corruption. For the intermediate levels there are multiple equilibria. On its consequences, corruption increases wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, and results in output and welfare losses. In the second essay, I argue that deterring corruption through efficiency wage may become prohibitively expensive. With endogenous monitoring technology that allows capturing the dual role of auditing, as a complement with and as a substitute for wage incentives, I find that the government is better-off accepting corruption when it is costly to monitor. When it is optimal to deter bribery, the government can do it either through efficiency wages or monitoring. The role of efficiency wages decreases in societies with higher level of dishonesty. In the third essay, I build a theory explaining a resource curse. In contrast to the existing literature which generally considers low education, corruption and natural resources separately, I combine three strands of literature. Natural resources affect incentives to invest in education and rent seeking that in turn affects growth. Second, the relationship between resource-abundance and resource-curse is non-monotonic. For low inequality in access to education and high cost of political participation, high-growth and poverty-trap equilibria co-exist.

This thesis investigates different social and political aspects of modern economies. The first chapter contributes to the natural resource curse debate, by showing that the impact of resource windfalls is different among democracies and autocracies. The results also point to the existence of a large heterogeneity in the response to resource shocks among autocracies. The second chapter focuses on metropolitan areas in the US, and deals with the issue of social capital formation. I examine one important aspect of social capital, trust, and argue that it is lower when income inequality between different racial groups in the metropolitan area is higher. The third chapter studies the relation between media influence and electoral voting in Italy. I relate electoral outcomes at the municipal level to differences in signal reception of Silvio Berlusconi's private TV network. The results show that greater exposure to commercial television increases support for Silvio Berlusconi's party. / Aquesta tesi investiga diferents aspectes socials i polítics de les economies modernes. El primer capítol versa sobre el debat a l'entorn dels recursos naturals, mostrant que l'impacte dels guanys imprevistos dels recursos és diferent entre democràcies i autocràcies. Els resultats també indiquen l'existència d'una àmplia heterogeneïtat entre autocràcies en la seva reacció davant a variacions dels recursos. El segon capítol se centra en les àrees metropolitanes dels EUA i tracta el tema de la formació de capital social. He examinat un aspecte important del capital social, la confiança, i, argumento que és baixa quan, en la mateixa zona metropolitana, hi ha una gran desigualtat en les rentes dels diferents grups racials. El tercer capítol estudia la relació entre la influència dels mitjans de comunicació i el vot electoral a Itàlia. He relacionat els resultats electorals a nivell municipal amb les diferències en la recepció del senyal dels canals privats de televisió de Silvio Berlusconi. El resultat mostra que una gran exposició a la televisió comercial incrementa el suport polític al partit de Berlusconi.