Development of concepts for victory through exercises, simulations and force comparison is a continuously ongoing process in military organizations. A complementing method of contributing to concepts for victory can be made through systematic testing of existing theories which prescribes such concepts. This can provide knowledge regarding the validity of a theory and provide fundamental insights concerning which basic factors contributes to victory in naval combat. In this essay Wayne P. Hughes Six Cornerstones are tested through a qualitative case study of the battle of the Nile in 1798 and the Falklands campaign in 1982 to test its explanatory value for victory. The results show findings of the theory in both cases and larger deviations only occurred between two cornerstones. The largest deviations occurred between the cornerstones which contained specific descriptions for successful actions. The cornerstones which described success in a general manner and as desired effects were more applicable in the cases. This strengthens the fact that a recipe for specific actions in combat hardly can prescribe general success. The results also show that general descriptions can be viewed valuable for what it excludes, not for what it specifically prescribes. More research has to be done to say something further regarding the validity of the theory.

In coastal defense operations, anti-ship missile (ASM) attacks on amphibious assault high value targets (HVT) constitutes a window of opportunity with decisive potential. However, in war, the availability and performance of ASM-forces is uncertain and most likely less than ideal. This thesis explores how organizational and technological flexibility can be a solution to such uncertainties. This is achieved by modeling representative examples of weapon redundancy, weapon versatility, and a flexible balance between offensive and defensive powers. A Two-Layer Defense HVT Acquisition Missile Salvo Model is developed, as an extension of Hughes Missile Salvo Model, to enable detailed study of sub-saturation attacks that rely on missiles leaking through target defenses. The result of this study shows that organizational and technological flexibility can potentially enhance ASM-attacks directed at the HVTs of an amphibious assault in multiple ways. Mentionable key-findings are that additional ways of challenging target defenses, additional firepower, and increased lethality through characteristics such as precision will create tolerance to loss and tactical benefits.

The aim of this dissertation is to show how counter missile tactics for a fast attack craft armed with missiles [FAC(M)] against a surface-to-surface, fireand- forget missile [SSM] can be optimised. As a result the ship and missile will be modelled as generic concepts while the environment will be a chosen area of operations. The applicable methodology is to simulate the ship, missile and environment as well as the interactions between them. At the same time, the ship will be carrying out combinations of five separate missile counter measures. The methodology is then to build a dynamic simulation model to optimise soft kill tactics by a generic F AC(M) against a generic SSM in the chosen environment and evaluate the outcome of the simulation by viewing the experiment as a 25 factorial design and to analyse it accordingly. / Operations Research / M.Sc. (Operations Research)

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / This study analyzes the effective use of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the Navy's Surface Search and Control mission. In the future, the Navy hopes to leverage the capabilities of a family of UAVs to provide increased situational awareness in the maritime environment. This family of UAVs includes a Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV and Vertical Take-Off UAVs (VTUAVs). The concepts of operations for how these UAVs work together have yet to be determined. Questions exist about the best number of UAVs, types of UAVs, and tactics that will provide increased capabilities. Through modeling and agent-based simulation, this study explores the validity of future UAV requirements and provides insights into the effectiveness of different UAV combinations. For the scenarios modeled, the best UAV combination is BAMS plus two or three VTUAVs. However, analysis shows that small numbers of VTUAVs can perform as well without BAMS as they do with BAMS. For combinations with multiple UAVs, BAMS proves to be a valuable asset that not only reduces the number of missed classifications, but greatly improves the amount of coverage on all contacts in the maritime environment. BAMS tactics have less effect than the mere presence of BAMS itself. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

The aim of this dissertation is to show how counter missile tactics for a fast attack craft armed with missiles [FAC(M)] against a surface-to-surface, fireand- forget missile [SSM] can be optimised. As a result the ship and missile will be modelled as generic concepts while the environment will be a chosen area of operations. The applicable methodology is to simulate the ship, missile and environment as well as the interactions between them. At the same time, the ship will be carrying out combinations of five separate missile counter measures. The methodology is then to build a dynamic simulation model to optimise soft kill tactics by a generic F AC(M) against a generic SSM in the chosen environment and evaluate the outcome of the simulation by viewing the experiment as a 25 factorial design and to analyse it accordingly. / Operations Research / Operations Management / M.Sc. (Operations Research)

The United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy developed during the interwar period a doctrine that addressed the problems inherent in the substitution of naval gunfire for artillery support in an amphibious assault. The invasion of Betio Islet, Tarawa Atoll, in November of 1943 was the first test of this doctrine. It has been said many times since the war that the doctrine basically passed this test and that lessons learned at Tarawa increased the efficiency with which the Marine Corps and Navy applied the prewar doctrine during the rest of the war. An analysis of the planning and execution of naval bombardments in the Central Pacific Campaign, after the invasion of the Gilberts, does not support this claim. This analysis leads the researcher to three conclusions. First, the Japanese developed defenses against many of the effects of the gunfire support doctrine that blunted much of the force of American firepower. American planners were slow to recognize the implications of these changes and, consequently, were slow to react to them. Second, many naval commanders responsible for providing naval gunfire support for Central Pacific operations still equated tonnage of ordnance to effectiveness of bombardment, regardless of their frequent references to "the lessons of Tarawa." Finally, strategic concerns and outright ignorance played a large part in determining the use of naval gunfire, the first taking precedence over the "lessons" and the second leading to the ignoring of the "lessons" all together.