Zugl.: Regensburg, Univ., Diss., 2007.

This dissertation examines relational models of selfhood cross-culturally through the work of G. W. F. Hegel, Simone de Beauvoir, and Nishida Kitarō. In the master-slave section of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel states that the self becomes aware of itself only through the presence of the Other. In this encounter, consciousness discovers that the Other can be a source of recognition (Anerkennung). I turn to the work of Beauvoir and Nishida because they further develop Hegel's notion of recognition through their insistence that the face-to-face relationship that incites self-knowledge is mediated by social-historical events and discourses. Fundamentally, they make Hegel's notion of recognition more concrete, thus giving the reader of the master-slave dialectic an idea of the broader implications of Hegel's view. While Nishida uses few examples to illustrate the determinacy of the historical field of relations, Beauvoir's The Second Sex is full of such descriptions, thus offering the reader of Nishida an illustration of the "historical world" that includes dimensions of constituted and constituting forces. Nishida's metaphor of the self as a place of interaction, or basho, in turn, is useful to the reader of Beauvoir who attempts to picture a self that is a project "toward the other." Moreover, their discussions of agency are weighted toward the perspective of the self in the case of Beauvoir and toward the side of the world for Nishida. Ultimately, this difference can be viewed as grounding the distinct ways in which the authors conceive of ethics. Lastly, both authors attribute ethical action to self-surpassing. However, for Beauvoir, the surpassing of one's individuality leads to the transformation of self-other relations through the mutual recognition of freedom, while Nishida's self-surpassing entails seeking a new locus of ethical action, i.e. absolute nothingness.

<p>Inspired by Kitaro Nishida’s concept of pure experience this thesis analyses Bergson’s concept of experience with the intention of showing how experience is related to duration and how this in turn destabilizes certain tendencies towards subjectivism that can be found in Bergson’s work. This is accomplished through a reading of Matter and memory, Creative Evolution and Introduction to metaphysics that tries to desintegrate both subject and object in favor of duration. The thesis arrives at describing the combination of duration and non-subjective and supra-individual experience as a polyrhythmic movement.</p>

Inspired by Kitaro Nishida’s concept of pure experience this thesis analyses Bergson’s concept of experience with the intention of showing how experience is related to duration and how this in turn destabilizes certain tendencies towards subjectivism that can be found in Bergson’s work. This is accomplished through a reading of Matter and memory, Creative Evolution and Introduction to metaphysics that tries to desintegrate both subject and object in favor of duration. The thesis arrives at describing the combination of duration and non-subjective and supra-individual experience as a polyrhythmic movement.

In this dissertation, focusing on the problem of &ldquo / aesthetic form&rdquo / and its relation to the distinction between natural and artistic beauty, it is argued that the Japanese philosopher Kitar

Thesis (M.A.)--Kent State University, 2007. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed July 3, 2008). Advisor: Jeffrey Wattles. Keywords: social self; self-other dialectic; pure experience; I-Me; I-Thou; sunyata; kenosis; basho; absolute nothingness; George H. Mead; Nishida Kitaro; Steve Odin. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65).

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In this philosophical work I explicate Nishida Kitaro's dialectics vis-à-vis Mahayana non-dualistic thought and Hegel's dialectical philosophy, and furthermore in terms of a "chiasmatic chorology." Nishida's work makes ample usage of western philosophical concepts, most notably the terminology of Hegelian dialectics. Nishida himself has admitted affinity to Hegel. And yet content-wise the core of Nishida's thinking seem close to Mahayana Buddhism in its line of thought traceable to the Prajñaparamita sutras. The point of my investigation is to clarify in what regard Nishida's dialectic owes allegiance to Hegel and to Mahayana and wherein it diverges from them. Moreover to what extent is Nishida's appropriation of Hegelian terminology adequate in expressing his thought? The work explicates the distinctive aspects of Nishida's thinking in terms of a "chiasmatic chorology" to emphasize the inter-dimensional and placial complexity of the dialectic. In summary two overarching concerns guide the work: 1) The relation of Nishida's dialectic to its forebears -- Mahayana non-dualism and Hegelian dialectics --; and 2) The distinctness of that dialectic as a "chiasmatic chorology." The work concludes that while Nishida, in his attempt to surmount the dualism of Neo-Kantianism, was led to Hegel's dialectic, the core ideas of his dialectic extend beyond the purview of Hegelianism. Contentwise his dialectic is closer in spirit to Mahayana. While Nishida admits to such commensurability with key Mahayana doctrines, his thought nevertheless ought not to be confined to the doctrinal category of "Buddhist thought" both because of its eclectic nature that brings in elements drawn from western and eastern sources, thereby constituting his work as a "world philosophy"; and because of its creative contributions, such as the formulation of basho and its explication in dialectical terms. What cannot be expressed adequately in terms of Hegelian dialectics is the concrete chiasma of what Nishida calls his "absolute dialectic." Moreover its founding upon the choratic nature of basho not only escapes the grasp of Hegel's self-knowing concept but extends beyond previous formulations within Buddhism. / Religion

This paper examines the role played by death in the philosophy of Nishitani Keiji, through the nondual logic of contradictory identity developed by his teacher and founder of the Kyotoschool of philosophy, Nishida Kitarō. I explore Nishitani’s understanding of how Nothingness, nihility, through our awareness of death penetrates and nullifies existence itself, how the irreality of all being comes to the fore to make being itself unreal. The nullifying nothingness of nihility, however, is still nothingness represented as a something; it is a reified nothing, defined as the antithesis to being and thus still seen as a corollary of being itself. A truly absolute nothingness, what Nishitani calls Śūnyatā, emptiness, must be a nothingness so devoid of being as to not even be nothing; it must be absolutely nothing at all, and thus nothing else than being itself. The final chapter of my paper seeks to apply this nondual understanding of being and nothingness to the question of death itself; to understand the ontological meaning of death - the passage from being to non-being - when being and non-being have been one from the very beginning. The paper also seeks to blur the lines between what has traditionally been considered philosophy and religion, using the thinking of the Kyoto school to point to the deeper ties between the two in the borderland that is buddhist philosophy.

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