In recent years, sentimentalist care ethics has been developed and defended as a normative ethical theory alongside and in opposition to Kantian liberalism. Carol Gilligan introduced the idea of a woman’s moral perspective that emphasizes maintaining relationships and responding to need, and saw it as a different way of framing moral issues. Care ethics is no longer associated only with women, and it is presented as a theory for both men and women that has its own distinctive accounts of ethical notions like justice and autonomy. These accounts have developed from analyses of injustice towards women and uncaring attitudes that they face in patriarchal societies, but ironically, care ethics has failed to discuss women’s anger at their own mistreatment, and their inability to deal with that anger. This notable lacuna in the care ethics literature is of philosophical importance because analyzing the phenomenon of women’s anger uncovers epistemic issues that have not been addressed. I discuss these epistemic issues in order to strengthen care ethics from within and extend it into other areas of ethics. My goal is to make care ethics a real contender among normative ethical theories and a truly feminist ethic.

On a manifold with edge we construct a specific class of (edgedegenerate) elliptic differential operators. The ellipticity refers to the principal symbolic structure σ = (σψ, σ^) of the edge calculus consisting of the interior and edge symbol, denoted by σψ and σ^, respectively. For our choice of weights the ellipticity will not require additional edge conditions of trace or potential type, and the operators will induce isomorphisms between the respective edge spaces.

We establish a parameter-dependent pseudo-differential calculus on an infinite cylinder, regarded as a manifold with conical exits to infinity. The parameters are involved in edge-degenerate form, and we formulate the operators in terms of operator-valued amplitude functions.

Syftet med studien var att beskriva patienters erfarenheter av hur den personligaintegriteten respekteras i olika vårdsituationer. Varje människa har rätt att blirespekterad som en individ och inte utsättas för intrång i den personliga sfären. Då dettainte alltid respekteras i vårdsituationerna blir det intressant att skaffa kunskaper om hurpatienter upplever detta. I studien användes en kvalitativ ansats. Med hjälp av criticalincident metoden undersöktes patienters positiva och negativa erfarenheter av hur denpersonliga integriteten respekterades i olika vårdsituationer. Nio informanter deltog istudien, dessa bidrog med arton berättelser. Materialet analyserades kvalitativt. Treöverordnade teman med fem underteman framstod. Övergripande handlar fenomenetom att bli respekterad som människa. De tre överordnade temana är att bli lyssnad till,att bli sedd och att bli förstådd. Resultatet visar att om den personliga integriteten interespekterades blev patienter kränkta och ett onödigt lidande orsakades därmed avvården. Studien har betydelse för vården då respekt för integriteten är ett grundläggandebehov för patienters upplevelse av hälsa och lidande. / The aim of this study was to describe patient’s experiences of how privacy is respectedin health care. Every human being has the right to be respected as an individual and notbe subjected to interference in the personal sphere. Since this is not always respected inhealth care, it is interesting to gain knowledge about patient’s experiences. Aqualitative method was used in the study. By using the critical incident techniquepatient’s positive and negative experiences of personal integrity in health care wasreviewed. Nine informants participated and contributed eighteen stories. The materialwas analyzed qualitatively. Three superior themes with five subthemes found. Overall,this phenomenon is about to be respected as a human being. The superior themes are tobe heard, to be seen and to be understood. The result shows that if the personal privacywas not respected, the patient’s felt violated and an unnecessary suffering was therebycreated of health care. The study has implications for health care because the integrityis a fundamental need for patient’s experiences of health and suffering.

This dissertation focuses on performance, moral practice, and self-respect in an urban South African setting. Taking as its point of departure the emergence and rapid expansion, in the 1990s and 2000s, of an outreach organization I call Jesus People Pretoria (JPP), it discusses this NGO’s attempt to create a ‘moral community’ in the post-apartheid city from the diverse vantage points of its Afrikaner leaders, its clients, and—most emphatically—its lay workers, the majority of whom are black women. Gradually moving from the everyday stage of outreach labour towards women’s gendered performances within and beyond the work environment, it proposes that at stake in the making of the JPP moral community is the negotiation of self-respect, which hinges upon the degree to which interactions imply the fostering or refutation of mutual respect, or the measure of the ‘equality’ of the exchange. As an urban entity deeply entwined in and illuminative of South Africa’s broader post-apartheid ironies, including ongoing race-based differentiation and the pervasiveness of HIV/AIDS and death, predominantly moral practice here remains but ambivalently constituted. Yet this does not denote the absence of the moral but temporarily rests it in the region of the indistinct, the unresolved, in the moment of its apparent impossibility or unachievability.

In contrast to his rationalist predecessors, Kant insists that feeling has a pos- itive role to play in moral life. But the exact nature of this role is far from clear. As much as Kant insists that moral action must proceed from a feeling of respect, he maintains with equal insistence that the objective basis of acting from duty must come from practical reason alone, and that when we act from duty we must exclude sensibility from the determining grounds of choice. In what way, then, is respect for the law a feeling? And what place does this feeling have—if any—in Kant’s ethics? The aim of my dissertation is to answer these questions, in part through a close engagement with Kant’s second Critique. I provide a close reading of his claim that our recognition of the moral law must effect both painful and pleasurable feelings in us, and I argue that these feelings, for Kant, are meant to explain how the moral law can figure into the basis of a maxim. By showing why our recognition of the law must be painful from the perspective of self-love, but pleasurable from the perspective of practical reason, Kant is able to show how our desires can acquire normative direction. On my reading, then, the theory of moral sensibility we find in the second Critique addresses a rather troubling form of skepticism: skepticism about moral motivation.In the course of defending this claim, I provide an alternative reading of the development of Kant’s project of moral justification from Groundwork III to the second Critique. Against a wide-spread view in the literature, I suggest that what changes between these texts is not a direction of argument (from freedom to morality, or morality to freedom), but a methodological shift toward the concept of human sensibility. In the later work, I argue, Kant develops a novel approach to moral feeling from the perspective of the deliberating agent; and this in turn clears room in Kant’s ethics for a new kind of a priori knowledge—namely, knowledge of what the activity of practical reason must feel like. The broader aim of my dissertation is thus to put Kant’s work on meta-ethics and moral psychology in closer proximity.

This essay is based on the work of arranging and making an inventory for an archive consisting of records from the Board of Education (Utbildningsnämnden) within the administration of the County Council in Uppsala, Sweden. This archive is kept at the County Councils Archives in Uppsala where I have done the work. I have documented the process and discussed the complex of problems relating to it. In this particular case the issue of limitation of the office of origin and the respect of the fonds, or the principle of provenance, have been of interest. This is due to the fact that the records had been rearranged and mixed with records with other origin related to the Board of Education. Records from the early existence of the board have previously been arranged and an inventory had been made. This earlier work covered the period of 1971-1978, when the board of education had a secretariat. The aim of the work was to arrange the records of the board during the period of 1979-1997. After this period the board ended being an independent body. With support from theories of respect of fonds my conclusion is that the Board of Education is a coherent office of origin for the fonds during its entire period of existence dur - ing the years 1971-1997. I decided to make the first inventory a part of the new one in order to keep a logical continuity of the records and the inventory. Creating a subordinate archive with its own inventory would make the whole seem badly arranged and complicate the finding of records. Based on the respect of fonds I used the previous inventory to a large extent. The knowledge and understanding I gained thanks to the fact that I was able see the complete fonds made me do some changes. The archive consist of files based on journals to a large ex - tent, which makes a large part of the records easy to find. The work in combination with the essay constitutes my one year master’s thesis in archival science.

This dissertation focuses on performance, moral practice, and self-respect in an urban South African setting. Taking as its point of departure the emergence and rapid expansion, in the 1990s and 2000s, of an outreach organization I call Jesus People Pretoria (JPP), it discusses this NGO’s attempt to create a ‘moral community’ in the post-apartheid city from the diverse vantage points of its Afrikaner leaders, its clients, and—most emphatically—its lay workers, the majority of whom are black women. Gradually moving from the everyday stage of outreach labour towards women’s gendered performances within and beyond the work environment, it proposes that at stake in the making of the JPP moral community is the negotiation of self-respect, which hinges upon the degree to which interactions imply the fostering or refutation of mutual respect, or the measure of the ‘equality’ of the exchange. As an urban entity deeply entwined in and illuminative of South Africa’s broader post-apartheid ironies, including ongoing race-based differentiation and the pervasiveness of HIV/AIDS and death, predominantly moral practice here remains but ambivalently constituted. Yet this does not denote the absence of the moral but temporarily rests it in the region of the indistinct, the unresolved, in the moment of its apparent impossibility or unachievability.

In contrast to his rationalist predecessors, Kant insists that feeling has a pos- itive role to play in moral life. But the exact nature of this role is far from clear. As much as Kant insists that moral action must proceed from a feeling of respect, he maintains with equal insistence that the objective basis of acting from duty must come from practical reason alone, and that when we act from duty we must exclude sensibility from the determining grounds of choice. In what way, then, is respect for the law a feeling? And what place does this feeling have—if any—in Kant’s ethics? The aim of my dissertation is to answer these questions, in part through a close engagement with Kant’s second Critique. I provide a close reading of his claim that our recognition of the moral law must effect both painful and pleasurable feelings in us, and I argue that these feelings, for Kant, are meant to explain how the moral law can figure into the basis of a maxim. By showing why our recognition of the law must be painful from the perspective of self-love, but pleasurable from the perspective of practical reason, Kant is able to show how our desires can acquire normative direction. On my reading, then, the theory of moral sensibility we find in the second Critique addresses a rather troubling form of skepticism: skepticism about moral motivation.In the course of defending this claim, I provide an alternative reading of the development of Kant’s project of moral justification from Groundwork III to the second Critique. Against a wide-spread view in the literature, I suggest that what changes between these texts is not a direction of argument (from freedom to morality, or morality to freedom), but a methodological shift toward the concept of human sensibility. In the later work, I argue, Kant develops a novel approach to moral feeling from the perspective of the deliberating agent; and this in turn clears room in Kant’s ethics for a new kind of a priori knowledge—namely, knowledge of what the activity of practical reason must feel like. The broader aim of my dissertation is thus to put Kant’s work on meta-ethics and moral psychology in closer proximity.

Negative interpersonal workplace behaviours are an important but relatively infrequently studied occupational-stressor. The present research investigated the connection between these behaviours and employee well-being. This work had two main goals. The first goal was to provide greater insight into when and why social interactions at work can be harmful to employee well-being. Consistent with this goal, theory and research were reviewed, and results from two field studies were presented suggesting that (1) disrespect is an important characteristic of interpersonal workplace events that can explain detriments to employee well-being, and (2) both individual and contextual moderators are relevant in this process. In a first study, disrespectful leader behaviours were shown to negatively relate to employee well-being independent of demanding, production-focused leader behaviours. In a second study, perceived disrespectfulness mediated the relationship between exposure to negative interpersonal behaviour and well-being; workplace norms, social support, control-related self-beliefs, and negative affectivity moderated associations within the mediation sequence. Given the importance placed on objective measurement methods in the occupational stress literature, the inherent difficulties in measuring social stressors objectively, and the widespread use of self-report instruments in the literature, the second main goal of this work was to approach greater objectivity in the measurements of self-reported negative interpersonal workplace interactions. A number of approaches were used toward this end, including the development of a more objective self-report measure of interpersonal workplace behaviours, as well as the use of aggregate variables and the investigation of moderated relations within multilevel frameworks. Implications of this work and directions for further research are discussed.