Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andre Navarro Lourenco.pdf: 571283 bytes, checksum: 0d527af68e7e0066f02629722927a6e0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-10 / This work is to clear and review the utilitarianism according to the thought of philosophers Jeremy Bentham, Stuart Mill and John Rawls. In pursuing this goal, we seek to scrutinize about what it is utilitarianism, and how their applicability. Prior to properly analyze these authors and their respective positions on utilitarianism, will be passed on a brief historical context, in order to understand all the sources that converge in this theory. We note throughout the work, each author will present a unique take on the subject, but with some converging points. Among these points, it will be attempted to explain the happiness of views, which make up one of the fundamental points of the utilitarian theory. Finally, the vision will be analyzed presented on utilitarianism, and its applicability in law, aiming to guarantee the effectiveness of law with utilitarian bases / O presente trabalho tem como diretriz mestra esclarecer e analisar o utilitarismo segundo o pensamento dos filósofos Jeremy Bentham, Stuart Mill e John Rawls. Na persecução desse objetivo, buscamos esmiuçar sobre do que se trata o utilitarismo, e como funciona a sua aplicabilidade. Antes de analisarmos devidamente esses autores, e suas respectivas posições acerca do utilitarismo, será repassada uma breve contextualização histórica, para podermos compreender todas as fontes que confluem nessa teoria. Notaremos ao longo do trabalho, que cada autor irá apresentar uma visão única sobre o tema, porém tendo alguns pontos convergentes. Entre esses pontos, tentar-se-á explicar as visões de felicidade, que compõem um dos pontos fundamentais sobre a teoria utilitária. Por fim, será analisada a visão apresentada sobre o utilitarismo, e a sua aplicabilidade no Direito, almejando a garantia da efetividade do Direito com bases utilitárias

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-04-11T11:51:16Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo José Rafful.pdf: 1264577 bytes, checksum: 48941699ba0e98c577a29912286be6cf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-11T11:51:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo José Rafful.pdf: 1264577 bytes, checksum: 48941699ba0e98c577a29912286be6cf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation has the scope of the analysis of the paper: "An introduction to the principals of morals and legislation" by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, the discussion of his theory and the application of it within a system in which legal positivism prevails. For this purpose, the descriptive method was used, based on an accurate bibliographic analysis of national and foreign papers about the author’s masterpiece and backbone of his work. We started from the hypothesis that the application of this theory could result in greater legal certainty. The application of utilitarianism in our legal system would remove arbitrariness and insecurity from the application of law as it does in the common law system. As so, the concepts of hedonistic and eudaimonist happiness were studied in order to verify what kind of individualistic happiness, utilitarianism can be embedded. In the following act, David Hume's principle of causality was analyzed in order to integrate those concepts, since Jeremy Bentham, in the first chapter of the work under analysis, states textually that the human being would be inextricably linked to the chain cause and effect. Finally, in order to insert in this research a counterpoint to the thought of Jeremy Bentham, the theory of Hebert Hart was analyzed, in his paper: "The concept of right", being verified that, while the first one takes care of the construction of a theory which would guarantee the elaboration of norms that lead to happiness, the second concerns about the application of law, concluding that utilitarianism is a theory directed to the legislators with the application in a positivist system, so that through it, society can achieve happiness without compromising legal security, social order, and caring, on the other hand, for causal relations / Esta dissertação tem por escopo a análise da obra: “An introduction to the principals of morals and legislation” da lavra do filósofo Jeremy Bentham, a discussão de sua teoria e a aplicação da mesma dentro de um sistema em que prevalece o positivismo jurídico. Utilizou-se, para tanto, o método descritivo, a partir da efetivação de uma acurada análise bibliográfica de obras nacionais e estrangeiras que comentam a obra mestra e espinha dorsal deste trabalho. Parte-se da hipótese de que a aplicação desta teoria traria, como conseqüência, uma maior segurança jurídica. A aplicação do utilitarismo em nosso sistema jurídico afastaria a arbitrariedade e a insegurança da aplicação do direito tal como ocorre no sistema do common law. Para tanto, foram estudados os conceitos de felicidade hedonista e eudaimonista com a finalidade de se verificar em qual tipo de felicidade individualista, o utilitarismo pode ser encaixado. Em ato seguinte, analisou-se o princípio da causalidade, defendido por David Hume, com o objetivo de integrar esses conceitos, uma vez que Jeremy Bentham, no primeiro capítulo da obra sob análise, afirma textualmente que o ser humano estaria ligado indissociavelmente da cadeia de causa e efeito. Por derradeiro, visando inserir na pesquisa um contraponto ao pensamento de Jeremy Bentham, analisou-se a teoria de Hebert Hart, em sua obra: “O conceito de direito”, constatando-se que, enquanto o primeiro cuida da construção de uma teoria que venha a garantir a elaboração de normas que acarretem a felicidade, o segundo preocupou-se com a aplicação do direito, concluindo-se que o utilitarismo é uma teoria direcionada aos legisladores com a aplicação em um sistema positivista, para que por meio dela, a sociedade possa alcançar a felicidade sem comprometer a segurança jurídica, a ordem social e cuidar, em contrapartida, das relações causais

A great virtue of our fairly liberal society is its willingness to allow, legally and socially, individuals to choose their own lifestyle, free from interference or coercion. For this reason, there is rightly a strong resistance and hostility to government regulation of wholly self-regarding behavior – acts which only affect the actor. Whether justified by an appeal to sovereignty or utility, that which one does to oneself is seen as beyond the jurisdiction of government. Yet the problem of the so-called obesity "epidemic" – the explosion in the prevalence of overweight and obesity in recent decades – is a case of self-harm which does indeed warrant government intervention. This thesis considers utilitarian and autonomy-based arguments against interference in self-regarding action, then show why obesity merits intervention nevertheless.

An instrumental defense of a right to do wrong is plausible because we cannot directly intervene in an individual's choices so as to effectively promote that individual's moral good, if her moral good is conceived as being some form of individual autonomy. An epistemic defense is also plausible if we reorient J.S. Mill's epistemological argument for his Harm Principle in "On Liberty" to center on the agent's knowledge, rather than on the interfering observer's knowledge. Restrictions on harmless acts that are imposed because the acts are wrong are only justifiable to that individual if she herself knows that her acts are wrong. Both approaches depend upon the limited subjectivity and fallibility of the agent or interfering observer. Moreover, both approaches make the justification for a right to knowingly do wrong problematic.

This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts. This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion. Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection – our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts. This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion. Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection – our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This dissertation aims to show that the criticism of John Raws to utilitarianism and the proposition of his Theory of Justice, especially the difference principle, offer an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis for the welfare economics, by providing a safe way to arbitrate social and economic inequalities. According to the philosopher, by making the utility as the supreme good, utilitarianism concerns only with maximizing the total happiness, and disregards the way it is distribute among different individuals. When interpersonal utility comparisons were criticized for being considered normative, welfare economy found on the principle of efficiency considered one scientific way to assess the well-being and at the same time, keeping alive the utilitarian tradition. This principle, however, is also criticized by the author, since selects various positions as equally effective, and among which some people can live in abundance while others live in extreme poverty. In this sense, John Rawls proposes a theory of justice in an attempt to offer an alternative to utilitarian perspective. In this theory, individuals are driven to put in a hypothetical situation, called original position, which must decide on the principles that will govern the institutions of their society. The author states that the principles to be chosen in the original position would be, briefly, the principle of equal liberty and the principle of difference. According to the first principle, which has priority over the second, ensures an equal system of basic freedoms for all individuals and, according to the difference principle, social and economic inequalities are allowed only if they occur in favor of individuals less fortunate in society. It is argued that the Rawlsian theory, and especially the principle of difference, is an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis of welfare economics. This is because this principle ensures the well-being for all individuals in society, and not only that contribute most to the total satisfaction to increase, as proposed by utilitarianism. In this sense, if taken into account, these contributions would allow the welfare economy fill the gap left by the distributive utilitarianism, and to assess the well-being of individuals in order to guarantee them not only economic efficiency but also distributive justice. / A presente dissertação objetiva demonstrar que a crítica de John Raws ao utilitarismo e a proposição de sua Teoria da Justiça, sobretudo o princípio da diferença, oferecem uma alternativa ao utilitarismo enquanto base normativa da economia do bem-estar, ao proporcionar uma forma segura para arbitrar as desigualdades sociais e econômicas. De acordo com o filósofo, ao condicionar a utilidade como bem supremo, o utilitarismo importa-se apenas com a maximização da felicidade total, e desconsidera a forma pela qual ela é distribuída entre os diferentes indivíduos. Quando as comparações interpessoais de utilidade foram criticadas por serem consideradas normativas, a economia do bem-estar encontrou no princípio da eficiência uma forma considerada científica para avaliar o bem-estar e, ao mesmo tempo, manter viva a tradição utilitarista. Este princípio, porém, também é criticado pelo autor, uma vez que seleciona várias posições como igualmente eficientes, e dentre as quais algumas pessoas podem viver em grande abundância enquanto outras vivem na extrema miséria. Neste sentido, John Rawls propõe uma teoria da justiça, na tentativa de oferecer uma alternativa à perspectiva utilitarista. Nesta teoria, os indivíduos são levados a colocar-se em uma situação hipotética, denominada posição original, na qual devem deliberar sobre os princípios que irão regular as instituições de sua sociedade. O autor afirma que os princípios a serem escolhidos na posição original seriam, de forma sucinta, o princípio da liberdade igual e o princípio da diferença. De acordo com o primeiro princípio, que possui prioridade sobre o segundo, garante-se um igual sistema de liberdades básicas para todos os indivíduos e, de acordo com o princípio da diferença, as desigualdades econômicas e sociais são permitidas somente se ocorrerem em prol dos indivíduos menos favorecidos na sociedade. Argumenta-se que a teoria rawlsiana, e de modo especial o seu princípio da diferença, representam uma alternativa ao utilitarismo como base normativa da economia do bem-estar. Isto ocorre porque este princípio assegura o bem-estar a todos os indivíduos da sociedade, e não apenas aos que mais contribuem para aumentar a satisfação total, como proposto pelo utilitarismo. Neste sentido, se levadas em consideração, estas contribuições permitiriam que a economia do bem-estar preenchesse a lacuna distributiva deixada pelo utilitarismo, e avaliasse o bem-estar dos indivíduos de forma a lhes garantir não apenas a eficiência econômica, mas também a justiça distributiva.

The thesis is an evaluation of a utilitarian argument for the permissibility of purchasing meat. The argument, which I call the replaceability argument, rests on four premises: 1. Meat purchases cause animals to be brought into existence. 2. The animals brought into existence by meat purchases live lives of positive final value. 3. If the first two premises are true, then meat purchases cause at least as good consequences as any alternative act. 4. If meat purchases cause at least as good consequences as any alternative act, then meat purchases are permissible. The first three premises are examined while the fourth one, representing consequentialism, is assumed to be true. The evaluation results in the conclusion that the argument is unsound because all of the premises evaluated turn out to be either doubtful or false.

O objetivo geral desta dissertação é defender que as religiões e os argumentos religiosos tenham um espaço no debate da definição de bem e justiça para a sociedade e para o desenvolvimento humano. Por isso faz se necessário debater as relações das teorias filosóficas do Utilitarismo de Jeremy Bentham, da Justiça como Equidade de John Rawls e da Abordagem da Capacitação de Amartya Sen com as religiões. Também é necessário repelir os argumentos que estas filosofias apresentam para que as religiões não participem do debate de bem comum, de justiça e para o desenvolvimento humano. Por fim será apresentado o Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano das Religiões (IDH-R), que segue a mesma metodologia utilizada pelo Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento para compor o IDH em seus relatórios de desenvolvimento humano, e se buscará explicar os motivos das variações do IDH-R entre as diferentes religiões. / The general objective of this dissertation is to argue that religions and religious arguments have a place in the discussion of the definition of good and justice to society and to human development. So it makes it necessary to discuss the relationship of philosophical theories the Utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, the Justice as Fairness of John Rawls and the Capability Approach of Amartya Sen with religions. It is also necessary to repel the arguments that these philosophies have that religions do not participate in the discussion of the common good, justice and human development. Finally will be presented the Human Development Index of Religions (HDI-R), which follows the same methodology used by the United Nations Development to compose the HDI in its human development reports, and seek to explain the reasons for variations HDI-R among different religions.

O objetivo geral desta dissertação é defender que as religiões e os argumentos religiosos tenham um espaço no debate da definição de bem e justiça para a sociedade e para o desenvolvimento humano. Por isso faz se necessário debater as relações das teorias filosóficas do Utilitarismo de Jeremy Bentham, da Justiça como Equidade de John Rawls e da Abordagem da Capacitação de Amartya Sen com as religiões. Também é necessário repelir os argumentos que estas filosofias apresentam para que as religiões não participem do debate de bem comum, de justiça e para o desenvolvimento humano. Por fim será apresentado o Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano das Religiões (IDH-R), que segue a mesma metodologia utilizada pelo Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento para compor o IDH em seus relatórios de desenvolvimento humano, e se buscará explicar os motivos das variações do IDH-R entre as diferentes religiões. / The general objective of this dissertation is to argue that religions and religious arguments have a place in the discussion of the definition of good and justice to society and to human development. So it makes it necessary to discuss the relationship of philosophical theories the Utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, the Justice as Fairness of John Rawls and the Capability Approach of Amartya Sen with religions. It is also necessary to repel the arguments that these philosophies have that religions do not participate in the discussion of the common good, justice and human development. Finally will be presented the Human Development Index of Religions (HDI-R), which follows the same methodology used by the United Nations Development to compose the HDI in its human development reports, and seek to explain the reasons for variations HDI-R among different religions.