Within many communities and religions, including the LDS community, there is some controversy surrounding the use of stem cells – particularly embryonic stem cells (ESC). Much of this controversy arises from confusion and misconceptions about what stem cells actually are, where they come from , and when life begins. The theology of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has interesting implications for the last of these considerations, and it becomes less a question of “when does life begin” and more an exploration of “when does personhood begin” or “when does the spirit enter the body.” With no official Church stance, statements from Church leaders vary on this topic, and this first section of the thesis explores the philosophical and practical meaning of personhood with a biological background intended for those not familiar with the origin or uses of stem cells.The second portion of the thesis explores possible cloning technologies. Recent events and advances address the possibility of cloning endangered and extinct species. The ethics of these types of cloning have considerations uniquely different from the type of cloning commonly practiced. Cloning of cheetahs (and other endangered or vulnerable species) may be ethically appropriate, given certain constraints. However, the ethics of cloning extinct species varies; for example, cloning mammoths and Neanderthals is more ethically problematic than conservation cloning, and requires more attention. Cloning Neanderthals in particular is likely unethical and such a project should not be undertaken. It is important to discuss and plan for the constraints necessary to mitigate the harms of conservation and extinct cloning, and it is imperative that scientific and public discourse enlighten and guide actions in the sphere of cloning.

En utilisant une perspective philosophique, ce mémoire explore les liens forts entre la réception spectatoriale du film Ikiru (1952) d’Akira Kurosawa et l’idée qu’une œuvre d’art peut être perçu comme une conversation d’auteur à public. L’analyse induite par l’établissement de ce rapprochement est nourrie par divers éléments connexes tel que le phénomène empathique au cinéma, la notion de l’humanisme chez Kurosawa ou la pensée morale de Stanley Cavell, qui place le cinéma comme une possibilité d’introspection et d’amélioration pour le spectateur. Le choix de ce film pour ce qui semble être une recherche s’intéressant plus au médium et sa réception qu’à une œuvre précise est motivé par la présence d’une construction narrative très particulière; le protagoniste principal meurt au deux tiers du film. La séquence suivante, lors de ses funérailles, est une grande conversation initiée par un auditoire interne (concept cher à Kurosawa), plaçant ainsi Ikiru comme un modèle incarnant les relations complexes que nous souhaitons comprendre avec ce mémoire. Il est donc question, dans un premier temps, de tirer une plus grande compréhension du principe de la conversation en s’appuyant sur l’œuvre et les intentions du cinéaste. Une fois les concepts importants posés, notamment la conversation interne, l’empathie et la distanciation narrative, la réception spectatorielle de la séquence des funérailles et de l’œuvre en général est disséquée. Ce n’est qu’après cela que la perspective philosophique entre complètement en jeu, l’humanisme et l’utilitarisme faisant partie de la réponse que Kurosawa donne à la question posée : qu’est-ce qu’une bonne vie? / Using a philosophical perspective, this study explores the strong links between the spectatorial reception of Akira Kurosawa's film Ikiru (1952) and the idea that a work of art can be perceived as an author-to-audience conversation. The analysis induced by the establishment of this parallel is nourished by various related elements such as the empathetic phenomenon in cinema, the notion of humanism in Kurosawa or the moral thought of Stanley Cavell, who places cinema as a possibility of introspection and improvement for the viewer. The choice of this film for what seems to be a research focusing more on the medium and its reception than on a specific work is motivated by the presence of a very particular narrative construction; the main protagonist dies two-thirds of the way through the film. The following sequence, during his funeral, is a conversation initiated by an internal audience (a concept dear to Kurosawa), thus placing Ikiru as a model embodying the complex relationships that we wish to understand with this memoir. It is therefore a question, first of all, of drawing a greater understanding of the principle of conversation by relying on the work and the intentions of the filmmaker. Once the important concepts are posed, including internal conversation, empathy and narrative distancing, the spectator's reception of the funeral sequence and the work in general is dissected. Only then does the philosophical perspective fully come into play, with humanism and utilitarianism being part of Kurosawa's answer to the question posed: what is a good life?

The normative political theory problem of dirty hands (DH) concerns the troubling possibility that political leaders, from a (mostly) consequentialist perspective, might sometimes be morally required to make exceptions from sensitive rules like prohibitions of extremely harmful practices (e.g. torture) in order to avert catastrophic threats and crises, while such rules are still considered so important and such crises so rare that one nonetheless feels inclined to deem dirty exceptions categorically wrong so as to prevent their unnecessary proliferation through a slippery-slope type development.  How can we conceptualize such a problematic necessity? A latent but insufficiently explored idea in the DH literature is that the normatively preferrable approach to such a wicked problem might be to not try to conceptualize it at all, or at least not in our public work as academics. In this thesis, I introduce the straightforward suggestion that if the DH problem cannot be discussed without risking slippery-slope demoralization of the partaking deliberators and/or audience, we seem to be morally required to content ourselves with terming it an unspeakable, taboo subject in non-crisis times, as a meta-level ersatz solution to the core-level political problem conventionally centered in the DH literature.  I also discuss to what extent the mainstream, weak rule utilitarian (WRU) DH literature can themselves be understood as intentionally testing the limits of consequentialist reasoning in a search for a 'higher' moral truth than what their ethical position might entail at first glance.

The moral justification of punishment is the fundamental concern of this thesis. It is argued that a moral response to crime has to be a civilised response; therefore, the notion of "civility" is defined and discussed. Punishment is then defended in such a way that it accords with being a civilised response to crime. It is argued that in order to be such a response, and thereby qualify as a moral response, punishment must have a certain structure, i.e. it must fulfil seven necessary conditions, which, it is argued, together constitute the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. In arguing for each of the necessary conditions, different onedimensional theories of punishment are dealt with (retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, a paternalistic theory of punishment, and restitutionalism}, indicating that each fulfils some of the criteria for morally justified punishment. None of the onedimensional theories fulfils all the necessary conditions, however, and hence none on its own fulfils the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. This is not to argue that a straightforward theory could never on its own fulfil the conditions for morally justified punishment, but I have not been able to conceive how this could be done. The theory I here present is therefore a hybrid approach, incorporating elements of all the above-mentioned theories into a unitary theory. In doing so, it fulfils all the necessary conditions for being a civilised response to crime, thereby fulfilling the sufficient condition too, and hence providing a morally defensible account of punishment. Finally, the question of how this theory can be put into practice is addressed. Because the objective of punishment ought to be a civilised response, thereby benefiting both society as a whole and those being punished and rehabilitated, the thesis may be seen as a progressive synthesis of the various approaches examined. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Text in Afrikaans / Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Na meer as veertig jaar het Suid-Afrika 'n nuwe politieke bedeling wat veranderde wetgewing in die vooruitsig stel. 'n Oorweging van 'n dekriminaliseringsbeleid vir die gebruik van dagga, beskou teen die agtergrond van 'n toename in emstige misdaad soos moord, gewapende roof, taxigeweld en verkragting, weerspieel die realiteite van vandag se oorweldigende misdaadprobleem in Suid-Afrika. Een van die belangrikste take van die kriminoloog is om misdaad te omskryf sodat 'n beleid voorgeskryf kan word wat die strafregsplegingstelsel van hulp kan wees om uiteindelik misdaad te verminder of, meer realisties, meer doeltreffend te beheer. Die omskrywing daarvan is egter nie so eenvoudig nie vanwee die kompleksiteit van die mensdom. Inhierdie studie is 'n meningsopname gebruik van sowel jeugdiges, die toekomstige beleidmakers en algemene daggagebruikers, as kenners op die gebied van dwelmrehabilitasie en -beheer, ten einde die wenslikheid van 'n dekriminaliseringsbeleid te beoordeel. Empiriese data van beide groepe (die wetsgehoorsame en die wetsverbrekende) is vir die voorwaardelike steun vir die wetlike beheer van daggagebruik versamel, met die verskil dat eerste- en eksperimentele daggagebruikers wat geen antler misdaadrekord het of by enige misdaadbedrywighede betrokke is, nie 'n misdaadrekord moet kry nie. Die respondente het dus die behoud van strafmaatreels ondersteun, maar met 'n de facto-dekriminalisasie deur middel van nie-toepassing van die wet. Die respondente is van mening dat 'n verslapping van die huidige dwelmwetgewing tot 'n toename in misdaad aanleiding sal gee. Die respondente betwyfel egter die doeltreffendheid van die kriminele regstelsel. Hulle is selfs van mening dat die SAPD nie in staat is om die probleem te bekamp solank die middel in aanvraag is nie. Die studie beklemtoon verder die kompleksiteit en dikwels teenstrydige opvattings ten opsigte van dekriminalisasie ten einde te illustreer hoe moeilik dit is om 'n staatsbeleid daarop te skoei. / After more than forty years, South Africa has a new political dispensation with prospective new legislation. The consideration of a policy of decriminalization for the use of dagga, seen against the background of an increase in serious crimes such as murder, armed robbery, taxi violence and rape, reflects the realities of the current overwhelming crime problem in South Africa. One of the most important tasks of the criminologist is to describe crime in order to facilitate the system of administration of criminal justice in the diminishing of, or more realistically, better control of crime. The description thereof is, however, not simple due to the complexity of humanity. In this study an opinion survey of both youths as the future policy makers and most common users of dagga, and specialists in the field of drug rehabilitation and control was used, in order to determine the expedience of a policy of decriminalization. Empirical data was obtained from both groups (the law abiders and the law-breakers) for the conditional support of legislative control of dagga use, with the exception that first and experimental users with no criminal record or history of criminality should not be subjected to a criminal record. The respondents therefore supported the retention of punitive measures, but with a defacto-decriminalization by way of non­ enforcement of the law. The respondents were of the opinion that the relaxation of the present drug legislation would lead to an increase in crime. The respondents doubt the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, however, they are of the opinion that the SAPS would never be able to combat the problem as long as a demand for the drug continues to exist. The study further emphasizes the complexity and often diverse conceptions of decriminalization in order to illustrate how difficult it is to base a state policy on these conceptions. / Criminology and Security Science / M.A. (Kriminologie)

This thesis investigates the social, legal and ethical perceptions of participants towards the implementation of biometric access control systems within a sample of United Kingdom work-based environments. It focuses on the application of fingerprint scanning and facial recognition systems, whilst alluding to the development of more advanced (bleeding edge) technologies in the future. The conceptual framework is based on a tripartite model in which Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is applied to the workforce whilst the principles of Utilitarianism and the Psychological Contract are applied to both management strategies and workforce perceptions. A qualitative paradigm is used in which semi-structured interviews are conducted with management and workforce participants within a sample of United Kingdom-based organisations (represented by Case Studies A-D). Discourse from these interviews are analysed, leading to the development of a series of first-cut findings for suggested "Best Practice " in the social, legal and ethical management of biometric access control systems. This process is subsequently developed with a refined sample of respondents (Case Studies A and C) culminating in the presentation of a suggested "Best Practice Model" for application to all four case studies. The model is based upon elements of a pre-determined Code of Practice (ISO/IEC 27002lnformation Technology - Security techniques - Code of Practice for Information Security Management) towards fostering acceptance of biometric technology within the workplace, in answering the question: How should organisations using biometric access control systems address social, legal and ethical concerns in the management of specific working environments in the United Kingdom?

Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Problem statement For utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on only two acquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychological personhood. Sentience is the entrance-requirement for moral significance, but does not justify a "right to life" claim; at most a "right" not to suffer. Personhood, described as some sort of self-conscious awareness with a concept of the future, may justify a "right to life" claim. However, since personhood is absent in prenatal beings, and only develops some time after birth, the implication is that such beings have little moral significance and may, for instance, be killed "at will". The moral problem that I address in this dissertation is to investigate, assess and evaluate the utilitarian position on the moral status or value of prenatal life. Methodology and results I firstly, on the basis of an extensive literature study, make a detailed analysis of the utilitarian position with reference to a number of themes that I have identified in their argument. This is followed by a critical philosophical evaluation of the utilitarian position, based on six particular arguments: • Utilitarianism is philosophically incoherent. It over-simplifies the moral argument in claiming that consequences are all that matter morally. Its underlying moral theory is at odds with moral claims contained in contemporary notions of human rights and individual justice. It ignores the moral significance of special obligations to special groups. • Utilitarianism potentially has unacceptable consequences. It IS inherently discriminatory and may lead to legitimate "slippery slope" fears. • Utilitarianism clashes with our fundamental moral intuitions on the value of prenatal life. These intuitions are cherished in most world religions. • Contrary to the utilitarian position, speciesism is inevitable to the human condition, especially argued from a position of existential phenomenology. Self- constitution, simultaneous constitution of the world as we know it, and the very possibility of morality are possible only within a particular notion of speciesism. • The potentiality of pre-persons to develop into persons cannot be as convincingly ignored as is done by the utilitarian. • There is a basic and underlying need and intuition to protect vulnerable human beings, of which pre-persons are exemplars. These notions clash with utilitarian theory. As an alternative, I introduce, set out and evaluate a two-phased position on the moral significance of pre-personal human life, a position of respectfulness of prenatal and pre-personal human life based upon its humanity, potentiality and separation-viability. This leads, firstly, to the conclusion of a graded, sliding scale conception of human prepersonal moral significance in line with the level of development and with the actuation of potentiality. Secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the advent of separationsurvivability (viability) is a morally significant cut-off point beyond which the human fetus may "normally" have a justifiable right to the continuation of its life. In as far as the application of my argument is concerned, I develop a "moderate" position with reference to the abortion debate. Whilst I recognize that all human prenatal beings of which it can be argued that they have a reasonable chance to develop their intrinsic potentiality, i.e., to become full-fledged persons, should have the opportunity to do so, I also recognize that neither this position, nor the complexities of life make it possible to hold "absolute" positions on the justifiability of abortion. I explore this extremely problematic notion in the text. That having been said, the advent of separation-survivability may imply a "moral cut-off point", beyond which termination is only rarely justified. I argue that I find no moral hindrance to wellmotivated research on human pre-embryos and stem cells. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Probleemstelling Utilitariste huldig sterk omlynde standpunte oor die waarde van lewe. Hulle redeneer dat menslike (inderwaarheid, alle lewende) wesens slegs op grond van twee eienskappe intrinsieke morele waarde kan verwerf: sentiëntisme, d.i. die vermoë om lyding te ervaar, en persoonstatus. Sentiëntisme is 'n bepalende vereiste vir morele status, maar regverdig nie 'n "reg op lewe"-aanspraak nie. Persoonsyn, verstaan as 'n vorm van selfbewustheid tesame met 'n bewuste belang by die voortsetting van eie bestaan, mag wel so 'n aanspraak regverdig. Voorgeboortelike (en "voorpersoonlike") wesens is egter nie persone nie; hulle word eers (aansienlik) ná geboorte volwaardige persone. Die implikasie is dat sulke wesens weinig morele status het, en byvoorbeeld, na willekeur gedood mag word. Die morele probleem wat ek in hierdie dissertasie aanspreek is om die utilitaristiese beskouing ten opsigte van die morale status of waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe krities-filosofies te ondersoek en te evalueer. Metodologie en gevolgtrekkings Eerstens maak ek na aanleiding van 'n gedetaileerde literatuurstudie 'n in-diepte analise van van die utilitaristiese posisie aan die hand van 'n aantal temas wat ek in hul argument geïdentifiseer het. Daarna volg 'n krities-filosofiese evaluasie van die utilitaristiese posisie, aan die hand van ses argumente: • Utilitarisme is filosofies onsamehangend. Dit oorvereenvoudig die morele argument deur voor te gee dat gevolge al is wat moreel saakmaak. Die onderliggende utilitaristiese teorie bots met die morele eise vervat in kontemporêre sienings van menseregte en geregtigheid. Dit negeer die morele belangrikheid van spesiale verpligtinge teenoor spesiale belangegroepe. • Utilitarisme het potensieelonaanvaarbare gevolge. Dit IS inherent diskriminerend en kan lei tot onkeerbare glybaan ("slippery slope")-argumente. Utilitarisme bots met ons fundamentele morele intuïsies betreffende die waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe. Hierdie intuïsies word onder meer ondersteun deur die meeste hoofstroom godsdienste. • Spesiësisme is, in kontras met die utilitaristiese beskouing, onafwendbaar vir ons selfverstaan as mense, soos aangetoon kan word met 'n beroep op die eksistensiële fenomenologie. Self-konstituering, gelyktydige konstituering van die wêreld van die mens, en selfs die moontlikheid van moraliteit is slegs moontlik vanuit' n bepaalde spesiësistiese beskouing. • Die potensialiteit van "pre-persone" om tot volwaardige persone te ontwikkel kan nie, soos die utilitaris doen, sonder meer geïgnoreer word nie. • Daar is 'n basiese en onderliggende morele eis om swak en weerlose menslike wesens te beskerm. Hierdie idees bots lynreg met utilitaristiese teorie. As 'n alternatief tot die utilitaristiese beskouing, ontwikkel ek 'n twee-fase posisie betreffende die morele waarde van voorgeboortelike menslike lewe. Ek noem hierdie posisie agting vir voorgeboortelike en voor-persoonlike menslike lewe gebaseer op die menslikheid, potensialiteit en oorleefbaarheid van prenatale mense. Dit lei, eerstens, tot die gevolgtrekking van 'n gegradeerde glyskaal konsepsie van voor-persoonlike menslike morele waarde, min of meer parallel aan die vlak van ontwikkeling en die ontwikkeling van potensialiteit. Tweedens lei dit tot die gevolgtrekking dat die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid 'n moreel-beduidende afsnypunt is waarna die menslike fetus "normaalweg" aanspraak kan maak op 'n reg dat sy lewe voortgesit moet word. In soverre dit die toepassing van my argument betref, ontwikkel ek 'n "gematigde" posisie vis-á-vis aborsie. Ek redeneer dat alle menslike voorgeboortelike wesens wat 'n redelike kans het dat hul intrinsieke potensialiteit verder sal ontwikkel, die geleentheid daartoe gegun behoort te word. Ek aanvaar ook dat nog hierdie beskouing, nog die kompleksiteit van die menslike bestaan "absolute" posisies moreel regverdig. Die problematiek en inherente spanning tussen hierdie oënskynlik-opponerende posisies word in die teks bespreek. Nogtans beskou ek die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid as 'n moreel insiggewende afsnypunt waarna terminasie net in buitengewone omstandighede moreel regverdigbaar is.

Dans ce mémoire, je cherche à expliquer comment politiquement intégrer les générations futures et les animaux non humains. Pour ce faire, je revisite les débats en philosophie concernant la valeur intrinsèque, les théories de justice, les droits et la représentation politique. J’avance que ce qui a été réalisé concernant les générations futures peut servir à la cause des animaux non humains, et inversement. J’analyse ainsi ce qui rassemble ces sans-voix. Après leur avoir accordé une valeur intrinsèque et politique, je leur reconnais des droits à l’intégrité physique, la vie et la liberté. Je propose finalement les solutions qui peuvent servir à contourner le problème de leur non audibilité en démocratie. / In this M.A. research, I try to understand how to politically admit future generations and nonhuman animals. To do this, I analyze debates in philosophy about intrinsic value, theories of justice, rights and political representation. I suggest that what has been accomplished about future generations can serve to the animal cause and conversely. I review what brings together this voices-less. After I allowed them an intrinsic and political value, I recognize them with rights to physically integrity, life and liberty. Finally, I suggest solutions to by-pass the problem of non-audibility in democracy.

In diesem Buch schlage ich eine radikal neuartige Sicht auf den Utilitarismus vor. Meine Hauptthese ist, dass der Utilitarismus selbst keine vollständige normative Theorie ist, aus der sich per se Handlungsbewertungen ableiten ließen, sondern normativ untersättigt und neutral ist. Sein normativer Gehalt ist vollständig abhängig von angenommenen Nutzenfunktionen. Jede konsistente Menge von moralischen Regeln (Moralsystem) kann, wie ich im Anhang beweise, als ein Spezialfall des Utilitarismus interpretiert werden. Um dies zu explizieren, stelle ich utilitaristische Interpretationen verschiedener Moralpositionen vor: Zwei alltagsmoralische Regeln (das Gebot, Versprechen zu halten und das Tötungsverbot), egalitäre Positionen zu Verteilungsfragen sowie die Rawls’sche Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Hierbei gebe ich stets korrespondierende Nutzenfunktionen an, deren Vorliegen Utilitaristen auf die interpretierten moralischen Positionen verpflichtet. Die Frage nach dem normativen Gehalt des Utilitarismus schlechthin ist somit falsch gestellt. Ein Großteil der Kritik des Utilitarismus als moralische Theorie läuft ins Leere, denn sie kritisiert einen solchen nur scheinbar eigenständigen normativen Gehalt des Utilitarismus, den sie selbst durch unterstellte Nutzenfunktionen erst erzeugt. Die Verteidigung des Utilitarismus verfehlt ebenso oft das Ziel, wenn sie zur Rettung des Utilitarismus an sich konkurrierende Nutzenfunktionen ins Feld führt, ohne die normative Neutralität des Utilitarismus generell zu thematisieren. Diese normative Neutralität macht den Utilitarismus gleichsam zur Normalform der Ethik, denn jeder moralische Disput lässt sich in einen Disput über korrespondierende Nutzenfunktionen überführen. Der Utilitarismus ist also nicht moralische Theorie, sondern vielmehr die Methode der Ethik. / In this book I suggest to look at utilitarianism in a radical new way. My key starting point is that utilitarianism in itself is not a complete normative theory from which judgements of actions could be drawn but instead that utilitarianism is normatively undersaturated and neutral. Its normative content is entirely dependent on assumed utility functions. Every consistent set of moral rules (moral system) can, as I prove in the appendix, be interpreted as a special case of utilitarianism. To explicate this, I give utilitarian interpretations of a number of different moral positions: two everyday moral rules (the rule to keep promises and the prohibition of killing), egalitarian positions on distribution, and the Rawlsian theory of justice. In each case I propose corresponding utility functions that commit utilitarians to the interpreted moral position. Thus, asking about the normative content of utilitarianism in itself is meaningless. Much of the critique of utilitarianism as a moral theory misses the point as it criticizes such an assumed normative content of utilitarianism in itself while imputing the existence of certain utility functions. Many defendants of utilitarianism fall for the same mistake, as they propose rival utility functions to rescue their assumed normative content of utilitarianism without addressing the general normative neutrality of utilitarianism. For this normative neutrality, utilitarianism can be viewed as the normal form of ethics, because every moral dispute can be translated into a dispute over corresponding utility functions. Therefore, Utilitarianism is not a moral theory, but rather the method of ethics.

A presente dissertação trata do problema dos direitos culturais sob a ótica do utilitarismo liberal de John Stuart Mill. Objetiva-se a inserção da filosofia política do autor nas discussões que vêm sendo travadas nas últimas décadas por liberais e comunitaristas a partir da colocação do problema filosófico da identidade. Para tanto, busca-se desfazer frequentes equívocos e apresentar uma leitura integrada da filosofia de Mill com base na análise criteriosa de seus escritos, auxiliada por seus mais eminentes intérpretes. Pretende-se demonstrar que é de uma fundamental e prévia compreensão utilitarista, bem como de uma particular posição acerca do modo de acesso à verdade, que decorrem as convicções liberais e a centralidade da autonomia individual em seu pensamento. Estabelecidas essas premissas, verifica-se que o estado milliano, ao dispensar a convicção na neutralidade da esfera pública que decorre do pensamento liberal contratualista usualmente professado, mostra-se compatível em tese com a tarefa de garantir direitos culturais. Ao mesmo tempo em que sua visão ampla acerca dos bens que contribuem para a felicidade é capaz de posicionar a cultura no cálculo hedonístico individual, com reflexos na quantificação da utilidade em vista da felicidade geral, a defesa de Mill da autonomia e da diversidade parece poder justificar uma especial atenção ao contexto social que sirva para a expressão máxima da individualidade. / This dissertation deals with the problem of cultural rights from the viewpoint of the liberal utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. It intends to include the author‘s political philosophy in the debates that have been held in recent decades between liberals and communitarians starting from the approach of the philosophical problem of identity. To this end, we try to undo common misconceptions and provide an integrated reading of Mill's philosophy based on careful analysis of his writings, aided by his most eminent interpreters. We attempt to demonstrate that it is based on a previous fundamental adhesion to utilitarianism, as well as from a particular position regarding the access to the truth, that arise the liberal convictions and the centrality of autonomy in his doctrine. Given these premises, we could find that the Millian state, exempting the assumption on the neutrality of public sphere derived from the liberal contractarian doctrine usually professed, reveals itself theoretically compatible with the task of guaranteeing cultural rights. Whilst Mill‘s broad view regarding goods that contribute to happiness is capable of dragging culture into the hedonistic calculus, which affects the measurement of utility over general happiness, his defense of autonomy and diversity seems to justify a special attention to social context which maximize the expression of individuality.