本文從個人、國家和世界三個層面來重新建構約翰彌爾的公眾參與理論。其公眾參與理論包含了公民精神和公民參與這兩個部份。公民精神主要強調合作的精神，天才和菁英組成的知識階級公民必須和其他大眾階級的公民合作，才可以減少痛苦得到快樂，唯有合作才能讓每個人可以充分運用到自己的能力，享受到高級樂趣，得到個人的幸福，也讓社會獲得更多的效益。合作的精神必須透過實際的參與才可以學習，因此參與本身具有教育的功能。彌爾認為公民精神必須透過國家內部的地方和中央雙軌式的參與才可以培養，由知識階級擔任引導的角色，在參與過程中協助大眾階級的學習。這種方式擴展到世界上就是文明國家對野蠻國家的帝國主義干預。殖民地不適用於不干預原則，因為他們必須透過和統治者的合作，才能學習如何運用自己的能力來得到幸福。 / This study tries to reconstruct John Stuart Mill’s theory of public participation from three perspectives: individual, national and international. This theory consists of an account of citizenship as well as an account of citizen participation. At the core of Mill’s idea of citizenship is cooperation between intelligent citizens, which include geniuses and elites, and the masses. By cooperation, people can make best use of their capacities, and attain their own higher pleasures and ultimately happiness. This citizen spirit can only be cultivated through political participation, and thus it has implications on education policy. The purpose of educating the masses is to help them develop and use their intellectual ability, and to do so intelligent citizens must assume the role of leading their fellow citizens with regard to political participation. And only from this perspective can we truly understand Mill’s theory of international intervention – or liberal imperialism, according to which civilized states are allowed to intervene the barbarian ones. Colonized population must cooperate with and learn from their rulers – that is to say, to conduct their own experiments in living under their colonizer’s tutelage.

<p>The purpose of this essay is to discuss the base of sociology from an existentialistic perspective. The discussion takes it's position in the debate on the crisis of sociology, and aligns with Alvin Gouldner's understanding of the crisis. Gouldner believed that the crisis of sociology was mirrored in a sociological method that failed to describe the social reality that it meant to describe; a lack in self-criticism and self-reflexivity, a lack in self-containment in relation to state interests and a lack in moral engagement. This raises a number of questions, which I discuss in the essay. What is the role of sociology in our society? How shall we form a method that responds to the social reality that we sociologists aim to describe? How can we make sociology more moral?</p><p>Existentialism offers a starting point to describe these questions. I argue that the existentialistic description of man as essence carries implications for the social science. By constituting a critique of a computable moral, existentialism points at the necessity of a standing self-criticism and dialogue. An existentialistic description of man as non-essence carries implications for the theory and method of sociology. Man's possibility of radical exceeding of himself means the impossibility to reach theories that describe reality as it is. At the same time, method and theory are necessary to create knowledge about social phenomenon. I read existentialism as an imperative for a sociology that is reflexive in the sense a) a reflexivity in relation to the basic presumptions (value philosophical and ontological) that effect our sociological examinations b) a self-reflexivity that amount to an understanding of the scientists own role relation to his study and the object being studied. Furthermore, I read existentialism as an imperative for a radicalization of dialogue as method.</p>

The purpose of this essay is to discuss the base of sociology from an existentialistic perspective. The discussion takes it's position in the debate on the crisis of sociology, and aligns with Alvin Gouldner's understanding of the crisis. Gouldner believed that the crisis of sociology was mirrored in a sociological method that failed to describe the social reality that it meant to describe; a lack in self-criticism and self-reflexivity, a lack in self-containment in relation to state interests and a lack in moral engagement. This raises a number of questions, which I discuss in the essay. What is the role of sociology in our society? How shall we form a method that responds to the social reality that we sociologists aim to describe? How can we make sociology more moral? Existentialism offers a starting point to describe these questions. I argue that the existentialistic description of man as essence carries implications for the social science. By constituting a critique of a computable moral, existentialism points at the necessity of a standing self-criticism and dialogue. An existentialistic description of man as non-essence carries implications for the theory and method of sociology. Man's possibility of radical exceeding of himself means the impossibility to reach theories that describe reality as it is. At the same time, method and theory are necessary to create knowledge about social phenomenon. I read existentialism as an imperative for a sociology that is reflexive in the sense a) a reflexivity in relation to the basic presumptions (value philosophical and ontological) that effect our sociological examinations b) a self-reflexivity that amount to an understanding of the scientists own role relation to his study and the object being studied. Furthermore, I read existentialism as an imperative for a radicalization of dialogue as method.

L’augmentation croissante du nombre de nouvelles maladies et des possibilités de traitements existants ou en cours d’étude et ayant pour but la guérison des patients atteints, ont amené les chercheurs à pousser davantage leurs recherches biomédicales sur des sujets humains. La conduite de recherches biomédicales sur des sujets humains est une étape cruciale pour la compréhension de la maladie et, par conséquent, l’avancement des connaissances permettant d’éradiquer un jour certaines maladies répandues à l’échelle planétaire, tel le virus de l’immunodéficience humaine (VIH) causant le syndrome d’immunodéficience acquise (SIDA). Aujourd’hui, ces importantes recherches sont conduites partout à travers le monde mais plus particulièrement dans des pays en développement où les populations sont davantage vulnérables. C’est précisément à cause de cette pratique que différents acteurs de ce milieu ont reconsidéré certains aspects éthiques de ces recherches. Ce mémoire examine donc les différentes normes éthiques en vigueur qui gouvernent la recherche sur des sujets humains, afin de voir comment celles-ci tiennent compte des caractéristiques des populations des pays en développement. Cette comparaison nous guide ensuite vers un survol de trois approches philosophiques pour fins d’application à la recherche biomédicale sur des sujets humains et ce, par le biais d'une étude de cas. Suite à ces trois étapes et à la lumière d’une analyse critique des différents écrits recensés sur le sujet, une conclusion s’impose quant à l’importance de renforcer l’application des normes éthiques universelles entourant la recherche biomédicale sur des sujets humains et ce, justement parce celle-ci est surtout conduite sur des populations vulnérables de pays en développement. / With a growing number of new human diseases being discovered, along with existing or novel treatments being explored for their cure, researchers are more than ever seeking to extend their biomedical trials on human subjects. Research with human models is a crucial step for the proper understanding of diseases and therefore advancing the science and technology required to eventually eradicate global diseases such as the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) causing acquired immune deficient syndrome (AIDS). At present, these important studies are conducted across the world, but more specifically, in developing countries with more vulnerable populations. This very practice has caused many stakeholders to reconsider certain ethical aspects of human studies. In this thesis, an examination of the various ethical norms for tests on human subjects will be presented in order to understand how they account for the characteristics of populations in developing countries. This will provide the framework for a case study analyzing three philosophical approaches to biomedical research on human subjects. Finally, a critical review of the field’s literature leads to the imperative conclusion of strengthening universal norms surrounding ethical biomedical research involving humans, specifically as vulnerable populations in developing countries are becoming more frequenctly the subjects.

No description available.

This thesis addresses the conflict traditionally found within moral philosophy between deontological and utilitarian schools of thought. Using the example of the serious moral ambivalence experienced by individuals who are deciding whether to end or continue a difficult pregnancy, it is argued that this ambivalence is the result of both absolute principles (such as the intrinsic value of human life) and outcome based considerations (such as the desire to avoid causing pain and suffering) appearing to be morally reasonable, while also being fundamentally opposed: Each course of action is at once morally defensible on the basis of its own reasonableness, and, conversely, reprehensible due to the reasonableness of the other. This lived experience of moral ambivalence is directly reflected by the tension between deontology and utilitarianism as it occurs at the moral philosophic level, where the deontological emphasis on the unconditional rightness of certain principles is seen to be at irreconcilable odds with the utilitarian emphasis on the attainment of certain ends. The thesis’ central claim is that such ambivalence strongly indicates that human morality is neither exclusively one type or the other, and that both types of moral property are in fact reasonable, and thus have moral value. It is theorised that accounting for this dual reasonableness would lead to the most accurate and helpful representation of the human moral experience – but that the philosophic ‘divide’ between the two types of principle has led to an either/or situation, which has largely prevented this sort of understanding from being developed. The thesis argues that Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick developed a view in which neither deontological nor utilitarian principles can be fully realised without reference to the other, precisely on the basis that both can be found to be ultimately rational. This thesis aims to revitalise that theory – represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’ - to show that Sidgwick reconciled the divide between absolute and end based principles in such a way that the relationship between them becomes a ‘synthesis’. In this synthesis, deontological and utilitarian concepts are both seen as essential components of morality, that combine to form a dynamic whole in which the value of each principle is both indicated and naturally limited by the value of the other, on account of their respective rationalities. It is argued that this provides a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of the human moral experience, and better moral justification for either course of action in situations of complex and sensitive ethical decision making.

No description available.

The thesis deals with ethical dilemmas that the author identified during the process of transformation of residency social care facilities. The aim of the work is to theoretically describe dilemmas identified and subsequently outline the procedure for their solution. The aim of the core part of the work, where is selected dilemma discussed using two ethical theories, is to point out the way these theories can help to solve the ethical dilemmas. The work is divided into five parts, the first of which defines the concepts, the process of transformation and the specifics of the target group of persons with mental disabilities. In the second part emphasises the role of the social worker in dealing with ethical dilemmas and the author generally deals with ethical problems and dilemmas from several points of view and addresses the question of responsibility of a social worker for the ethically-based decision in the specific situation of transformation. The third section describes the specific ethical dilemmas that have been identified during the transformation process, including identifying possible solutions. In the fourth part is the one selected ethical dilemma discussed with the aid of two ethical theories, deontology and consequentialism. In the final fifth part, the discussion, is thinking about benefits and the real possibilities of using ethical theories in social work practice and their meaningful link.

A presente dissertação trata do problema dos direitos culturais sob a ótica do utilitarismo liberal de John Stuart Mill. Objetiva-se a inserção da filosofia política do autor nas discussões que vêm sendo travadas nas últimas décadas por liberais e comunitaristas a partir da colocação do problema filosófico da identidade. Para tanto, busca-se desfazer frequentes equívocos e apresentar uma leitura integrada da filosofia de Mill com base na análise criteriosa de seus escritos, auxiliada por seus mais eminentes intérpretes. Pretende-se demonstrar que é de uma fundamental e prévia compreensão utilitarista, bem como de uma particular posição acerca do modo de acesso à verdade, que decorrem as convicções liberais e a centralidade da autonomia individual em seu pensamento. Estabelecidas essas premissas, verifica-se que o estado milliano, ao dispensar a convicção na neutralidade da esfera pública que decorre do pensamento liberal contratualista usualmente professado, mostra-se compatível em tese com a tarefa de garantir direitos culturais. Ao mesmo tempo em que sua visão ampla acerca dos bens que contribuem para a felicidade é capaz de posicionar a cultura no cálculo hedonístico individual, com reflexos na quantificação da utilidade em vista da felicidade geral, a defesa de Mill da autonomia e da diversidade parece poder justificar uma especial atenção ao contexto social que sirva para a expressão máxima da individualidade. / This dissertation deals with the problem of cultural rights from the viewpoint of the liberal utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. It intends to include the author‘s political philosophy in the debates that have been held in recent decades between liberals and communitarians starting from the approach of the philosophical problem of identity. To this end, we try to undo common misconceptions and provide an integrated reading of Mill's philosophy based on careful analysis of his writings, aided by his most eminent interpreters. We attempt to demonstrate that it is based on a previous fundamental adhesion to utilitarianism, as well as from a particular position regarding the access to the truth, that arise the liberal convictions and the centrality of autonomy in his doctrine. Given these premises, we could find that the Millian state, exempting the assumption on the neutrality of public sphere derived from the liberal contractarian doctrine usually professed, reveals itself theoretically compatible with the task of guaranteeing cultural rights. Whilst Mill‘s broad view regarding goods that contribute to happiness is capable of dragging culture into the hedonistic calculus, which affects the measurement of utility over general happiness, his defense of autonomy and diversity seems to justify a special attention to social context which maximize the expression of individuality.

The moral justification of punishment is the fundamental concern of this thesis. It is argued that a moral response to crime has to be a civilised response; therefore, the notion of "civility" is defined and discussed. Punishment is then defended in such a way that it accords with being a civilised response to crime. It is argued that in order to be such a response, and thereby qualify as a moral response, punishment must have a certain structure, i.e. it must fulfil seven necessary conditions, which, it is argued, together constitute the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. In arguing for each of the necessary conditions, different onedimensional theories of punishment are dealt with (retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, a paternalistic theory of punishment, and restitutionalism}, indicating that each fulfils some of the criteria for morally justified punishment. None of the onedimensional theories fulfils all the necessary conditions, however, and hence none on its own fulfils the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. This is not to argue that a straightforward theory could never on its own fulfil the conditions for morally justified punishment, but I have not been able to conceive how this could be done. The theory I here present is therefore a hybrid approach, incorporating elements of all the above-mentioned theories into a unitary theory. In doing so, it fulfils all the necessary conditions for being a civilised response to crime, thereby fulfilling the sufficient condition too, and hence providing a morally defensible account of punishment. Finally, the question of how this theory can be put into practice is addressed. Because the objective of punishment ought to be a civilised response, thereby benefiting both society as a whole and those being punished and rehabilitated, the thesis may be seen as a progressive synthesis of the various approaches examined. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)