Text in Afrikaans / Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Na meer as veertig jaar het Suid-Afrika 'n nuwe politieke bedeling wat veranderde wetgewing in die vooruitsig stel. 'n Oorweging van 'n dekriminaliseringsbeleid vir die gebruik van dagga, beskou teen die agtergrond van 'n toename in emstige misdaad soos moord, gewapende roof, taxigeweld en verkragting, weerspieel die realiteite van vandag se oorweldigende misdaadprobleem in Suid-Afrika. Een van die belangrikste take van die kriminoloog is om misdaad te omskryf sodat 'n beleid voorgeskryf kan word wat die strafregsplegingstelsel van hulp kan wees om uiteindelik misdaad te verminder of, meer realisties, meer doeltreffend te beheer. Die omskrywing daarvan is egter nie so eenvoudig nie vanwee die kompleksiteit van die mensdom. Inhierdie studie is 'n meningsopname gebruik van sowel jeugdiges, die toekomstige beleidmakers en algemene daggagebruikers, as kenners op die gebied van dwelmrehabilitasie en -beheer, ten einde die wenslikheid van 'n dekriminaliseringsbeleid te beoordeel. Empiriese data van beide groepe (die wetsgehoorsame en die wetsverbrekende) is vir die voorwaardelike steun vir die wetlike beheer van daggagebruik versamel, met die verskil dat eerste- en eksperimentele daggagebruikers wat geen antler misdaadrekord het of by enige misdaadbedrywighede betrokke is, nie 'n misdaadrekord moet kry nie. Die respondente het dus die behoud van strafmaatreels ondersteun, maar met 'n de facto-dekriminalisasie deur middel van nie-toepassing van die wet. Die respondente is van mening dat 'n verslapping van die huidige dwelmwetgewing tot 'n toename in misdaad aanleiding sal gee. Die respondente betwyfel egter die doeltreffendheid van die kriminele regstelsel. Hulle is selfs van mening dat die SAPD nie in staat is om die probleem te bekamp solank die middel in aanvraag is nie. Die studie beklemtoon verder die kompleksiteit en dikwels teenstrydige opvattings ten opsigte van dekriminalisasie ten einde te illustreer hoe moeilik dit is om 'n staatsbeleid daarop te skoei. / After more than forty years, South Africa has a new political dispensation with prospective new legislation. The consideration of a policy of decriminalization for the use of dagga, seen against the background of an increase in serious crimes such as murder, armed robbery, taxi violence and rape, reflects the realities of the current overwhelming crime problem in South Africa. One of the most important tasks of the criminologist is to describe crime in order to facilitate the system of administration of criminal justice in the diminishing of, or more realistically, better control of crime. The description thereof is, however, not simple due to the complexity of humanity. In this study an opinion survey of both youths as the future policy makers and most common users of dagga, and specialists in the field of drug rehabilitation and control was used, in order to determine the expedience of a policy of decriminalization. Empirical data was obtained from both groups (the law abiders and the law-breakers) for the conditional support of legislative control of dagga use, with the exception that first and experimental users with no criminal record or history of criminality should not be subjected to a criminal record. The respondents therefore supported the retention of punitive measures, but with a defacto-decriminalization by way of non­ enforcement of the law. The respondents were of the opinion that the relaxation of the present drug legislation would lead to an increase in crime. The respondents doubt the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, however, they are of the opinion that the SAPS would never be able to combat the problem as long as a demand for the drug continues to exist. The study further emphasizes the complexity and often diverse conceptions of decriminalization in order to illustrate how difficult it is to base a state policy on these conceptions. / Criminology and Security Science / M.A. (Kriminologie)

Toute économie ainsi que toute science a pour mission d’atteindre un certain progrès dans son domaine. Or si nous pouvons tous être d’accord sur ce point, nous ne partageons pas forcément la même définition du progrès. Pour élucider cette divergence de compréhension, nous avons pris le parti d’adhérer à une distinction entre éthique et morale : là où tout ordre moral consiste à ordonner les éléments d’un cadre déterminé pour une fin donnée, une posture éthique consiste à adopter et à adapter un principe faisant autorité pour découvrir un environnement alors inconnu. Nous avançons alors que le domaine de l’économie ainsi que toute idée de progrès ne peuvent être rattachés qu’à un ordre moral et non à une posture éthique. Pour illustrer ces propos, nous menons une réflexion sur la question de l’identité, notion certes vide et idéologique mais qui permet tout de même, couplée avec la distinction entre éthique et morale, de nous concentrer notamment sur les notions d’Etat, de personne ou encore de pouvoir. Ces réflexions nous éclairent sur certains fondements de l’économie et sur la philosophie utilitariste, philosophie avant tout liée au langage et de ce fait à la notion d’identité une fois encore ; utilitarisme et économie seraient en un sens déterministes, nous permettant d’accéder à un bonheur identifiable et vers lequel nous pourrions progresser. Ainsi nous avançons que le progrès ne peut qu’être conçu à partir d’un ordre moral et qu’il faille plutôt rechercher un certain équilibre pour que la dimension éthique puisse être elle aussi cultivée, au même titre que la catallaxie puisse être encouragée au côté de l’économie. / Every economics or science has to reach some progress in its field. But, if we can agree on this point, we do not necessarily share the same definition of progress. To clarify this divergence of understanding, we have chosen to distinguish between ethics and morals: if a moral order permits to order elements in a determined frame for a specific goal, an ethical posture means to adopt and to adapt an authoritative principle for the discovery of an unknown environment. We advance that the economic field and the idea of progress can only be associated with a moral order and not with an ethical posture. To illustrate that, we conduct a reflection about identity, which is an empty and ideological notion but which allows us, along the distinction between ethics and morals, to focus especially on notions like State, person or power. These reflections can enlighten us about some foundations of economics and utilitarianism which is a philosophy deeply related to language and then with the notion of identity once again; utilitarianism and economics are in a certain way playing a defining role, allowing us to reach a well-being which we can identify and to which we can progress. Thereby, we are advancing that the progress can only be conceived from a moral order and that we should search a kind of equilibrium to let the ethical dimension be cultivated, as well as to encourage catallaxy outre economics.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AnselmoCO_DISSERT.pdf: 1468756 bytes, checksum: 13c794c8c2ed091a0986d24349272b48 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-10-11 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / This research aims to reconstruct and explain the argument proposed by Peter Singer to justify the principle of equal consideration of interests (PECI). The PECI is the basic normative principle according to people should consider the interests of all sentient beings affected when somebody taking a moral decision. It is the join that Singer proposes between universalizability and the principle of equal consideration of interests that constitutes a compelling reason to justify it. The universalizability requires to disregard the numerical differences, putting yourself in other people s shoes, and to consider preferences, interests, desires and ideals of those affected. Singer joins universalizability to normative principle and molds the form and content of his theory. The first chapter introduces the discussion will be developed in this essay. The second chapter deals the historical and philosophical viewpoint from which Singer starts his studies. The third chapter is about the Singer s critiques of naturalism, intuitionism, relativism, simple subjectivism and emotivism. The fourth chapter exposes the design of universal prescriptivism proposed by R. M. Hare. The universal prescriptivism indicates, in the Singer s viewpoint, a consistent way to create the join between the universalizability and PECI. It highlights also the criticism designed by J. L. Mackie and Singer himself to universal prescriptivism. The second part of this chapter shows briefly some of the main points of the classical conception of utilitarianism and its possible relationship with the theory of Singer. The fifth chapter introduces the Singer s thesis about the origin of ethics and the universalizability as a feature necessary to the point of view of ethic, and the way which this argument is developed to form the PECI. The sixth chapter exposes the main distinctions that characterize the PECI. Finally the seventh chapter provides a discussion about the reasons highlighted by Singer for one who wants orient his life according to the standpoint of ethics. This structure allows explaining the main ideas of the author concerning the theoretical foundations of his moral philosophy / Esta investiga??o tem como objetivo reconstruir e explicitar o argumento proposto por Peter Singer para justificar o princ?pio de igual considera??o de interesses (PICI). O PICI ? o princ?pio normativo b?sico segundo o qual as pessoas devem considerar igualmente os interesses de todos os seres sencientes afetados ao tomarem uma decis?o moral. ? o v?nculo que Singer estabelece entre a universalizabilidade e o princ?pio de igual considera??o de interesses que se constitui em uma raz?o convincente para justific?-lo. A universalizabilidade consiste na exig?ncia de desconsiderar as diferen?as num?ricas, de colocar-se no lugar do outro e de considera??o igual pelas prefer?ncias, interesses, desejos e ideais dos afetados. Singer ao vincular a universalizabilidade e o princ?pio normativo estabelece a forma e o conte?do da sua teoria. No primeiro cap?tulo, introduzimos a discuss?o que ser? desenvolvida nesta disserta??o. No segundo cap?tulo, apresentamos o panorama hist?rico-filos?fico no qual Singer inicia suas investiga??es. No terceiro cap?tulo, apresentamos a sua cr?tica ao naturalismo, intuicionismo, relativismo e subjetivismo simples e, por fim, ao emotivismo. No quarto cap?tulo, expomos a concep??o do prescritivismo universal proposta por R. M. Hare. O prescritivismo universal indica, para Singer, uma forma consistente para estabelecer o v?nculo entre a universalizabilidade e o PICI. Apontamos, tamb?m, as cr?ticas feitas por J. L. Mackie e pelo pr?prio Singer ao prescritivismo universal. Na segunda parte do cap?tulo, apresentamos resumidamente alguns pontos centrais da concep??o cl?ssica do utilitarismo e uma poss?vel rela??o com a teoria de Singer. No quinto cap?tulo, apresentamos a tese de Singer sobre a origem da ?tica e sobre a universalizabilidade como uma caracter?stica necess?ria do ponto de vista da ?tica, bem como o argumento que ? desenvolvido para estabelecer o PICI. No sexto cap?tulo, expomos as principais distin??es que caracterizam o PICI. Encerramos no s?timo cap?tulo com uma discuss?o sobre as raz?es apresentadas por Singer para que uma pessoa oriente a sua vida de acordo com o ponto de vista da ?tica. Essa estrutura permite-nos explicitar as principais ideias do autor naquilo que concerne aos fundamentos te?ricos da sua filosofia moral

A presente dissertação trata do problema dos direitos culturais sob a ótica do utilitarismo liberal de John Stuart Mill. Objetiva-se a inserção da filosofia política do autor nas discussões que vêm sendo travadas nas últimas décadas por liberais e comunitaristas a partir da colocação do problema filosófico da identidade. Para tanto, busca-se desfazer frequentes equívocos e apresentar uma leitura integrada da filosofia de Mill com base na análise criteriosa de seus escritos, auxiliada por seus mais eminentes intérpretes. Pretende-se demonstrar que é de uma fundamental e prévia compreensão utilitarista, bem como de uma particular posição acerca do modo de acesso à verdade, que decorrem as convicções liberais e a centralidade da autonomia individual em seu pensamento. Estabelecidas essas premissas, verifica-se que o estado milliano, ao dispensar a convicção na neutralidade da esfera pública que decorre do pensamento liberal contratualista usualmente professado, mostra-se compatível em tese com a tarefa de garantir direitos culturais. Ao mesmo tempo em que sua visão ampla acerca dos bens que contribuem para a felicidade é capaz de posicionar a cultura no cálculo hedonístico individual, com reflexos na quantificação da utilidade em vista da felicidade geral, a defesa de Mill da autonomia e da diversidade parece poder justificar uma especial atenção ao contexto social que sirva para a expressão máxima da individualidade. / This dissertation deals with the problem of cultural rights from the viewpoint of the liberal utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. It intends to include the author‘s political philosophy in the debates that have been held in recent decades between liberals and communitarians starting from the approach of the philosophical problem of identity. To this end, we try to undo common misconceptions and provide an integrated reading of Mill's philosophy based on careful analysis of his writings, aided by his most eminent interpreters. We attempt to demonstrate that it is based on a previous fundamental adhesion to utilitarianism, as well as from a particular position regarding the access to the truth, that arise the liberal convictions and the centrality of autonomy in his doctrine. Given these premises, we could find that the Millian state, exempting the assumption on the neutrality of public sphere derived from the liberal contractarian doctrine usually professed, reveals itself theoretically compatible with the task of guaranteeing cultural rights. Whilst Mill‘s broad view regarding goods that contribute to happiness is capable of dragging culture into the hedonistic calculus, which affects the measurement of utility over general happiness, his defense of autonomy and diversity seems to justify a special attention to social context which maximize the expression of individuality.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it makes a normative idea analysis concerning organ donation, by comparing the perspectives of utilitarianism and classical liberalism. Secondly, it applies these perspectives on the Swedish legislation, in order to understand it in a political philosophical view. As a theoretical framework, the paper uses the two perspectives´ overarching ethical standpoints, but also try to discern their views on four - for the topic -appropriate concepts, these being the concepts of liberty, consent and self-ownership. These are then bundled together into two so-called ”ideal types”, to use for making normative statements about what the most morally right legislation would be concerning organ donation. In utilitarianism, an agent-neutral overall happiness is at the forefront, which leads it to prioritize an increase in donations over the autonomy of the individual. This makes the case for a conscription of organs or the softer notion of an opt-out system. Classical liberalism focus more on the right to self-ownership and negative liberty, and therefore argue for an opt-in system, which requires the explicit consent of the individual. Lastly, the paper makes the claim that the Swedish legislation falls in a category inbetween the normative judgements of the two perspectives, as it prescribes an opt-out system, but reserves the right of the family to refuse a donation, in case the deceased had not made a choice ante mortem.

Humanitär intervention är ett begrepp inom internationella relationer som väcker många känslor och frågor. Trots att idén om att använda våld för att stoppa brott mot de mänskli-ga rättigheter kan verka attraktivt från ett moraliskt perspektiv, vilket man i århundraden har gjort, har denna praktik varit synnerligen oregelbunden. Detta i hög grad beroende på den ambivalens som finns inför de internationella normer som skall reglera staters använ-dande av militärt våld. Synen på humanitära interventioner har ändrats i överensstämmelse med de förändringar som skett inom det internationella systemet. Dessa ändringar har, till viss del, medfört en förändrad syn på de normer som legitimerar användandet av våld inom det internationella samfundet. Humanitära interventioner som begrepp och praktik innehåller många dilemman i vår tid. Detta eftersom det berör traditionella normer av suveränitet och ickeintervention, som är de främsta byggstenarna för det moderna internationella systemet, tillika del av Förenta Na-tionernas (FN) stadgar. Stater är i dag förbjudna att använda militärt våld som ett instru-ment i deras utrikespolitik, förutom i fall av självförsvar eller i kollektiva säkerhetsåtgärder, beslutade av FN:s säkerhetsråd. Det handlar även om att det finns traditionella normer som förbjuder intervention i andra staters interna angelägenheter. Dessutom ska allt militärt våld auktorernas av säkerhetsrådet, som har till uppgift att upprätthålla internationell fred och säkerhet. Med detta perspektiv för ögonen, är användandet av våld för att genomdriva internationella humanitära normer, mycket begränsad enligt internationell lag. Detta har i många situatio-ner skapat ett svart hål när det kommer till att stoppa allvarliga förbrytelser mot de mänsk-liga rättigheter, genom internationellt ingripande. Ovanstående har lett till att man börjat diskutera och ifrågasätta traditionella principer som har varit ledande för det internationella samarbetet, vilket i sin tur skulle kunna öppna vägen för vissa interventioner med humani-tära syften. Denna diskussion handlar om suveränitet, internationella lag och det handlar om moraliska ställningstaganden. Realismen har under lång tid varit den ledande skolan i internationella relationer och därmed lagt grunden för hur man ska tolka internationella konflikter, krigs-föring och interventioner. På senare tid har Realismen utmanats av andra teoretiska skolor och ställningstaganden som ifrågasätter Realismens förmåga att förklara händelser på den internationella arenan. Genom att jämföra Realismens ståndpunkter, gentemot humanitära interventioner, med Utilitarismen och den Kosmopolitiska skolan, har uppsatsen kunnat presentera olika bilder av den problematik som humanitära interventioner idag står inför och därmed måste för-hålla sig till. Igenom att granska konflikten i Rwanda 1994 och Kosovo 1999 har problema-tiken runt humanitära interventioner ytterligare kunnat belysas och diskuteras. Detta har skett genom en kvalitativ textanalys. Nyckelord: Humanitär Intervention, Suveränitet, Icke-intervention, Internationell lag, Rea-lism, Kosmopolitanism, Utilitarism, Moral / Humanitarian intervention is a concept within international relations that provoke many diverse feelings and questions. Although the idée too use force in the name of ending crimes against human rights may seem attractive from a moral perspective, its practise has been highly irregular. This is much due to the norms that regulate states use of military force. The view on humanitarian interventions has changed in unity with the changes that have appeared within the international system. These changes have, to some extent, brought on a transformation in how we look upon the norms that regulate the use of force within the international community. Humanitarian intervention is also a concept and practises that creates many dilemmas in our time. This because it touches and concerns traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, that is not only fundamental building stones for the modern international system, but also a immense part of the structure of the United Nations (UN). States today, are forbidden to use military force as an integrated part of their foreign policy, except in cases of self-defence or collective security measures authorised by the UN Security Council. It is also about customary norms, which declare that states should not interfere in other states internal affaires. In the company of the above stated, the use of force to implement humanitarian norms is fairly limited according to international law. This has repeatedly created a gap when it comes to stop serious violations against human rights through international interference. The above stated has led to an intense discussion concerning how traditional principals may have to chance in ways that better can guide international cooperation’s in these matters. This discussion may in turn lead to an opening for some sort of interventions with humanitarian purposes. This discussion, furthermore, concerns sovereignty, international law, and it is about morality. Realism has for a long period of time been the leading school in international relations and has laid the ground for how we should interpret international conflicts, war and intervention. Recently, this school has been forced too respond to opposition from some other theoretical schools; questioning Realisms ability to explain activities on the international arena. By comparing Realism opinion toward humanitarian interventions, with the Utilitarian and Cosmopolitan school, this thesis has been able to present different pictures describe the complexity of humanitarian interventions. Through analyse of the conflicts taking place in Rwanda 1994 and in Kosovo 1999, the issue of humanitarian intervention has been further scrutinised and discussed. This has been done through a qualitative text analyse. Keywords: Humanitarian Intervention, Sovereignty, Non-intervention, International law, Realism, Cosmopolitanism, Utilitarianism, Morality

Ce qui arrive à l’homme du XXIe siècle en prison est en partie analogue à ce qui arrive àl’homme tout court. Nous avons perdu l’innocence (seuls les enfants ne l’ont pas encore perdue), ettentons de la récupérer en nous revendiquant victimes. Présumés coupables, isolés, observés, voilà ceque nous sommes devenus. L’homo carceralus est une sorte de type qui hante notre cultureoccidentale. Fruit du nihilisme et de la gnose. C’est pourquoi il est pertinent de chercher à penser sonépreuve, non de l’extérieur, mais comme ce qui peut nous arriver à chacun, et d’en repérer ce quil’empoisonne ou ce qui la libère. Car la gnose, qui est peut-être sophisme ou nihilisme, est menteuselorsqu’elle fait croire que l’on sort de l’épreuve par “en haut”, par la fuite hors des conditions de viehumaines, dans le scientisme naturaliste, le savoir statistique ou la technique. La résignation et la fuiteen avant ont le même visage, celui de la fatalité : ni l’une et ni l’autre n’aiment ce monde, ni ce temps.Or, ce n’est pas ailleurs que du sens peut advenir. Si la prison est un pharmakon, remède etpoison, c’est qu’elle reste une institution humaine. La grandeur de l’homme est d’être puissance descontraires, capacité de surmonter tout déterminisme, capacité de ne pas se résigner à la fatalité, aucoeur même de sa misère. Encore faut-il ne pas être abandonné seul dans l’épreuve, tant il est vrai quec’est l’autre, et particulièrement l’autre ébranlé, grâce à qui la traversée est possible, par “en bas”. Lesoin en prison s’enracine dans cette « solidarité des ébranlés ». Pour naviguer entre les différentsdispositifs pénitentiaires et sanitaires qui visent à contrôler et à prévoir le comportement des captifs, lemédecin doit faire preuve de mêtis, cette intelligence des interstices, au service de son patient. Et enmême temps, il doit garder de façon catégorique le secret médical, au nom de ce que l’homme restetoujours opaque à toutes les sciences et les techniques, plus grand que lui-même, en sa fragilité. Cesavoir « de nuit » n’est autre que le savoir socratique : « je sais que je ne sais pas ». / That which is happening to XXIst century man in prison is, in part, similar to what ishappening to all of us. Our innocence lost, (innocence is retained only by the child), we try to regain itby claiming to be the victim. We are presumed guilty, isolated, observed. Homo carceralus hauntsour Western culture; fruit of nihilism and gnosis. It is the reason we should reflect on his ordeal, notfrom the outside, but as something that could happen to each and every one of us, and in which todiscover where the poison lies and what the remedy could be. For gnosis, (either sophism ornihilism), is false when we are led to believe that we exit an ordeal by escaping our human conditionin the ‘upward’ direction of the natural sciences, statistical knowledge or technique. Resignation andheadlong pursuit share a characteristic, that of a predestined tendency towards disaster. Neither theone nor the other sits comfortably in this world or our times.But meaning does not have to come from elsewhere. If prison is pharmakon, both remedy andpoison, it is because it is a human institution. Man’s greatness is his conflicting authority : having thecapacity to overcome determinism, the ability not to resign himself to his fate, even at his lowestpoint. But it is imperative not to be left alone through this ordeal, for it is true that it is the other,particularly the ‘weakened other’, thanks to whom the crossing is possible from ‘below’. Care inprison is rooted in this ‘solidarity of the weak’. To navigate the different penitentiary and healthsystems, which seek to control and foresee the captives’ behaviour, the medical doctor must exertmêtis, become complicit with the patient in order to serve the patient. And at the same timecategorical medical confidentiality must be maintained, in the name of which the patient in his or herfragility, remains invisible to all sciences and techniques which are yet greater than he or she is. This‘secret’ knowledge is none other than Socratic knowledge: ‘I know that I do not know’.

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No description available.

Dans le contexte utilitariste de l’éthique des populations, deux positions s’opposent naturellement à propos de ce qui a de la valeur et de ce que nous devons faire afin de bénéficier au plus grand nombre. Là où certaines intuitions nous invitent à chercher la maximisation totale du bien-être, d’autres soulignent l’importance de faire de notre mieux pour parvenir à la plus haute moyenne possible. Ce document a pour vocation de traiter le débat théorique qui oppose ces deux avenues. Il s’agira donc de décrire et de préciser le fonctionnement et les conséquences de ces positions, afin de tenter d’apporter des éléments de réponses sur la solidité et la robustesse de ces deux axiologies. Dans ce but, nous évaluerons et répondrons aux objections qui leurs sont présentées, et ferons la lumière sur leurs lacunes respectives. Plus précisément, ce document s’intéressera principalement aux problèmes de la Conclusion Répugnante et de la Conclusion Sadique, qui ont fait couler beaucoup d’encre, mais également à d’autres objections couramment discutées dans la littérature. Nous conclurons que contrairement à ce qu’ils peuvent laisser croire, ce ne sont pas des arguments décisifs à l’encontre de ces positions. Il s’agira de surcroît d’interroger et d’expliquer les intuitions qui fondent ces positions, les biais qui les menacent mais également les conséquences contre-intuitives qui en découlent. / In the utilitarian context of population ethics, two positions are naturally opposed about what has value and what we ought to do to benefit the greatest number. Where some intuitions invite us to seek total well-being, others stress the importance of doing our best to achieve the highest possible average. This paper aims to adress the theoretical debate between these two avenues. It will therefore be necessary to describe and clarify the functioning and consequences of these positions, in order to try to provide elements of answers about the solidity and robustness of these two axiologies. To this end, we will assess and respond to the objections presented to them, and shed light on their respective shortcomings. More precisely, this paper will focus on the problems of the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion, which have caused a lot of ink to flow, but also on other objections commonly discussed in the litterature. We will conclude that contrary to what they may suggest, these are not decisive arguments against these positions. In addition, the document will question and explain the intuitions that underlie these positions, the biases that threaten them but alo the counter-intuitive consequences thats follow.