Despite its immense personal significance, procreation is an inherently other-regarding endeavor. By its very nature, the decision to procreate is the decision to bring into existence another morally considerable being, one who will be exposed to the full range of harms, benefits, and risks that accompany a typical human life, and one who cannot by its nature ever consent to being born. Moreover, when this decision is undertaken in a community of persons, it is also a decision to affect the lives of others in a host of profound (if often underappreciated) ways, from its effects on population size and environmental sustainability, to its consequences for a community's distribution of resources. In many cases, of course, these interests coincide: adults need children for their parenting projects, societies need citizens for the maintenance of their institutions, and children themselves are often happy to have been brought into existence. However, as a burgeoning literature is beginning to demonstrate, the various interests that are implicated by procreative decision-making can also come into conflict as well, and in ways that raise basic questions of justice. This thesis explores five of these questions, and in so doing, seeks to contribute to our understanding of the normative significance of procreation. Chapter One considers the relationship between procreation and child welfare, asking what role (if any) prospective children's interests play in limiting the scope of the right to procreate. Chapters Two and Three consider the relationship between procreation and parenthood, asking whether the act of creating a child generates special rights and/or obligations to parent that child. Chapter Four considers how the significant costs of procreation and parenting ought to be distributed through society, asking whether parents are responsible for paying the full cost of their childrearing projects, or whether childrearing costs should be shared in some way among parents and non-parents alike. Finally, Chapter Five considers our moral obligations to orphaned children, asking whether it is permissible to create new children in conditions where there are already existing children in need of parental care. While numerous positions are defended on each of these interrelated questions, one general conclusion runs through all of them: rather than being viewed as something that is immune from moral scrutiny, or as something that individuals have an unqualified right to do, procreation ought to be viewed as the site of potentially conflicting interests that must be carefully balanced against one another.

In this thesis I establish a hitherto unseen parallel between John Rawls’ theory of justice and utilitarian accounts with respect to population ethics; I argue that the absurd conclusions which plague utilitarianism also plague Rawls’ theory. These are the repugnant and preposterous conclusions. I then argue that Kant's political philosophy offers the resources to escape these absurd conclusions because of a crucial metaphysical difference between theories governed by outcome-oriented considerations and those governed by freedom-oriented constraints.

There has been growing recognition in recent environmental discourse that environmental justice, which is normally understood to mean the disproportionate effect of climate change on minority groups, also takes the form of epistemic injustice. In the Canadian context, this means the exclusion of Indigenous philosophies, values, and perspectives from discourse about environmental ethics, as well as the spheres of policy and governance as they pertain to the environment. At the same time, there has been increasing concern with creating just outcomes for future people. Given that future generations have made no contribution to the pollution that causes climate change, but will feel its worst effects, many environmental and political philosophers have recently pointed to the need for a strong theory of intergenerational justice, especially as it pertains to the environment. In this thesis, I argue that an essential part of achieving intergenerational environmental justice in Canada is working toward the rectification of both material and epistemic harms toward Indigenous peoples which are perpetuated by the “rationalistic” conception of nature which sees nature as an instrumentally valuable resource to be exploited for human gain. I explore the historical construction of this conception of nature and its pervasiveness in recent work on environmental ethics in order to show how Indigenous perspectives have historically been suppressed through colonialism, and more recently been subjected to epistemic oppression within Western environmental ethics. I then focus specifically on intergenerational environmental justice as a field in which Indigenous philosophies have faced the greatest exclusion, and may also have the most to teach us. I conclude by providing a brief overview of recent Indigenous environmental activism as an expression of Indigenous values, and look to treaties as understood by Indigenous philosophies as a potential framework for moving together toward a just future for all.

Time raises a host of difficult ethical questions. This doctoral project focuses on two: 1. How are "static" comparative principles (e.g. equality, desert) to be understood over time? (The Problem of Fairness & Time) 2. How might separation (in time) between agents, objects, and threats affect claims to the relevant resources? (The New Problem of Temporal Distance) My work begins with a simple observation: our prima facie intuitions about the value of simple distributions change depending on whether such cases are presented as static (occurring at one time) or dynamic (extended over time). Further examination of more complicated distributions leads to the proposal of a new theory, Weighted Progressive Egalitarianism. This theory has two features: only past-regarding complaints matter (a scope restriction), and a comparative complaint between persons located at a great temporal distance matters less than a complaint between contemporaries (a weighting restriction). This theory provides one plausible answer to the first question, the Problem of Fairness & Time. The evaluation of this theory relies on and reveals some non-standard answers to the second question, the New Problem of Temporal Distance. I conclude by arguing that the theory’s application to a few puzzles in population axiology merits further investigation.

The idea of writing this essay begun as an attempt to enter into the current discussion about the theory and ethics of sustainability. The essay aims to compare the meaning of sustainability with two ethical theories that are currently used in developmental and environmental issues, namely the theories of Martha Nussbaum and Peter Singer, and see how coherent these theories are with the concept of sustainability. In order to achieve the essays aims, the study will have to discuss first issues regarding the ‘meaning of sustainability’ and discuss the challenges in its conceptualisation to finally outline a reasonable framework meaning for sustainability. The paper contributes in this way in forming consistency between what the conceptualisation of sustainability represents and how ethical systems could be more coherent with these conceptualisation efforts. This essay aims to answer how deontological and utilitarian perspectives provide guidance regarding sustainability and if these perspectives are coherent with sustainability as a concept. The essay understands coherence as ideas or structures that are logically compatible and that logically support each other. This study concludes that there is a possibility to delineate a coherent meaning for sustainability as a two-level meaning structure; one formal meaning where we found the principle of sustainability and without which, we would not be talking about sustainability and a second level, called the substantive meaning, where four main ethical relations arise, and where obligations and responsibilities appear. The study also concludes that there are certainly fundamental moral ideals and moral ideas embedded in sustainability that have the potential to be agreed upon in a global consensus. The formal meaning of continuance (sustainability moral ideal) gives in turn some fundamental moral ideas (normative relations) at a second level of definition. Additionally, the study shows that it is not self-evident which ethical model is more or less coherent with sustainability but the results indicate that a strong, coherent and egalitarian idea about the value of life, whether as flourished and functional as opportunities and interests, on which many of today's ethical systems are based on, can help an ethical system to be more coherent with the meaning of sustainability.

This research is guided by the assertion that, as American society journeys through the post-modern transition, many established churches are struggling to respond adequately to cultural change within a fragmented generational context. It further is argued that the resulting ineffectiveness of many of these churches in transmitting the Christian tradition to Gen Xers, the first post-modern generation, threatens the ability of these churches to sustain their witness through this period. This project advances the hypothesis that, if established churches are to sustain their witness through the post-modern transition, they must engage in a process of missional renewal that encompasses Generation X. When considered from both a sociological and a theological perspective, this process must be seen as entailing a commitment to intergenerational reconciliation and justice. Chapter one provides an introduction to this study and explains how it is situated within the discipline of Practical Theology. Following Heitink (1999:6), Practical Theology is defined as “the mediation of the Christian faith in the praxis of modern society.” Chapter two offers additional theoretical foundations through an exploration of the intergenerational praxis of the church within the intergenerational praxis of society. In chapter three, essential historical background is provided through an exploration of the influence of modernity in shaping the praxis of American society, as well as the influence of the Christendom paradigm in guiding the church’s praxis. This chapter also explores the emergence of institutional structures that have fostered distance between the generations, as well as the impact of these changes upon the intergenerational praxis of the church. Chapter four examines the complexities associated with the post-modern paradigm shift. Generation X is introduced as a generation whose formative years most closely approximate this period. Generation X is shown to be a misunderstood and maligned generation possessing discontinuous cultural values. In chapter five, the “marriage” of Christendom and modernity is shown to limit the ability of established churches to respond faithfully to the post-modern turn. The intergenerational dynamics of these churches also are shown to hinder their response. This chapter demonstrates that the resulting absence of the first post-modern generation from these churches places their continued viability at risk. Chapter six explores the need for these churches to experience missional renewal. A case is made for the participation of Generation X as a crucial consideration in this pursuit. The issue of “process” is shown to be important in helping churches negotiate the challenges of missional renewal. Chapter seven advances the assertion that, from both theological and sociological perspectives, intergenerational reconciliation and justice must be seen as integral dimensions of the missional renewal process. In chapter eight, the argument developed in the preceding chapters is subjected to empirical evaluation. The results of a survey conducted among churches from five denominations lend credibility to this study’s hypothesis. The final chapter (nine) introduces the “Missional Change Model” as one strategic framework through which established churches might be guided in pursuing missional renewal. This chapter also demonstrates how this model might help to facilitate intergenerational reconciliation and justice. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Practical Theology / unrestricted

Climate change is a critical threat to all the countries of the world today, not least because of the severe human rights infringements it may well lead to. However, although climate change is a collective, global challenge, there are considerable inequalities regarding contribution to cause and burden of the effects. Those suffering the most from the effects of climate change tend to be least responsible for the emissions causing it. The theoretical concept of climate justice aims to address these injustices, between different countries as well as societal groups and generations. To contribute to the understanding of how this concept is present in the global climate debate today, this thesis examines a selection of the Paris Agreement parties’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) from a perspective of climate justice. The analysis is based on a theoretical framework developed by Andrea Schapper, focusing on three dimensions of climate justice – international, intra-societal and intergenerational. Through this framework, a total of 36 NDCs are studied, the top and bottom three countries for each world region based on levels of cumulative CO2-emissions. The aim of the case selection has been to obtain a variation regarding development status, vulnerability to the effects of climate change, levels of greenhouse gas emissions and geographical location of the studied countries. The results of the study show that all the dimensions are present in at least some of the studied NDCs, but to a very different extent. Primarily, the parties discuss the issue of international justice. Intra-societal justice is touched upon quite frequently but very few bring up the matter of intergenerational justice. Moreover, all three dimensions are predominantly handled by countries classified as ”developing” (according to the UN statistics division).  This implies that climate justice is a higher priority for the most vulnerable to and least responsible for climate change, which is problematic for many reasons. Above all, it indicates that rich, industrialized countries are reluctant to take responsibility for their current and historical emissions, as well as the effect those emissions have on others.

The progression of climate change has brought the issue of intergenerational justice further into focus. At the same time, there has been a global increase in climate litigation. Activists increasingly use litigation and fundamental and human rights as instruments to enforce their demands for intergenerational justice. This thesis, therefore, focuses on the question of whether climate litigation can transform intergenerational justice from a political norm into a human rights-based, justiciable right.  Previous studies identified a human-rights turn in climate litigation. In addition, other studies revealed that climate activists are increasingly using intergenerational framing. However, the relationship between intergenerational justice and human rights is understudied.  This thesis addresses the existing research gap. Utilizing a mechanism-based account, the legal framing and the legal interpretation of the Neubauer case, decided by the German Federal Constitutional Court are analyzed to show the transformation of intergenerational justice into a matter of human rights. Moreover, climate litigation cases at the ECtHR are analyzed whether they contain references to Neubauer to identify indicators for a precedent-setting effect upon the supranational human rights framework of ECHR. This thesis demonstrates the importance of climate litigation as a policy tool in national and international climate governance.

Dans le contexte utilitariste de l’éthique des populations, deux positions s’opposent naturellement à propos de ce qui a de la valeur et de ce que nous devons faire afin de bénéficier au plus grand nombre. Là où certaines intuitions nous invitent à chercher la maximisation totale du bien-être, d’autres soulignent l’importance de faire de notre mieux pour parvenir à la plus haute moyenne possible. Ce document a pour vocation de traiter le débat théorique qui oppose ces deux avenues. Il s’agira donc de décrire et de préciser le fonctionnement et les conséquences de ces positions, afin de tenter d’apporter des éléments de réponses sur la solidité et la robustesse de ces deux axiologies. Dans ce but, nous évaluerons et répondrons aux objections qui leurs sont présentées, et ferons la lumière sur leurs lacunes respectives. Plus précisément, ce document s’intéressera principalement aux problèmes de la Conclusion Répugnante et de la Conclusion Sadique, qui ont fait couler beaucoup d’encre, mais également à d’autres objections couramment discutées dans la littérature. Nous conclurons que contrairement à ce qu’ils peuvent laisser croire, ce ne sont pas des arguments décisifs à l’encontre de ces positions. Il s’agira de surcroît d’interroger et d’expliquer les intuitions qui fondent ces positions, les biais qui les menacent mais également les conséquences contre-intuitives qui en découlent. / In the utilitarian context of population ethics, two positions are naturally opposed about what has value and what we ought to do to benefit the greatest number. Where some intuitions invite us to seek total well-being, others stress the importance of doing our best to achieve the highest possible average. This paper aims to adress the theoretical debate between these two avenues. It will therefore be necessary to describe and clarify the functioning and consequences of these positions, in order to try to provide elements of answers about the solidity and robustness of these two axiologies. To this end, we will assess and respond to the objections presented to them, and shed light on their respective shortcomings. More precisely, this paper will focus on the problems of the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion, which have caused a lot of ink to flow, but also on other objections commonly discussed in the litterature. We will conclude that contrary to what they may suggest, these are not decisive arguments against these positions. In addition, the document will question and explain the intuitions that underlie these positions, the biases that threaten them but alo the counter-intuitive consequences thats follow.

本論文題旨為：「論代間正義：一個羅爾斯式的觀點」。代間正義是晚近三十年來新興且益愈受到重視的倫理學議題之一，其主要關切的核心問題，乃在於追問「當代之於後代所應擔負的責任」。本文透過當代政治哲學與倫理學家羅爾斯（John Rawls）有關社會正義理論的設計與主張，分兩部分處理此問題。 / 第一部份所處理的問題為由帕菲特（Derek Parfit）所深化之「後代人格不同一問題」（The Non-Identity Problem），旨在探究「代間正義是否可能」。帕菲特指出，前代不同的行為選擇，將造成不同後代的存在，而這使得現存既有之各種權利與責任相對應的理論，無法合理地適用於代間關係。帕菲特主張，可以採取「忽略特定人格的比較（品質）原則」以解決此後代人格不同一問題。然而，帕菲特此舉卻陷入「不特定人格的後代無法追究前代之行為責任」的理論困境。本文主張，透過羅爾斯原初位置（original position）的理論設計啟發，即便在代間存在著「前代不同的行為選擇，將造成不同後代的存在」的後代人格不同一疑慮，當代仍可採納原初位置的理論啟示，區分人的屬性（properties）與獨特性（particular）的差異，在後代存有人格不同一問題（獨特性）的情形下，針對「屬性」而確立追問當代之於後代所應擔負責任之正當性。 / 第二部分主要處理羅爾斯有關代間正義觀點的內部論證問題，並進一步藉此說明「代間正義如何可能」。羅爾斯以「正義的儲蓄原則」（just savings principle）說明代間的分配正義問題，並《正義論》（A Theory of Justice）中將它納入正義二原則之中，成為建構社會基本體制的基本原則之一。然而，羅爾斯早期解釋與證成儲蓄原則的相關理據如動機假定（motivation assumption）與家族模式等，卻可能與其他理論假定如締約者的理性等相衝突、衍生解釋融貫上的困難，而遭到眾多學者們的質疑。羅爾斯在一九九三年的《政治自由主義》（Political Liberalism）中對此做出回應，並將關切下一代的動機假定，修正為「要求前代也承諾遵守他們所遵守的儲蓄原則，無論向前或向後追溯多遠」。除此之外，羅爾斯於《正義論》以外的其他著作，在提及正義二原則時，皆不再表述「正義的儲蓄原則」。本文認為羅爾斯後期所提出的證立主張，不僅整合了代內分配正義（差異原則）與代間分配正義（儲蓄原則）的論證理據（小中取大規則的應用），更與其主張「社會作為一世代相繼之公平的合作體系」時所標舉之「相互性理念」（the idea of reciprocity）的核心概念相符應。本文認為，在論證理據得到順利整合的前提下，羅爾斯仍可在後期表述正義二原則時，將「正義的儲蓄原則」放回其中，並可據此呼應當代永續發展理念「既滿足當代人的需求，又不對後代人滿足其需求的能力造成危害」的核心主張。 / The topic “Intergenerational Justice” is one of the newest but getting more important ethics problems to contemporaries. One of the key points of this issue is how to make sense of our obligations to the posterity (include future people) if possible. In this dissertation, I intend to clarify this problem by Rawls’s theory of justice into two parts. / The first part is “The Non-Identity Problem” held by Derek Parfit. This problem shows that “in the different outcomes, different people would be born”, and it seems inactive the traditional theories of rights. Parfit suggests that we can through it by the priinciple Q: “if in either of two outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be bad if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived.” But this principle makes new difficulties about this problem. According Reiman, I argue that we can adjust this non-identity problem by the theory hypothesis “Original Position” of Rawls’s theory of justice, and that there are obligations from contemporaries to the future people. / The second part is about the arguments of Rawls’s theory of justice between generations. According to early Rawls in 1971, the theory of justice between generations represented by the “just savings principle” and was one part of the Two Principles of Justice in A Theory of Justice. But there are some argument troubles about the assumptions that makes the theory of justice between generations difficultly, especially on the “motivation assumption” and the family mode and so on. In 1993, Rawls changed his arguments about the theory of justice between generations, but he also take off the just savings principle from the Two Principles of Justice in other books or articles besides A Theory of Justice. I argue that latter arguments seem more reasonable to the theory of justice between generations, and they also makes the whole theory of social justice comprehensive. Then I argue that Rawls can still presents the just savings principle when he says about the Two Principles of Justice.