La croissance de l’infertilité féminine liée à l’âge dans les sociétés européennes et nord-américaines suscite une augmentation de demandes en matière d’assistance médicale à la procréation (AMP) et amène chaque société à s’interroger sur ses normes et pratiques. En France, cette question est un révélateur de la spécificité du modèle bioéthique qui encadre les techniques d’AMP, ainsi que de ses tensions et contradictions croissantes. La particularité de ce modèle est de se présenter comme strictement « thérapeutique » et de reposer sur l’opposition entre infertilité « normale » et infertilité « pathologique ». Cette opposition en nourrit une autre, à connotation plus morale, celle qui distingue une AMP légitime et une AMP dite « de convenance personnelle », légitimant un discours social et médical particulièrement conservateur et réactif face aux perspectives d’utilisation des techniques médicales dans le but de pallier l’infertilité féminine liée à l’âge.À partir de deux enquêtes, l’une auprès de professionnels de l’AMP et l’autre auprès de femmes confrontées à une infertilité liée à leur âge, cette thèse propose d’appréhender l’infertilité dans une démarche pragmatique, en s’inscrivant dans une approche relationnelle. Elle révèle ainsi que les règles d’accès à l’AMP en France et le discours social, reposant sur l’opposition entre les deux infertilités, s’appuient sur une vision trop étroite, simplifiée et au fond ininterrogée de l’infertilité elle-même. Notre recherche permet de mettre au jour l’existence de référents normatifs non pris en compte par ce modèle, qui s’avèrent pourtant centraux dans les pratiques des professionnels et des femmes. Elle ouvre ainsi vers une approche plus complexe de l’infertilité à la fois biologique, mais aussi et toujours sociale, relationnelle et temporelle. / Growth in age-related female infertility in European and North American societies raises demands for assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and leads each society to question its standards and practices. In France, this question reveals the specificity of the bioethics model that frames the techniques of ART, as well as its increasing tensions and contradictions. The particularity of this model is to present itself as strictly "therapeutic" and to rely on the opposition between "normal" infertility and "pathological" infertility. This opposition encourages one another, with a more moral connotation, that distinguishes a legitimate ART and an ART called "personal convenience", legitimizing a social and medical discourse that is particularly conservative and reactive in the face of prospects for the use of medical techniques for the purpose to mitigate female infertility related to age.Based on two surveys, one with ART professionals and the other with women facing age-related infertility, this thesis proposes to understand infertility in a pragmatic approach by adopting a relational approach. It thus reveals that the rules governing access to ART in France and social discourse, based on the opposition between the two types of infertilities, are based on a too narrow, simplified and, in the end, not taking into consideration the view of infertility itself. Our research makes it possible to discover the existence of normative referents not taken into account by this model, which are nevertheless central in the practices of professionals and women. This thesis opens up a more complex approach to infertility that is both biological, but also and always social, relational and temporal.

FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgico / Trata-se de uma investigaÃÃo sobre as dualidades conceptuais saÃde/doenÃa e normal/patolÃgico em Freud. Mediante a perspectiva epistemolÃgica de Kurt Lewin, buscamos saber o quanto estas dualidades expressariam o modo de pensamento galilÃico e o que hà do modo aristotÃlico. Ora, uma vez que Freud oscilou entre as duas formas de pensamento, procuramos, no seu prÃprio texto, algumas indicaÃÃes que pudessem servir como referÃncia galilÃica suplementar. Consideramos que ao falar sobre plasticidade e adesividade libidinais, ele teria estabelecido um continuum entre estas categorias em relaÃÃo: em vez de opÃ-las em dicotomias aristotÃlicas, ele as teria conectado dialeticamente como verdadeiras dualidades ou sÃries de fenÃmenos que compreenderiam uma variaÃÃo contÃnua entre si. Tal justificaria o reconhecimento de que fases de transiÃÃo estariam sempre presentes entre a normalidade e a patologia, e saÃde e doenÃa, respectivamente. Supondo que Freud tenha apenas raciocinado mediante tal lÃgica, nÃo chegando a formalizÃ-la epistemologicamente, tentamos formalizÃ-la com a ajuda do que Canguilhem expÃs sobre a normatividade de vida e as diferenÃas entre normalidade e saÃde e, anormalidade e patologia. Verificamos que (1) as dualidades acima referidas expressam amplamente o modo de pensamento galilÃico, mormente quanto Ãs neuroses; ele as concebeu como sÃries de fenÃmenos que compreendem uma variaÃÃo contÃnua entre si. (2) Apesar da distinÃÃo entre seus campos de referÃncia, a lÃgica que descobrimos haver em Freud à algo comparÃvel com o que Canguilhem atribuiu à normatividade vital. / We search here about two kinds of conceptual dualities in Freud: health/disease and normality/pathology. By means of Kurt Lewinâs epistemological perspective, we seek to know how these dualities could correspond to Galilean and Aristotelian ways of scientific thought. Having evidenced that Freud had shown an oscillation between the modes of scientific thought, we have sought, through Freudâs own works, some indication which would help as a supplementary Galilean reference. We considerate, then, that Freudâs view on plasticity and adhesiveness of libido present the idea of a continuum between the two phenomena. That is, instead of opposing them in the way of the Aristotelian dichotomies, Freud has dialectically connected them as dualities and series of phenomena which show internal and continuous variation among themselves. This testifies the existence of some phases of transition between normality and pathology and health and disease. Once Freud had only conceived but never formalized his idea in epistemological terms, we have tried to do this. By means of Canguilhem theory life normativity and the differences between normality and health as well as abnormality and pathology, we have found out that: (1) the above mentioned dualities correspond to the Galilean way of thought; this occurs mainly when Freud refers to neurosis; Freud conceived them as a series of phenomena that show internal and continued interconnection. (2) Despite the difference between their fields of reference, the logic found in Freud is somewhat comparable to what Canguilhem attributed to life normativity.