The drama of Jean-Paul Sartre is primarily an investigation into the meaning of the human condition. The question of primary concern is: What does it mean to be a human being? Through his drama, Sartre reveals the nature of the existential situation. This thesis looks at five plays of Sartre and discusses the philosophical ideas in each.

<p>This thesis attempts to render a comprehensive interpretation of Heidegger's concept of nothingness as it is argued for in Being and Time. This thesis has two main objectives: 1) to reinterpret Heidegger's concept of the anxiety in which Dasein experiences nothingness and to argue against the standard interpretation which states that Dasein experiences anxiety or nothingness when it acknowledges its mortality, and 2) to show that section 40 of <em>Being and Time</em> should be interpreted independently from later sections. The main emphasis of this thesis is to clarify what Heidegger means by nothingness and to criticize those who misinterpret Heidegger. I attempt to provide a more satisfactory account of nothingness and its relation to anxiety and death.</p> <p>In chapter I, merely give an account of Heidegger's concept of inauthenticity, which includes the following concepts: The "they", averageness, distantiality, levelling down, publicness, idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, and falling and throwness.</p> <p>In chapter II, I discuss anxiety and nothingness. refer to Heidegger's essay entitled "What is Metaphysics?" in order to get a deeper understanding of Heidegger's concept of nothingness. I argue against the standard interpretation and show that nothingness can be experienced without the acknowledgement of one's mortality.</p> <p>In chapter III, I attempt to answer the following question: What does Heidegger mean by death? I outline the arguments of various interpreters of Heidegger's concept of death. They equate nothingness with one's acknowledgement of mortality, i.e., the possibility of one's own death. Those who argue for this position do not understand what Heidegger means by nothingness and its significance to death. I criticize these interpreters and reveal their oversights and misinterpretations, and then put forth my own interpretation of what Heidegger means by death.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Nossa pesquisa pretende trabalhar a maneira pela qual a filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, especialmente no que se convencionou chamar período intermediário e período final de sua obra, opera uma espécie de dissolução das dicotomias clássicas, sobretudo no que se refere à oposição entre sujeito e objeto, propondo uma reformulação ontológica que recusa a cisão entre o Ser e o Nada, buscando afirmar e explicitar a reversibilidade originária entre eles. / Our research intends to show the way Merleau-Ponty\'s philosophy, especially during what is usually called its intermediary period and its last period, realizes a dissolution of classical dicotomies, over all the one that concerns the oposition between subject and object, proposing an ontological reformulation that refuses the cleavage between Being and Nothingness, intending to affirm the original reversibility betwwen them.

Nossa pesquisa pretende mostrar a relação entre liberdade e situação presente na primeira fase da filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, especialmente na Fenomenologia da Percepção. Nosso objetivo é indicar que ela se apoia em uma dimensão ontológica, cuja característica principal é a recusa da tradicional separação entre ser e nada, e cujo fundamento encontra-se na temporalidade. / Our research intends to show the relation between freedon and situation present at the begining of Merleau-Ponty\'s philosophy, especially at Phénoménologie de la Perception. Our objective is to indicate that it is suported by an ontoligical dimension, whose main caracteristic is the refuse of the traditional separation between \"being\" and \"nothingness\", and whose fundament is found at the temporality.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche's account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche's discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human's ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche's account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche's discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human's ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

Nossa pesquisa pretende mostrar a relação entre liberdade e situação presente na primeira fase da filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, especialmente na Fenomenologia da Percepção. Nosso objetivo é indicar que ela se apoia em uma dimensão ontológica, cuja característica principal é a recusa da tradicional separação entre ser e nada, e cujo fundamento encontra-se na temporalidade. / Our research intends to show the relation between freedon and situation present at the begining of Merleau-Ponty\'s philosophy, especially at Phénoménologie de la Perception. Our objective is to indicate that it is suported by an ontoligical dimension, whose main caracteristic is the refuse of the traditional separation between \"being\" and \"nothingness\", and whose fundament is found at the temporality.

Nossa pesquisa pretende trabalhar a maneira pela qual a filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, especialmente no que se convencionou chamar período intermediário e período final de sua obra, opera uma espécie de dissolução das dicotomias clássicas, sobretudo no que se refere à oposição entre sujeito e objeto, propondo uma reformulação ontológica que recusa a cisão entre o Ser e o Nada, buscando afirmar e explicitar a reversibilidade originária entre eles. / Our research intends to show the way Merleau-Ponty\'s philosophy, especially during what is usually called its intermediary period and its last period, realizes a dissolution of classical dicotomies, over all the one that concerns the oposition between subject and object, proposing an ontological reformulation that refuses the cleavage between Being and Nothingness, intending to affirm the original reversibility betwwen them.