I trace the concept of nothingness in twentieth century philosophical theology from the work Paull Tillich through that of Martin Heidegger and Keiji Nishitani toward Robert Neville and Ray L. Hart all of whom have taken up the challenge of nothingness. As a specific metaphysical concept or category, these philosophers and theologians would undoubtedly disagree on a specific definition of nothingness; however, I argue they would agree on the vague function of nothingness, which is a relief or contrast to being. Tied up with existence contra nothingness are the possibilities of existence or meontic nothingness. At stake in the encounter with or exposure to nothingness is the ability to refund or redeem one’s ownmost potential and possibilities. How one responds to the specter of nothingness makes nothing matter (or not) in the way one turns from nothingness back to existence. In other words, the stakes are not merely the metaphysical (non)status of nothingness, but the desire to find meaning and value in human, finite existence in the face of radical contingency and the specter of nihilism.

Ką, kodėl ir kaip slepia žmogus? Kas yra paslaptis? Kas slepiasi už pačios paslapties? Ar gali būti, kad žmoguje esantys slėpiniai ir pačio žmogaus paslaptys yra Būties paslapties kartotė? Ar galima analizuojant žmogaus paslaptis ką nors sužinoti apie Būtį? Būties stoka įgalina mus laužyti taisykles, dekonstruoti vaidmenis, nusižengti sociumo įstatymams. Būties trokšdami išbandome visus kelius, o bandymų destruktyvią informaciją užkasame kaip vaikiškus sekretus. Žmogus slepia Nerimą. Nerimas slepia Niekį. O “gryna Būtis ir grynas Niekis yra tas pats.”. / What, why and how does a man hide? What is a secret? What hides behind the secret itself? Can it be that the secrets within a human being and the secrets of a man are the repetition of the secret of Being? Is it possible to find out anything about Being by analyzing the secrets of man? The lack of Being empowers us to break the rules, to deconstruct the roles, to violate the laws of the social. While wishing for Being we try out all the ways, and we cover up the destructive information of the attempts as childish secrets. A man hides Anxiety. Anxiety hides Nothingness. “Pure Being and pure Nothing are the same.”.

The main objective of this study is to make a comprehensive analysis of the question &ldquo / Why is there something rather than nothing?&rdquo / , which is one of the major questions of metaphysics, and to find a plausible answer at the end, if it is possible. To begin this analysis, a clarification of what we understand by this question is needed first. For the clarification, a definition of &lsquo / nothingness&rsquo / will be sought. Afterwards, the motivation for us to ask this question, the significance of it, and the content of it will be investigated. This investigation will help us concentrate on and discuss within the framework of causation and necessity our understanding of &ldquo / contingent beings&rdquo / and &ldquo / nothingness&rdquo / . Two main approaches sought to answer this question till now are by theists and physicists. Those approaches will be discussed and compared. And at the end of the comparative analysis of these two approaches, a metaphysical approach which will be a layer of them will be sought.

Samuel Huntington provoked great debate among international relations (IR) theorists with an article titled ¡¥The Clash of Civilizations?¡¦ and thus caused ¡¥civilizational turn¡¦ in international studies. While criticizing Huntington¡¦s mode of analysis, the IR theorists seek alternative ways of interpreting civilization. This civilizational turn has also emerged in the discussion of ¡¥non-western IR theories¡¦. Reflecting the Eurocentrism of the discipline, some of the IR theorists have kept searching alternative ways of theorizing the world through cultures and historical experiences originated in the non-western areas, which conceive of learning across different ways of being (ontology) and knowing (epistemology). This dissertation analyzes the possibility of an Asian school of international relations through civilizational analysis of non-western IR theories with Asian perspectives. While Asia is often regarded as a highly heterogeneous area both culturally and economically, this dissertation explores the compatibilities or even commonalities among discourses of Asian intellectual communities on civilization which may consist of a school of thought serving to enrich and dialogue with contemporary IR theories. The dissertation consists of three case studies: Confucian ¡¥Harmonious world¡¦, Nishida¡¦s philosophy on ¡¥nothingness¡¦ and postcolonial India with principles of non-violence, nonalignment and subaltern studies. Based on different ontologies and epistemologies, these three schools of thought contribute a common alternative way of interpreting world politics: the middle way, which provides the rationale for the possibility of an open Asian regionalism.

La présente thèse de doctorat est consacrée à la problématique du Néant dans les œuvres romanesques de Georges Bataille et Raymond Queneau. Une lecture comparée de ces deux auteurs ne semble pas a priori évidente tant leurs œuvres sont éloignées, aussi bien d’un point de vue thématique que d’un point de vue stylistique. Pourtant, les deux auteurs entendent faire du roman, et de la littérature en général, le lieu d’une expérience de pensée leur permettant d’envisager les problèmes fondamentaux de l’homme. C’est à ce titre qu’ils se confrontent au néant de l’existence, sujet d’angoisse qui suscite volontiers le vertige. Nous nous intéressons dans un premier temps à la constitution de cette expérience du Néant, en soulignant qu’elle relève d’une configuration de pensée aussi bien variée qu’hétérodoxe, reflétant l’émulation intellectuelle qui caractérise l’amitié de Bataille et Queneau. Dans une deuxième partie, nous nous interrogeons plus spécifiquement sur l’intérêt de l’écriture romanesque pour traiter de la question du Néant, en particulier au regard de la philosophie. La dernière partie aborde la problématique de la lecture qui permet de faire du Néant inscrit dans les textes une véritable expérience. Tout au long de ce travail, nous montrons ainsi la singularité d’une pensée littéraire dans le rapport problématique qu’elle entretient avec la philosophie. / This PhD work is devoted to the subject of Nothingness in the fiction works by George Bataille and Raymond Queneau. A comparative reading of those two authors is far from obvious in theory because their works are so remote from each other, from a thematic point of view as well as from a stylistic point of view. However, both authors are intent upon turning the novel, and literature in general, into a thought provoking place enabling them to face the fundamental problems of Man. It is for that reason that they address the nothingness of life, a source of anguish prone to provoke vertigo. In a first part, we will reflect upon the building of that experience of nothingness, by underlining that it derives from a frame of mind as varied as heterodox, mirroring the intellectual emulation that is a key feature of the friendship between Bataille and Queneau. In a second part, we will more specifically wonder about the interest of fiction writing to deal with the subject of nothingness, in particular in relation with philosophy. The last part focuses on the question of reading which enables to turn Nothingness inscribed in the texts into a real experience. Throughout this work, we thus show the uniqueness of a literary thinking in its problematic relation with philosophy.

Keywords: Emanuele Severino, Neo-Parmenidism, original structure, Being, Nothingness, death. The aim of this work is to put into circulation the thought of the Italian philosopher Emanuele Severino. The Neo-Parmenidism, of which Severino is the most important representative, is an interesting voice in the Italian and European philosophical panorama nowadays and it can open a new field for philosophical research, especially in the theme of death. A definition of Neo-Parmenidism will be given and the context from which and in which it was born and developed in the XXᵉ century will be outlined. The 'original structure' will then be explained. It is the logical-conceptual knot which, according to Severino, is the true foundation, since it allows the Being to be shown in its full authenticity, that is, without contamination by nothingness. The second half of Severino's writings will also be discussed. The path to the affirmation of authentic Being through the "sunset" of being-that-is-not will be shown. Finally, we will expose how Severino manages to give a new meaning to the phenomenon of death, which no longer has to do with nothingness but only with Being, as an approach to the Glory.

In my essay, I reflected on my personal experience of moving to another city and all the physical, fiscal, and emotional changes that I went through. Through the text, I bounced between my thoughts of my old hometown and questions that one suburb lifestyle brings. In my painting practice, I used references from my visions and memories. In a way, every piece has a kind of resemblance to gambling and child upbringing. Every painting situation creates its own needs, and my work is engaged in staying attentive to this setting and how it changes and changes me. / Fine Art

Il semblerait que la recherche d’un premier principe ne puisse ni aboutir une fois pour toutes ni être abandonnée. L’objectif est de montrer, d’une part, que cette tension travaille l’apophatisme de Plotin et la déconstruction de Derrida en y induisant des difficultés symétriques, et, d’autre part, que l’exploration de ces difficultés suggère une doctrine « intermédiaire » du premier principe intégrant la tension en question. Leurs philosophies reposent toutes deux sur une instance que son excès radical conduit à déborder l’être et l’originarité, mais le néoplatonicien et le déconstructeur interprètent ce débordement de façons diamétralement opposées. Le premier la comprend comme un aboutissement de la quête d’origine, tandis que le second y voit une invitation à dépasser cette quête. D’un côté, Plotin pense une arkhè que sa transcendance radicale rend difficile à déconstruire, mais qui devrait aussi interdire d’en garantir l’existence et la fonction. Sa volonté de maintenir cette garantie induit une série de perturbations, notamment autour du thème de la matière. D’un autre côté, la déconstruction du principe repose sur l’usage d’un schème principiel dénié. Pour le montrer, il faut élaborer une présentation générale de la pensée derridienne, qui révèle une tension culminant avec l’occultation de cet usage par un positionnement anti-principiel. Il s’agit de montrer que l’auto-dépassement de l’arkhè ne représente ni une garantie ni une abolition, qu’il peut être intégré dans une conception originale fondée sur certains éléments propres à chacun de nos auteurs, et qui articule un premier principe métaphysique à une ontologie et à une éthique. / It would seem that the search for a first metaphysical principle cannot either succeed once for all or be abandoned. The objective is to show, on one hand, that this tension works Plotinus’ apophatism and Derrida’s deconstruction by causing in it symmetric difficulties, and, on the other hand, that the exploration of these difficulties suggests an "intermediate" doctrine of the first principle, integrating the tension. Their philosophies rest both on something that its radical excess drives beyond being and origin, but they give diametrically opposite interpretations of this situation.The Neoplatonist understands it as a success of the quest for the first principle, whereas the deconstructionist sees it as an invitation to give up this quest. On one side, Plotinus tries to think an arkhè which its radical transcendence makes difficult to deconstruct, but that should also forbid guaranteeing its existence and its function. His will to maintain this guarantee causes disturbances, in particular in his theory of matter. On the other hand, the deconstruction of the first principle requires the use of a transcendental schema, which is yet partially denied by Derrida. To show this, it is necessary to elaborate a general presentation of derridean thought, which reveals a tension, peaking with the attempt to conceal the use of foundational methods.Our aim is to show that the auto-exceeding of the arkhè is neither a guarantee nor an abolition, and that it can be integrated into an original conception based on certain elements from each of our authors, which associates a first metaphysical principle with an ontology and an ethics.

Le Dasein ne pourra jamais « être » son « là ». Une telle remarque pourra surprendre. Toutefois, dès lors que la totalité ou la plénitude d'un « là » soient pensées, ce dernier se révèle transi de néant. Or, parler du néant implique une méthode propre, car c’est l’absence de tout « phénomène ». Devons-nous plutôt, et « déjà », constater la mort de la phénoménologie, son incapacité de « dire » ce qui est radicalement « sans » phénomène, même à entendre ce qu’elle nous aura enseigné ? C'est alors une Méthode du Néant qui se « donne » – ou plutôt « qui se sera déjà donnée », maintenant, comme dans l’Histoire – comme reste irréductible, têtu et tenace. Ce Néant implique qu’il est tant sans « temporalité » que sans « spatialité ». Il nous importe, par conséquent, de pouvoir « penser » le « non-lieu » et d’entendre à nouveaux frais ce que l’histoire nous en informe, notamment dans la pensée de Sohravardî. Le paradoxe est que cette histoire est peut-être elle-même hors histoire. / The Dasein cannot « be » its « be-ing-there ». Such a proposition may surprise us. However, where the totality of a « there » is considered, the latter reveals itself as kneaded by « nothingness ». Further, nothingness would imply its own method. Here, one is dealing with the absence of all phenomena. Should we, and « already », find in favour of the death of phonemenology, of its incapacity to « say » what is radically « without » phenonmenon, even where we are to heed what this tradition has taught us ? A Method of Nothingness, the kind which is sought here, seems to propose itself – or rather « has already proposed itself », as it is within History – as an irreducible, stubborn and tenacious one. Nothingness does imply the absence of « temporality » as well as « spatiality ». Consequently, we are driven to « think » the « no-where » and to heed afresh what history has taught us, namely the thought of Sohravardî on the matter. The paradox is this may bring us outside history itself.

Heideggers Philosophie erweist sich als die Suche nach dem Lebenssinn. Es geht ihm darum, wie der Einzelmensch sein eigenes Leben als ein sinnvolles Ganzes gestalten und führen soll. Es kommt dabei darauf an, ob das Individuum sich von der Masse befreien und mit dem eigenen Tod konfrontieren kann bzw. will. Unter diesen Umständen weist Heidegger auf die Vereinzelung der Person und ihre Erfahrung des Nichts hin. Das Dasein kann sich allein in der Erfahrung des Nichts als Seins vom Seienden als Ganzen abkehren. Sich über das Seiende im Ganzen erheben bedeutet Heidegger zufolge die metaphysische Betrachtungsweise. Die Existenz des Menschen ist für Heidegger genau das metaphysische Phänomen, nämlich unsere Bezugnahme auf die Welt als Ganzes. Diese kontemplative Haltung des Individuums hängt wiederum mit seiner Einstellung zur Gottesauffassung zusammen. Das Verständnis Gottes als eines Seienden führt zum unangemessenen Gottesverhältnis. Gott als das Sein ansehen kann das Gottesverhältnis zurechtsetzen. Die Bedeutung des Lebens erschließt sich erst dann, wenn das Individuum sich seiner Endlichkeit vor Gott als dem Sein bewusst ist. / This dissertation argues that the entire Heidegger’s Philosophy amounts to an exploration of the meaning of human life. For him, it is important in life to form and fulfil our own life as an integral whole. It is thus crucial to explore how we can do so, by freeing ourselves, each in our respective individual ways, from the influence of the masses and face resolutely up to our own individual death, by realising each one’s indiviualization and experiencing nothingness. Dasein our inauthentic being-there is dispersed only in the experience of Nothingness as Being per se. For Heidegger, transcendence beyond all entities/beings is the genuine metaphysical way of envisaging them. Human existence is for Heidegger just a metaphysical phenomenon, namely, our point of reference to the world as a whole. This contemlative attitude of the individual is connected further with his views of God. Understanding God as an entity, a mere being, leads to an inappropriate relationship to God, and should be redressed by regarding God as the Being per se. The meaning of life discloses itself only as an individual becomes aware of his/her finiteness before God as the Supreme Being.