Object permanence (OP) is a cognitive ability that enables animals to mentally represent the existence of hidden objects even if they can not be perceived by senses. In humans, OP develops during six qualitative stages, in which the understanding of relationships between objects in space and time changes. Current research shows that primates, some carnivores and several species of birds also acquire various degrees of this ability depending on their social life and foraging strategies. Many studies of OP have focused on food-storing birds but yet only in the Corvidae family. Therefore we decided to test this ability in two species of the Paridae family, food-storing coal tit (Periparus ater, N=23) and non-storing great tit (Parus major, N=24) to find out which stage they can achieve and whether there is a difference between these species in relation to their caching ability. Our results suggest that food-storing coal tits search for completely hidden objects significantly better than great tits. Most of the great tits were not able to solve this task. However, the upper limit for both species is probably Stage 4 because coal tits probably solved OP tasks with more screens randomly or used alternative strategies rather than mental representation. Substantial interindividual variability in the...

Cognition allows animals to acquire, process, and store sensory information from the environment and use it to adapt to their surroundings. A battery of behavioral tests was used to assess the cognitive abilities of black-handed spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi). Black and white cups were used to assess (1) object permanence by showing the animals under which cup the reward was placed, (2) associative learning by concealing where the reward was placed, and (3) long-term memory by repeating the second task after a 4-month break; petri dishes with varying amounts of food were used to assess (4) relative quantity discrimination; and boxes fitted with dotted cards were used to assess discrete number discrimination with (5) equallysized dots and (6) various-sized dots. For each task, one session comprised 10 trials (i.e. responses). All nine animals succeeded in all tests and, as a group, reached the learning criterion of 70% correct responses on session two in the object permanence and associative learning tasks; on session eleven in the quantity discrimination task; on session sixteen in the numerosity task with equally-sized dots; on session three in the numerosity task with various-sized dots; and averaged 84.4% correct responses in the long-term memory task. Their prompt high score in the numerosity task with various-sized dots suggests that the animals acknowledged the task for its numerical properties as opposed to the size or pattern of the dots. These cognitive abilities are thought to shape the necessary behaviors for the ecological and social needs of the species.

This study examined object permanence in Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii), Western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), and black-and-white-ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata) at Zoo Atlanta. A literature review reveals two main issues with object permanence research in non-human primates. One of the issues is that it is difficult to make valid comparisons between different species because very few studies have been conducted using appropriate controls. Thus, one of the goals of this study was to conduct control trials for all tasks in the traditional object permanence test battery, in order to reliably assess and compare performance in the species under study. The second issue is concerned with the finding that all of the non-human primate species tested so far have failed one of the more difficult tasks in the test battery, namely the non-adjacent double invisible displacement task. It has been hypothesized that this performance limitation is a result of the manner in which the task is presented. Thus, the second goal of this study was to modify the existing methodology and present the task to gorillas and orangutans in locomotive space to see if performance improves. This is the first study to present this task to non-human primate species in locomotive space. This study found that orangutans were the only species to reliably pass most tasks in the traditional object permanence test battery. Black-and-white ruffed lemurs failed most visible and invisible displacement tasks. Owing to the small sample size of gorillas in this study, further research is required before any firm conclusions can be made about the ability of this species to solve visible and invisible displacement tasks in the traditional object permanence test battery. Presenting the boxes in locomotive space to gorillas and orangutans did not improve performance on the non-adjacent double invisible displacement task. Further research is required to resolve the question of whether this performance limitation is a result of the manner in which the task was presented.

5 ABSTRACT Object permanence is a cognitive ability to perceive the continuous existence of objects, even if they cannot be directly observed, respectively perceived by other senses (Piaget 1954). In humans object permanence develops in 6 qualitatively different stages. By using a comparative approach, it was found that the last stage 6 of this ability also occurs in great apes, gibbons and some New World monkeys (capuchin, marmoset and tamarin). In this study, we conducted a study with a series of invisible displacements of an object, in which we investigated whether two rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) have fully developed the ability of object permanence and don't rely on simple alternative cognitive strategies, while solving the different tasks. With one test subject, we confirmed that he solved the tasks with stage 6 object permanence abilities. Although the second individual reached significant performance in some sessions, the overall results are ambiguous, because during the testing he had a tendency to use simple alternative strategies. Our study concludes that under certain circumstances macaques have the cognitive capacity for a fully developed ability of object permanence. Key words: Object permanence, rhesus macaque, invisible displacement, cognitive functions

Object permanence is a cognitive ability, which allows individual to realize the existence of an object even it is not directly accessible to its senses. This ability is essential for successful using of complex cognitive operations. Object permanence is qualitatively and gradually change throughout the development of a child. Congruently, it is not developed to the same level in various species of animals. The aim of this study is to study object permanence in naive rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), because there is still some uncertainty about the development of this ability in macaques. Our results show that the naive subjects do not have the highest stage of object permanence (and they do not use representative strategy to solve the tasks), however, other results of our team suggest that more experienced individuals are able to achieve the highest stage under certain circumstances. We show that experimental design used to test object permanence can be modified and used also for studying of other cognitive abilities. We test the preferences of macaque monkeys toward novel non-food stimuli. The reactions of different species of animals can vary. The reactions depend on the type of stimuli (food or non-food), but also on the ecology and ethology of the species. Age, sex and personality of the...

Autonomous vehicles are regularly predicted to be on the verge of broad integration into regular traffic. A crucial aspect of successful traffic interactions is one agent’s ability to adequately understand other agents’ capabilities and limitations. Within the current state of the art concerning self-driving cars, there is a discrepancy between what people tend to believe the capabilities of self-driving cars are, and what those capabilities actually are. The aim of this study was to investigate whether people attribute the capacity of object permanence to self-driving cars roughly in the same manner as they would to a human driver. The study was conducted with online participants (N = 105). The results showed that the participants did not attribute object permanence differently between a self-driven car and a human driver. This indicates that people attribute object permanence similarly to self-driving cars as they do toward human drivers. Furthermore, the results indicate no connection between participants’ tendency to anthropomorphize and whether they attributed object permanence or not. The findings provide evidence for the issues connected to the perceptual belief problem in human-robot interaction, where people attribute capabilities to autonomous vehicles that are not there. The results highlight the importance of understanding which mechanisms underlie these attributions as well as when they happen, in order to mitigate unrealistic expectations.

Ce travail participe aux recherches contemporaines qui s'attachent à améliorer notre compréhension de ce que nous appelons les « objets d'expérience », et en particulier des objets ordinaires. Il s'arrête sur une dimension qui leur apparaît propre, leur permanence, c'est-à-dire leur continuité spatio-temporelle, telle que nous pouvons la constater et en faire usage dans l'expérience perceptive ou le discours, et leur identité intersubjective – en dépit des différentes visées qu'autrui et moi pouvons avoir sur eux. L'objet est pluriel, son identité, qui n'est pas simplement logique, manque de critères nets, mais cela ne peut remettre en question son existence, comme le voudraient les éliminativistes que nous affrontons. Mais les universalistes, les intellectualistes et tous les idéalistes sémantiques qui, à l'inverse, voient des objets partout, par notre seul pouvoir de les penser, confondent objet réel et objet de pensée. Nous défendons un réalisme contextualiste de l'objet ordinaire qui en précise l'existence dans les contextes où il fait sens d'en parler, et d'abord le contexte perceptif, puisqu'il semble définitoire des normes d'objectification et d'objectivation les plus courantes dans nos pratiques identificatoires, réidentificatoires et catégorisantes, de s'inscrire au sein de la perception et de l'action. Ce sont des processus plus ou moins simples cognitivement et plus ou moins répandus éthologiquement qui sont enjeu selon les cas. Cette pluralité implique d'en explorer les terrains, en particulier dans le plus jeune âge lorsque beaucoup des normes réglant notre saisie cognitive du réel sont en formation. C'est pourquoi notre investigation choisit rapidement de se faire philosophie de la connaissance afin de comprendre la genèse des objets ordinaires dont nous parlons, plutôt que d'essayer de dresser de façon abstraite une liste exhaustive de leurs critères d'identité. Nous défendons que la permanence de l'objet peut être comprise à trois niveaux, perceptif, social et logicolinguistique. Le bébé atteint ces niveaux d'objectivité par des concepts naturels (concepts affordantiels et modules innés, qui ont une inscription corporelle et un développement social), des concepts expérientiels (prototypiques et essentialisants, aidés par nos activités humaines de socialisation et d'attention partagée, qu'on trouve aussi dans le monde animal), et des concepts lexicaux, hérités de notre langue. C'est l'occasion de remettre en cause l'opposition trop facile entre l'inné et l'acquis, ou le nativisme et le constructivisme. À chacun de ces niveaux, il y a des raisons d'utiliser, en un sens non mentaliste mais naturaliste et fonctionnaliste, la notion de représentation, pour comprendre ce qui fait la transcendance de ces objets distaux, traités à partir des stimuli proximaux mais différents d'eux. On peut user d'un discours réaliste à leur sujet, sans présupposer que celui-ci se fonde sur des capacités cognitives rationnelles propositionnelles, synthétiques, inférentielles ou judicatives de haut niveau et nécessairement spécifiques à l'humain, mais sans céder non plus aux oppositions classiques entre réalisme indirect et réalisme direct, ou conceptualisme et non-conceptualisme. De même, on défendra, au-delà des débats entre continuisme et discontinuisme sur l'humain et l'animal, un émergentisme qui pense à la fois la continuité des espèces et leurs différences chaque fois propres dans leur rapport aux objets de leur environnement, tels qu'ils sont visés dans des normes naturelles et sociales. / The understanding of the ordinary objects of our daily experience implies a definition of spatiotemporal and intersubjective levels of permanence. This is due to the fact that these objects, whose existence we defend against eliminativism and mereological nihilism, can be said to endure or perdure, at least in our experiences and our discourses about them. This existence in time and space and between subjects of experience cannot be defined by mere logical features. That is why we choose a contextualist approach of objects, and study perceptual situations where identifications and categorizations occur, especially at the early stages of objectification and objectivation which babies are able to achieve. The newborn and the young child indeed need to gain object permanence, a phenomenon first described by Gestalt psychologists like Michotte and Piaget's school of developmental psychology, and which has been even more accurately studied by cognitive psychologists such as Elizabeth Spelke, Dominique Baillargeon, Susan Carey or Susan Gelman. We defend the thesis that three types of object permanence can be distinguished (perceptual, social and logical-linguistic). Object transcendence can be described as an emergent feature of these stages. Babies acquire these levels of objectivity through normal and universal phases of development, even though different cultural environments can influence rhythms of maturation and the intentional behaviors relating to objects, which children develop. To access ordinary objects, infants need natural concepts (affordantial concepts and innate modular abilities - quite common among animals -, which are embodied and developed through social stimulations), experiential concepts (prototypical and essentialist tendencies, stimulated by joint attention and social phenomena that also occur in the animal world), and inherited lexical concepts. Nativism and constructivism work together and a realist, naturalist and emergentist approach of our cognitions of objects and their representations (understood only as a functional ability to register distal objects from proximal stimuli) enables us to overcome classical oppositions between direct and indirect realism, conceptualism and anti-conceptualism, as well as the continuity-thesis and the discontinuity-thesis between human and non-human beings.