Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Droit privé--Paris 1, 2003. / Bibliogr. p. 459-498. Index.

Diss.--Münster--Univ., 1991. / Bibliogr. p. 380-428. Index.

. / .

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Freiburg in der Schweiz, 1922. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [viii]-xi).

Thèse (M. Sc.)--Université Laval, 2004. / Bibliogr.: f. 101-111. Publié aussi en version électronique.

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Droit privé--Paris 1, 1997. / Bibliogr. p. 351-364. Index.

Le concept de contrat de financement participatif des œuvres de l’esprit, est ignoré de la théorie générale du contrat, tout comme des contrats d’auteur. La pratique a façonné un nouveau genre de contrat encore méconnu du droit. Les faits anticipant le droit, un travail de qualification est nécessaire et primordial pour l’étude et le maniement du concept. Le renouvellement des modes de diffusion et d'exploitation des œuvres conduit à l'apparition de conventions apparemment innommées créées par la pratique, conventions qu'il convient de confronter non seulement aux modèles du droit d'auteur, mais aussi de la théorie générale des obligations. Ce contrat de financement participatif ne fait qu'entourer la levée de fonds réalisée auprès d’un large public de particuliers pour financer un projet spécifique via une plate-forme sur internet est rattaché selon les modèles de plate-forme, soit au droit d'auteur soit au droit civil. La fonction de modèle du contrat nommé impose de confronter le contrat de financement participatif, aux modèles du genre que sont les contrats spéciaux du code civil, ainsi que ceux du code de la propriété intellectuelle. Ce travail de rattachement présente un intérêt pratique évident : éclairer et compléter le régime des contrats, en donnant un cadre juridique à de nouvelles formes de conventions. Il sera révélé que cette confrontation ne se fait pas sans heurts, notamment quant au régime envisageable, et qu’il apparaît nécessaire de faire du contrat de financement participatif, un contrat spécial / The concept of a contract for the participatory financing of works of the mind is ignored by the general theory of the contract, as well as by contracts of authorship. Practice has shaped a new kind of contract that is still unrecognized in law. Facts anticipating law, this work of qualification is necessary and primordial for the study and the handling of the concept. The renewal of the modes of dissemination and exploitation of works leads to the appearance of apparently unnamed conventions created by practice, which should be confronted not only with copyright models but also with the general theory of obligations. This participative financing contract merely entails the raising of funds made with a large public of individuals to finance a specific project via a platform on the Internet is attached according to models of platform, either to the civil law. The model function of the named contract imposes a confrontation of the participatory financing contract with the models of the kind that are the special contracts of the civil code, as well as those of the code of the intellectual property. This work of attachment is of obvious practical interest: to clarify and complete the contract system, giving a legal framework to new forms of agreements. It will be revealed that this confrontation is not uneven, particularly about the possible regime, and that it appears necessary to make the contract of participatory financing, a special contract

Yes / This paper provides an overview of the laws regulating positive action in the UK. It also presents key findings from a selection of research studies on positive action in the UK conducted between 2003 and 2009 by the Centre for Inclusion and Diversity at the University of Bradford, and provides examples of positive action drawn from these studies.

This thesis examines the relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples in the particular context of the prairie provinces to determine whether or not it can be described as fiduciary and, if so, what obligations arise from it. <p>While very few judicial decisions have dealt with this specific issue, an analysis of the existing jurisprudence suggests that there are two types of fiduciary relationships in which Aboriginal peoples are involved. The first type is a manifestation of the more traditional fiduciary concept. It is similar to classic fiduciary situations, such as doctor/patient, director/corporation, partner/partner, in which a fiduciary having control over the property or person of another must act in that other person's best interests. In the Aboriginal context, the power of the federal Crown over surrendered Indian reserve lands and over Indian moneys is limited by its fiduciary obligations of this traditional type. The second type is unique to the situation of Aboriginal peoples. It arises out of the constitutional protection provided to Aboriginal and treaty rights and gives rise to obligations that limit the jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments over them. <p> This thesis concludes that the provincial Crown in the prairie provinces possesses no fiduciary obligations arising directly out of its relationship with First Nations peoples, in the classic fiduciary sense, because history and the Constitution have established that that relationship is with the federal Crown. Provincial fiduciary obligations are limited to those arising from the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights and thus arise only in respect of constitutionally valid provincial laws that infringe on such rights. In Saskatchewan, the only infringing provincial laws that are possible are those made under the authority provided by paragraph 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930, which authorizes Saskatchewan to make limited laws relating to hunting, fishing and trapping applicable to Indians.

This thesis examines the relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples in the particular context of the prairie provinces to determine whether or not it can be described as fiduciary and, if so, what obligations arise from it. <p>While very few judicial decisions have dealt with this specific issue, an analysis of the existing jurisprudence suggests that there are two types of fiduciary relationships in which Aboriginal peoples are involved. The first type is a manifestation of the more traditional fiduciary concept. It is similar to classic fiduciary situations, such as doctor/patient, director/corporation, partner/partner, in which a fiduciary having control over the property or person of another must act in that other person's best interests. In the Aboriginal context, the power of the federal Crown over surrendered Indian reserve lands and over Indian moneys is limited by its fiduciary obligations of this traditional type. The second type is unique to the situation of Aboriginal peoples. It arises out of the constitutional protection provided to Aboriginal and treaty rights and gives rise to obligations that limit the jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments over them. <p> This thesis concludes that the provincial Crown in the prairie provinces possesses no fiduciary obligations arising directly out of its relationship with First Nations peoples, in the classic fiduciary sense, because history and the Constitution have established that that relationship is with the federal Crown. Provincial fiduciary obligations are limited to those arising from the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights and thus arise only in respect of constitutionally valid provincial laws that infringe on such rights. In Saskatchewan, the only infringing provincial laws that are possible are those made under the authority provided by paragraph 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930, which authorizes Saskatchewan to make limited laws relating to hunting, fishing and trapping applicable to Indians.