Thesis (M.A.A.S.) -- Air University, 2004. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on April 23, 2009). "June 2004." Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-93).

Thesis (doctoral)--Groningen, 1947. / "Theses": 4 p. inserted. Includes index.

Thesis (doctoral)--Groningen, 1947. / "Theses": 4 p. inserted. Includes index.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 204-208).

Thesis (Honors)--College of William and Mary, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-87). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995. / Subject: The development and usefulness of US air attack theory and doctrine during the interwar period, 1919-1941. Cover page date: June 1995. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

There is an increasing gap between the progress of technological systems and the successful exploitation of these systems through cyber-attack. Whilst the mechanism and scope of cyberspace is progressing with each passing day, risk factors and the ability to process the required amount of data from cyberspace efficiently are proving to be major obstacles to achieving desired outcomes from cyber operations. This, coupled with the dramatic increase in the numbers of cyber attackers, who are constantly producing new ways of attacking and paralysing cyber systems for political or financial gain, is a critical issue for countries that have linked their major infrastructures with Internet applications. The defensive methods currently applied to counter these evolving attacks are no longer sufficient, due to their preventive and reactive nature. This research has developed a new Active Situational Awareness theoretical model for Active Defence that aims to enhance the agility and quality of cyber situational awareness in organisations in order to counter cyber attacks. Situational Awareness (SA) is a crucial component in every organisation. It helps in the assessment of an immediate situation in relation to the environment. Current SA models adopt a reactive attitude, which responds to events and works in passive manner to any progressing enemy cyber attack. This creates a defensive mind-set and consequently influences the operator to process and utilise knowledge only within the concept of attack prevention. Thus, one can assume that operators will only gather certain knowledge after the occurrence of an attack, instead of actively searching for new intelligence to create new knowledge about the cyber attack before it takes place. This research study introduces a new approach that incorporates an Active Defence posture; namely, a ‘winning attitude’ that conforms to the military stratagems of Sun Tzu, where operators always engage attackers directly in order to create new knowledge in an agile manner by deploying active intelligence-gathering techniques to inform active defence postures in cyberspace. This also allows the system being protected to remain one step ahead of the attackers to ultimately defeat them and thwart any costly attacks. To back these statements, this study issued a survey to 200 cyber defence and security experts in order to collect data on their opinions concerning the current state of Active SA. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was then employed to analyse the data gathered from the survey. The results of the analysis revealed significant importance of Active Offensive Intelligence gathering in enhancing Cyber SA. The SEM showed there is a significant impact on SA Agility and Quality from Active Intelligence gathering activities. Further to this, the SEM results informed the design of the serious gaming environments utilised in this research to verify the SEM causality model. Also, the SEM informed the design of a SA assessment metric, where a behavioural anchor rating scale was used along with ground truth to measure participant SA performance. The results of this experiment revealed that there was 2 times better enhancement in cyber Situational awareness among those who did utilise active measures compared with participants who did not which mean almost double and this shows the importance of offensive intelligence gathering in enhancing cyber SA and speed up defender decision making and OODA loop. This research provided for the first time a novel theory for active cyber SA that is aligned with military doctrine. Also, a novel assessment framework and approaches for evaluating and quantifying cyber SA performance was developed in this research study. Finally, a serious gaming environment was developed for this research and used to evaluate the active SA theory which has an impact on training, techniques and practice Deception utilisation by Active groups revealed the importance of having deception capabilities as part of active tools that help operators to understand attackers’ intent and motive, and give operators more time to control the impact of cyber attacks. However, incorrect utilisation of deception capabilities during the experiment led operators to lose control over cyber attacks. Active defence is required for future cyber security. However, this trend towards the militarisation of cyberspace demands new or updated laws and regulations at an international level. Active intelligence methods define the principal capability at the core of the new active situational awareness model order in to deliver enhanced agility and quality in cyber SA.

In the last three decades, states and societies have increasingly been connected to each other through Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) such as satellites and the Internet, thus expanding the sphere of influence of cyberspace. While offering numerous economic and security benefits, this increased global connectivity also poses various security challenges and threats at the national and international level. In particular, the threat of cyberwar has become one of the top national security issues in both the United States and China, as reflected in an increasing number of cyber disputes between the two nations recently. In the wake of this emerging threat, scholars have turned to the classical deterrence strategies of Cold War to counter these new challenges, inspiring the development of cyber deterrence theory. However, numerous pundits in the cyber deterrence literature doubt the efficacy of cyber deterrence in hindering cyberwar. What theory or approach can offer the best explanatory framework for understanding the efficacy of cyber deterrence in forestalling cyberwar, specifically between the U.S. and China, is a question that remains unanswered. This study explores the effectiveness of cyber deterrence outside the bounds of classical deterrence and technological vulnerabilities in cyber systems and networks, and, then, offers Power Transition Theory (PTT) as an alternative approach to understanding whether cyber deterrence in the context of cyberwar between the rival antagonists can be successful. It answers the question of how PTT can allow us to better understand the effectiveness of cyber deterrence in preventing cyberwar between the United States and China. A cyber application of PTT argues that cyber deterrence is largely an ineffective approach to preventing potential cyberwar between the U.S. and China, particularly if the latter achieves parity in offensive cyberwar capability with the former while concurrently remaining dissatisfied with the status quo in cyberspace.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the degree to which the Parliament of Canada was able to control the defence policy, administration and expenditures of the Canadian government in the 1945-1962 period. Because of the distribution of power between the two houses of Parliament, the thesis is primarily concerned with the House of Commons. In the second last chapter, however, the role of the Senate is analyzed. The House of Commons has four principal (although not mutually exclusive) techniques through which it attempts to exercise control. These include critical debate, control of finances, select committees and the question period. The use of each of these techniques is analyzed separately. Also, each of the four is analyzed with reference to the party in opposition. Hence for each technique, the 1945-1957 and the 1957-1962 periods were dealt with separately. The analysis of the defence debates and question period indicated striking differences in the pattern of opposition between the two periods. In the 1957-1962 period the Liberal opposition was concerned primarily with destroying the prospects of the government for the ensuing election. Hence the Liberals strove to discredit the defence programme of the government. Policy and politics were the major issues. Both in the debates and the question period the opposition dealt harshly and exhaustively with the defence policy of the government. The Liberal opposition virtually ignored, however, the administration of the defence departments. In contrast, the Progressive Conservative opposition of the 1945-1957 period devoted most of its energies, during question time and the debates, to the implementation of policy and administration of defence. Their efforts were culminated by their success in obstructing the 1955 amendment to the Defence Production Act. On the other hand, the Progressive Conservatives did not debate critically the major steps taken in the development of Canadian defence policy. Indeed, they never questioned the broad defence road that the government chose to follow. House of Commons control of defence expenditures was a myth. No direct control over the estimates was exercised. Nor did the debates in Supply serve, even indirectly, to indicate that the House of Commons still retained control of the purse. Moreover, statutory controls were less effective for defence than the other functions of government. In the 1945 to 1957 period, select committees were appointed with post-audit functions only. In five of these years the Public Accounts Committee dealt with irregularities in defence expenditures as a result of its examination of the annual Report of the Auditor General. Because of its broad duties, circumscribed powers and partisan atmosphere, however, this Committee was not especially effective. In 1951, however, after completing its examination of the Auditor General's Report, the Public Accounts Committee dealt specifically with defence expenditures and served usefully to inform members of current developments in the defence establishment. The work of the 1951 Public Accounts Committee was continued by the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures that met between 1951 and 1953. This Committee, despite the lack of permanent staff, received an enormous amount of evidence on the administration of defence. Its usefulness was cut down, however, by the partisan atmosphere which prevented the Committee from making constructive reports to the House. After dealing with the Currie Report in 1953, the Committee was not re-appointed. Thus, the only effective and continuous post-audit scrutiny was carried out by the Defence Branch of the Office of the Auditor General. Its efficacy was hampered too, however, by the failure of the House to develop a technique for dealing regularly with Report; for the House proper never debated the Auditor General’s Report and the Public Accounts Committee did not meet regularly during these years. Since 1957, the Public Accounts Committee has met annually and reported to the House without partisan interference, examples of ineffective administration and waste. Constructive recommendations have often been included. The Committee thus has not only strengthened its own usefulness as an effective organ of post-audit control. It has also increased the effectiveness of the Auditor General by guaranteeing more publicity for his annual report than it had been receiving in earlier years. These years also marked the initial ventures in pre-audit control through select committee. In 1958 and 1960 the defence estimates were dealt with through these committees. Although the work of these committees, especially the 1958 committee, was an improvement over the performances of Committee of Supply, they appeared to have no inherent advantages over what a better informed Committee of Supply could reasonably be expected to accomplish. Moreover, there was evidence that these select committees might be used as the focal point for interest group pressures. Finally, the defence policy discussions which accompanied the review of the estimates clearly would have been more effective had they been held in the House of Commons. Thus, since the Senate played no significant role, the record of Parliament in controlling defence was very poor. There was no effective pre-audit control of expenditure and post-audit control was at no time comprehensive. Defence debates in the 1945-1957 period seldom probed into the implications of policy decisions. In more recent years, although the debates have been more comprehensive, they have not been at a very high level of sophistication. Both these shortcomings, it might be noted, were closely related to the dearth of information available on defence. It is suggested that a select standing committee of the House might possibly help to strengthen parliamentary control. Such a committee, if left to investigate problems of administration, technology and weaponry, as well as past expenditures (all matters of fact) might serve two purposes. First, it might accumulate sufficient relevant information to permit more sophisticated policy debates and more informative discussion of the estimates. Second, it would permit better control of past expenditure through detailed and comprehensive investigation of defence. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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