`Organ of state' as a constitutional concept was first introduced by the 1993 Constitution, in which it was defined as including any statutory body or functionary. In their interpretation of this notion, the courts and academic writers invoked the tests developed at common law in order to determine its meaning. The commentators, on the one hand, used a variety of tests. The courts, on the other hand, subscribed to what has come to be known as the `control test'. The 1996 Constitution followed with a comprehensive definition of `organ of state'. This notion is also employed in other laws by direct reference or incorporation of the definition in section 239 with slight adjustments. Regrettably, the limited approach developed by the court in their interpretation of the notion of `organ of state' for the purposes of the 1993 Constitution has spilled over to the interpretation of the concept under the 1996 Constitution. The question is whether this is justifiable. The constitutional definition of `organ of state' makes it clear that other institutions and functionaries are organs of state on the basis of what they are and others by virtue of the functions they are engaged in. Therefore strict adherence to the control test or any other test could unjustifiably limit the application of the Constitution. / Jurisprudence / LL.M.

`Organ of state' as a constitutional concept was first introduced by the 1993 Constitution, in which it was defined as including any statutory body or functionary. In their interpretation of this notion, the courts and academic writers invoked the tests developed at common law in order to determine its meaning. The commentators, on the one hand, used a variety of tests. The courts, on the other hand, subscribed to what has come to be known as the `control test'. The 1996 Constitution followed with a comprehensive definition of `organ of state'. This notion is also employed in other laws by direct reference or incorporation of the definition in section 239 with slight adjustments. Regrettably, the limited approach developed by the court in their interpretation of the notion of `organ of state' for the purposes of the 1993 Constitution has spilled over to the interpretation of the concept under the 1996 Constitution. The question is whether this is justifiable. The constitutional definition of `organ of state' makes it clear that other institutions and functionaries are organs of state on the basis of what they are and others by virtue of the functions they are engaged in. Therefore strict adherence to the control test or any other test could unjustifiably limit the application of the Constitution. / Jurisprudence / LL.M.

L'ordre juridique international appréhende une collectivité infra-étatique comme un organe de l'État souverain. Cette logique classique d'assimilation, guidée par une lecture étatiste des rapports internationaux, y conditionne les opérations d'identification d'un engagement en raison d'un acte juridique, d'imputation d'un fait illicite et d'établissement d'une capacité à ester en justice. Dans ce contexte, une collectivité infra-étatique ne dispose pas d'une personnalité juridique propre, réserve faite du cas particulier des collectivités fédérées. Originellement internationaux, les ordres juridiques de l'Union européenne (U.E.) et du Conseil de l'Europe conservent une part de cet héritage. Toutefois, l'incorporation des collectivités infra-étatiques à cet édifice juridique régional, certes encore dominé par les États, les hisse progressivement au rang d'actrices singulières. L'autonomisation des deux ordres juridiques européens à l'égard de ces mécanismes internationaux classiques et la réalisation du principe d'immédiateté amènent alors à reconsidérer la pertinence d'une assimilation systématique des collectivités infra-étatiques à la figure de l'État et à prendre plus régulièrement en compte leur personnalité juridique distincte, telle que consacrée en droit interne. Cette logique nouvelle de personnification, qui trouve à s'exprimer dans une dimension verticale (i.e. dans les rapports entre les ordres juridiques internes et européens) et horizontale (i.e. dans les rapports entre les ordres juridiques internes des États) reste encore imparfaite. / The international legal system perceives a sub-state collectivity as a sovereign State's organ. This classical logic of assimilation, led by a statist perception of international relations, conducts the operations of identification of a commitment due to a juridical act, attribution of a wrongful act and acceptance of standing. In this context, a sub-state collectivity is not considered as a juridical person, subject to the particular situation of federated collectivities. Originally international, European Union's (E.U.) and Council of Europe's legal systems retain a measure of this heritage. However, the incorporation of sub-state collectivities in this regional legal system, admittedly still dominated by States, raises them gradually to the rank of singular actresses. The empowerment of both European legal systems from these classical international mechanisms and the realization of the principle of immediacy bring to reconsider the relevance of a systematic assimilation of the sub-state collectivities as insignificant parts of State and take account of their own juridical personality, such as established by domestic law. This new logic of personification, which develops vertical (i.e. relations between European and domestic legal systems) and horizontal dimensions (i.e. relations between domestic legal systems) is still imperfect. When they're not considered as State's organs, sub-state collectivities are sometimes perceived as individuals, who try to satisfy their own interests without any reference to general interest.