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Merleau-Ponty and Levinas: Traces of Childlike Peace in a World at WarBahler, Brock A. 15 June 2016 (has links)
Because Emmanuel Levinas distanced himself from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy for a more radical account of the self as primordially oriented by a radical passivity and asymmetrical ethical obligation to the other, few secondary sources have articulated the clear influence Merleau-Ponty had on the trajectory of Levinas's thought. Further, Levinas's more radical account of intersubjectivity raises three primary concerns: (1) Levinas resorts to a form of Platonic dualism when he depicts the other as beyond culture, history, and the physical appearance of the body; (2) there are questions as to whether the phenomena warrant his later view that the self is grounded in a radical passivity and an utter noncoincidence between self and other; (3) his ethics based on an infinite, asymmetrical obligation for the other conflates any kind of self-regard with egoism, thus creating a scenario in which my infinite concern for the singular other stands at odds with concerns of equality and justice. <br> Drawing on the work of Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, I develop a hybrid account of intersubjectivity. Echoing the work of Adriaan Peperzak, I depict the self-other relation as "chiastic asymmetry" that stresses that the asymmetry in Levinas's thought and the mutuality in Merleau-Ponty's must be seen as equiprimordial. Peperzak neither considers Merleau-Ponty's thought, nor does he provide a phenomenological description of chiastic asymmetry. The parent-child relationship provides this explanation by highlighting how ethics is cultivated simultaneously in both the child and the caregiver, and thus, both responsibility and mutuality constitute the self-other relation. In addition, the study of the parent-child relation (1) offers a phenomenological analyses of passivity and sensibility that decenter the autonomous, self-reflective cogito that is prioritized by Descartes, Kant, and Husserl and (2) stands in contrast to the predominant accounts of intersubjectivity that are grounded in self-interest, indifference, or shame, as represented by Hegel, Heidegger, and Sartre. This alternative account seeks to preserve the alterity of the other and unearths an originary posture toward the other that is peaceful and positive. <br> After considering Levinas's and Merleau-Ponty's respective roots in Husserl's thought (chapter 1), I respond to Levinas's criticisms of Merleau-Ponty in the areas of language, history, aesthetics, and embodiment (chapter 2). Then, I turn to their respective accounts of the parent-child relation, supplemented by current empirical research in child development, to establish my account of chiastic asymmetry (chapter 3). After explaining how chiastic asymmetry offers an alternative to the views set forth by Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, and Hobbes (chapter 4), I conclude by considering how intersubjectivity as chiastic asymmetry might serve as a basis for a peaceful politics that reframes the use of violence and suggest its conceptual presence in the thought of Enrique Dussel, Desmond Tutu, and Miroslav Volf. <br> / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;
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Le mythe de la caverne. L’interprétation originale de Platon face à l’approche originaire de Heidegger / The myth of the cave. The original interpretation of Plato juxtaposed with Heidegger’s originary approachNéria, William 03 June 2017 (has links)
Le mythe de la caverne de Platon qui ouvre le livre VII de La République, plonge ses racines dans l’héritage spirituel et immémorial de l’humanité. Les multiples interprétations qui en ont été données, ont, chacune, mis en lumière un aspect particulier du mythe platonicien. Ainsi, le sens du mythe de la caverne n’est pas invariable ; bien au contraire, il est sujet au changement, car la difficulté d’interprétation qui le caractérise, ouvre la voie à une forte variabilité de la signification à donner à chacun des symboles et à la façon dont ces derniers se définissent les uns par rapport aux autres. En conséquence, la signification originale du mythe de la caverne échappe, de fait et depuis toujours, à toute la tradition philosophique interprétative ultérieure ; c’est pourquoi Heidegger a réinvesti massivement ce récit, en sautant par-dessus toutes les interprétations antérieures, afin de nous en proposer une approche originaire. Toutefois, est-il raisonnable d’affirmer que l’interprétation originaire de Heidegger donne le fin mot du sens initial du mythe ? Notre recherche se propose donc de démontrer, au contraire, que le mythe de la caverne recouvre une signification platonicienne originale qui n’a jamais été entièrement développée et exploitée par les interprètes de ce dernier. En effet, si le livre VII de La République constitue le commentaire original de Platon vis-à-vis du mythe de la caverne, ce commentaire natif platonicien pourrait recéler tous les philosophèmes métaphysiques, épistémologiques et politiques nécessaires pour éclairer, puissamment et à nouveaux frais, la symbolique du mythe de la caverne. De facto, s’en dégagerait-il une signification platonicienne originale et surtout inédite qui pourrait soit se rapprocher du sens de l’interprétation originaire de Heidegger, soit s’en éloigner de façon irréductible ? / The myth of Plato’s cave which opens Book VII of the Republic, has its roots in the age-old intellectual heritage of humanity. The various interpretations of Plato’s cave, have, each, elucidated a particular element of the Platonic myth. Thus, the meaning of the myth of the cave is not invariable ; on the contrary, it is subject to change as the particular difficulty of its interpretation paves the way for a high degree of variability in the meaning of each symbol and how it is defined in relation to the others. In fact and from the outset, the original signification of the myth of the cave has eluded the entire interpretive philosophical tradition that follows it; this is why Heidegger massively reinvested in this tale in bypassing all previous interpretations in order to offer an originary approach. But can one reasonably assert that Heidegger’s originary interpretation gives the final word on the original meaning of the myth ? This thesis intends to show, on the contrary, that the myth of the cave holds an original Platonic meaning that has never been completely developed and elaborated by its interpreters. Indeed, if Book VII of the Republic constitutes Plato’s original commentary on the myth of the cave, this native Platonic commentary could hold all of the metaphysical, epistemological and political philosophemes necessary to powerfully elucidate the symbolism of the myth of the cave in a fresh light. Would this in fact draw out an original and unprecedented Platonic meaning ? And would it approach Heidegger’s originary interpretation, or distance itself from it irreducibly ?
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Towards a language of inquiry : the gesture of etho-poetic thinkingHanley, Fiona Marie Cecelia January 2016 (has links)
This thesis presents a recollection of the relation of “being” and thinking through an articulation of the gesture of etho-poetic thinking. Part I marks out a path towards such a thinking through an encounter with Martin Heidegger’s “sketch” of the self as Dasein, where his description of being-there is read as an originary language of inquiry – one which attempts to respond to the issue of being, to the questionability and groundlessness of existence stemming from simply being-in-the-world. Part I follows out a description of this language of inquiry as a pre-conceptual, pre-cognitive, attuned, bodily understanding, through chapters which unfold this sketch of Dasein. This language of inquiry is construed as a two-fold action of being begun, being sketched, and beginning, sketching-out. The final chapter of part I connects Heidegger’s articulation of “Care” to the ancient practice of “care of the self” and the transformative, etho-poetic potentiality of thinking. As the thesis proffers, it is this pre-conceptual language of inquiry which must be repeated in a resolute thinking, as Heidegger articulates it in Being and Time, seeking not to objectivise the world, to represent it, but to resonate with it. In this sense, the “purpose” of thinking is not so much the obtainment of knowledge as it is an attempt to come back into “Care” for the questionability of one’s existence. As the thesis gestures to in the conclusion, part of the attempt of the thesis is, thus, an implicit critique of the contemporary situation and discourse on thinking with its emphasis on outcomes and outputs. The thesis itself follows the two-fold structure of the language of inquiry. Whilst part I depicts Heidegger’s sketch of this originary language of inquiry, part II sketches-out this language, seeking to articulate how an etho-poetic language of inquiry can occur in writing by bringing the sketch of part one into conversation with other etho-poetic thinkers; Walter Benjamin, Henri Meschonnic, Jan Zwicky, Giorgio Agamben, Lisa Robertson. In this way, through the textual composition of the writing, the thesis presents itself as the primary example of such a language of inquiry, making it not an investigation which objectifies an etho-poetic thinking, but makes an attempt at its own performance of it.
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Da impossibilidade de intuições intelectuais como refutação do idealismo / Of the impossibility of intelectual intuitions as refutation of the idealismRafael Estrela Canto 22 June 2010 (has links)
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / O objetivo desta Dissertação é modesto, ela pretende apenas mostrar que, para a Filosofia Crítica, não há lugar para intuições intelectuais e que, na mesma medida em que estas são terminantemente afastadas, estão na base do idealismo refutado por Kant ao menos segundo o seu ponto de vista. Consequentemente, o dogmatismo, em ambas as suas formas, o racionalismo (idealismo empírico) e o materialismo radical (realismo transcendental), são refutados, embora não ainda de modo completamente justificado, já na Estética Transcendental da Crítica da Razão Pura, onde se prova que as intuições são única e exclusivamente sensíveis. A prova de que não há intuições intelectuais é também afirmativa, na medida em que, como tentamos reproduzir, Kant prova que as intuições são todas sensíveis e sua forma são espaço e tempo. Este percurso é fundamental para todos os problemas que virão em seguida. Para tanto, não medimos esforços em tentar mostrar que as categorias na medida em que são a forma de toda determinação de um objeto, o que faz com que elas sejam ainda a forma de toda ligação (síntese) determinam o próprio modo de aparecer dos objetos na intuição, em uma conformidade originária à forma desta última. / The subject of this dissertation is modest: it intends simply to show that, for Critical Philosophy, theres no place for intelectual instuitions and that, as they are peremptorially rejected, they constitute the basis of the idealism refutated by Kant - at least, in his own point of view. Consequently, dogmatism, in both its shapes - rationalism (aka empirical idealism) and radical materialism (transcendental realism) - are refutated, although not in a completely justified way yet, in the Transcendental Aesthetics of the Critique of Pure Reason, where it is demonstrated that intuitions are exclusively sensitive. The proof that there are no intelectual intuitions is also affirmative as, as we tried to reproduce, Kant proves that all intuitions are sensitive and forms of space and time. This is a fundamental course for every issue that's going to follow. We will try with all ressources to show that the categories - in the sense that are the form of every determination of an object, which also turn them into the the form of every connection (synthesis) - determine the very way of appearing of the objects in intuition, in an originary conformity with the form of the latter.
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Da impossibilidade de intuições intelectuais como refutação do idealismo / Of the impossibility of intelectual intuitions as refutation of the idealismRafael Estrela Canto 22 June 2010 (has links)
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / O objetivo desta Dissertação é modesto, ela pretende apenas mostrar que, para a Filosofia Crítica, não há lugar para intuições intelectuais e que, na mesma medida em que estas são terminantemente afastadas, estão na base do idealismo refutado por Kant ao menos segundo o seu ponto de vista. Consequentemente, o dogmatismo, em ambas as suas formas, o racionalismo (idealismo empírico) e o materialismo radical (realismo transcendental), são refutados, embora não ainda de modo completamente justificado, já na Estética Transcendental da Crítica da Razão Pura, onde se prova que as intuições são única e exclusivamente sensíveis. A prova de que não há intuições intelectuais é também afirmativa, na medida em que, como tentamos reproduzir, Kant prova que as intuições são todas sensíveis e sua forma são espaço e tempo. Este percurso é fundamental para todos os problemas que virão em seguida. Para tanto, não medimos esforços em tentar mostrar que as categorias na medida em que são a forma de toda determinação de um objeto, o que faz com que elas sejam ainda a forma de toda ligação (síntese) determinam o próprio modo de aparecer dos objetos na intuição, em uma conformidade originária à forma desta última. / The subject of this dissertation is modest: it intends simply to show that, for Critical Philosophy, theres no place for intelectual instuitions and that, as they are peremptorially rejected, they constitute the basis of the idealism refutated by Kant - at least, in his own point of view. Consequently, dogmatism, in both its shapes - rationalism (aka empirical idealism) and radical materialism (transcendental realism) - are refutated, although not in a completely justified way yet, in the Transcendental Aesthetics of the Critique of Pure Reason, where it is demonstrated that intuitions are exclusively sensitive. The proof that there are no intelectual intuitions is also affirmative as, as we tried to reproduce, Kant proves that all intuitions are sensitive and forms of space and time. This is a fundamental course for every issue that's going to follow. We will try with all ressources to show that the categories - in the sense that are the form of every determination of an object, which also turn them into the the form of every connection (synthesis) - determine the very way of appearing of the objects in intuition, in an originary conformity with the form of the latter.
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Déconstruction de l'auto-affection pure : étude sur les notions de répétition et d'auto-affection pure à l'époque de Sein und Zeit / Deconstruction of pure self-affection : an study on the notions of repetition and self-affection in the epoch of Sein und ZeitCastellanos, Rafael 04 February 2011 (has links)
Si la déconstruction devait commencer quelque part, si son principe n'était pas d'emblée celui de lamultiplication originaire du principe, il faudrait alors dire que c'est comme déconstruction de l'autoaffectionpure qu'elle commence. En effet, l'interrogation du concept d'auto-affection pure estl'interrogation d'une dernière tentative pour penser encore la subjectivité en termes de principe (c'est-àdireen termes aussi de « subjectivité »). L'« auto-affection pure » est un concept qui renvoiecouramment au livre de 1929 de Heidegger sur Kant, Kant et le problème de la métaphysique. Or, dansce contexte, il renvoie déjà de manière essentielle à la répétition comme dispositif de sa production etcomme ce à partir de quoi sa déconstruction a concrètement lieu. La question de la répétition est en faitinséparable de la déconstruction de l'auto-affection pure. Si celle-ci est un autre nom de la temporalité,il faut alors démontrer en droit ce qui est un fait : c'est à partir de la répétition que la temporalité peutseulement être dévoilée. En ce sens, la répétition est déjà répétition de la question de l'être (Sein undZeit) mais aussi répétition de Kant (Kant et le problème de la métaphysique). Or, la détermination de latemporalité comme auto-affection pure, dans la répétition heideggerienne de Kant, n'est elle-mêmepossible que d'après la compréhension essentielle de la temporalité phénoménologique à partir duconcept de Husserl d'impression originaire. En ce sens, comme déconstruction de l'auto-affection pure,la répétition – en-deçà de toute identité constituée – doit aussi se trouver déjà à la racine de touteimpression originaire. / If deconstruction begins somewhere, if its starting point is not already the original multiplication ofprinciple and origin, then it is necessary to say that it begins first as the deconstruction of pure selfaffection.The interrogation of the concept of pure self-affection is the interrogation of probably the lastattempt to think about subjectivity in the terms of a principle (which are of course the terms of“subjectivity”). The pure self-affection concept widely refers to the 1929 book by Heidegger on Kanttitled Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. In this context, the concept of pure self-affection refersalready to repetition as the essential “device” for its production. The question of repetition is in factinseparable from pure self-affection deconstruction. If pure self-affection can work as another name fortemporality, then we have to show the reason for a well established fact : it is just through repetitionthat temporality can be disclosed. In this sense, repetition is already the repetition of the question onbeing (Sein und Zeit), but also the repetition of Kant (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics). Now, thedetermination of temporality as pure self-affection, through Heidegger's repetition of Kant, supposesthe essential understanding of phenomenological temporality on the basis of Husserl's concept oforiginary impression. In this sense, as leading pure self-affection deconstruction, repetition – before theconstitution of identity – is to be found on the grounds of the originary impression itself.
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Depth Technology: Remediating OrientationReynolds, Peggy E. 18 December 2012 (has links)
No description available.
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La motion transubjective : un mouvement d’autoréalisation de soi impulsé par la méthode du psychodrame existentiel / The Transubjective motion : a movement of one’s being selfrealization triggered by the existential psychodrama methodGal, Corinne 21 October 2017 (has links)
Cette thèse montre comment le travail thérapeutique, en psychodrame existentiel de groupe, permet un accès direct à « l’être-du-patient », sans sacrifier du temps au démêlage des représentations. Dans ce cadre, la motion individuelle sollicitée se transforme, via l’intersubjectivité, pour se loger « entre » (aida) les membres du groupe. Elle y prend une forme transubjective qui s’amplifie par résonnance, pour délivrer une tonalité climatique singulière au groupe. J’ai nommé cette nouvelle dynamique : motion transubjective. Fonctionnant rythmiquement sur les pôles « ouverture-fermeture », la motion transubjective ouvre à l’espace corporel du Sentir, du « sens commun », et favorise un ajustement apaisé des patients au monde qui les entoure.Pour servir la thèse et modéliser ce concept, trois recherches-actions sont présentées (menées auprès de différentes populations : travailleurs sociaux, personnes atteintes de V.I.H. et personnes souffrant de psychose). Elles révèlent la valeur opératoire de la motion transubjective, au cœur même de l’intersubjectivité humaine, que cette dernière soit celle des foules, celle qui tient en contact les membres d’un groupe ou l’aida que créent ensemble le thérapeute et son patient. Enfin, ces trois recherches-actions concourent, en psychologie clinique, à la modélisation d’un processus émergent d’autoréalisation de soi, dans la rencontre avec le monde, qui se déploie dans la sphère de la corporalité.Outre la proposition d’un outil groupal -le psychodrame existentiel- cette thèse en discute les conditions de mise en œuvre (en termes de dispositif d’intervention clinique) afin d’en comprendre les leviers thérapeutiques. / This thesis shows how therapeutic work, in an existential psychodrama group, enables the therapist to access directly to “the-patients’-being”, without spending some time unravelling representations. In this context, the individual motion is triggered. Then, it transforms, via intersubjectivity, to place itself “between” (aida) the members of the group. There, it turns into a transubjective form which expands through resonance to deliver a peculiar climatic tone to the group. I have named that new dynamism: transubjective motion. As it functions dynamically according to the “opening-closing” poles, the transubjective motion permits the opening to the Feeling body space to the “common sense” space, enabling the patient to have a pacified relationship to the world around.In order to demonstrate our thesis and to model the concept, three researches-actions are presented (they were conducted among different populations: social workers, persons suffering from H.I.V and psychotic patients.) They reveal the operational value of the transubjective motion, situated at the heart of human intersubjectivity, whether it reveals itself in a crowd, between the members of a group, or the aida created by the therapist and his/her patient. Finally, those three researches-actions contribute, in clinical psychology, to the modelling of an emergent process of one’s being selfrealization through the relationship to the world around, expressing itself in the area of corporality.Beyond proposing a group therapy method -the existential psychodrama- this thesis analyses the conditions for its implementation (in terms of clinical intervention experience) in order to understand its therapeutic efficiency.
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