This thesis presents a critical reading of the theme of phenomenology in the work of the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou. My criticism is exercised through a reading of Badiou’s references to this theme. I demonstrate that Badiou’s magnum opus, Being and Event, and its sequel, Logiques des Mondes, are the two pillars between which the philosopher exercises his constructive attack against the phenomenological tradition. I argue that Badiou’s developmental logic is driven by a subterranean and disavowed dialogue with phenomenology, a tradition he deliberately marginalises. / The thesis begins with a literature review of academic responses currently in circulation. Six respondents and their critiques of Badiou’s enterprise are examined for key points, significance to this research, gaps and omissions, and consequences thereof. Each respondent’s primary focus (for example, existential criticism or the phenomenon) is detailed for its specific connection to Badiou’s disregard for phenomenology. The thesis then examines ten of Badiou’s works and meticulously lists specific references (or lack thereof) to phenomenology. I demonstrate that Badiou’s philosophical arguments all carry the ghost of phenomenology that the philosopher has, largely, left unexamined. / The thesis ends with a detailed exegesis of Badiou’s most recent text, Logiques des Mondes. With the release of this text, Badiou returns to the question of phenomenology to present an explicit position regarding questions of experience, existence, phenomenality and appearing. Badiou’s references to phenomenology throughout his texts prior to the release of this sequel are clearly marginal, but his attack on the phenomenological tradition is renewed here via a new theory of appearing. Highly dependent on arguments established in Being and Event, Badiou’s theory of appearing provides him with a superior mathematico-logical model (category theory and set theory) to explain the philosophical notions of ontology (what-is) and being-there (there-is) which create the material world.

This thesis presents a critical reading of the theme of phenomenology in the work of the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou. My criticism is exercised through a reading of Badiou’s references to this theme. I demonstrate that Badiou’s magnum opus, Being and Event, and its sequel, Logiques des Mondes, are the two pillars between which the philosopher exercises his constructive attack against the phenomenological tradition. I argue that Badiou’s developmental logic is driven by a subterranean and disavowed dialogue with phenomenology, a tradition he deliberately marginalises. / The thesis begins with a literature review of academic responses currently in circulation. Six respondents and their critiques of Badiou’s enterprise are examined for key points, significance to this research, gaps and omissions, and consequences thereof. Each respondent’s primary focus (for example, existential criticism or the phenomenon) is detailed for its specific connection to Badiou’s disregard for phenomenology. The thesis then examines ten of Badiou’s works and meticulously lists specific references (or lack thereof) to phenomenology. I demonstrate that Badiou’s philosophical arguments all carry the ghost of phenomenology that the philosopher has, largely, left unexamined. / The thesis ends with a detailed exegesis of Badiou’s most recent text, Logiques des Mondes. With the release of this text, Badiou returns to the question of phenomenology to present an explicit position regarding questions of experience, existence, phenomenality and appearing. Badiou’s references to phenomenology throughout his texts prior to the release of this sequel are clearly marginal, but his attack on the phenomenological tradition is renewed here via a new theory of appearing. Highly dependent on arguments established in Being and Event, Badiou’s theory of appearing provides him with a superior mathematico-logical model (category theory and set theory) to explain the philosophical notions of ontology (what-is) and being-there (there-is) which create the material world.

Cytologic smears of a Warthin's tumor (WT) typically consist of sheets of oncocytic (oxyphilic) cells and scattered lymphocytes. Reparative foci within this neoplasm can occur, which may give rise to exfoliated, malignant‐appearing, squamouslike cells. A false‐positive diagnosis of squamous carcinoma can occur when these atypical cells dominate the cytologic aspirate. Histochemical and immunoperoxidase stains may aid in diagnosing an atypical WT when the usual cytologic features are absent.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / O objetivo desta Dissertação é modesto, ela pretende apenas mostrar que, para a Filosofia Crítica, não há lugar para intuições intelectuais e que, na mesma medida em que estas são terminantemente afastadas, estão na base do idealismo refutado por Kant ao menos segundo o seu ponto de vista. Consequentemente, o dogmatismo, em ambas as suas formas, o racionalismo (idealismo empírico) e o materialismo radical (realismo transcendental), são refutados, embora não ainda de modo completamente justificado, já na Estética Transcendental da Crítica da Razão Pura, onde se prova que as intuições são única e exclusivamente sensíveis. A prova de que não há intuições intelectuais é também afirmativa, na medida em que, como tentamos reproduzir, Kant prova que as intuições são todas sensíveis e sua forma são espaço e tempo. Este percurso é fundamental para todos os problemas que virão em seguida. Para tanto, não medimos esforços em tentar mostrar que as categorias na medida em que são a forma de toda determinação de um objeto, o que faz com que elas sejam ainda a forma de toda ligação (síntese) determinam o próprio modo de aparecer dos objetos na intuição, em uma conformidade originária à forma desta última. / The subject of this dissertation is modest: it intends simply to show that, for Critical Philosophy, theres no place for intelectual instuitions and that, as they are peremptorially rejected, they constitute the basis of the idealism refutated by Kant - at least, in his own point of view. Consequently, dogmatism, in both its shapes - rationalism (aka empirical idealism) and radical materialism (transcendental realism) - are refutated, although not in a completely justified way yet, in the Transcendental Aesthetics of the Critique of Pure Reason, where it is demonstrated that intuitions are exclusively sensitive. The proof that there are no intelectual intuitions is also affirmative as, as we tried to reproduce, Kant proves that all intuitions are sensitive and forms of space and time. This is a fundamental course for every issue that's going to follow. We will try with all ressources to show that the categories - in the sense that are the form of every determination of an object, which also turn them into the the form of every connection (synthesis) - determine the very way of appearing of the objects in intuition, in an originary conformity with the form of the latter.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / O objetivo desta Dissertação é modesto, ela pretende apenas mostrar que, para a Filosofia Crítica, não há lugar para intuições intelectuais e que, na mesma medida em que estas são terminantemente afastadas, estão na base do idealismo refutado por Kant ao menos segundo o seu ponto de vista. Consequentemente, o dogmatismo, em ambas as suas formas, o racionalismo (idealismo empírico) e o materialismo radical (realismo transcendental), são refutados, embora não ainda de modo completamente justificado, já na Estética Transcendental da Crítica da Razão Pura, onde se prova que as intuições são única e exclusivamente sensíveis. A prova de que não há intuições intelectuais é também afirmativa, na medida em que, como tentamos reproduzir, Kant prova que as intuições são todas sensíveis e sua forma são espaço e tempo. Este percurso é fundamental para todos os problemas que virão em seguida. Para tanto, não medimos esforços em tentar mostrar que as categorias na medida em que são a forma de toda determinação de um objeto, o que faz com que elas sejam ainda a forma de toda ligação (síntese) determinam o próprio modo de aparecer dos objetos na intuição, em uma conformidade originária à forma desta última. / The subject of this dissertation is modest: it intends simply to show that, for Critical Philosophy, theres no place for intelectual instuitions and that, as they are peremptorially rejected, they constitute the basis of the idealism refutated by Kant - at least, in his own point of view. Consequently, dogmatism, in both its shapes - rationalism (aka empirical idealism) and radical materialism (transcendental realism) - are refutated, although not in a completely justified way yet, in the Transcendental Aesthetics of the Critique of Pure Reason, where it is demonstrated that intuitions are exclusively sensitive. The proof that there are no intelectual intuitions is also affirmative as, as we tried to reproduce, Kant proves that all intuitions are sensitive and forms of space and time. This is a fundamental course for every issue that's going to follow. We will try with all ressources to show that the categories - in the sense that are the form of every determination of an object, which also turn them into the the form of every connection (synthesis) - determine the very way of appearing of the objects in intuition, in an originary conformity with the form of the latter.

yes / BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE Aging of the healthy brain is characterized by focal or nonfocal white matter (WM) signal abnormality (SA) changes, which are typically detected as leukoaraiosis (LA). Hypertension is a risk factor for WM lesion formation. This study investigated whether LA might be associated with increased cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) pulsatility linked to arterial hypertension. METHODS A total of 101 individuals without neurologic diseases (53 females and 48 males) aged between 18 and 75 years underwent 3T brain MRI with cine phase contrast imaging for CSF flow estimation, after providing their informed consent. LA was defined as the presence of focal T2 WM SA changes and/or nonfocal uniform areas of signal increase termed dirty appearing white matter (DAWM). Relevant information relating to cardiovascular risk factors was also collected. RESULTS When controlled for age and hypertension, significant partial correlations were observed between: DAWM volume and: net negative flow (r = –.294, P = .014); net positive flow (NPF) (r = .406, P = .001); and peak positive velocity (r = .342, P = .004). Multiple linear regression analysis revealed DAWM volume to be significantly correlated with CSF NPF (P = .019) and hypertension (P = .007), whereas T2 WM SA volume was only significantly correlated with age (P = .002). Combined DAWM and T2 WM SA volumes were significantly related with age (P = .001) and CSF peak negative velocity (P = .041). CONCLUSIONS Rarefaction of WM leading to LA is a multifactorial process, in which formation of DAWM induced by hypertension and increased aqueductal CSF pulsatility, may play a contributory role. These two factors appear to act independently of each other in a process that is independent of age.

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The present investigation discusses the phenomenological concept of the phenomenon through an interpretation of the meaning of the negativity of the phenomenon in the philosophical works of Martin Heidegger, Jan Patočka and Eugen Fink. This negativity is thematised in terms of a loss and a privation that leads to a description of the appearing of the phenomenon as a sublime event, which exposes existence to an absence of meaning. A formulation of the absence in question as a dynamic movement of existence opens a new perspective on what it means to do phenomenology: phenomenological thinking does not begin with the immediate givenness of appearance, but through the trembling of meaning in the experience of a loss of the phenomenon. / Denna avhandling belyser fenomenologins fenomenbegrepp genom en tolkning av dess i förhållande till framträdelsen negativa innebörd i Martin Heideggers, Jan Patočkas och Eugen Finks filosofiska författarskap. Fenomenets negativitet tematiseras i termer av ett berövande och en förlust av fenomenet. Förståelsen av detta fördjupas stegvis, och leder fram till en beskrivning av fenomenets framträdande som en sublim tilldragelse. Denna tilldragelse exponerar existensen inför en frånvaro av mening. En formulering av frånvaron ifråga som en dynamisk rörelse av existensen öppnar för ett nytt perspektiv på vad det innebär att bedriva fenomenologi: fenomenologiskt tänkande börjar inte med framträdelsens omedelbara givenhet, utan genom erfarenheten av en förlust av fenomenet som skakar om den givna meningen.