国立情報学研究所で電子化したコンテンツを使用している。

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国立情報学研究所で電子化したコンテンツを使用している。

国立情報学研究所で電子化したコンテンツを使用している。

The purpose of this paper is to make a suggestion to deontic logic: Respect Hume\'s Law, the answer to the is-ought problem that says that all ought-talk is completely cut off from is-talk. Most deontic logicians have sought another solution: Namely, the solution that says that we can bridge the is-ought gap. Thus, a century\'s worth of research into these normative systems of logic has lead to many attempts at doing just that. At the same time, the field of deontic logic has come to be plagued with paradox. My argument essentially depends upon there being a substantive relation between this betrayal of Hume and the plethora of paradoxes that have appeared in two-adic (binary normative operator), one-adic (unary normative operator), and zero-adic (constant normative operator) deontic systems, expressed in the traditions of von Wright, Kripke, and Anderson, respectively. My suggestion has two motivations: First, to rid the philosophical literature of its puzzles and second, to give Hume\'s Law a proper formalization. Exploring the issues related to this project also points to the idea that maybe we should re-engineer (e.g., further generalize) our classical calculus, which might involve the adoption of many-valued logics somewhere down the line. / Master of Arts

This paper criticises the famous “”ought” implies “can”” on the grounds that its main claim - that there can be no unfulfillable obligations - is false. The first part of the paper investigates the use, history and previous literature on the topic, as well as the proper understanding of the principle. The second part presents the main argument, directed at the interpretation of “”ought” implies “can”” as a conceptual truth. It is argued that it must be possible to split the meaning of the term “ought” into component parts, parts that must each be quite capable of functioning on their own. The result is that we cannot conclude that one part of the term “ought” (such as whatever is its moral content) must disappear just because another part of it (such as “can”) does so. Finally, in the third part, we tackle some common arguments and intuitions in favour of the principle, and provides a few concluding words and a summary. / Den här uppsatsen kritiserar den berömda “”bör” implicerar “kan””-principen, (här tolkad som “konceptuell implikation), på så vis att principens viktigaste punkt är falsk, nämligen idén att det inte kan finnas några ouppnåbara plikter. Uppsatsens första del undersöker användningen, historien och litteraturen bakom ämnet, samt formuleringen av principen. Den andra delen presenterar huvudargumentet, riktat mot ””bör” implicerar ”kan”” som en konceptuell sanning. Argumentet fungerar på så vis att det måste vara möjligt att dela upp meningen i termen ”borde/bör” i komponenter, komponenter som måste vara kapabla att fungera även på egen hand. Resultatet blir att vi inte kan dra slutsatsen att en del av termen måste försvinna (såsom dess moraliska innehåll) bara för att en annan del av termen (såsom ”kan”) gör det. Slutligen, i den tredje delen, så behandlar vi några vanliga argument och intuition som förs fram till principens försvar, och summerar texten.

O pensamento ocidental entrou, em seus primórdios fundantes, em um beco, sem saber que se tratava de uma via sem saída. Quando chegado o tão esperado acabamento, não houve a recompensa sonhada, algum tipo de conhecimento pleno, mas o desânimo de uma obra não concluída. Foi necessário buscar uma saída, a qual não poderia ser outra senão a própria entrada. Assim, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Arendt e outros redesenharam todo o percurso da filosofia até os que com desdém foram chamados poetas, os pré-socráticos, a estabelecer novas possibilidades para a já tão íntima relação entre verdade e liberdade, bem como novas possibilidades para o ser e seu modos, o dever-ser e o poder-ser, e, ainda, novas possibilidades para o próprio pensamento. / Western thought has entered, in its infancy founding, in an alley, not knowing that it was a dead end. When it reached the awaited end, there was no dreamed reward, some kind of full knowledge, but the dismay of a work not completed. It was necessary to find a way out, which could not be other than the entry itself. Thus, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Arendt and others redesigned all the way of philosophy until those who were scornfully called poets, the pre-Socratics, to establish new possibilities for the already intimate relationship between truth and freedom, as well as new possibilities to the being and its modes, the being-ought and the being-able, and also new possibilities for thought itself.

国立情報学研究所で電子化したコンテンツを使用している。

国立情報学研究所で電子化したコンテンツを使用している。

O pensamento ocidental entrou, em seus primórdios fundantes, em um beco, sem saber que se tratava de uma via sem saída. Quando chegado o tão esperado acabamento, não houve a recompensa sonhada, algum tipo de conhecimento pleno, mas o desânimo de uma obra não concluída. Foi necessário buscar uma saída, a qual não poderia ser outra senão a própria entrada. Assim, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Arendt e outros redesenharam todo o percurso da filosofia até os que com desdém foram chamados poetas, os pré-socráticos, a estabelecer novas possibilidades para a já tão íntima relação entre verdade e liberdade, bem como novas possibilidades para o ser e seu modos, o dever-ser e o poder-ser, e, ainda, novas possibilidades para o próprio pensamento. / Western thought has entered, in its infancy founding, in an alley, not knowing that it was a dead end. When it reached the awaited end, there was no dreamed reward, some kind of full knowledge, but the dismay of a work not completed. It was necessary to find a way out, which could not be other than the entry itself. Thus, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Arendt and others redesigned all the way of philosophy until those who were scornfully called poets, the pre-Socratics, to establish new possibilities for the already intimate relationship between truth and freedom, as well as new possibilities to the being and its modes, the being-ought and the being-able, and also new possibilities for thought itself.