Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Bushatsky.pdf: 1380757 bytes, checksum: 47bccc0b95080221650937333369ec7e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-09 / This doctoral thesis presents the principle of negotiating security, relating it to corporate law. For such, the principles of rules are differentiated, exposing the basic principles of corporate law, emphasizing that it is due to private autonomy that the partners subject themselves to the will of the majority in corporate resolutions, just as decisions made should follow the interests of the corporation. After this, the principle of negotiating security was conceptualized, which is sustained over 4 (four) pillars: objective good faith (loyalty), confidence theory, principle of correction (inspired by the Italian law) and private autonomy. It was asserted that loyalty, reliability, correction and subjective and objective autonomy jointly studied provide the base value for the interpretation of the Law and Legal Affairs, bringing security to corporate relations, within the legal framework of trade, creating the standard of behavior expected from all those involved in trade. By combining the principle of negotiating security with the principle of corporate preservation, it can be demonstrated how conflicts of interest involving the company, partners and administrators should be resolved. Following, first an overview of business risk and the multiple facets of justice, then a review on the legal protection of private investment, arriving at the conclusion that it must comply with its corporate function, in order to expose the main aspects of the business corporation. In order to prove the understanding, doctrinal passages were presented, recent decisions of the Brazilian courts on corporate law were analyzed, as well as how theoretical examples were used as illustration. Finally, the paper emphasizes that the principle of negotiating security must be applied in corporate law, protecting society, partners, administrators, and, thus, helping both the economic and the social development / Na presente tese de doutorado apresenta-se o princípio da segurança negocial relacionando-o com o direito societário. Para tanto, diferenciam-se os princípios das regras, expondo, depois, os princípios basilares do direito societário, destacando que é graças à autonomia privada que os sócios se sujeitam à vontade da maioria nas deliberações sociais, assim como as tomadas de decisões devem seguir o interesse da sociedade. Após, conceituou-se o princípio da segurança negocial sustentando-o em 4 (quatro) pilares: boa-fé objetiva (lealdade), teoria da confiança, princípio da correção (inspirado no direito italiano) e autonomia privada. Asseverou-se que lealdade, confiança, correção e a autonomia subjetiva e objetiva estudadas conjuntamente trazem o valor base para a interpretação da Lei e dos negócios jurídicos, trazendo segurança às relações sociais, dentro do regime jurídico comercial, criando o padrão de comportamento esperado de todos os envolvidos no comércio. Conjugando o princípio da segurança negocial com o princípio da preservação da empresa, demonstrou-se como os conflitos de interesses envolvendo sociedade, sócios e administradores devem ser resolvidos. Seguiu-se, primeiro com uma visão geral sobre o risco empresarial e as múltiplas facetas sobre justiça, depois realizando uma crítica sobre a proteção jurídica ao investimento privado, concluindo que este deve cumprir sua função social, para assim expor os principais aspectos da sociedade empresária. Para provar o entendimento, trouxeram-se passagens doutrinárias, analisaram-se recentes decisões dos tribunais brasileiros sobre direito societário assim como se utilizaram exemplos teóricos como ilustração. Por fim, ressaltamos que o princípio da segurança negocial deve ser aplicado no direito societário, protegendo sociedade, sócios, administradores, e, ajudando, consequentemente, no desenvolvimento econômico e social

Cette thèse analyse l’impact des facteurs institutionnels et de la gouvernance sur l’investissement privé dans les pays en développement. La problématique de la « bonne gouvernance » et de l’amélioration de la qualité institutionnelle notamment dans les pays en développement sont au coeur des préoccupations de la communauté internationale. Pour autant, il n’existe pas un cadre institutionnel et un système de gouvernance unique et optimal qui s’imposeraient de manière exogène à tous les pays, car les facteurs culturels, historiques et anthropologiques modèlent la qualité des institutions et le mode de gouvernance. En effet, si les pays peuvent avoir un objectif commun, celui d’un cadre institutionnel permettant notamment de garantir la viabilité et la crédibilité du climat d’investissement, ils démarrent tous de points différents, marqués par des caractéristiques propres.Ces facteurs nous emmènent à privilégier une approche relativiste et non normative de la qualité des institutions et de la gouvernance. Cependant,tous les cadres institutionnels ne se valent pas. Certaines configurations institutionnelles accroissent l’incertitude et l’irréversibilité de l’investissement. Nos analyses placent le déficit de gouvernance et la faiblesse des institutions au cœur de la problématique de l’incertitude et de l’irréversibilité de l’investissement dans les pays en développement. Nous adoptons dans cette thèse une démarche plurielle consistant en une analyse macroéconométrique qui permet d’apprécier le comportement de l’investissement au niveau agrégé, et une analyse microéconométrique qui a l’intérêt de prendre en compte l’hétérogénéité des comportements d’investissement des entreprises. Un accent particulier est porté à l’Afrique subsaharienne qui est la région ayant le plus faible taux d’investissement. / This thesis analyzes the impact of governance and institutions on private investment in developing countries. "Good governance" and institutional quality especially in developing countries are of great concern to the international community. However, there is no unique and optimal institutional framework and governance system which can be set up in all countries independently to their cultural, historical and anthropological characteristics. Indeed, if all countries can share a common objective which consists of an institutional framework, able to ensure the sustainability and credibility of the investment climate, they will all start from different points with specific characteristics. These factors lead us to favor a non normative approach of the quality of institutions and governance. However, some institutional framework increases uncertainty and irreversibility ofinvestment. In this thesis, we consider weak institutions and poor governance as the main sources of uncertainty and irreversibility of investment indeveloping countries. We use a macroeconometric approach which analyses the investment behavior at the aggregate level, and a microeconometric approach which takes into account the heterogeneity of the investment behavior of firms. An emphasis is put on sub-Saharan African countries that have the lowest private investment rate.

Global economy is going through a transition where investments in extractive industryprojects have drastically slowed down, which results in a competition among governments for establishing regulatory incentives to make their jurisdictions more attractive. In this context, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has created a Specialized Team to Track Investment Execution, which is intended to identify all the issues and obstacles that hinder the execution of investments so as to adjust their regulatory frameworks. As a result, the aforementioned Team submitted a bill that the Congress has recently approved, Law N° 30230, known as Economic Recovery Package, which provides for a set of measures relatedto the private investment and environmental regulations.Based on the analysis of the aforementioned measures, the authors propose that this Law does not intend to reduce the environmental standards or requirements but to provide such legal security that gives investors certainty and predictability as to the regulatory framework. / La economía mundial viene atravesando una fase de transición donde la inversión en proyectos de industrias extractivas se ha desacelerado drásticamente, lo cual conlleva a que muchos gobiernos compitan por generar incentivos regulatorios que vuelvan más atractivas sus jurisdicciones. En ese contexto, el Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas creó un Equipo Especializado de Seguimiento de la Inversión, cuyo propósito es identificar todos aquellos problemas y trabas que afectan la ejecución de las inversiones, a fin de proponer la adecuación de los marcos normativos. Es así que, a propuesta del referido equipo, recientemente fue aprobada por el Congreso la Ley No. 30230, conocida como el Paquete de Reactivación Económica, que contempla una serie de medidas vinculadas con la regulación ambiental y la inversión privada.Partiendo del análisis de las referidas medidas, los autores proponen que la Ley no busca reducir los estándares o exigencias ambientales, sino mas bien alcanzar aquella seguridad jurídica que permita otorgar certeza y predictibilidad a los inversionistas respecto del marcoregulatorio.

The study has empirically examined the relative impact of public and private investment on economic growth and has also tested the crowding in or crowding out effect of public investment on private investment in four Southern African economies – Malawi, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The analysis used annual time-series data covering the period from 1970 to 2014. The study provides new evidence to contribute firstly to the current debate regarding the relative importance of public and private investment in economic growth processes and secondly, on whether public investment crowds in or crowds out private investment in the selected countries. For this purpose, the study employed two empirical models using the recently developed Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)-bounds testing approach to cointegration. Model 1 examines the relative impact of public and private investment on economic growth while Model 2 investigates the crowding in or crowding out effect of gross public investment and its subcomponents (infrastructural and non-infrastructural) on private investment. The results of Model 1 largely supported the private investment-led economic growth strategy. In all the study countries, private investment had a positive impact on economic growth. Also, public investment positively contributed to economic growth in Zimbabwe, but in the remaining study countries, public investment had a negative relationship with economic growth. Results from Model 2 reveal that: (i) the crowding out effect of gross public investment on private investment predominates in the study countries; (ii) infrastructural public investment crowds in private investment in South Africa and Zimbabwe in the long run while it crowds out private investment in Malawi and Zambia in the short run; and (iii) non-infrastructural public investment crowds out private investment in South Africa and Zambia. On balance, the results from Model 2 show that public investment tends to crowd out private investment in the selected countries and this further underscore the importance of the private sector-led economic growth processes in the study countries. / Economics / D. Phil. (Economics)