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The literature on security sector actors in transitional societies emerging from war and/or authoritarianism has evolved by critiquing local perspectives recently. While the existing literature has extensively analysed transitional societies in Africa, Middle East and Eastern Europe, the thesis adds a new geographical perspective by providing a case study of security sector change processes in the Republic of Georgia, 1985 - 2008. More specifically, the thesis examines the local processes and drivers of security sector change in Georgia, and their interrelationships with donor supported programmes including SSR. The thesis employs a political economy analysis to examine indigenous security sector actors and their characteristics. Based on the approach, the thesis particularly examines processes of change and reform of policing institutions. The paramilitary is identified and examined as a key focus for analysis. The research shows that political dynamics among a few political elites determined the course of security sector change in Georgia. Despite ample external assistance, domestic political dynamics remained the main driving factor in the SSR agenda-setting process. In the politically-driven security sector change efforts, the restoration and maintenance of regime security remained a priority under both the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili regimes. Overall, the security sector actors played significant role in the political developments. Consequently, the process of changing these actors was a largely domestically driven political process. The role of paramilitaries in relation to regime security and the security sector change agenda-setting process in Georgia requires the security sector research to treat paramilitary as a distinguished unit for consideration. / Akino Yutaka Eurasia Fund and the United Nations University Akino Memorial Research Fellowship.

No description available.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

Ce mémoire s’intéresse aux récits des ex-combattants des groupes paramilitaires Autodéfenses unies de Colombie sur leur participation au conflit armé. Ces narrations, construites dans un contexte de réintégration à la société, permettent de réfléchir à la construction de la vérité par les ex-combattants dans les contextes post-conflit. Nous avons analysé les histoires de vie de 18 ex-combattants qui participaient au Programme de réintégration à la vie civile à Bogota. Nos interviewés ont adopté une position de victimes, en élaborant des discours justificateurs visant à se déresponsabiliser. Ces discours montrent une normalisation de la violence qui revient à la notion de « banalité du mal » d’Hannah Arendt. Nos interviewés ont employé plusieurs rhétoriques des groupes paramilitaires afin de justifier la violence. Ces rhétoriques font partie de la construction psychologique de l’ennemi par les groupes et elles invitent à analyser le rôle du langage dans la construction d’une culture paramilitaire. Néanmoins, certains interviewés ont condamné la violence exercée par leur groupe. Nous avons observé qu’il existe plusieurs interprétations de la manière dont nos interviewés disaient avoir réagi aux contextes de violence de masse, ce qui nous a amenés à réfléchir aux notions de culpabilité morale et juridique. / This paper studies the interpretations of the ex-combatants of the paramilitary groups United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia about their participation in the internal conflict. These discourses, created in a context of social reintegration, are used to discuss the recreation of the truth brought by the ex-combatants in post-conflict contexts. We analyzed the life stories of 18 ex-combatants who were part of the reintegration to civil life Program held in Bogota. Our interviewees have adopted a position of victims, creating discourses of legitimation of the violence in order to avoid the according responsability. In there, it suggests a normalization of violence, remembering the concept of the “banality of evil” brought by Hannah Arendt. Our interviewees have used the paramilitary rhetoric to justify violence. This rhetoric belongs to the psychological construction of the enemy by the groups and it reveals the role of language in the construction of a paramilitary culture. Although, we found that there are other interpretations that don’t concede and justify violence. There are different interpretations of their reactions in the contexts of mass violence. From there we discussed the notions of moral and legal guilty. / Esta investigación se interesa por las interpretaciones de los excombatientes de los grupos paramilitares Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia sobre su participación en el conflicto armado interno. Estas narraciones, creadas en un contexto de reintegración social, permiten reflexionar sobre la construcción de la verdad por los excombatientes en los contextos post-conflicto. Analizamos las historias de vida de 18 excombatientes que participaban en el Programa de Reintegración a la Vida Civil en Bogotá. Nuestros entrevistados adoptaron una posición de víctimas, construyendo discursos justificatorios buscando des-responsabilizarse. Estos discursos muestran una normalización de la violencia que recuerdan la noción de “banalidad del mal” de Hannah Arendt. Nuestros entrevistados emplearon varias retóricas de los grupos paramilitares para justificar la violencia. Estas retóricas hacen parte de la construcción psicológica del enemigo por los grupos e invitan a analizar el rol del lenguaje en la construcción de una cultura paramilitar. Sin embargo, no todos utilizaron discursos justificatorios. Encontramos que existen varias interpretaciones de la manera en que nuestros entrevistados decían haber reaccionado a los contextos de violencia de masa, lo cual nos condujo a reflexionar sobre las nociones de culpabilidad moral y jurídica.

Cette étude porte sur les films qui traitent du conflit politique nord-irlandais de 1968 à 1998 et elle entend mettre en lumière les relations entre le cinéma et l’évolution de ce conflit. Le cinéma, dans sa construction discursive, à sa travers sa voix indépendante et sa portée populaire, offre un véhicule unique pour l’exploration des Troubles et du processus de paix. Les films sur les Troubles, réalisés pendant cette période, abordent principalement l’IRA dans ses rapports avec l’Angleterre, tandis que les films sortis pendant le processus de paix reflètent la remise en question identitaire, avec entre autres, des membres de l’IRA qui, dans leur quête d’identité, se détournent de la violence politique. Les comédies qui datent du processus de paix dénoncent, de manière ironique, la violence politique des Troubles et illustrent l’espoir que génère ce processus en libérant progressivement l’Irlande du Nord de la violence. Ces films, réalisés pour la plupart pendant le processus de paix - qui repense les rapports anglo-irlandais et les relations entre les deux communautés en Irlande du Nord - se focalisent sur l’un des acteurs du conflit : la communauté catholique (les nationalistes et les républicains) et ses liens avec les Britanniques. Les rapports intercommunautaires sont peu abordés et la communauté protestante, relativement absente de l’image, n’est évoquée qu’à travers les loyalistes. Si ces films explorent principalement la perspective catholique, certains d’entre eux se concentrent sur les victimes catholiques d’événements particuliers des Troubles et ces films proposent une version alternative à l’histoire officielle, conférant au cinéma la fonction de source historique mais aussi de lieu de mémoire des victimes. Ainsi, le cinéma ne retranscrit pas seulement l’histoire de façon figée mais s’intègre dans l’évolution de la situation en Irlande du Nord. / This study centres on films dealing with the political conflict in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998 and attempts to trace the relationship between cinema and this ongoing conflict. Through its discursive construction, its independent voice and its popular reach, cinema provides a unique vehicle for the exploration of the Troubles and the peace process. The films about the Troubles, shot during this period, look mainly at the IRA and its relationship with England. The films made during the peace process reflect the question of identity - a central facet of the peace process - by representing, for example, some members of the IRA engaged in the search for their identity turning away from political violence. The comedies - also made during the peace process - use irony to denounce the political violence of the Troubles and depict the hope that the peace process generates. These films, mostly shot during the peace process which reconsiders t! he East-West relations and the internal relations in Northern Ireland between the two communities, focus primarily on the catholic community [nationalists and republicans] in its relationship with the British. Intercommunal relations appear rarely in films and the protestant community, relatively absent from the screen, is represented almost exclusively by loyalist paramilitaries. Therefore these films display a certain interest for the catholic point of view and some of them concentrate on catholic victims of specific events of the Troubles and offer an alternative to the official version of history endowing cinema with a role as historical source and also as a space for the memory of the victims. Thus, cinema does not only retranscribe history in a static way but takes part in the changes going on in Northern Ireland.

Ce mémoire s’intéresse aux récits des ex-combattants des groupes paramilitaires Autodéfenses unies de Colombie sur leur participation au conflit armé. Ces narrations, construites dans un contexte de réintégration à la société, permettent de réfléchir à la construction de la vérité par les ex-combattants dans les contextes post-conflit. Nous avons analysé les histoires de vie de 18 ex-combattants qui participaient au Programme de réintégration à la vie civile à Bogota. Nos interviewés ont adopté une position de victimes, en élaborant des discours justificateurs visant à se déresponsabiliser. Ces discours montrent une normalisation de la violence qui revient à la notion de « banalité du mal » d’Hannah Arendt. Nos interviewés ont employé plusieurs rhétoriques des groupes paramilitaires afin de justifier la violence. Ces rhétoriques font partie de la construction psychologique de l’ennemi par les groupes et elles invitent à analyser le rôle du langage dans la construction d’une culture paramilitaire. Néanmoins, certains interviewés ont condamné la violence exercée par leur groupe. Nous avons observé qu’il existe plusieurs interprétations de la manière dont nos interviewés disaient avoir réagi aux contextes de violence de masse, ce qui nous a amenés à réfléchir aux notions de culpabilité morale et juridique. / This paper studies the interpretations of the ex-combatants of the paramilitary groups United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia about their participation in the internal conflict. These discourses, created in a context of social reintegration, are used to discuss the recreation of the truth brought by the ex-combatants in post-conflict contexts. We analyzed the life stories of 18 ex-combatants who were part of the reintegration to civil life Program held in Bogota. Our interviewees have adopted a position of victims, creating discourses of legitimation of the violence in order to avoid the according responsability. In there, it suggests a normalization of violence, remembering the concept of the “banality of evil” brought by Hannah Arendt. Our interviewees have used the paramilitary rhetoric to justify violence. This rhetoric belongs to the psychological construction of the enemy by the groups and it reveals the role of language in the construction of a paramilitary culture. Although, we found that there are other interpretations that don’t concede and justify violence. There are different interpretations of their reactions in the contexts of mass violence. From there we discussed the notions of moral and legal guilty. / Esta investigación se interesa por las interpretaciones de los excombatientes de los grupos paramilitares Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia sobre su participación en el conflicto armado interno. Estas narraciones, creadas en un contexto de reintegración social, permiten reflexionar sobre la construcción de la verdad por los excombatientes en los contextos post-conflicto. Analizamos las historias de vida de 18 excombatientes que participaban en el Programa de Reintegración a la Vida Civil en Bogotá. Nuestros entrevistados adoptaron una posición de víctimas, construyendo discursos justificatorios buscando des-responsabilizarse. Estos discursos muestran una normalización de la violencia que recuerdan la noción de “banalidad del mal” de Hannah Arendt. Nuestros entrevistados emplearon varias retóricas de los grupos paramilitares para justificar la violencia. Estas retóricas hacen parte de la construcción psicológica del enemigo por los grupos e invitan a analizar el rol del lenguaje en la construcción de una cultura paramilitar. Sin embargo, no todos utilizaron discursos justificatorios. Encontramos que existen varias interpretaciones de la manera en que nuestros entrevistados decían haber reaccionado a los contextos de violencia de masa, lo cual nos condujo a reflexionar sobre las nociones de culpabilidad moral y jurídica.

Research was conducted using hermeneutic-phenomenology and semi-structure interviews to explore and understand the lived experience of women veterans of the Canadian Forces. Women recently entered Canadian military combat positions, taking on a profession historically exclusively occupied by men. Due to the lack of research on women veterans of the Canadian Forces, knowledge was drawn from research about women in nontraditional work, American paramilitary and military occupations, as well as an historical review of women’s involvement in the Canadian Forces, to provide context to the research themes. Participants comprised of 6 women veterans who described 11 essential and 4 significant themes. Unique contributions to literature include essential themes such as, Slut or a lesbian, take your pick, Proving I’m good enough, Trying to be treated better, Got some support, Visible and singled out, Perpetual outsider, Given gender based tasks or opportunities, and Women demeaned. Suggestions for future studies and implications for counselling practice are discussed.