In this dissertation, the first two chapters seek to understand and quantify how different types of frictions shape individual and market outcomes. This strand of my current research studies questions in urban settings such as the role of ridesharing platforms in mitigating the search and match frictions prevalent in taxi markets and how information frictions can hinder the growth small and medium sized firms in developing countries. The final chapter of my dissertation studies the consequences of electoral accountability in democracies. This strand of research studies the role of electoral incentives in shaping the allocation and provision of effort by politicians. The first chapter of my dissertation, co-authored with Motaz Al-Chanati, studiesthe sources of efficiency gains in ridesharing markets. The key motivation arises from the fact that in many decentralized transportation markets, search and match frictions lead to inefficient outcomes. Ridesharing platforms, who act as intermediaries in traditional taxi markets, improve upon the status quo along two key dimensions: surge pricing and centralized matching. We study how and why these two features make the market more efficient; and explore how alternate pricing and matching rules can improve outcomes further. To this end, we develop a structural model of the ridesharing market with four components: (1) dynamically optimizing drivers who make entry, exit and search decisions; (2) stochastic demand; (3) surge pricing rule and (4) a matching technology. Relative to our benchmark model, surge pricing generates large gains for all agents; primarily during late nights. This is driven by the role surge plays in inducing drivers to enter the market. In contrast, centralized matching reduces match frictions and increases surplus for consumers, drivers, and the ridesharing platform, irrespective of the time of the day. We then show that a simple, more flexible pricing rule can generate even larger welfare gains for all agents. Our results highlight how and why centralized matching and surge pricing are able to make the market more efficient. We conclude by drawing policy implications for improving the competitiveness between taxis and ridesharing platforms. My second chapter, co-authored with Jonas Hjort and Golvine de Rochambeau, studies the role of information frictions amongst firms in developing countries. Evidence suggests that many firms in poor countries stagnate because they cannot access growth-conducive markets. We hypothesize that overlooked informational barriers distort market access. To investigate, we gave a random subset of medium-sized Liberian firms vouchers for a week-long program that exclusively teaches “sellership”: how to sell to corporations, governments, and other large buyers. Firms that participate win three times as many formal contracts a year later. The impact is heterogeneous: informational sales barriers bind for about a quarter of firms. Three years after training, these firms continue to win desirable contracts, are more likely to operate, and employ more workers. In my final chapter, I analyze how politicians in Canada allocate their time and effort when faced with competitive elections. In particular I study how well the so-called discipline effect work in democratic elections and how does it affect the allocation of time and resources of politicians. To do this, I present causal evidence of the effect of electoral vulnerability on subsequent performance of Canadian Members of Parliament along various dimensions. More specifically, I document a politician’s substitution of effort across different tasks in response to plausibly exogenous variation in electoral vulnerability. Using party opinion polls on the day before the election as an instrument, I estimate that more electorally vulnerable politicians substitute effort away from attending the parliament and instead spend more money in their constituency and more money in the following election campaign. These MPs spend more on salaries to their staff, travel to and from the constituency and advertising to constituents. I also find evidence that electorally vulnerable MPs find it harder to raise money for their next election but are compensated by transfers from the political party they belong to. This substitution of effort towards constituency and campaign activities is rationalized with a simple political economy model where politicians can influence a voter’s belief about their ability by exerting effort on more costly, but informative actions.

No description available.

Are all parliamentarians treated equally in their parliamentary work? And do all parliamentarians have equal opportunities to carry out their duties? This study seeks to understand if parliamentarians with a foreign background have equal opportunities to carry out their parliamentary duties and whether this differs between men and women. To achieve this, in-depth interviews with Swedish parliamentarians with a foreign background, have been conducted. The study shows that there are cases of both direct and indirect discrimination against people with a foreign background in the Swedish parliament. Most of the respondents also face direct discrimination and racism on social media that is linked to the legislators' background and/or gender. Male and female respondents do not seem to experience different levels of discrimination. However, the discrimination they experience seems to be different. The study also investigates the strategies used to respond to discrimination. The strategies and time the legislators spend on responding to the discrimination require a great deal of commitment outside their regular work tasks. The respondents thus seem to have to work more and harder in their parliamentary work, a commitment that takes both time and energy.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, EU enlargement has regained prominence on the EU agenda. I examine the politicisation of enlargement and arguments for and against enlargement in two debates in the European parliament conducted in November 2023. This is done with a postfunctionalist outlook, expecting that polarisation on the subject will shape along the identity axis. I find that the two debates lack polarisation and can thus not be seen as very politicized. In accordance with postfunctionalist integration theory, I do however note that most traditional and authoritarian parties oppose enlargement. Previous research shows that a member of the European parliament’s nationality also affects positions on enlargement, in combination with the cultural axis. When also taking this into consideration, the understanding of what shapes opinions on enlargement is refined.  The argumentation analysis of the debates shows that opinions that favor enlargement in the debates often stem from a geopolitical urge of positioning the EU against Russia. Opinions that argue against enlargement are mostly concerned about the own country’s payments to the EU budget. This finding leads to a suggestion that more research should be done on how the status as net contributor or net beneficiary to the EU budget shapes opinions on enlargement.

Yes / Purpose – The objective of this study is to understand the budgetary role of national legislatures in Euro Area (EA) countries and to analyse implications for fiscal discipline. Design/methodology/approach – Building on the budget institutions literature, a legislative budgetary power index for all the 19 EA countries is constructed using OECD and European Commission data as well as data generated from questionnaires to national authorities. A two-way fixed effects panel data model is then used to assess the effect of legislative budgetary power on the budget balance in the EA during 2006-15. Findings - Overall, in the EA, formal legislative powers vis-à-vis the national budgetary process are weak but there is more legislative involvement in SGP procedures and legislative budgetary organisational capacity is generally quite good. In contrast to the traditional view in the budget institutions literature, our empirical findings show that strong legislative budgetary power does not necessarily result in larger budget deficits. Research limitations/implications – Data on legislative budgeting was available from different sources and timeseries data was very limited. Practical implications – There is scope to improve democratic legitimacy of the national budgetary process in the EA, without necessarily jeopardising fiscal discipline. Originality/value – The constructed legislative budgetary power index covers all the 19 EA countries and has a broad scope covering various novel institutional characteristics. The empirical analysis contributes to the scarce literature on the impact of legislative budgeting on fiscal discipline.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(地球環境学) / 甲第25518号 / 地環博第261号 / 京都大学大学院地球環境学舎地球環境学専攻 / (主査)准教授 真常 仁志, 教授 舟川 晋也, 教授 西前 出 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Global Environmental Studies / Kyoto University / DGAM

The lobbying of Parliament and the Government in the United Kingdom by wealthy or influential groups and individuals raises concerns about corruption and political equality. Professional lobbying is available mainly to those with significant resources and is often the most effective means of influencing decision-makers. Unchecked, it corrodes public trust in core public institutions. This thesis argues that the problems attending the lobbying of Parliament and Government in the UK need to be identified and understood more clearly so that targeted regulatory solutions can be determined. Currently, lawmakers, organisations and academics have struggled to propose clear pathways for identifying the main issues and understanding them. This is due to a failure to agree on the nature and scope of the central problems associated with lobbying, the relationship between them, and how they are relevant to the model of democratic government in the UK. To overcome this, an analytical framework called ‘institutional diversion’ is developed, tested and evaluated. The framework is developed from institutional corruption literature in the United States and is divided into three parts. Part 1 provides elements which help to identify specific lobbying concerns and provide a rich account of the underlying issues. Part 2 articulates a test to determine whether the identified problem in Part 1 causes a diversion from the purpose of the relevant public institution. It is argued that the critical purpose of decision-makers in Parliament and the Government is to ‘act in the public interest’ and that a diversion from that purpose can be tested using the two criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’. Further, it is not sufficient for a framework to simply identify and help to understand the concerns with lobbying. The logical next step is to identify solutions, and that process must also be rationally guided. Therefore, guidelines are developed from an analysis of an interview with the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists in the UK conducted specifically for this thesis. The guidelines are intended to help future reform analyses by highlighting the practical and political restrictions within which solutions must be developed otherwise they will be unlikely to succeed.

Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka hur den politiska gestaltningen i de svenska dagstidningarna Dagens Nyheter och Svenska Dagbladet skiljer sig åt under olika tidsperioder och därmed vid de olika valen; Europaparlamentsvalet samt Svenskt Riksdagsval. Uppsatsen utgår från teorier om andrahandsval och vad det innebär samt teorier om mediegestaltning av politik och vilken roll det kan ha. Uppsatsen jämför Europaparlamentsvalet 2014 med Svenska Riksdagsvalet 2014 för att belysa skillnaderna mellan de två valen samt hur de gestaltas i nämnda dagstidningar. Vidare belyses läsaren om hur Europaparlamentsvalet har förändrats över tid genom en undersökning av perioden år 2003-2004 i syftet att uppmärksamma hur Europaparlamentsvalet som ägde rum år 2004 gestaltades och tolkades av samma svenska dagstidningar då som vid senare tidsperiod. Uppsatsen avslutar i att diskutera resultatet och gör försök att förklara Europaparlamentsvalet position idag samt i framtiden utifrån den empiri och de teorier om andrahandsval som uppsatsen utgick från.

Les relations internationales sont aujourd’hui confrontées à un mouvement en faveur dela démocratisation de leurs espaces décisionnels. Les parlementaires deviennentprogressivement des acteurs clés dans ce scénario, organisant des forums transnationauxde délibération qui prétendent influencer l’action gouvernementale dans diversdomaines. Ce phénomène touche aussi les intégrations régionales, dont l’Unioneuropéenne et son parlement co-législateur constituent le cas le plus remarquable. Àl’inverse, en Amérique latine, la tradition présidentialiste et le caractèreintergouvernemental des initiatives régionales ont toujours confiné les parlementaires àun rôle secondaire. Pourtant, contre toute attente, un parlement a été créé au sein duMercosur en 2006. Comment expliquer un tel choix institutionnel ? Cette thèse sepropose d’analyser les raisons de la création du Parlement du Mercosur (Parlasur) audelàdes discours officiels. Pour ce faire, on mobilise l’ensemble théorique des « troisi », selon lequel des déterminants découlant des institutions, des intérêts et des idéesjouent un rôle conjoint dans l’action politique. Ces facteurs sont mis en perspective àl’aide des théories de l’action publique, qui soulignent le rôle de la temporalité, descoalitions de cause et de l’inspiration des modèles déjà existants dans le changementinstitutionnel. Ce cadre théorique est ensuite appliqué à l’examen des quatre périodesfondamentales de la construction du Parlasur : le développement institutionnel del’ancienne Commission parlementaire conjointe ; la montée en puissance des relationsentre le Mercosur et l’Union européenne et le transfert de mécanismes d’intégration ; lemoment critique correspondant à la confrontation de la Zone de libre-échange desAmériques aux nouvelles idéologies gouvernantes ; enfin, la difficileinstitutionnalisation du nouveau parlement. Cette analyse chrono-thématique estorientée empiriquement par l’objectif de tracer le parcours des variables explicativesdans le processus institutionnel, sur la base d’entretiens semi-directifs et d’observationsconduites au Mercosur et en Europe. / Recently, some movements have been calling for the democratization of decisionmakingspaces in international relations. Members of parliament have progressivelybecome key actors in this scenario, organizing transnational deliberative forumsintended to influence several domains of governmental action. This is also occurring atthe regional integration level, with the European Union and its co-legislative parliamentas the most prominent examples. In Latin America, on the other hand, the presidentialtradition and intergovernmental character of regional initiatives have always relegatedmembers of parliament to a secondary position. However, against all expectations, aparliament was created in Mercosur in 2006. How can this institutional choice beexplained? This dissertation aims to analyze the reasons for the creation of the MercosurParliament (Parlasur) beyond the official discourse. In order to do so, it explores thecombination of institutions, interests and ideas in determining political action. Thesefactors are contextualized through policy process theories, which underline the role oftiming, advocacy coalitions and inspiration in existing models in institutional change.This theoretical framework is then applied to the study of the four fundamental stages ofthe Parlasur building: the institutional development of the former ParliamentaryCommission; the relations between the Mercosur and the European Union and thetransfer of integration mechanisms; the critical moment when the Free Trade Area ofthe Americas was confronted by the new governmental ideologies; and the difficultinstitutionalization process that is being faced by the new parliament. This chronothematicanalysis is intended to trace the path of explanatory variables in thisinstitutional result, based on semi-structured interviews and observations carried out inMercosur as well as in the European Union.

No description available.