M.A. (Applied Linguistics) / Much research has focused on general strategy use during simultaneous interpreting (SI), while little research has been conducted on how interpreters’ choice of strategies relates to source text (ST) delivery speed (DS). Hence, it is unclear whether interpreters use the same strategies when confronted with fast speech, average speech, and slow speech; or, whether they use different strategies under these three conditions. This research argues that interpreters use specific strategies to cope with the different ST delivery speed during simultaneous interpreting within the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). The PAP consists of delegates from African countries with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. In order to facilitate communication in this multilingual setting, the PAP has adopted six official working languages. However, the latter still do not resolve institutional communication barriers; hence the need for such services as simultaneous interpreting. The PAP is situated in Midrand, South Africa, and plays an important role in African politics. It offers SI in English and French. Nevertheless, no previous studies on simultaneous interpreting have been conducted at the PAP. Thus, through empirical research based on primary data consisting of recordings of simultaneous interpreting in French and English at the PAP, this study examines interpreters’ use of strategies. The main focus of the study is the strategies for fast, average, and slow delivery speed identified by Gile (1995), during actual interpreting at the PAP The study categorises these interpreting strategies into meaning-based (lexical dissimilarity) or form-based (lexical similarity) and indicates those that are more appropriate for each DS during SI. By differentiating the various strategies used by interpreters to deal with all three ST delivery speeds, this study creates an awareness about and clarifies how certain interpreting conditions, such as speed, affect interpreters’ coping tactics. In particular, the study demonstrates that the faster the speed, the more form-based (FB) the strategies will be; and, the slower the speed, the more interpreters will resort to meaning-based (MB) strategies. Ultimately, the study demonstrates that strategies that lead to meaning-based interpreting are more successful than the others which lead to a form-based interpreting.

Magister Legum - LLM / Tensions have arisen in Kenya’s devolved system between the Senate - the body representing the sub-national units at the national level and the county governors. The magnitude of the problem is such that it has motivated a publisher in Nairobi, to ‘capture the moment’ by way of a comic book. This is in a bid to fathom the nature and cause of the problem in a fun way for the public good, and to seek to find solutions to the volatile relations. These conflicts threaten to rock Kenya’s nascent devolved system. As figure 1.1 below demonstrates, there is almost a boxing match between the senator and governor. In such an antagonistic atmosphere, realising the full fruits of devolution would become a nearly impossible mission. In first cartoon, the two ‘titans,’ a governor and senator, are seen in a boxing ring ready to take on each other. The senator is portrayed as an enraged aggressor, eager to strike, while the exasperated governor appears to be more on the defensive. Mr Knowings, a neutral character and the narrator of the comic book stands between them, ostensibly as a referee. The second cartoon portrays the senator in a more casual carefree manner, almost like a rogue, holding what could be money in his hands, perhaps an indication of the power that the Senate wields over the county government finances and its oversight role. The governor, on the other hand, is depicted as a smartly dressed, more sober individual, with documents tucked beneath his arms and holding what appears to be a pen in one hand, ostensibly ready to fulfil his executive functions. In the subsequent discussions, this depiction falls into place when the roles of the governor and senator are examined and the causes of the conflicts analysed. Similar to the Mr Knowings, this research study seeks to explore, albeit on a more serious note, the nature and causes of these conflicts, what the law provides concerning the relationship between senators and governors and how the conflicts can be avoided or resolved. Who, if at all, is the ‘bad guy’ here? This study sets to find out.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the degree to which the Parliament of Canada was able to control the defence policy, administration and expenditures of the Canadian government in the 1945-1962 period. Because of the distribution of power between the two houses of Parliament, the thesis is primarily concerned with the House of Commons. In the second last chapter, however, the role of the Senate is analyzed. The House of Commons has four principal (although not mutually exclusive) techniques through which it attempts to exercise control. These include critical debate, control of finances, select committees and the question period. The use of each of these techniques is analyzed separately. Also, each of the four is analyzed with reference to the party in opposition. Hence for each technique, the 1945-1957 and the 1957-1962 periods were dealt with separately. The analysis of the defence debates and question period indicated striking differences in the pattern of opposition between the two periods. In the 1957-1962 period the Liberal opposition was concerned primarily with destroying the prospects of the government for the ensuing election. Hence the Liberals strove to discredit the defence programme of the government. Policy and politics were the major issues. Both in the debates and the question period the opposition dealt harshly and exhaustively with the defence policy of the government. The Liberal opposition virtually ignored, however, the administration of the defence departments. In contrast, the Progressive Conservative opposition of the 1945-1957 period devoted most of its energies, during question time and the debates, to the implementation of policy and administration of defence. Their efforts were culminated by their success in obstructing the 1955 amendment to the Defence Production Act. On the other hand, the Progressive Conservatives did not debate critically the major steps taken in the development of Canadian defence policy. Indeed, they never questioned the broad defence road that the government chose to follow. House of Commons control of defence expenditures was a myth. No direct control over the estimates was exercised. Nor did the debates in Supply serve, even indirectly, to indicate that the House of Commons still retained control of the purse. Moreover, statutory controls were less effective for defence than the other functions of government. In the 1945 to 1957 period, select committees were appointed with post-audit functions only. In five of these years the Public Accounts Committee dealt with irregularities in defence expenditures as a result of its examination of the annual Report of the Auditor General. Because of its broad duties, circumscribed powers and partisan atmosphere, however, this Committee was not especially effective. In 1951, however, after completing its examination of the Auditor General's Report, the Public Accounts Committee dealt specifically with defence expenditures and served usefully to inform members of current developments in the defence establishment. The work of the 1951 Public Accounts Committee was continued by the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures that met between 1951 and 1953. This Committee, despite the lack of permanent staff, received an enormous amount of evidence on the administration of defence. Its usefulness was cut down, however, by the partisan atmosphere which prevented the Committee from making constructive reports to the House. After dealing with the Currie Report in 1953, the Committee was not re-appointed. Thus, the only effective and continuous post-audit scrutiny was carried out by the Defence Branch of the Office of the Auditor General. Its efficacy was hampered too, however, by the failure of the House to develop a technique for dealing regularly with Report; for the House proper never debated the Auditor General’s Report and the Public Accounts Committee did not meet regularly during these years. Since 1957, the Public Accounts Committee has met annually and reported to the House without partisan interference, examples of ineffective administration and waste. Constructive recommendations have often been included. The Committee thus has not only strengthened its own usefulness as an effective organ of post-audit control. It has also increased the effectiveness of the Auditor General by guaranteeing more publicity for his annual report than it had been receiving in earlier years. These years also marked the initial ventures in pre-audit control through select committee. In 1958 and 1960 the defence estimates were dealt with through these committees. Although the work of these committees, especially the 1958 committee, was an improvement over the performances of Committee of Supply, they appeared to have no inherent advantages over what a better informed Committee of Supply could reasonably be expected to accomplish. Moreover, there was evidence that these select committees might be used as the focal point for interest group pressures. Finally, the defence policy discussions which accompanied the review of the estimates clearly would have been more effective had they been held in the House of Commons. Thus, since the Senate played no significant role, the record of Parliament in controlling defence was very poor. There was no effective pre-audit control of expenditure and post-audit control was at no time comprehensive. Defence debates in the 1945-1957 period seldom probed into the implications of policy decisions. In more recent years, although the debates have been more comprehensive, they have not been at a very high level of sophistication. Both these shortcomings, it might be noted, were closely related to the dearth of information available on defence. It is suggested that a select standing committee of the House might possibly help to strengthen parliamentary control. Such a committee, if left to investigate problems of administration, technology and weaponry, as well as past expenditures (all matters of fact) might serve two purposes. First, it might accumulate sufficient relevant information to permit more sophisticated policy debates and more informative discussion of the estimates. Second, it would permit better control of past expenditure through detailed and comprehensive investigation of defence. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Much recent scholarship celebrates the early modern period for its development of broader public political engagement through printed media and coffeehouse culture. It is the argument of this study that the formation in England under Charles II of a public sphere may be shown to have followed a reassessment of political discourse that began at Westminster during the troubled reign of that king’s father, Charles I. The narrative of parliament’s growth in this era from an “event to an institution,” as one historian describes it, tells of more than opposition to the King on the battlefields of the English Civil War. Parliament-work in the early years of England’s revolutionary decade also set new expectations for rhetorical deliberation as a means of directing policy in the House of Commons. The ideals of discursive politics that were voiced in the Short Parliament (May 1640), and more fully put into practice in the opening session of the Long Parliament (November 1640), were soon also accepted by politically-minded authors and readers outside Westminster. Prose controversy published in print and political poetry that circulated in manuscript both demonstrate that the burgeoning culture of debate outside parliament could still issue “in a parliamentary way.” Such promotion of productive textual engagements eventually constituted a wider, notional assembly, whose participants – citizen readers – were as much a product of deliberate education and fashioning as they were of the “conjuring,” “interpellation,” or “summoning” that recent scholarly vocabulary suggests. Following the spirit of reform in the English parliament, and subsequently developing through the years of partisan political writing that followed, public opinion, like the Commons, established itself in this era as an institution in its own right. These public and private assemblies disseminated the unprecedented amount of parliamentary writing and record-keeping that distinguishes the period under review, and this rich archive provides the literary and historical context for this study.

Théoricien du régime républicain de 1795 à 1810, Benjamin Constant se doit d'adapter son système institutionnel à la Restauration des Bourbons en 1814. Cependant son attachement à la monarchie constitutionnelle, illustrée par sa participation à la rédaction de l'Acte additionnel durant les Cent-jours n'entraîne pas une renonciation à sa pensée libérale.Malgré cette fidélité apparente aux principes libéraux qu'il défendait déjà en 1800 au sein du Tribunat, et qui entraîna son expulsion en 1802, la pratique de la monarchie constitutionnelle le confronte à différents problèmes auxquels ses écrits théoriques ne répondent pas; ainsi, le pouvoir royal constitue-t-il véritablement un pouvoir neutre, ou son pouvoir de nomination des ministres ne l'entraîne-t-il pas à intervenir directement dans les affaires du pays? De plus, Une fois élu député, en 1819, c'est aussi l'importance des droits de la minorité qu'il doit défendre, notamment envers la majorité ultra de la Chambre «retrouvée» de 1824, et c'est donc l'importance du règlement de l'assemblée, seul cadre légal auquel est astreint la majorité, qu'il va développer.Mais la monarchie constitutionnelle suppose aussi la responsabilité des gouvernants, celle des députés par la réélection, mais aussi celle des ministres, élément central du régime parlementaire. Cette responsabilité ministérielle oscillant entre procédure pénale spéciale et justification politique, comme l'illustre l'acte d'accusation envers Villèle auquel participe Constant en 1827. Mais le contrôle des gouvernants s'effectue aussi indirectement par l'opinion publique dont les journaux sont le relais. Leur développement exponentiel au début du XIXème siècle, expliquant l'importance accordée par Constant aux différentes législations sur la presse intervenant de 1814 à 1830.En tant que journaliste, homme politique et député, Constant participe directement à l'élaboration du gouvernement représentatif qui va devenir le régime parlementaire sous la Monarchie de Juillet, mais cette confrontation à la vie politique l'entraîne-t-elle à abandonner certains éléments de sa doctrine, ou tout au moins à faire évoluer certains éléments pour les adapter à la pratique? De plus, son intervention est-elle réellement décisive dans la mise en place des différents éléments du régime parlementaire ou les désaccords avec les autres libéraux ou avec les doctrinaires l'entraînent-ils à la marge?C'est donc au travers de l'ensemble de son œuvre théorique, ainsi que de ses différents articles de journaux mais aussi par sa participation aux débats de la Chambre des députés et enfin par l'analyse des différentes théories s'affrontant sur le sens de la Charte et la pratique de la Monarchie constitutionnelle, que le rôle de Constant dans la construction du régime parlementaire pourra être analysé. / The Restoration represents the beginnings of the parliamentary in France. This form of government based on the political responsibility of the ministry before the assemblies. .It is built by the practice more than the application of a preconceived theoretical system. Through the interventions of Benjamin Constant in the press and at the House of Representatives we can study the implementation of Parliamentary in France since 1814 to 1830. But the purpose of Constant during this area is also the safeguarding of rights.

Scholars of party strategy and government accountability rarely directly connect the priorities of parties' principals, groups seeking to influence parties, to their theories of electoral strategy, parliamentary behavior and policy outputs. I develop a theory that links parties' goals to their behaviors in three areas: electoral strategy, parliamentary behavior and government policies. I build on previous theories by focusing on the issues included in parties' electoral campaigns and their principals. In particular, I conceptualize policy platforms as a balance between parties' policy and electoral goals. I distinguish between statements reflecting these goals by considering the effect of the electoral context on the intra-party groups' policy approach. My theory predicts that party leaders add issues to their electoral platforms when conditions lead intra-party groups to be pragmatic. They decrease the number of issues in the platform when electoral conditions lead intra-party groups to be more ideologically rigid. Parties performing well in the previous election or that expect voters to reward them for their participation in government cause intra-party groups to act more pragmatically. However, these groups become more ideologically rigid when the party lost seats in previous elections or expect punishment for their economic record in office. Upon taking office, I theorize that parliamentary leaders use procedures that both highlight and constrain information about their policy priorities to build the party's image of accountability with voters. Government leaders limit information to voters on issues important to their ideologically motivated intra-party groups, but protect their image with intra-party groups by discussing information about their policy agenda at the party's national meetings. Finally, I predict that ideologically cohesive governments dedicate greater more laws to the priorities of their intra-party groups than to voters' goals because intra-party groups have greater information about the government's behavior and can replace party leaders through national congresses more frequently than voters. I test my theory using a mixed-methods approach. In particular, I test my theory quantitatively in three sections. Using data on 24 countries between 1962 and 2008 from the Comparative Manifestos Project and the OECD, I first predict the number of issues in parties' platforms based on the electoral context. I then use the results from this analysis to predict the application of legislative procedures and the amount of legislation on issues for parties' principals in the French Assemblée Nationale from 1978 through 2007 with data from the Comparative Agendas Project. Throughout these large-N analyses I find evidence in favor of the theory; parties' platforms respond to electoral conditions, government leaders use procedures on issues important to both groups and ideologically cohesive governments devote a larger number of laws to intra-party groups. Finally, following the logic of a nested-analysis, I undertake case studies of the French Parti Socialiste's organizational behavior leading up to elections in 1993 and 1997 and its behavior in office following the 1997 election. I use evidence from news reports, party congress and legislative debates, party newsletters, and personal interviews. The analysis indicates that intra-party groups influence parties' electoral and legislative strategies. The results suggest that intra-party politics hold broad consequences for parties' behavior in office.

Masters in Public Administration - MPA / South Africa has undergone a process of dramatic change since the first democratic elections of 1994, notably so in the area of gender equity in public life. The struggles and demands of women during the constitutional process have resulted in an unprecedented 31,5 % representation of women in Parliament, the highest in Africa.

This monograph is the result of the extension of a Master's thesis which was submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Wisconsin in 1925. The present work is divided into three parts. The first four chapters which deal the legal procedure of Parliamentary elections in England embody the corresponding part of the original essay with some changes. The next four chapters which describe the working of the electoral system are entirely new additions and they were written after the author had spent one year in England in personal investigations. The last three chapters which treat the corrupt and illegal practices and the election petitions are the result of reconstruction from that part of the old dissertation which covers the same ground.

Masters of Commerce / After Independence in Africa, vast institutions were established in order to deal with the legacy of colonialism and to encourage development in the continent. Decades later, some of these institutions are said to be ineffective due to a number of constraints – one of which is the colonial legacy which has rendered them almost dysfunctional. This study assesses the impacts of colonialism on these African institutions and uses the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) as a case study. Guided by Post-colonial theory and Institutional theory, and using Content Analysis (CA) as a tool for data analysis, this study has found that African institutions are operating under the influence of ex-colonial countries. This is evidenced by how these institutions are using European languages as their medium of communication and receive more than half of their funds from international bodies which then control their operations. This contributes to their inability to make decisions due to conflicting interests within the representatives and member states. Based on these findings, this study concludes that the colonial legacy plays a major role in delaying the development of African institutions. Therefore, this study provides recommendations or a way forward by arguing that these institutions which include the AU should tie/tighten the knots on their programmes such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) so as to strengthen democracy within member states. They should revive or reconsider constitutions that focus on the penalties for member states that do not pay their membership contribution as agreed and on those member states that fail to obey agreed to protocols. Lastly, this study recommends that fund-raising programmes should be established in selected member states so as to prevent financial dependency on international bodies that weaken African institutions.

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / After Independence in Africa, vast institutions were established in order to deal with the legacy of colonialism and to encourage development in the continent. Decades later, some of these institutions are said to be ineffective due to a number of constraints – one of which is the colonial legacy which has rendered them almost dysfunctional. This study assesses the impacts of colonialism on these African institutions and uses the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) as a case study. Guided by Post-colonial theory and Institutional theory, and using Content Analysis (CA) as a tool for data analysis, this study has found that African institutions are operating under the influence of ex-colonial countries. This is evidenced by how these institutions are using European languages as their medium of communication and receive more than half of their funds from international bodies which then control their operations. This contributes to their inability to make decisions due to conflicting interests within the representatives and member states.