The business value of Information Technology (measuring the impact of IT investments on organizational productivity and efficiency) and quantifying Information technology’s tangible and intangible benefits havebeen significant areas of interest forresearchers and industry experts alike for more than threedecades. In healthcare, an information-rich industry that directly impacts peoples’ lives, investing in IT is still being challenged by questions of payoffs and returns; thus understanding how IT impacts quality outcomes and organizational financial performancein healthcare organizations is important in IT investment decisions. The goal of this research study is to critically examinethe business value of IT in healthcare. To this end, IT’s impact on hospital outcomes is assessed throughmeasures such as increasedpatient satisfaction, improved clinical outcomes (i.e. reduced numbers of adverse events incidents and rates of readmissions), and enhanced hospital financial condition. Additionally, the effect of readily available clinical and administrative data and well-aligned process redesign initiatives to enhance strategic decision making by leadership teams is considered. To address these issues, panel data on 17 performance indicators from 107 hospitals were collected to analyze the impact of IT investment on hospital financial performance and quality of outcomes. The study showsthat the relationship between IT investment and hospital performance measures is type dependent; community or small hospitals have different results from teaching hospitals,and IT investment has an impact on the financial condition of small hospitals only. Similarly, IT investments were shown to improve clinical outcomes in community hospitals but not in small or teaching hospitals. Finally, no direct relationship was found between IT investment and patient satisfaction in any type of hospital. The impact of IT investments is shown to be enhanced when combined with corresponding process-redesign initiatives; and making the right levels of investment in organizational corporate services such as administrative services, finance, human resources, and system support improved hospitals’ financial performance. Among the IT systems used in hospital organizationsare the decision support systems that enhance the decision-making capabilities of both clinicians and administrative leaders. The Hospital Analytics Dashboard is introduced as an example of the use of such systems to allow leaders to analyzehospital’s performance as it relates to the impact of IT on patient satisfaction, clinical outcomes, and financial conditions. This proof-of-concept decision support tool can be adapted to include other performance measures, and has been devised to help hospital leadership teams visualize and analyze the relationships among performance measurespresented in a static scorecard format.It provides benchmarking information from similar-sized hospitals and is accompanied by an interactive dashboard where historical performance information can be analyzed to predict future performance according to different inputs.

The business value of Information Technology (measuring the impact of IT investments on organizational productivity and efficiency) and quantifying Information technology’s tangible and intangible benefits havebeen significant areas of interest forresearchers and industry experts alike for more than threedecades. In healthcare, an information-rich industry that directly impacts peoples’ lives, investing in IT is still being challenged by questions of payoffs and returns; thus understanding how IT impacts quality outcomes and organizational financial performancein healthcare organizations is important in IT investment decisions. The goal of this research study is to critically examinethe business value of IT in healthcare. To this end, IT’s impact on hospital outcomes is assessed throughmeasures such as increasedpatient satisfaction, improved clinical outcomes (i.e. reduced numbers of adverse events incidents and rates of readmissions), and enhanced hospital financial condition. Additionally, the effect of readily available clinical and administrative data and well-aligned process redesign initiatives to enhance strategic decision making by leadership teams is considered. To address these issues, panel data on 17 performance indicators from 107 hospitals were collected to analyze the impact of IT investment on hospital financial performance and quality of outcomes. The study showsthat the relationship between IT investment and hospital performance measures is type dependent; community or small hospitals have different results from teaching hospitals,and IT investment has an impact on the financial condition of small hospitals only. Similarly, IT investments were shown to improve clinical outcomes in community hospitals but not in small or teaching hospitals. Finally, no direct relationship was found between IT investment and patient satisfaction in any type of hospital. The impact of IT investments is shown to be enhanced when combined with corresponding process-redesign initiatives; and making the right levels of investment in organizational corporate services such as administrative services, finance, human resources, and system support improved hospitals’ financial performance. Among the IT systems used in hospital organizationsare the decision support systems that enhance the decision-making capabilities of both clinicians and administrative leaders. The Hospital Analytics Dashboard is introduced as an example of the use of such systems to allow leaders to analyzehospital’s performance as it relates to the impact of IT on patient satisfaction, clinical outcomes, and financial conditions. This proof-of-concept decision support tool can be adapted to include other performance measures, and has been devised to help hospital leadership teams visualize and analyze the relationships among performance measurespresented in a static scorecard format.It provides benchmarking information from similar-sized hospitals and is accompanied by an interactive dashboard where historical performance information can be analyzed to predict future performance according to different inputs.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T15:50:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo5044_1.pdf: 719046 bytes, checksum: 11d8404fa1c9bca450ba1d9299d72994 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 / A presente dissertação tem como objeto a identificação dos mecanismos instituídos nas agências formais inseridas na região Metropolitana do Recife, as quais diretamente lidam com denúncias de Assédio Sexual, a saber: a Delegacia da Mulher, o Ministério Público , o Juizado Especial Criminal e a Delegacia Regional do Trabalho, todos estudados no período de agosto de 2001 a agosto de 2003. Trata-se de uma pesquisa empírico-descritiva de metodologia qualitativa. As correntes feministas , Liberal, Marxista , Socialista e Radical bem como a Teoria da Escolha Racional e o Neoinstitucionalismo Histórico são as correntes teóricas utilizadas nesta análise. O principal pressuposto é que a exeqüibilidade da lei do Assédio Sexual está diretamente relacionada com a escolha racional dos atores, arrimada nas instituições (formal ou informalmente) constituídas em cada agência. No caso da Delegacia da Mulher, conclui-se que o Assédio Sexual é invisibilizado pelas instituições particularistas e subjetivas, pois os payoffs (benefícios) não são recompensadores se tais denúncias fossem dirimidas. No caso do Ministério Público e do Juizado Especial Criminal, conclui-se que os atores optam por uma subotimização em suas escolhas racionais para alcançarem um equilíbrio que satisfaça tanto a agência formal quanto a vítima, e finalmente, no caso da Delegacia Regional do Trabalho, a escolha racional dá-se pela resolução dos conflitos, uma vez que as instituições são uniformes, públicas e objetivas. A conclusão é que a mera neocriminalização de uma conduta de natureza discriminatória não garante a sua eficácia e exequibilidade a curto ou a médio prazo, nem que o direito das mulheres ,objeto da nova lei, seja ratificado pelas agências operadoras da justiça, pois as instituições de fato importam

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T15:52:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo5078_1.pdf: 719046 bytes, checksum: 11d8404fa1c9bca450ba1d9299d72994 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004 / A presente dissertação tem como objeto a identificação dos mecanismos instituídos nas agências formais inseridas na região Metropolitana do Recife, as quais diretamente lidam com denúncias de Assédio Sexual, a saber: a Delegacia da Mulher, o Ministério Público , o Juizado Especial Criminal e a Delegacia Regional do Trabalho, todos estudados no período de agosto de 2001 a agosto de 2003. Trata-se de uma pesquisa empírico-descritiva de metodologia qualitativa. As correntes feministas , Liberal, Marxista , Socialista e Radical bem como a Teoria da Escolha Racional e o Neoinstitucionalismo Histórico são as correntes teóricas utilizadas nesta análise. O principal pressuposto é que a exeqüibilidade da lei do Assédio Sexual está diretamente relacionada com a escolha racional dos atores, arrimada nas instituições (formal ou informalmente) constituídas em cada agência. No caso da Delegacia da Mulher, conclui-se que o Assédio Sexual é invisibilizado pelas instituições particularistas e subjetivas, pois os payoffs (benefícios) não são recompensadores se tais denúncias fossem dirimidas. No caso do Ministério Público e do Juizado Especial Criminal, conclui-se que os atores optam por uma subotimização em suas escolhas racionais para alcançarem um equilíbrio que satisfaça tanto a agência formal quanto a vítima, e finalmente, no caso da Delegacia Regional do Trabalho, a escolha racional dá-se pela resolução dos conflitos, uma vez que as instituições são uniformes, públicas e objetivas. A conclusão é que a mera neocriminalização de uma conduta de natureza discriminatória não garante a sua eficácia e exequibilidade a curto ou a médio prazo, nem que o direito das mulheres ,objeto da nova lei, seja ratificado pelas agências operadoras da justiça, pois as instituições de fato importam

This dissertation explores the importance of the payoff structure and beliefs for noncooperative games. Chapter 2 considers instances where the payoffs and the objectives may not be very clear to the players or the analyst. We develop a model for analyzing such games using a vector of reference utilities which are included in the definition of the game and assumed to be shared by all players. These are used to obtain the true utilities in the game. Conditions for the existence of equilibrium are identified by allowing players to have beliefs about the others. The solution concept is applied to the Traveler's Dilemma and a duopoly. In Chapter 3 a non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity by allowing for different failure probabilities. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and redundancy and provide an explicit characterization of star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We also explore the consequences of three alternative specifications which address criticisms of such communication networks. Chapter 4 examines noncooperative fuzzy games. Both in fuzzy noncooperative games and in abstract economies, players impose mutual restrictions on their available strategic choices. Here we combine these two theories: A player tries to minimize the restrictions he imposes on others, while respecting the restrictions imposed by others on him, but does not explicitly pursue any other objectives of his own. We establish existence of an equilibrium in this framework. In Chapter 5 normal form game is modeled using tools from fuzzy set theory. We extend the decision theory framework of Bellman and Zadeh (1970) to a game-theoretic setting. The formulation is preliminary / Ph. D.

The concern of this thesis is to discuss different applications of two-player game theory in economics. It is divided into two main chapters - the theoretical part and the practical part. The theoretical part is composed of the classical game theory and the game theory with vector payoffs. In the first instance basic ideas of the classical game theory is introduced. Elaboration of the duopoly model follows. Subsequently basic ideas of the theory with vector payoffs and one of the solution concepts of game theory with vector payo s are included. The practical part follows. This part contains two examples which are the real application of the concept described in the theoretical part.

The subject of the thesis are vector-valued Markov Games. Chapter 1 presents the idea, that has led to the development of the theory of general stochastic games. The work of Lloyd S. Shapley is outlined, and the most important authors and bibliography are stated. Also, the motivation behind the research of vector-valued game-theoretic problems is presented. Chapter 2 develops a rigorous mathematical model of vector-valued N-person Markov games. The corresponding definitions are stated, and the notations, as well as the notion of a strategy are explained in detail. On the basis of these definitions a probability measure is constructed, in an appropriate probability space, which controls the stochastic game process. Furthermore, as in all models of stochastic control, a payoff is specified, in our case the expected discounted payoff. The principles of vector optimization are stated in Chapter 3, and the concept of optimality with recpect to some convex cone is developed. This leads to the generalization of Nash-equilibria from scalar- to vector-valued games, the so-called D-equilibria. Examples are provided to show, that this definition really is a generalization of the existing definitions for scalar-valued games. For a given convex cone D, necessary and sufficient conditions are found to show, when a strategy is also a D-equilibrium. Furthermore it is shown that a D-equilibrium in stationary strategies exists, as one could expect from the known results from the theory of scalar-valued stochastic games. The main result of this chapter is a generalization of an existing result for 2-person vector-valued Markov games to N-person Markov Games, namely that a D-equilibrium of an N-person Markov game is a subgradient of specially constructed support functions of the original payoff functions. To be able to develop solution procedures in the simplest case, that is, the 2-person zero-sum case, Chapter 4 introduces the Denardo dynamic programming formalism. In the space of all p-dimensional functions we define a dynamic programming operator H? to describe the solutions of Markov games. The first of the two main results in this chapter is the following: the expected overall payoff to player 1, f(??), for a fixed stationary strategy ??, is the fixed point of the operator H?. The second theorem then shows, that the latter result is exactly the vector-valued generalization of the famous Shapley result. These theorems are fundamental for the subsequent development of two algorithms, the successive approximations and the Hoffman-Karp algorithm. A numerical example for both algorithms is presented. Chapter 4 finishes with a discussion on other significant results, and the outline of the further research. The Appendix finally presents the main results from general Game Theory, most of which were used for developing both theoretic and algorithmic parts of this thesis. / Das Thema der vorliegenden Arbeit sind vektorwertige Markov-Spiele. Im Kapitel 1 wird die Idee vorgestellt, die zur Entwicklung genereller stochastischer Spiele geführt hat. Die Arbeit von Lloyd S. Shapley wird kurz dargestellt, und die wichtigsten Autoren und Literaturquellen werden genannt. Es wird weiter die Motivation für das Studium der vektorwertigen Spiele erklärt. Kapitel 2 entwickelt ein allgemeines mathematisches Modell vektorwertiger N-Personen Markov-Spiele. Die entsprechenden Definitionen werden angegeben, und es wird auf die Bezeichnungen, sowie den Begriff einer Strategie eingegangen. Weiter wird im entsprechenden Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum ein Wahrscheinlichkeitsmaß konstruiert, das den zugrunde liegenden stochastischen Prozeß steuert. Wie bei allen Modellen gesteuerter stochastischen Prozesse wird eine Auszahlung spezifiziert, konkret der erwartete diskontierte Gesamtertrag. Im Kapitel 3 werden die Prinzipien der Vektoroptimierung erläutert. Es wird der Begriff der Optimalität bezüglich gegebener konvexer Kegel entwickelt. Dieser Begriff wird weiter benutzt, um die Definition der Nash-Gleichgewichte für skalarwertige Spiele auf unser vektorwertiges Modell, die sogenannten D-Gleichgewichte, zu erweitern. Anhand mehrerer Beispiele wird gezeigt, dass diese Definition eine Verallgemeinerung der existierenden Definitionen für skalarwertige Spiele ist. Weiter werden notwendige und hinreichende Bedingungen hinsichtlich des Optimierungskegels D angegeben, wann eine Strategie ein D-Gleichgewicht ist. Anschließend wird gezeigt, dass man sich ? wie bei Markov'schen Entscheidungsprozessen und skalarwertigen stochastischen Spielen - beim Suchen der D-Gleichgewichte auf stationäre Strategien beschränken kann. Das Hauptresultat dieses Kapitels ist die Verallgemeinerung einer schon bekannten Aussage für 2-Personen Markov-Spiele auf N-Personen Markov-Spiele: Ein D-Gleichgewicht im N-Personen Markov-Spiel ist ein Subgradient speziell konstruierter Trägerfunktionen des Gesamtertrags der Spieler. Um im einfachsten Fall der Markov-Spiele, den Zwei-Personen Nullsummenspielen, ein Lösungskonzept entwickeln zu können, wird im Kapitel 4 die Methode des Dynamischen Programmierens benutzt. Es wird der Denardo-Formalismus übernommen, um einen Operator H? im Raum aller p-dimensionalen vektorwertigen Funktionen zu entwickeln. Die Haputresultate dieses Kapitels sind zwei Sätze über optimale Lösungen, bzw. D-Gleichgewichte. Der erste Satz zeigt, dass für eine fixierte stationäre Strategie ?? der erwartete diskontierte Gesamtertrag f(??) der Fixpunkt des Operators H? ist. Anschließend zeigt der zweite Satz, dass diese Lösung genau der vektorwertigen Erweiterung des Resultats von Shapley entspricht. Anhand dieser Resultate werden nun zwei Algorithmen entwickelt: sukzessive Approximationen und Hoffman-Karp-Algorithmus. Es wird ein numerisches Beispiel für beide Algorithmen berechnet. Kapitel 4 schließt mit dem Abschnitt über weitere Resultate und Ansätze für weitere Forschung. Im Anhang werden die Hauptresultate der statischen Spieltheorie vorgestellt, viele von denen werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit benutzt.

Theory of multicriteria games is a special field of game theory, when one or more players have at least two payoff functions and want to maximize simultaneously. The work introduces a number of new findings. It examined the concept of finding equilibria in pure strategies in noncooperative multicriteria game. It is possible to find all the equilibria in pure strategies by full search and solving two linear programs for each point. Furthermore, two linear programs are formulated for verifying that a selected point is the equilibrium of the game or not. In the noncooperative games is also introduced the concept that with knowledge of the equilibrium of bimatrix game determines preferences of the players. Although finding the equilibrium point of the bimatrix game is nonlinear problem, finding the preferences is linear problem. The latest findings in the noncooperative games is a generalization of the concept that solves multicriteria game by assigning weights to each criterion of each player. The work demonstrates that it may not be necessarily linear weights, but it can be more general function that describes the player's preference. The remaining part is devoted to knowledge in cooperative games. There is considered that the players know their preferences and are able to express them by weights. The game with known preferences is defined and solved with the use of bargaining theory. Then it is generalized to a case where players have more payoff functions, from which they can choose. Finally, the multicriteria case of voting game is defined. It is designed completely new concept, which selects the winning coalition in the voting game. This concept is then applied to the real situation after the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 2013.

The subject of the thesis are vector-valued Markov Games. Chapter 1 presents the idea, that has led to the development of the theory of general stochastic games. The work of Lloyd S. Shapley is outlined, and the most important authors and bibliography are stated. Also, the motivation behind the research of vector-valued game-theoretic problems is presented. Chapter 2 develops a rigorous mathematical model of vector-valued N-person Markov games. The corresponding definitions are stated, and the notations, as well as the notion of a strategy are explained in detail. On the basis of these definitions a probability measure is constructed, in an appropriate probability space, which controls the stochastic game process. Furthermore, as in all models of stochastic control, a payoff is specified, in our case the expected discounted payoff. The principles of vector optimization are stated in Chapter 3, and the concept of optimality with recpect to some convex cone is developed. This leads to the generalization of Nash-equilibria from scalar- to vector-valued games, the so-called D-equilibria. Examples are provided to show, that this definition really is a generalization of the existing definitions for scalar-valued games. For a given convex cone D, necessary and sufficient conditions are found to show, when a strategy is also a D-equilibrium. Furthermore it is shown that a D-equilibrium in stationary strategies exists, as one could expect from the known results from the theory of scalar-valued stochastic games. The main result of this chapter is a generalization of an existing result for 2-person vector-valued Markov games to N-person Markov Games, namely that a D-equilibrium of an N-person Markov game is a subgradient of specially constructed support functions of the original payoff functions. To be able to develop solution procedures in the simplest case, that is, the 2-person zero-sum case, Chapter 4 introduces the Denardo dynamic programming formalism. In the space of all p-dimensional functions we define a dynamic programming operator H? to describe the solutions of Markov games. The first of the two main results in this chapter is the following: the expected overall payoff to player 1, f(??), for a fixed stationary strategy ??, is the fixed point of the operator H?. The second theorem then shows, that the latter result is exactly the vector-valued generalization of the famous Shapley result. These theorems are fundamental for the subsequent development of two algorithms, the successive approximations and the Hoffman-Karp algorithm. A numerical example for both algorithms is presented. Chapter 4 finishes with a discussion on other significant results, and the outline of the further research. The Appendix finally presents the main results from general Game Theory, most of which were used for developing both theoretic and algorithmic parts of this thesis. / Das Thema der vorliegenden Arbeit sind vektorwertige Markov-Spiele. Im Kapitel 1 wird die Idee vorgestellt, die zur Entwicklung genereller stochastischer Spiele geführt hat. Die Arbeit von Lloyd S. Shapley wird kurz dargestellt, und die wichtigsten Autoren und Literaturquellen werden genannt. Es wird weiter die Motivation für das Studium der vektorwertigen Spiele erklärt. Kapitel 2 entwickelt ein allgemeines mathematisches Modell vektorwertiger N-Personen Markov-Spiele. Die entsprechenden Definitionen werden angegeben, und es wird auf die Bezeichnungen, sowie den Begriff einer Strategie eingegangen. Weiter wird im entsprechenden Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum ein Wahrscheinlichkeitsmaß konstruiert, das den zugrunde liegenden stochastischen Prozeß steuert. Wie bei allen Modellen gesteuerter stochastischen Prozesse wird eine Auszahlung spezifiziert, konkret der erwartete diskontierte Gesamtertrag. Im Kapitel 3 werden die Prinzipien der Vektoroptimierung erläutert. Es wird der Begriff der Optimalität bezüglich gegebener konvexer Kegel entwickelt. Dieser Begriff wird weiter benutzt, um die Definition der Nash-Gleichgewichte für skalarwertige Spiele auf unser vektorwertiges Modell, die sogenannten D-Gleichgewichte, zu erweitern. Anhand mehrerer Beispiele wird gezeigt, dass diese Definition eine Verallgemeinerung der existierenden Definitionen für skalarwertige Spiele ist. Weiter werden notwendige und hinreichende Bedingungen hinsichtlich des Optimierungskegels D angegeben, wann eine Strategie ein D-Gleichgewicht ist. Anschließend wird gezeigt, dass man sich ? wie bei Markov'schen Entscheidungsprozessen und skalarwertigen stochastischen Spielen - beim Suchen der D-Gleichgewichte auf stationäre Strategien beschränken kann. Das Hauptresultat dieses Kapitels ist die Verallgemeinerung einer schon bekannten Aussage für 2-Personen Markov-Spiele auf N-Personen Markov-Spiele: Ein D-Gleichgewicht im N-Personen Markov-Spiel ist ein Subgradient speziell konstruierter Trägerfunktionen des Gesamtertrags der Spieler. Um im einfachsten Fall der Markov-Spiele, den Zwei-Personen Nullsummenspielen, ein Lösungskonzept entwickeln zu können, wird im Kapitel 4 die Methode des Dynamischen Programmierens benutzt. Es wird der Denardo-Formalismus übernommen, um einen Operator H? im Raum aller p-dimensionalen vektorwertigen Funktionen zu entwickeln. Die Haputresultate dieses Kapitels sind zwei Sätze über optimale Lösungen, bzw. D-Gleichgewichte. Der erste Satz zeigt, dass für eine fixierte stationäre Strategie ?? der erwartete diskontierte Gesamtertrag f(??) der Fixpunkt des Operators H? ist. Anschließend zeigt der zweite Satz, dass diese Lösung genau der vektorwertigen Erweiterung des Resultats von Shapley entspricht. Anhand dieser Resultate werden nun zwei Algorithmen entwickelt: sukzessive Approximationen und Hoffman-Karp-Algorithmus. Es wird ein numerisches Beispiel für beide Algorithmen berechnet. Kapitel 4 schließt mit dem Abschnitt über weitere Resultate und Ansätze für weitere Forschung. Im Anhang werden die Hauptresultate der statischen Spieltheorie vorgestellt, viele von denen werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit benutzt.

Over the past decade, the explosive growth of the Internet has led to a surge of interest to understand and predict aggregate behavior of large number of people or agents, particularly when they are connected through an underlying network structure. Numerous Internet-based applications have emerged that are as diverse as getting micro-tasks executed through online labor markets (also known as crowd sourcing) to acquiring new skills through massively open online courses (also known as MOOCs). However, there has been a major inadequacy in existing studies with respect to evaluating the impact of strategic behavior of the agents participating in such networks, crowds, and classrooms. The primary focus of this doctoral work is to understand the equilibrium behaviour emerging from these real-world, strategic environments by blending ideas from the areas of game theory, graph theory, and optimization, to derive novel solutions to these new-age economic models. In particular, we investigate the following three research challenges: (1) How do strategic agents form connections with one another? Will it ever happen that strategically stable networks are social welfare maximizing as well? (2) How do we design mechanisms for eliciting truthful feedback about an object (perhaps a new product or service or person) from a crowd of strategic raters? What can we tell about these mechanisms when the raters are connected through a social network? (3) How do we incentivize better participation of instructors and students in online edu-cation forums? Can we recommend optimal strategies to students and instructors to get the best out of these forums?