La consolidation de la paix au lendemain d'un conflit est une entreprise multidimensionnelle et complexe qui exige d'importantes ressources (financières, techniques, humaines, ...). Avec le foisonnement des acteurs en la matière, il est pertinent de s'intéresser au rôle et à la contribution des organisations internationales économiques dont l'intervention, dans les pays fragiles y compris ceux post-conflit, est très souvent décriée. Les organisations internationales économiques en question sont notamment les institutions financières internationales (Banque mondiale, FMI, Banques régionales de développement), les communautés économiques régionales (CEDEAO, CEEAC, ASEAN, ...), et l'OCDE. Dans l'optique d'accroître les chances de réalisation de la consolidation de la paix, il convient de déterminer si ces organisations internationales économiques sont une partie intégrante de la solution ou si elles constituent plutôt le problème. Concrètement, l'analyse qui est faite dans le cadre de ces travaux, porte d'abord sur la légalité et les outils d'intervention (mécanismes financiers, techniques, ...) des organisations internationales économiques en vue de la consolidation de la paix. Ensuite, est abordé l'impact de leur méthode et de leurs outils d'intervention sur la réalisation des objectifs de la consolidation de la paix. Un intérêt particulier est porté aussi bien sur les priorités récurrentes de la consolidation de la paix que sur celles spécifiques à un ou certains pays post-conflit. Finalement, au regard des changements constants qui interviennent dans les contextes post-conflit, et comme l'a souvent rappelé le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies dans ses différents rapports sur la consolidation de la paix au lendemain d'un conflit, il est nécessaire d'améliorer l'intervention des différents acteurs. Dans le même ordre d'idées, les perspectives d'optimisation de l'intervention des organisations internationales économiques dans la consolidation de la paix, sont identifiées. / Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict is a multidimensional and complex undertaking that requires significant resources (financial, technical, human …). Among a wide spectrum of actors in this field, it is relevant to focus on the precise role and contribution of international economic organizations whose intervention in fragile countries including post-conflict, is very often criticized. The economic international organizations concerned are international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, and regional development banks), regional economic communities (ECOWAS, ECCAS, ASEAN ...), and OECD. In order to increase the chances of achieving peacebuilding, it is necessary to determine whether these international economic organizations are an integral part of the solution or rather if they are the problem. First of all, the analysis is focused on the legality and the intervention tools (financial mechanisms, technical mechanisms ...) of international economic organizations in post-conflict contexts. Then the impact of their method and their intervention tools on achieving the objectives of peacebuilding, is discussed. Recurrent priorities of peacebuilding and those specific to one or some post-conflict countries are particularly addressed. Finally, given the constant changes occurring in post-conflict contexts, and as the Secretary General of the United Nations has often reiterated in his different reports on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict, it necessary to improve the involvement of different actors. In the same vein, optimization outlooks for the intervention of international economic organizations in peacebuilding are identified.

Depuis deux décennies, le monde musulman, dans ses deux volets arabe et asiatique, regorge d’exemples sur la violence organisée, de la prise du pouvoir des talibans en Afghanistan, en passant par la guerre en Irak, et en atterrissant dans le berceau du Printemps arabe. Ce dernier ayant touché de nombreuses dictatures arabes dans lesquelles le dialogue s’est vu écarté de l’espace politique arabe, de par la violence et la répression sanglante des mouvements de contestation populaires contre les régimes autoritaires en place depuis des décennies. Cette vague révolutionnaire fait appel à l'urgence du "dialogue" qui s'avère une obligation générale dans le système musulman en cas de rébellion, une telle expression peut paraître inappropriée à l'Islam souvent perçu comme étant une religion de violence et de contrainte. Or, dans l’ordre international comme interne prévu par le droit musulman, il y a une concomitance de la violence et du dialogue, une coexistence de la norme et de son exception interprétée selon la nécessité, la question centrale qui se pose est celle de savoir si le dialogue, comme un instrument de règlement pacifique des différends reste alors d'actualité dans le cas de rébellion dans les sociétés arabo-musulmane. Cette thèse essaie de répondre, en premier lieu, à la question suivante pourquoi et comment le système musulman maintient-il l'obligation générale du dialogue, en tant que régime de la paix, même en cas de rébellion ou conflits armés internes dans l’Islam ? Ensuite, elle examine la résistance du régime de la paix à l'éventuel recours à la force. / Over the last two decades, the Muslim world, in his Arabic and Asian components has been witnessing organized violence, ever since the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, followed by the Iraq War, until the Arab Spring arrived in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, where dialogue has been practically non-existent with the authoritarian regime who could only respond to the protests with bloody repression.This revolutionary wave of demonstrations calls for an urgent need for "dialogue", which will result in a general obligation in the Muslim system in cases of rebellion, such an expression may seem inappropriate to Islam which is often perceived as a religion of violence and coercion.However, there is a concomitance between the violence and the dialogue, and a coexistence of the rule with its exception, under the plea of necessity as per the existing norms in domestic and international Islamic law.The central question that arises is whether the dialogue, as an instrument of peaceful settlement of disputes, remains relevant in cases of rebellion and domestic armed conflicts in the Arab-Muslim societies.This thesis attempts to answer, first, to the following question: why and how does the Muslim system maintain the general obligation of dialogue, as a regime of peace, even in cases of rebellion or domestic armed conflicts in Islam. Then, it examines the resistance of the regime of peace to the eventual use-of-force.

This study aims to examine the relation between Sudanese police and peacebuilding in the country following an exceptionally long period of varied and complex violent conflict Literature on peacebuilding acknowledges the increasing role of police in peacebuilding, but is more often focussed on international police forces than domestic police. in order to investigate the roles of domestic forces in peacebuilding an analysis of the Sudan police is undertaken, which includes its history, organisation, management, training and the adoption of a policy of ‘community policing’. The study evaluates community policing as relatively modern policing style that is espoused by international peace builders in post conflict settings. It also examines the placement of police in peace agreements. The study concludes that whilst international police efforts in peacebuilding are not without pitfalls, domestic police, such as the Sudanese, may also be unfit for peacebuilding roles without changes in certain aspects of their organisational, management, recruitment, training and policing approaches. The study proposes a more combined approach that brings together domestic and international police for more effective role in peacebuilding.

This thesis argues that a peace-oriented struggle has emerged in Peshawar from within the non–state space and is demonstrated at the empirical level by various associations in that space. The struggle to embrace peace and reject different forms of violence, by this associational life in Peshawar is what we call an ‘emergent civil society’. The thesis argues against those who claim that civil society cannot exist or flourish in a non-western environment. Civil Society in Peshawar is emergent, as the empirical evidence suggests, but within an overarching tendency to root this in a local cultural identity. The latter is, however, imbued with values, belief systems, and gender roles, which limit the search for peace. Two examples are the dominance of a hyper masculinity and religious orthodoxies, which undermine forms of associationalism which might promote peace. To find an indigenous cultural identity, the ‘emergent civil society’ navigates, not without tensions, across three different worldviews that includes cultural (Pakhtunwali), religious (Islam) and, to a certain extent, liberal (human rights) perspectives. The tensions between different perspectives become more frictional when the ‘emergent civil society’ advocates women’s rights and religious pluralism, which is resisted by the antithetical forces of masculinity and religious orthodoxies. Amidst these contestations, the ‘emergent civil society’, while resisting these antithetical forces, pressurizes the state also to provide favourable conditions to continue its peace-oriented struggle. This thesis, however, suggests that the ‘emergent civil society’ also needs an in-ward looking tendency to self reflect on certain challenges that seem to impact the potential for growth and development of an associational life, which can fully embrace the social conditions for peace.

<p>Since the end of the cold war, military interventions have shifted from concerning only to win peace in their operation areas towards start helping the society to rebuild the capacity for development and democracy after the end of the armed conflict. This is made through a large diversity of organisations and actors of various kind with a large range of activities and goals. For the best possible efficiency it could be assumed that these actors should gain from cooperating and working together since their overall intentions are the same. This is not the case though and for this there are several different reasons. It do occur civil-military relations in a couple of areas of operation and the purpose of this study was to explore in which of these the relations are more or less suitable; politics and diplomacy, security, humanitarian aid, reconstruction and peacebuilding. This was done through analyses of litterature on the subject and through a few interviews with experienced personell. The material is derived from scientific research, individual and independent reports but also from statements and comments from those who have actually been on the field. The study also investigated how the links and relations in those networks the actors on the field theater belong to can explain the problems and possibilities. There is no clear answer of which area of operation is most suitable for civil-military relations, but the areas for security and reconstruction have the best possibilities to succeed in achieving their goals if coordination and education about long term consequences are dealt with. The humanitarian aid is the area that is most riskful to perform cooperation within since it could be harmful for the relations of participating actors as well as for the long-term peacebuilding. It is necessary in certain situations though. The need for further coordination and education is emphasized to be held in the arenas that preceeds the field work. This is also what the result from the network analysis gives. All links between actors are important in the field area of an international operation, wether they are strong or weak. They give the possibility to bring the organisations together and increase the knowledge about eachother and also create an understanding for the different types of organisations goals and methods. This will in the long run create conditions for improved coordination and cooperation and thus stronger peacebuilding efforts.</p>

This study focuses on the theory of conflict transformation and on its influence on the work of grassroots peacebuilding organizations in Colombia and in Israel/Palestine. Since there is no uniform and universally accepted definition of what conflict transformation is, the first step in this analysis will involve the construction of a clear framework for this approach. Once completed this task, it will be possible to use the resulting theoretical framework as a tool to analyze the work of six grassroots organizations operating in two of the most protracted, rooted and complicated conflicts of our times. The practical implementation of conflict transformation has still not been investigated in depth and the need for a clarification of this concept started to arise only recently. This research represents an effort in both these directions and hopefully will constitute a suitable starting point for future studies on the subject.

This thesis presents a critical analysis of the contemporary Islamic discourse of interfaith dialogue (IFD) founded on normative examinations of the Qur'an and hadith. Expanding from this baseline, theories of religious universalism and particularism are engaged as well as underlying themes of humanism, social stability, and acceptance of God's will. These are further placed along a Dove-Hawk framework to demonstrate the patterns underlying interpretations regarding the legitimacy of IFD in situations of conflict. It examines the writings and speeches of nine recent and contemporary Muslim intellectual-activists scholars. This analysis reveals a fragmented discourse, which is generally supportive of IFD, and indicates limits to the religious legitimization of IFD during Christian-Muslim hostilities.

The international community has followed up its 2001 invasion of Afghanistan with a complex multi-faceted peacebuilding project. However, informed observers believe the Western-led mission in Afghanistan has failed to address the inherent peacebuilding needs of Afghanistan and has hindered the formation of a locally experienced sustainable peace. In response, emerging peacebuilding theory and rhetoric has pointed to an urgent need for revised peacebuilding paradigms and strategies that hold local (Afghan) ownership of peacebuilding activities as a central concern. This research project utilised a qualitative grounded theory methodology to explore perceptions of Afghan ownership of peacebuilding activities in Afghanistan. Research data was gathered in early 2011 through face-to-face semi-structured interviews with 63 local and international peacebuilding leaders in two Afghan urban centres. The participants included persons from the United Nations, the Afghan and foreign governments, local and international NGOs, a broad range of civil society groups, international donors, and the international military forces. Analysis of the interview narratives revealed several dilemmas on the journey towards increased Afghan ownership of peacebuilding. First, participants believed that the international community is performing important roles in Afghanistan, but is struggling to ensure Afghan ownership of peacebuilding activities. Second, international and Afghan peacebuilding actors have struggled to define who should be owning peacebuilding in at least two respects: (1) civil society or government; and (2) traditional- informal or democratic-formal institutions. Third, grassroots populations and Afghan civil society felt virtually no ownership of upper-level peace processes, and described a distinct lack of locally owned grassroots-level peace process activities. And fourth, inappropriate external forces and processes, the militarisation and politicisation of peacebuilding activities, local aid dependency, and inadequate local control over peacebuilding coordination have hindered the international-domestic inter-relationship in Afghanistan. However, the dilemmas of local ownership do not need to be viewed as unworkable barriers but can be re-conceptualised as holding constructive potential in designing sustainable peacebuilding solutions. To this end, this research study proposed the creation of a locally owned, broadly participatory, and strategic dispute resolution system that might transform international-local relations and forge the necessary space in which the transition to local authority and ownership might occur.

The international community has followed up its 2001 invasion of Afghanistan with a complex multi-faceted peacebuilding project. However, informed observers believe the Western-led mission in Afghanistan has failed to address the inherent peacebuilding needs of Afghanistan and has hindered the formation of a locally experienced sustainable peace. In response, emerging peacebuilding theory and rhetoric has pointed to an urgent need for revised peacebuilding paradigms and strategies that hold local (Afghan) ownership of peacebuilding activities as a central concern. This research project utilised a qualitative grounded theory methodology to explore perceptions of Afghan ownership of peacebuilding activities in Afghanistan. Research data was gathered in early 2011 through face-to-face semi-structured interviews with 63 local and international peacebuilding leaders in two Afghan urban centres. The participants included persons from the United Nations, the Afghan and foreign governments, local and international NGOs, a broad range of civil society groups, international donors, and the international military forces. Analysis of the interview narratives revealed several dilemmas on the journey towards increased Afghan ownership of peacebuilding. First, participants believed that the international community is performing important roles in Afghanistan, but is struggling to ensure Afghan ownership of peacebuilding activities. Second, international and Afghan peacebuilding actors have struggled to define who should be owning peacebuilding in at least two respects: (1) civil society or government; and (2) traditional- informal or democratic-formal institutions. Third, grassroots populations and Afghan civil society felt virtually no ownership of upper-level peace processes, and described a distinct lack of locally owned grassroots-level peace process activities. And fourth, inappropriate external forces and processes, the militarisation and politicisation of peacebuilding activities, local aid dependency, and inadequate local control over peacebuilding coordination have hindered the international-domestic inter-relationship in Afghanistan. However, the dilemmas of local ownership do not need to be viewed as unworkable barriers but can be re-conceptualised as holding constructive potential in designing sustainable peacebuilding solutions. To this end, this research study proposed the creation of a locally owned, broadly participatory, and strategic dispute resolution system that might transform international-local relations and forge the necessary space in which the transition to local authority and ownership might occur.

Post-violence periods present sub-Saharan African countries emerging from violence with the challenges of social reconstruction, the rebuilding of peace and the redressing of legacies of human rights violations. To respond to these challenges, these countries are increasingly utilising truth and reconciliation commissions. To date ten truth commissions have been established in the sub-Saharan African region. With varying mandates, the truth commissions have in their specific contexts provided public spaces to survivors of human rights violations to give voice to their personal narratives, and shed light on the forms of persecution they faced. Often missing from the work of these commissions are stories of refugees living in camps. This is an unfortunate exclusion by a transitional justice process because refugees represent a group adversely affected by rights violations. So far in sub-Saharan Africa only the Kenyan, Liberian and Sierra Leonean commissions have incorporated some of their refugee populations in their proceedings. Driven away from their homes and countries by armed strife and other forms of persecution, the stories of sub-Saharan African refugees continue to bear witness to their human rights plight. Their exclusion in the proceedings of most truth commissions is a glaring omission in the work set to champion human rights and consolidate post-violence peace and justice initiatives. Therefore, working with 33 male and female adult refugees living in Dukwi Refugee Camp in Botswana, this narrative study sought to find answers to this exclusion by exploring avenues of inclusion of refugees’ voices, perspectives and lived human rights experiences in the work of truth commissions. Participants came from sub-Saharan African countries which included DR Congo, Somalia and Zimbabwe. An analysis of the interview narratives revealed several key findings. Among others, these findings included the importance of recognising refugees as co-partners in peacebuilding. They also underscored the importance of having responsible democratic leadership promote a culture of peace and human rights and combat perpetrators impunity in post-violence African countries. The study demonstrated that future truth commissions can create opportunities to incorporate refugees’ human rights narratives and give refugees the space to offer solutions for the redress of rights violations and suggestions for promoting durable peace.