Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of South Carolina, 1995. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 327-334).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of South Carolina, 1995. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 327-334).

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Queensland, 2005. / Includes bibliography.

This study investigates the role of the state in Singapore???s political economy. The conventional methodology in the neoclassical economics tradition is essentially apolitical and is thus inadequate to appraise the inner working mechanism of the Singapore polity, given the pervasive influence of politics in policy decisions. This study therefore synthesizes a new analytical methodology, drawn from neo-institutionalism, to analyse the interrelations of state, market and social institutions in the Singapore of the People???s Action Party (PAP). Ronald Coase???s theorem of transaction costs, Steven Cheung???s economics of property rights and Douglass North???s theories of institutions and institutional change, collectively, provide a theoretical framework that allows this study to examine the intrinsic nature and characteristics of the Singapore polity. Three major areas are investigated using this research paradigm. The first is the post-war political transition from colony to self-rule and the eventual emergence of an independent Singapore in the context of Cold War politics. The second is the process of social engineering through reconstitution, resettlement and socialization, a process that has aimed to alter the institutional environment that regulates the state and people and has tended to generate a submissive social ethos. The focus of the third is the redefining of property rights through nationalization, industrialisation, and privatisation that, in effect, has resulted in the extensive transfer of private wealth to the state. Four case studies are offered to demonstrate the impact of politics in the making of economic policy, the general effect of which has been to eradicate entrepreneurs in favour of state-owned entities. The analysis concludes that Singapore is essentially to be characterised as a predatory state, and adopts Mancur Olson???s ???stationary bandit??? theory to reconcile the state???s predatory behaviour with Singapore???s record of positive economic development. The study identifies nine unique features that have characterised the Singapore polity, the single most important feature being the emergence of ???Lee???s Law??? which amounts to the paramount Singapore informal rule in regulating all aspect of social exchange. It is paramount because without reference to this rule the inner working mechanism of Singapore???s political economy cannot be explicated. But the predominance of PAP control imposes a heavy social cost as it risks Singapore???s long-term viability as a national state because of the likely emergence of distributional collusion and institutional sclerosis. Singapore???s long-term viability is therefore contingent upon the kind of political reformation that would reinstitute a low transaction cost mediation mechanism that would then facilitate incremental institutional change.

This study investigates the role of the state in Singapore???s political economy. The conventional methodology in the neoclassical economics tradition is essentially apolitical and is thus inadequate to appraise the inner working mechanism of the Singapore polity, given the pervasive influence of politics in policy decisions. This study therefore synthesizes a new analytical methodology, drawn from neo-institutionalism, to analyse the interrelations of state, market and social institutions in the Singapore of the People???s Action Party (PAP). Ronald Coase???s theorem of transaction costs, Steven Cheung???s economics of property rights and Douglass North???s theories of institutions and institutional change, collectively, provide a theoretical framework that allows this study to examine the intrinsic nature and characteristics of the Singapore polity. Three major areas are investigated using this research paradigm. The first is the post-war political transition from colony to self-rule and the eventual emergence of an independent Singapore in the context of Cold War politics. The second is the process of social engineering through reconstitution, resettlement and socialization, a process that has aimed to alter the institutional environment that regulates the state and people and has tended to generate a submissive social ethos. The focus of the third is the redefining of property rights through nationalization, industrialisation, and privatisation that, in effect, has resulted in the extensive transfer of private wealth to the state. Four case studies are offered to demonstrate the impact of politics in the making of economic policy, the general effect of which has been to eradicate entrepreneurs in favour of state-owned entities. The analysis concludes that Singapore is essentially to be characterised as a predatory state, and adopts Mancur Olson???s ???stationary bandit??? theory to reconcile the state???s predatory behaviour with Singapore???s record of positive economic development. The study identifies nine unique features that have characterised the Singapore polity, the single most important feature being the emergence of ???Lee???s Law??? which amounts to the paramount Singapore informal rule in regulating all aspect of social exchange. It is paramount because without reference to this rule the inner working mechanism of Singapore???s political economy cannot be explicated. But the predominance of PAP control imposes a heavy social cost as it risks Singapore???s long-term viability as a national state because of the likely emergence of distributional collusion and institutional sclerosis. Singapore???s long-term viability is therefore contingent upon the kind of political reformation that would reinstitute a low transaction cost mediation mechanism that would then facilitate incremental institutional change.

In 1965, Singapore became independent. While this country¡¦s history is not a long one, nor is its surface area expansive, its economic prowess has astounded all. It is truly a city state which deserves closer examination. The long rule of the People¡¦s Action Party includes the terms of Prime Ministers Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong, and Lee Hsien Loong. While this period has been marked with outstanding economic accomplishments, Singapore¡¦s political development has been primarily under an authoritarian leadership model. This study divides these three administrations into the Lee Kuan Yew period and post Lee Kuan Yew period and analyzes methods of rule the People¡¦s Action Party takes with respect to politics, economic issues, and social issues in creating its authoritarian regime today. In the political realm, the People¡¦s Action Party limited opposition from gaining political control through intended and actual operations. In the economic realm, they created large nationally owned companies covering an enormous scope and, through the cooperation of labor, capital, and governance, kept their hand on the levers of the economy. With respect to society, the People¡¦s Action Party controlled media and news publications in order to slow the development of civil society. Thus, they have achieved stability in their authoritarian rule. The same time, the theory through Western authoritarian, it is attributed to the authoritarian rule of the common features in order to distinguish between Singapore today is what type of authoritarian regime. Found that Singapore, although from time to time that congressional elections are held regularly, but still did not have a fair and free election system, therefore be classified as a mixed constitution "competitive authoritarian" regimes. Contemporaneously,western theories are utilized to draw conclusions concerning the common characteristics of authoritarianism and distinguish what type of authoritarian regime Singapore is today. This study finds though Singapore holds regular parliamentary elections from time to time, it has never held fair or free elections and must therefore be classified as a hybrid ¡§competitive authoritarian¡¨ form of government.

本論文以新加坡為例，探討新加坡文官制度之內涵在此間運作的相關議題。筆者從新加坡文官制度的發展歷史、法令規章、社會政經等因素的相互關係上，探討新加坡文官制度在靜態面、動態面所衍生出各種面向與特色。 新加坡同其它英屬殖民地一樣，沿襲英國文官制度的傳統與設計，在二次世界大戰後英屬殖民地國家紛紛獨立，但這些國家戰後似乎並未在國家發展與經濟建設上，締造出如同爭取殖民獨立一樣的奇蹟，唯獨新加坡能以一彈丸小國，在風雨飄搖中建國成功，並締造傲人的國家發展與經濟成就。新加坡成功之道當然很多，對於新加坡之研究大多涉及政治與經濟領域為多，對於文官制度的探討則甚為少見，文官制度的行政運作與政府政治的關係密切，兩者可說是一體兩面，彼此影響甚大，文官制度可以說是政府行政運作最主要的組織，對於新加坡文官制度的建立、組織、內涵、運作、特色等等，在本篇論文中即針對這些議題加以論述，使我們一步瞭解新加坡的文官制度，同時並提出一些看法及見解。 第一章「導論」。本章說明筆者的研究動機與研究目的、研究方法、研究資料收集與研究限制等論文寫作要項，並對文官制度所關聯的一些名詞作概念、定義與界定，以作為建構本篇論文的分析架構。 第二章「文官制度之形成與發展」。本章簡述新加坡的現況、政府組織與文官結構，並從新加坡的歷史發展瞭解文官制度的演變過程，探討殖民地到自治建國時期，文官制度的概況與文官制度的重建，從本章節中，筆者將描繪出殖民地時期文官的角色、功能及政治立場與心態，並探究文官制度在新加坡自治到獨立建國過程中，採取的具體方法與措施，如此對於新加坡文官制度健全的法制化，將有一全面性的瞭解。 第三章「人事行政機關」。本章節中將就新加坡主管文官的權限機關作一分析，探討新加坡文官制度屬於哪一個體制類型的機制，這樣對我們瞭解文官制度的權力運作，人事主管機關的對應位階有所瞭解，在章節中也將分析現行新加坡各級文官的人事行政機關，以及各級機關組織的設立、成員、功能與權限劃分。 第四章「文官制度的內涵」。本章節中將針對新加坡文官制度運作的人士機關製作--說明，諸如文官的聘任、考核、訓練、俸給、分類、福利、獎懲、退休、服務制度、肅貪廉政等都包括在內，從這些制度的運作過程中，對我們瞭解新加坡文官制度法制面的規範與實際運作，提供一個檢視比較的範圍。 第五章「文官制度的特色」。本章節中分別就文官制度在新加坡發展運作過程中，呈現的特色分別說明，包括(1)一級政府之行政組織；(2)菁英主義與功續制度的結合；(3)快速晉升與高薪政策；(4)專家行政的增加等四個部份，新加坡之所以被人稱為行政國家自有其一定的道理，從這些特色中可以讓我們發現新加坡行政效率成功之道，也可以發現在成功背後人才流失的危機，文官快速晉升與高薪政策的行程因素，以及專家行政的形成。 第六章「文官相關問題研究與探討」。在瞭解新加坡文官制度的歷史沿革，各級人事行政機關，文官制度的內涵與文官制度的特色後，在本章節中將進一步深入探討與評析文官制度對新加坡整體國家發展的影響與貢獻，文官在政治、社會、經濟領域的功能與角色扮演為何？在我們常強調的行政中立問題上，新加坡文官政治立場是否受到影響，以及文官在運作過程中所採取的政策與措施，不可能完美無缺，其所引申的弊端與問題為何？藉由這些問題的探討，提供我瞭解新加坡文官制度運作與發展的借鏡及參考。 第七章「結論」。本章總結筆者將整篇論文的一些要點概略地整理歸納出來，使讀者很容易對新加坡文官制度的瞭解進入狀況，同時並提出一些建議，作為我國在文官制度的參考。