This thesis applies a Partial Integral Differential Equation model, along with a Monte Carlo approach to quantitatively analyze the no arbitrage value of hedge fund performance fees. From a no-arbitrage point of view, the investor in a hedge fund is providing a free option to the manager of the hedge fund. The no-arbitrage value of this option can be locked in by the hedge fund manager using a simple hedging strategy. Interpolation methods, grid construction techniques and parallel computation techniques are discussed to improve the performance of the numerical methods for valuing this option.

This thesis applies a Partial Integral Differential Equation model, along with a Monte Carlo approach to quantitatively analyze the no arbitrage value of hedge fund performance fees. From a no-arbitrage point of view, the investor in a hedge fund is providing a free option to the manager of the hedge fund. The no-arbitrage value of this option can be locked in by the hedge fund manager using a simple hedging strategy. Interpolation methods, grid construction techniques and parallel computation techniques are discussed to improve the performance of the numerical methods for valuing this option.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-24T04:11:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Wendell Feitosa Castro.pdf: 1220597 bytes, checksum: 338b2a30a09cfcc125df0c4d300a0bdf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-11-20 / This paper analyzes if the performance achieved by mutual funds that charge performance fees as a component of compensation for services rendered (mixed) is greater than the return filed by mutual funds that charge only management fee (simple). The methodology used to compare mixed and simple funds was the matching developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006), where each fund mixed is confronted with another simple fund on one or more similar characteristics. The database includes existing investment funds data in the years 2005-2012 from Brazilian Security and Exchange Comission classes Shares. Finally, we observe that in Brazil funds that charge the performance fee showed results significantly above those funds only charging the administration fee, so the payment of incentive for higher performance is reflected in benefits to investors. / Neste trabalho é analisado se o desempenho obtido pelos fundos de investimento que cobram taxa de performance como um dos componentes de remuneração pelos serviços prestados (mistos) é superior ao retorno apresentado pelos fundos de investimento que cobram apenas taxa de administração (simples). Para a comparação foi utilizada a metodologia de matching apresentada por Abadie e Imbens (2006), onde cada fundo do tipo misto é confrontado com outro do tipo simples para uma ou mais características semelhantes. A base de dados contempla dados de fundos de investimentos existentes nos anos de 2005 a 2012 da classe da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários Ações. Por fim, observa-se que fundos que possuem em sua composição a taxa de performance apresentaram no Brasil resultados significativamente acima daqueles de fundos apenas com cobrança de taxa de administração, ou seja, o pagamento de incentivo pelo desempenho superior reflete-se em benefícios aos investidores.

Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this thesis is to give the investors a better understanding on how to interpret the costs of funds with performance fee with high-water mark and give some guidelines when comparing funds with different fee structures, i.e. mutual funds and hedge funds. Mathematical approaches – Two mathematical approaches are used in the study. The first approach is to describe the high-water mark contract as a partial differential equation, which has the characteristics of Black-Scholes equation. The second approach is to numerically simulate the evolution of a fund’s value. During the development of the fund’s value the cost of the fees are calculated and discounted. Findings – It is found that the expected cost of the performance fee with high-water mark, vary a lot. An example is when the volatility increases the expected cost of performance fee drastically raises while the management fee is unchanged. Another interesting finding is that the order of when the fees’ are charged affects the expected cost of the performance fee. Conclusion – The guidelines for the investor is to invest in a fund with a performance fee in low volatile markets and a fund with just the management fee in high volatile markets. Another impact is the time step which the high-water mark level is controlled. The investor wants these controls as infrequently as possible. If the controls are done at a daily basis the expected cost of the performance fee is higher than in a monthly control. It is also concluded that the Normanbelopp of a fund with a performance fee should not be trusted. Key-words:

Submitted by JOAO MARQUES (jcostamarques@ufrj.br) on 2014-01-06T15:49:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAO EPGE MFEE JMCM v.final.pdf: 650494 bytes, checksum: 9679e883b7ef40c0b9da83e7683da08e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vitor Souza (vitor.souza@fgv.br) on 2014-01-22T14:08:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAO EPGE MFEE JMCM v.final.pdf: 650494 bytes, checksum: 9679e883b7ef40c0b9da83e7683da08e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-01-23T16:35:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAO EPGE MFEE JMCM v.final.pdf: 650494 bytes, checksum: 9679e883b7ef40c0b9da83e7683da08e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-29 / This study analyses the effect of charging a performance fee on Brazilian equity funds. Performance fees charged upon investment funds may be regarded as buying a financial call option. In theory, the value of a call option is directly proportional (ceteris paribus) to the volatility of the underlying asset (i.e. the fund quota, in this case). As it is, there is a clear incentive to increase volatility of the quotas of the funds that charge a performance fee. However, on contrary to expectations, the results indicate that those funds that charge a performance fee have presented not only a smaller risk, but also greater efficiency, measured by the relation risk / return. / Este estudo analisa o efeito da cobrança da taxa de performance sobre os fundos de ações na indústria brasileira de fundos de investimento. As taxas de performance cobradas dos fundos de investimento podem ser equiparadas a uma opção financeira de compra. Em tese, o valor da opção de compra é diretamente proporcional (ceteris paribus) à volatilidade do ativo subjacente (neste caso a cota do fundo). Sendo assim, há um claro incentivo ao aumento da volatilidade das cotas dos fundos de ações que cobram taxa de performance. Entretanto, contrariando as expectativas, os resultados indicaram que os fundos de ações que cobraram taxa de performance apresentaram, não somente, risco inferior, como também, maior eficiência, aferida pela relação risco / retorno.

Submitted by Gustavo Moraes (gusmoraes@ig.com.br) on 2011-08-29T22:27:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MFEE-EPGE - Gustavo de Paula Moraes.pdf: 288790 bytes, checksum: 75b700ba628f559aaf81308e4aaf88c8 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vitor Souza (vitor.souza@fgv.br) on 2011-08-30T13:06:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MFEE-EPGE - Gustavo de Paula Moraes.pdf: 288790 bytes, checksum: 75b700ba628f559aaf81308e4aaf88c8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-09-20T20:34:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MFEE-EPGE - Gustavo de Paula Moraes.pdf: 288790 bytes, checksum: 75b700ba628f559aaf81308e4aaf88c8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-20 / Este trabalho estuda o diferencial de retorno entre fundos de ações com benchmark em índices de renda fixa e fundos de ações com benchmark em índices de renda variável. A escolha de um índice de renda fixa como benchmark para um FIA, em média tende a ser pior para o cotista, pois gera um potencial de ganho financeiro para o gestor não associado ao real valor por ele criado. Portanto, como a remuneração dos gestores através da taxa de performance depende em parte do benchmark escolhido, fundos com benchmark em renda fixa deveriam apresentar melhores desempenhos a fim de compensarem seus cotistas por este custo. Os resultados encontrados sugerem que os gestores de fundos com benchmark em renda fixa obtêm um retorno líquido de taxas de performance e administração superior para seus cotistas e também apresentam uma menor correlação com o Índice Bovespa. / This paper analyses the difference between returns of equities funds that have fixed-income index as benchmark and equities funds that have stocks index as benchmark. The choice of a fixed-income index as benchmark for an equities fund on average tends to be worst for the investor as it creates a potential financial recompense for the fund manager that is not associated with its performance. So, as fund managers performance-fee remuneration depends on the chosen benchmark, funds with fixed-income benchmark should feature better performances to compensate their investors for this cost. The results suggests that fixed-income benchmark funds managers shows better liquid of taxes returns and lower correlation with Bovespa Index.

全權委託投資業務(俗稱代客操作),在證券市場中提供專業投資管理服務。我國證期會於民國81年，政策性地決定將開放此項業務。雖然整個規範體系已在民國87年建立，但它忽略掉經濟層面之考量，勢必造成全權委託投資契約無效率。 目前規範體系所允許之委託報酬的計算方法，稱之為「固定佣金制度」，由於此制度無法對業者提供經濟誘因，它會引發業者有嚴重之道德危險發生。因此，為解決誘因問題，應該使用「績效佣金制度」，不過在目前股市環境下，此一制度則引入過高之風險。因此，為解決兩種制度所帶來之問題，本文提出「改良式績效佣金制度」，在此制度下，委託報酬除基於傳統財務績效衡量值外，並基於非財務性績效衡量值，本文稱之為前瞻性績效衡量值（簡稱F-LPM）。 本文使用兩期之「主理人-代理人」模型，推導出最適委託報酬制度以及相關之比較靜態。在基本模式之下，本文進一步探討F-LPM之相關屬性及功能。所得結果與相關文獻一致，首先是，在最適委託報酬制度下，納入F-LPM可降低業者過度地重視短期，因而犧牲了委任人之報酬，這表示F-LPM具有增額資訊內涵。其次，無成本地提高F-LPM之精確度，可增加委任人之報酬。最後，改良式績效佣金制度優於固定佣金制度與績效佣金制度，因為它可降低風險，因而帶給委任人之報酬增加。 第壹章 緒論 第一節 / Discretion account business provides professional investment management service in the securities market. The Securities and Futures Commission decides in policy to approve the business in 1992. Althrough the regulation system of the discretion account business has been established, it will make the advisory contract inefficient with the negligence of economic consideration. The form of advisory fees permitted by the regulation system is 'constant fee system'. Under the system, advisory contract provides no incentive and serious moral harazd will occur. In order to solve the motivation problem, 'performance fee system' should be used. Under the circumstance of Taipei securities market, however, the performance fee system will bring in high risk. Hence, this paper suggests the 'improved performance fee system' to overcome the dilemma born by the performance fee system. In the improved system, advisory fees are based on the traditional performance measure and the fordward-looking performance measure (hereafter F-LPM). With a two-period principal-agent model, this paper develops the optimal reward system and related comparative static. Following the basic model, the paper examines the attributes and function of F-LPM. The findings are consistent with the related literature. First, the inclusion of a F-LPM in reward system can mitigate the potential for the advisor to focus excessively on the short-term at the expense of the investor. That is, F-LPM is incremental informative. Second, costless increases in precision of F-LPM will lead to increase in payoffs for the inveator. Finally, the improved performance fee system is superior to the constant fee system and the performance fee system in that it can reduce risk and results in higher payoffs to the investor.

Submitted by Adalto Acir Althaus Junior (adaltojl@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-03-20T19:06:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese2_AdaltojL-V_final_corrigida.pdf: 1890382 bytes, checksum: 4a35dbb3a389546a0654556227bf3070 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2017-03-20T19:09:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese2_AdaltojL-V_final_corrigida.pdf: 1890382 bytes, checksum: 4a35dbb3a389546a0654556227bf3070 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-20T20:24:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese2_AdaltojL-V_final_corrigida.pdf: 1890382 bytes, checksum: 4a35dbb3a389546a0654556227bf3070 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-20 / This study aims to investigate the risk shifting behavior of mutual funds to test the hypotheses that managers have incentives to raise risk. We evaluated the effect of performance fees on the level of risk, risk shifting and mutual fund's performance to assess agency costs differences between both mutual funds - with and without performance fees. We observed the mutual fund's volatility level and its changes imposed by the managers. Volatility was estimated by a standard deviation of returns in the last 12 months. The change on the level of risk measured was the risk shifting, that is, the difference between a mutual fund's current portfolio holdings volatility and its past realized volatility, both estimated over past 12 months' period. We used a sample of 203 Brazilian mutual funds which covered the period from 2009 to 2015. We used data from stock prices, Brazilian bonds prices, BDRs prices and the characteristics of these funds. When funds have higher monthly returns, they tend to run negative risk shifting; when they have lower monthly returns, they tend to seek risk by doing positive risk shifting. When the funds decrease their risk (negative risk shifting), they tend to perform better. It is possible to ensure that the funds which charge performance fee have superior performance if compared to those that without performance fee. Also, they have greater positive risk shifting and lower negative risk shifting. However, funds that charged performance fees presented lower levels of risk. These findings suggest that the performance fee can contribute to align interests between mutual funds and their investors. These results are more in accordance to the behavior of risk-averse managers who used their stock selection or market timing ability to ensure a desirable minimum performance, rather than use maximum effort to looking for extraordinary returns. / Este trabalho investiga o comportamento do deslocamento de risco (risk shifting) nos fundos de investimento em ações e suas consequências sobre o desempenho, para examinar a hipótese de que os gestores têm incentivos para elevar o risco dos fundos. Estuda o efeito da taxa de performance sobre o desempenho, o nível de risco e o risk shifting dos fundos para identificar diferenças nos custos de agência entre os fundos que cobram e os que não cobram taxa de performance. Essa avaliação é feita observando-se o nível de risco dos fundos e as variações impostas pelo gestor em torno do nível de risco operado pelo fundo. O risco é medido pelo desvio padrão do retorno mensal realizado pelos fundos nos últimos 12 meses. O risk shifting dos fundos é medido como a diferença entre a volatilidade de um retorno mensal hipotético, estimado a partir das carteiras divulgadas pelos fundos, e a volatilidade do retorno mensal realizado, ambos sobre os últimos 12 meses. A amostra contou com dados de 203 fundos brasileiros de investimento em ações no período de 2009 a 2015. Foram utilizados dados de retorno das ações da BM&F Bovespa, títulos públicos, BDRs e cotas de fundos de investimento, além das características dos fundos. Quando os fundos têm maiores retornos mensais, tendem a fazer risk shifting negativo; quando têm menores retornos mensais; tendem a buscar risco, fazendo risk shifting positivo. Quando os fundos fazem risk shifting negativo tendem a ter desempenho melhor. É possível afirmar que os fundos que cobram taxa de performance têm desempenho superior àqueles que não cobram, fazem maiores risk shiftings positivos e menores negativos. No entanto, fundos que cobram taxa de performance apresentam menores níveis de risco. Esses achados sugerem que a taxa de performance é um instrumento capaz de contribuir no alinhamento de interesses entre os fundos de investimento em ações e seus investidores. Esses resultados estão mais alinhados com o comportamento de gestores avessos a risco, que usam sua habilidade de seleção de ativos ou market timing para garantir um desempenho mínimo desejável, em vez de imprimir esforços para buscar retornos extraordinários.