In this thesis, I attempt to map a relationship between theories of selfhood and theories of free will. In doing so, I hope to establish that the metaphysical commitments that characterize major branches of libertarian theory entail a commitment to an ‘executive’ model of selfhood as opposed to a ‘psychological’ model. In essence, I argue that there exist two major lines of disagreement between libertarian and compatibilist thinkers. The first disagreement is over the truth of the determinism thesis, and a second disagreement is over the nature of the self or agent. I then argue that while much attention has been given to the first of these disagreements, the most significant problem facing free will has to do with the nature of the self, and that if stronger efforts were devoted to uncovering the nature of selfhood, there would be much to be learned about the possibility of free will. / Graduate / 0422

In this thesis, I defend compatibilism from all manipulation arguments. Manipulation arguments are supported by control cases. These cases purport to be counter-examples to all plausible current compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility. Some compatibilists – historicists – have argued that manipulation arguments can be undermined by endorsing the view that an individual’s moral responsibility for her actions is, in some sense, sensitive to her history. In Part One, I first argue that historicism is without motivation and is untenable. I then sketch a form of compatibilism – the structural-narrative view. This view differs from standard compatibilist accounts because it not only makes clear the synchronic ‘ownership’ (the free will or control condition), but also the diachronic ‘ownership’ conditions (normally taken to be personal identity) on moral responsibility. Both conditions have a narrative component, which I draw from narrative views of personal identity. These conditions insulate my structural-narrative from the manipulation arguments that motivate historicism, thereby providing compatibilists with a tenable alternative to historicism. In Part Two, I argue that the remaining manipulation arguments do not show that compatibilism is false. I first clarify the structure of manipulation arguments. In particular I argue that compatibilists ought to focus their efforts on showing that the control cases that support manipulation arguments are not in fact counter-examples to the compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility. I then distinguish two types of control case: threatening and unthreatening. I argue that the remaining threatening control cases only seem to be counter-examples because of ambiguities in their descriptions that result in us misidentifying the locus of moral responsibility in those cases; once these ambiguities are clarified, the non-responsibility judgement elicited by those cases soon dissipates. I then present three related to arguments to support the claim that unthreatening cases are not counter-examples the compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility; hence I conclude that manipulation arguments do not show that compatibilism is false.

How do we persist over time: What conditions need to be fulfilled for us to remain the same person from one moment to the next? Two theories have dominated the debate for a longtime: the physical and psychological approaches, which are centred on sameness of body and sameness of psychology, respectively. This thesis will focus on a third theory, the phenomenal approach, which defines persistence as the sameness of consciousness. That is, what is required for persistence is a continuous stream of consciousness. In part 1, I will present and analyse two different arguments that advocate for the phenomenal approach and I will also offer criticism for each argument individually. In part 2 I will present criticism that is directed to both arguments and the view as a whole. I will argue that the phenomenal approach to personal identity over time is an intuitive and convincing alternative at first glance but after deeper analysis it is an inadequate and unsatisfactory argument for personal persistence. Both arguments defend the capacity for consciousness as the condition for persistence but neither is able to define what has the capacity for consciousness and how it could persist without consciousness in a meaningful way.

No / Disabled activists and feminist thinkers both lay claim to ownership of `care'. To the disabled people's movement, care is a necessity on the road to equal rights and citizenship. To women, care relationships are premised in capitalist economic and family relationships and can be both oppressive, and, conversely, sources of personal identity claims. The two perspectives are different, and conflict. Oppositional claims are sited in practical resource giving decisions, and state resources have implications for the individuals concerned. Resource relationships between the state and individuals affect both practical help given and the location of the resourced group to the wider society. I argue that these claims are fundamentally oppositional and result in oppression. The relationship, when mediated by provision of care, inevitably becomes disempowering. Care provision is a function of a welfare state, and care policy will effectively empower one or other group. This oppressive dyad can be altered by fundamental re-assessment of disabled theorization and feminist action, carried through into state provision and reflecting feminist perspectives of ethical care.

The variables that contribute to the acquisition of personal identity are many, and the interactions that occur before someone realizes "I am ... " are complex, to say the least. The process of ' identification' that is, the aforementioned acquisition of the self is not a static process that is the same for each person. Although some similar patterns of existence may occur, it is ultimately a unique occurrence. I propose that in the 'construction of the self that there are three broad facets of existence that should be addressed in answering questions concerning personal identity the physiological, the psychological, and the social. Each of these factors contributes to the process of becoming that is personal identity. This is in line with modem psychological models. The present work seeks to bring to light some of these facets of personal identity in general. More than this however, an attempt will be made to examine some of the ways in which physical disability can affect one's sense of personal narrative that is woven into "Who I am and whom I wish to be." In the course of this work several topics will surface. First an emphasis will be placed on the physical expressions and ' limitations' of the body as an extension into space. The concept of the "body schema" will be explained here to illustrate the ways in which the body is integrated into the self. Next, the psychological effects of physical disability will be addressed with a focus toward the reconstruction of mental representations of the 'normal' body and the resultant effects of this reconstruction. Here, the "body image" of the disabled individual will be discussed using data from

A particularly intriguing aspect of personal identity is the staying power of the first arguments. Many of the earliest arguments have remained influential to contemporary theories, even if they sometimes go unacknowledged. One of the most prominent of those long-lived theories comes from Descartes. In this paper I establish the intellectual background, framework, and implications of Cartesian dualism. With this theory in mind I examine Derek Parfit’s We Are Not Human Beings. Despite his denial dualism’s relevance, Parfit’s argument for personal identity contains Cartesian Dualism within it. His examples, definitions, and “intuitions” are compatible, if not more supportive of the Cartesian philosophy. To have the strongest argument that we are not human beings Parfit needs dualism - even if he will not directly acknowledge it.

John Locke claims both that ‘person' is a forensic term and that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness. The aim of my dissertation is to explain and critically assess how Locke links his moral and legal account of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness. My interpretation of Locke's account of persons and personal identity is embedded in Locke's sortal-dependent account of identity. Locke's sortal-dependent account of identity provides an important theoretical framework for my interpretation: It makes clear that Locke's account of personhood is to be considered separately from his account of personal identity. My approach gives full credit to Locke's claim that ‘person' is a forensic term, because I argue that persons, according to Locke, belong to a moral and legal kind of being: they are subjects of accountability. On this basis I argue that two components explain why Locke argues that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness: firstly, his particular moral and legal conception of a person, and, secondly, his particular understanding of the conditions of just accountability and just reward and punishment. Given one accepts Locke's conception of a person and his understanding of the conditions of just accountability, it will be easy to see why Locke regards sameness of consciousness to be necessary for personal identity, but the more challenging question is whether sameness of consciousness is also sufficient. I critically assess this question by considering Locke's account of persons and personal identity within Locke's epistemological, metaphysical and religious views. I will argue that, at least from the divine perspective, the underlying ontological constitution has to be taken into consideration and that it is a verbal question whether Locke's term ‘consciousness' refers not only to phenomenologically given consciousness, but also to the underlying ontological constitution.

<p>Sverige är ett mångkulturellt land och forskningsområdet kring hur det är att leva med två kulturer är viktig att belysa. Denna studies fokus riktas mot hur unga vuxna upplever kopplingen mellan den personliga och etniska identiteten. En kvalitativ undersökning genomfördes med 16 intervjuer. Respondenterna levde i den svenska samt en utomeuropeisk kultur. Resultatet visade att deltagarna upplever sig som en blandning av de två erfarna kulturerna och att den etniska identiteten upplevs som stark. Svårigheter hos deltagarna låg i den personliga identiteten som påverkas av att ha en etnisk identitet. Den personliga identiteten var vacklande bland annat på grund av en svår anpassningsprocess till båda kulturer. Studien bidrar framförallt med fördjupade kunskaper om den personliga identiteten.</p>

Sverige är ett mångkulturellt land och forskningsområdet kring hur det är att leva med två kulturer är viktig att belysa. Denna studies fokus riktas mot hur unga vuxna upplever kopplingen mellan den personliga och etniska identiteten. En kvalitativ undersökning genomfördes med 16 intervjuer. Respondenterna levde i den svenska samt en utomeuropeisk kultur. Resultatet visade att deltagarna upplever sig som en blandning av de två erfarna kulturerna och att den etniska identiteten upplevs som stark. Svårigheter hos deltagarna låg i den personliga identiteten som påverkas av att ha en etnisk identitet. Den personliga identiteten var vacklande bland annat på grund av en svår anpassningsprocess till båda kulturer. Studien bidrar framförallt med fördjupade kunskaper om den personliga identiteten.

Eco Dwelling: Interior Design as a Medium for a Branded Lifestyle explores how the built environment can be used as a three-dimensional media in the context of branding a lifestyle. In Western society the exchange between consumption of material goods and personal identity is strongly influenced not only by media such as newspaper, radio, and television, but as well as by newer forms of social networking. The Eco Dwelling is a lifestyle complex that uses the environment as a three-dimensional media to promote the ideologies of a sustainable lifestyle. Eco-luxury apartments, eco-conscious retail and a vertical garden act as a narrative for a hybrid eco-luxury lifestyle by providing a mixed use, multi-tenant complex. Employing Holt’s Cultural Branding Strategy for brand development, the intent of the project is to create a new typology that allows consumers and eco-dwellers the opportunity to express their identity of both eco-consciousness and luxury living.