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Born in Russia in 1904, Alexandre Marc was very active among the French non-conformist movements of the thirties. He attempted to federate them around the Ordre Nouveau group he founded in 1930; there, under the impulse of Arnaud Dandieu (1897-1933), a philosophy of personalism was elaborated, in a Nietzschean and federalist form, a few years before it was taken up and adapted in a communitarian Catholic version by the review Esprit of Emmanuel Mounier, where the term was made famous. Marc had brought there the idea of personalism, which he had derived from his Russian background and his German philosophical formation. With the aim of forming a revolutionary common front of European youth beyond national and party divisions, he made contacts on behalf of O.N. with a number of youth movements in Germany, most notably that of the review Gegner of Harro Schulze-Boysen, who would become a controversial leader of the Resistance against Hitler.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Talbot School of Theology, Biola University, 1989. / Bibliography: leaves 132-145.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Ohio University, June, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 190-208)

Issued also as thesis, Paris. / Bibliography: p. [349]-356.

A slightly revised version of the author's thesis, Innsbruck, 1967. / Bibliography: p. 234-240.

This thesis elaborates a notion of Bergsonian personhood that is particularly well suited for understanding the corporate person. Personalists have contributed much to the study of personhood, but they also fail to fully embrace the image of the embodied person offered by Bergson, from which their work appears to emerge. My concern for freedom is part of what animates this study, but I am not framing a new theory of freedom. Rather, I am trying to bring a broader conception of what freedom means to bear on the subject of personhood. To this end, I present the work of Bergson. I distinguish the terms ‘self’ and ‘person,’ defending self as being more properly outlined by the subjective and fleeting nature of the individual. Then, I discuss Bergson’s connections to personalism, with particular attention to the tradition that grew out of Boston University at the turn of the 20th century. Finally, I give a Bergsonian account of personhood that emphasizes the self’s freedom of creative expression, richly connected to its environment, which is elaborated over time in a movement of becoming personal. I make the case that Bergson’s treatments of self and person greatly aid our investigations into personhood socially, legally, and philosophically.

The dissertation pursues the thesis that although Karol Wojtyła makes great strides in expanding the notion of subjectivity beyond consciousness and then establishing the other as acting subject as the foundation for ethical personalism, his analysis could be significantly enhanced through engagement with the classical Confucian interpersonal ethical sensibility. After all, Wojtyła reviles both individualistic and collectivistic forms of ethics. With Jean-Paul Sartre functioning as a foil for the purposes of appraisal, we can see how Wojtyła extends the notion of subjectivity into the dimension of action and how he establishes the person and, moreover, the other as subject, that is, as acting subject. Subjectivity understood on the basis of action instead of (as reducible to) consciousness is compatible with the personalistic ethical postulate “to treat the other not as an object but as a subject.” On Wojtyła’s account, ethical action is an interaction ipso facto and implies intersubjectivity insofar as one’s action is guided by the other’s subjectivity. What is more, Wojtyła contends not only that the subject is the person but also that person is act. In so doing, he has set the stage for an interpersonal ethics that is the middle way between individualistic and collectivistic forms of ethics. The trajectory of Wojtyła’s ethics bends toward the interpersonal dimension of the human condition, but, perhaps held back by his metaphysics and soteriology, he never fully or methodically develops this interpersonal ethical sensibility. It is regarding this lack that an appeal to Confucius and classical Confucianism is auspicious. Indeed, there is a somewhat surprising but striking compatibility between Wojtyłan personalist ethics and classical Confucian humanistic ethics. They are both built around the interpersonal dimension. While the interpersonal ethical sensibility of the classical Confucians lacks modern theoretical development, unlike Wojtyła they provide vivid descriptions of interpersonal ethical conduct and a clearer vision for an interpersonal ethical program. What emerges from adapting Wojtyła’s ethics to the classical Confucian interpersonal ethical sensibility is enhancement of the Wojtyłan interpersonal ethos and a comprehensive interpersonalist ethics.

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This project focusses on the idea of how the person as developed by Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950) is a departure from a common understanding of the person. Mounier's concept of the person is simultaneously singular and relational. Furthermore, the person is a spiritual being who represents the highest form of humanity that one can become. The idea of the person contains liberal and communitarian elements: the person understands herself as a unique subject whilst ontologically requiring the other to fully flourish as a person. It is incoherent for the person to conceive of herself as fundamentally separate of the other, which is why the person joins with the other to form a nous. This draws a stark line between Mounier and liberal individualist thought that conceives of the person as an isolated subject. The liberal element of Mounier's thought is that the state protects the person and her communities against actions that impinge upon the person's fundamental rights so that the person can maximise her freedom to flourish. Moreover, the institutions that form the personalist state are inspired by liberal thought. This means that Mounier's project begins from a communitarian standpoint and finishes by offering a liberal communitarianism. -- Ce projet se concentre sur l'idée de la personne qu'a développée Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950) et comment elle dévie d'une compréhension courante de la personne. Le concept de la personne de Mounier est simultanément singulier et relationnel. De plus, la personne est un être spirituel qui représente la plus honte forme de l'humanité que l'on pourrait devenir. Cette idée de la personne comprend des éléments libéraux et communautaires : la personne se perçoit comme un sujet unique alors qu'elle requiert ontologiquement autrui, afin de s'épanouir en tant que personne. Il est incohérent que la personne se conçoive comme être fondamentalement séparé d'autrui, ce qui est pourquoi la personne se joint à autrui pour qu'ils forment un nous. Cela établit une distinction nette entre Mounier et la pensée individualiste libérale qui conçoit de la personne comme un sujet isolé. L'élément libéral de la pensée de Mounier est que l'État protège la personne et ses communautés contre des infractions contre ses droits fondamentaux, afin que la personne puisse maximiser sa liberté de s'épanouir. En outre, les institutions qui forment l'État personnaliste s'inspirent de la pensée libérale. Cela veut dire que le projet de Mounier commence d'une perspective communautaire et se termine en proposant un communautarisme libéral.