My dissertation investigates how relativity impacts human personhood and freedom in theology. Assumptions about human subjectivity have always affected philosophical and religious discourse about time. Most Abrahamic religious traditions assume what James McTaggart has called an A-theory of time, in which time flows, and the differences among past, present and future are meaningful, in accordance with our subjective impressions. The A-theory complements an assumption that human beings can choose their actions. However, philosophers like Hilary Putnam have employed relativistic physics to contend that time does not flow, and that the future is as fixed as the past—a B-theory in McTaggart’s terminology. D. H. Mellor and others, explicitly assuming an opposition between scientific objectivity and all subjectivity, including the subjective sense of self, have built on B-theoretic arguments to claim human consciousness is illusory. Given Abrahamic religions’ emphasis on the importance of selves, this interpretation rules out any dialogue between science and religion. If Abrahamic theology is to be compatible with modern physics, we must reconcile relativity with the A-theory of time. Two potential models already exist. William Lane Craig and J. R. Lucas draw upon physicist Hendrik Lorentz to posit a universal reference frame, based on the experience of a God who lives in time much as human beings do. Robert John Russell fuses a traditional interpretation of special relativity with Boethius’s metaphysics to propose a pluricentric view of time in which God is present in every observer’s reference frame, making each relativistic construction of events true on its own terms, and eliminating the need to reconcile frames that disagree. I argue that Russell’s model is preferable: neo-Lorentzian relativity is vulnerable to scientific critique, and Craig’s view of God risks falling into occasionalism. Finally, Russell’s system not only establishes the kind of open future that is a prerequisite for free will, but in fact dovetails with personalist ontology and epistemology that place subjectivity at the heart of existence without sacrificing the importance of science. Far from being mutually exclusive, science and subjectivity need one another, and time’s flow is an excellent place for their collaboration to start.

This thesis examines the reasons for the survival of Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe over more than thirty years. Approaching this question from comparative politics perspective the author examines the type of regime, its capacity (including capacity of the state and of other institutions) and strategy of survival that can be found in Zimbabwe, in the context of relevant historical events before and after Mugabe's seizing of power. Thereby the author devaluate those aspects taking into account all the broader context of sub-Saharan African regimes.

After countering claims that truth cannot be a norm of belief, this dissertation argues that truth’s normativity is grounded in personhood. It does so by attending to the fact that truth is a norm for the human person, and to the relationships between the human person and the objective goodness and value of truth. The dissertation develops this argument by critically appropriating writings of Thomas Aquinas and representatives of twentieth-century personalism on the relationship between truth and the human person. The dissertation’s initial chapters rebut objections (1) that the involuntariness of belief rules out any possibility of norms of belief, (2) that truth cannot be a norm of belief because truth is unable to provide guidance in determining what to believe, and (3) that it is incompatible with other norms of belief such as justification. It rebuts the first objection by challenging its general account of belief and outlining an alternative account. It responds to the second argument by criticizing its understanding of guidance as overly narrow and sketching an alternative notion of guidance-by-value. It counters the third objection by arguing for the primacy of the truth-norm. The dissertation then takes up the question of what grounds the truth-norm. Chapter Three surveys recent accounts, drawing from its survey a set of desiderata for any satisfactory account. Chapter Four begins the dissertation’s account of the normativity of truth. Working from Dietrich von Hildebrand’s conception of objective goods, it argues that truth is an objective good for the person by showing how deeply interwoven truth is with friendship. Given that friendship is an objective good for the person, and that truth stands in certain intimate relationships to friendship, it follows that truth is an objective good for the person. Chapter Five rounds out the argument. The objective goodness of truth entails that truth is a value. Values are normative for persons. Therefore, truth is normative for the human person. This chapter defends the claim that values are normative for persons by elucidating the dependency of the realization of personhood—in several of its various dimensions—on value-grasping and value-realizing acts.

O personalismo de Emmanuel Mounier não é nem uma filosofia do sujeito, nem uma de suas expressões, como filosofia do Eu ou filosofia da consciência; nem uma filosofia da morte do sujeito e nem também uma filosofia do objeto. O personalismo de Emmanuel Mounier é uma filosofia da relação. Ao eleger a intuição da experiência originária como sendo o modo de ser da relação, ele junta a conseqüente inscrição da afirmação da vida no cerne mesmo do movimento mais próprio da pessoa criadora em sua luta pelo real. Isso faz com que ele perspective, por sua vez, sob o modo de ser do artefato, a maneira pela qual a pessoa se compreende a si mesma e compreende o mundo. Ou seja, não somente como quer a ideologia do trabalhismo como homo faber. Pois desde a manifestação do Ser em suas formas mais simples até a sua expressão mais grandiosa, que é a pessoa criadora e afirmadora de vida não somente enquanto expressão empírica, quantitativa, mas qualitativa, ou seja, como afirmação do amor, quer dizer, Eros cativo por Agápe, o personalismo vai dizer não somente homo artifex est, mas homo perfectibilis est e, em seguida, ampliará mais ainda para omnia arte facta sunt. Para o personalismo: tudo está por se fazer, a própria pessoa e o mundo. Essa tarefa é realizada em dois níveis em mútua interação: no da expressão singular, em que à pessoa cabe a execução de uma tarefa que pertence só a ela como expressão de sua especificidade na realização de sua vocação singular e única, em sua luta pelo real, e no da expressão da pessoa em comunidade. Não há aqui separação, mas distinção, pois se trata, em suma, para o personalismo, de uma mesma tarefa cujas dimensões e tratamento das problemáticas específicas implicarão o êxito ou o fracasso na realização integral da vida pessoal, quer dizer, em sua manifestação singular e em comunidade. A manifestação da pessoa singular, portanto, só encontrará sua realização plena quando ela tomar parte, como elo insubstituível, na formação de uma pessoa de pessoas: a comunidade. Todavia para essa tarefa coletiva cada um é convocado, pois cada pessoa, em sua expressão singular, é, para o personalismo, o nó górdio que desata um mundo de criação e de sentido insuspeito. Assim, Mounier colocará, em sua busca de diálogo, como critério para avaliar e pesar a densidade das outras filosofias, compreender o quanto elas, permanecendo fiéis a si mesmas, ou seja, aos seus valores, permanecerão fiéis, 10 ao mesmo tempo, à pessoa e o quanto os seus conteúdos cooperarão para o cumprimento dessa vocação fundamental da pessoa ou se elas não serão apenas mais um adiamento e protelação ocidentais que, apesar de sua maior antiguidade, Mounier prefere datar do século XVI e com o surgimento da burguesia e do individualismo reivindicador; adiamento e protelação ocidentais sempre da escolha da pessoa livre e criadora por alguma outra coisa, ou seja, para o personalismo, mais um tipo de alienação fundamental, ou mais um tipo de objetificação da pessoa. Assim, a crítica personalista, entendendo a Razão como a lógica da personalidade integral, será um complemento necessário à crítica kantiana ao dogmatismo do além da razão; ou seja, a crítica personalista será uma crítica ao dogmatismo do aquém da razão que tem se fixado dentro do pensamento contemporâneo, quer dizer, pós-kantiano, como sendo a última palavra. / The personalism of Emmanuel Mounier isnt a philosophy of the subject, or one of its expressions as a philosophy of the I or a philosophy of consciousness; or a philosophy of the death of the subject; or even a philosophy of the object. The personalism of Emmanuel Mounier is a philosophy of connection. When He elects as a fundamental intuition of originary experience the mode of being of connection, he attaches the consequent inscription of the affirmation of life into the pith even of movement more proper of creator person in its fight for the real. This makes him to put in perspective, consequently, under the mode of being of artifact the way by means of that the person comprehends him/herself and the World. In other words, it isnt as the ideology of labourism wants: to present man only as homo faber. The personalism of Emmanuel Mounier wants to go farther: till the manifestation of Being in its more simple forms until its more sublime, that is, the creator person and affirmer of life, and that not only as empiric expression, or quantitative, but qualitative expression, it sees the manifestation of person as unconditional affirmation of love, that is, Eros captive for Agápe. So, personalism goes to say not only homo artifex est, but homo perfectibilis est and, in continuation, it increases still more for omnia arte facta sunt. In the personalism of Emmanuel Mounier all is yet to be made, the person itself and the World. The latter task is realized in two levels in loan company interaction: in the singular expression, in which only to the person belongs the action of the accomplishment, task that belongs him/her as a realization on the strength of the expression of his/her specific character in his/her accomplishment of his/her singular and unique vocation in his/her fight for the real, and too in the expression of the person in the community. There isnt here separateness, but distinction, for this matter, in short, for the personalism of Emmnauel Mounier, is one same task whose specific dimensions and treatment of the specific problems will implicate the success or the ruin in the integral realization of personal life. That is, in its singular manifestation and in its life of the inter-connection in community. The manifestation of the singular person, therefore, only will meet its full realization when the person takes part, as an irreplaceable link, in the constitution of the one person of persons: that is, the community. However, for this collective task each one is convoked, 12 for each person, in his/her singular expression, is, for the personalism of Mounier, the Gordian-knot that unfastens a World of creation and sense unexpected. Then, Mounier posits, in his quest for dialogue, as the criterion by which he evaluates and to ponder the density of others philosophies and by which he understands how far persons have been faithful to themselves, that is, to their worth, and at the same time have been faithful to the person. If their contents announce the accomplishment of this fundamental vocation of the person or if they would be only one more occidental adjournment and procrastination that, in spite of their more ancient history, Mounier prefers to start from XVI century and with the appearance in history of the bourgeoisie and claimant individualism; Occidental adjournment and procrastination that has been in all time the choice of other thing than free and creator person. That is, for Mounier, one more kind of fundamental alienation, or one more kind of objectification of the person. Thus, Personalist criticism, which understands Reason as the logic of integral personality, will be a necessary complement to Kantian criticism of the dogmatism of the beyond of reason; that is, Personalist criticism will be a criticism of the dogmatism of the below of reason, that has fixed itself into contemporary thought, that is, pos-Kantian, as being the last word.

L’Idée d’université de John Henry Newman est, à l’origine, une série de conférences universitaires, rédigées en 1852 ainsi qu’un ensemble d’essais et d’allocutions, publiées entre 1854 et 1858. C’est à l’occasion de la fondation de l’université catholique d’Irlande (1854) que la hiérarchie catholique invita Newman à exposer ses vues sur l’éducation. C’est principalement sur sa défense de l’éducation libérale et de l’enseignement théologique que repose l’argumentation de Newman. L’objet de cette étude est, d’une part, de montrer de quelle manière Newman articule sa pensée sur l’éducation avec l’ensemble de sa philosophie religieuse et culturelle et, d’autre part, de souligner de quelle manière la philosophie personnaliste de Newman offre une réponse alternative à la conception libérale et utilitariste de l’éducation. Dans un premier temps, on aborde la forme d’esprit de Newman, à travers les deux principes constitutifs de sa pensée : la conscience et l’intelligence personnelle. Ils témoignent de l’esprit de relation dont Newman fit preuve au détour de son expérience d’éducateur, de pasteur et de théologien. En un second temps, on s’interroge sur l’articulation entre sa pensée personnaliste et sa conception de l’université. Newman envisage l’idée d’université à l’aune de ce principe de relation, et dévoile ainsi la manière dont il conçoit l’organisation des savoirs, le milieu universitaire et les relations qui y sont exercées ainsi que le rôle de l’enseignement religieux sur la formation intellectuelle et morale. En un troisième temps, on interroge la relation entre l’approche culturelle de l’éducation et le personnalisme newmanien. En soutenant l’idée que l’éducation vise le développement de la personne, Newman souhaite montrer les bienfaits de la culture et, précisément, celle des humanités. Pour autant, l’éducateur catholique n’en oublie pas de souligner que la culture humaine peut aussi entrer en rivalité avec la conscience chrétienne. / The Idea of a University by John Henry Newman (1801-1890) is originally a set of lectures on university written in 1852 and a collection of essays and inaugural lectures published between 1854 and 1858. On the occasion of the foundation of the Catholic University of Ireland, the Catholic hierarchy invited Newman to set out his views on education. It is mainly on his defence of liberal education and theological teaching that Newman’s argument is based. The aim of this study is, on the one hand, to show how Newman connects his thought on education with his whole religious and cultural philosophy and, on the other hand, to underline how Newman’s personalist philosophy is an alternative to the liberal and utilitarian conception of education. First, our study tackles the form of Newman’s mind through the two principles which are at the basis of his thought: conscience and personal intelligence. They both reveal the spirit of connectedness Newman showed throughout his experience as an educator, as a pastor and as a theologian. Secondly, our study examines the connection between his personalist thought and his idea of a university. Newman envisages the idea of a university in the light of this principle of connectedness, and so reveals the way he conceives the organization of knowledge, the university milieu and its interpersonal relations, as well as the influence of religious teaching on intellectual and moral training. Thirdly, our study examines the relationship between the cultural approach to education and Newman’s personalist thought. By asserting that education aims at developing the person, Newman wishes to show the benefits of culture, and more precisely, that of humanities. However, the Catholic educator does not forget to underline that human culture may also come into conflict with the Christian conscience.

Spurred on by the controversy over contraception, the twentieth century became one of most eventful for the history of Catholic thought on human sexuality. The Catholic Church in this century experienced the rise and eventual dominance, at least at the level of the Magisterium, of a personalist approach to Marriage and sexual ethics, an approach which sought to treat of these subjects from the perspective of their relation to personal values, especially the value of love. Of those figures who were most crucial in the development of such a personalist approach, one was Karol Wojtyła. As bishop,archbishop, cardinal and finally pope, Wojtyła (John Paul II) would be involved in some of the most important events of this history, such as the drafting of Vatican IIs Gaudium et Spes and the controversy surrounding Paul VIs <i> Humanae Vitae</i>. <p>This study is intended to further an understanding of Wojtyłas role in this history by investigating his thought on human sexuality. Accurate interpretation of his actions would require knowledge about his convictions, beliefs and reasons for them. This study, however, limits itself to investigating only one of Wojtyłas works, Love and Responsibility, and to asking one specific question of it, what relation is understood to exist between love and sexuality. This investigation leads to several important conclusions. First, Wojtyła has a definite and reasoned belief that sexuality is necessarily related to love. Second, his understanding of sexuality and its relation to love depends on his belief about the nature of love. Third, Wojtyła believes that human sexuality is related to love because a) it is the sexuality of a person and a person is the sort of entity which is able to love and ought to be loved, b) by virtue of the sexual urge attraction (a form of love) arises very easily, c) by sex (male and female) being a limitation or imbalance a special basis is created for love-as-desire (another form of love), and finally d) by sexual intercourse being a union of bodies, intercourse both expresses betrothed love (yet another form of love) and gives it an added perfection.

Spurred on by the controversy over contraception, the twentieth century became one of most eventful for the history of Catholic thought on human sexuality. The Catholic Church in this century experienced the rise and eventual dominance, at least at the level of the Magisterium, of a personalist approach to Marriage and sexual ethics, an approach which sought to treat of these subjects from the perspective of their relation to personal values, especially the value of love. Of those figures who were most crucial in the development of such a personalist approach, one was Karol Wojtyła. As bishop,archbishop, cardinal and finally pope, Wojtyła (John Paul II) would be involved in some of the most important events of this history, such as the drafting of Vatican IIs Gaudium et Spes and the controversy surrounding Paul VIs <i> Humanae Vitae</i>. <p>This study is intended to further an understanding of Wojtyłas role in this history by investigating his thought on human sexuality. Accurate interpretation of his actions would require knowledge about his convictions, beliefs and reasons for them. This study, however, limits itself to investigating only one of Wojtyłas works, Love and Responsibility, and to asking one specific question of it, what relation is understood to exist between love and sexuality. This investigation leads to several important conclusions. First, Wojtyła has a definite and reasoned belief that sexuality is necessarily related to love. Second, his understanding of sexuality and its relation to love depends on his belief about the nature of love. Third, Wojtyła believes that human sexuality is related to love because a) it is the sexuality of a person and a person is the sort of entity which is able to love and ought to be loved, b) by virtue of the sexual urge attraction (a form of love) arises very easily, c) by sex (male and female) being a limitation or imbalance a special basis is created for love-as-desire (another form of love), and finally d) by sexual intercourse being a union of bodies, intercourse both expresses betrothed love (yet another form of love) and gives it an added perfection.

Tyrimo rezultatai. Darbo eigoje išryškėjo, jog asmens vertingumą lemia ne tik jo vertybinė orientacija, bet gebėjimas įžvelgti savyje, kartu ir kitame žmoguje, asmenį, ne tik suvokti, bet aktyviai, atsakingai kurti save ir plėtoti tarpusavio santykius. Reikia teigti ne vien objektyvią tiesą, pagal fiziologinius, instrumentinius ar kitus matus, bet pastebėti žmogiškosios prigimties aktualizacijos prasmę bei jos vystymosi galimybes atskirose asmenyse, pastebėti dabar integralaus „Aš” ir „Tu” esatį bei ją suvokus brandinti. Asmens vertingumą apibūdina ne jo geri įpročiai, bet sąmoningi ir aktualūs veiksmai skirti asmeniui. Prasmingiau būtų kalbėti apie įgūdžius. Taip pat asmens vertingumą labiau apibūdina ne patys veiksmai, bet jų darymo vidinė motyvacija, grįsta savęs bei kito įvertinimu. Taigi tikslinant hipotezę, galima suformuluoti tezę: Asmens vertingumas yra asmens savikūra remiantis žmogiškosios prigimties duotybe, vykdoma sąmoningai, sąveikaujant su kitais asmenimis bei nukreipta į asmenį. Ši tezė suformuluota analizuojant E. S. Brightman‘o, M. Buber��io, E. Mounier ir J. Lacroix poziciją asmens atžvilgiu. Jos pagrindu tirti psichologiniai bei sociologiniai asmens vertingumo įsisąmoninimo ir aktualizacijos ypatumai. Apžvelgiant A.H. Maslow’o, C. R. Rogers’o, G. W. Allport’o, E. Fromm’o, V. E. Frankl’io požiūrį į asmenį (saviaktualizaciją, besąlygišką pagarbą, propriumą, moralinį aspektą, prasmę), išryškintos esminės asmens struktūros –... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The study is based on the personalistic point of view and the evaluation of a person. The theme of self-developing, conscious actualisation of man’s value without loss of human nature is a matter of great relevance of modern-day problems, such as lack of opportunity and ability to live humanly, loneliness, every kind of national, cultural conflict, war etc. In this work the essence and features of a person’s value, and the sense of the process of this consciousness and actualisation are analysed. In this study God’s presence is not denied, but the religious question is not touched. To reach the aim, the work starts with the foundation of the theme on philosophical arguments. E. S. Brightman’s, M. Buber’s, E. Mounier’s, J. Lacroix’s explanations of the person are investigated and a thesis is formulated: The value of person is his self - creation based on human nature, pursued consciously, in relationship with others and always oriented towards the person. Secondly, the evaluation of psychological humanistic approach to the person was analysed. Emphasis was placed upon the individual continuous effort of attention to a person, moral relationship, connection of understanding, memory, fantasy with a man’s value, exact action and at the same time unlimited love and maturity. Self- esteem is grounded on objective evaluation of person and his actualisation together with others. The third part is dedicated to discussion about social issues (political... [to full text]

Thesis (Th. M.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1994. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-127).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 127-131).