The primary aim of this thesis is the consideration of neuroscientific studies regarding the localization of high-level cognitive (i.e., nonsensory and nonmotor) processes into the brain. To accomplish this aim, I briefly summarized history of the localizations which lead to the cortical localization of high-level cognitive processes. Then, I present a case study, memory consolidation to compare molecular neuroscience (MN) and cognitive neuroscience (CN) as to how they differ in their localizations. After I put forward the difference between MN and CN, I make use of Uttal&rsquo / s arguments to consider the localizations of MN and CN. His arguments resemble the underdetermination problem and pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) highly debated topic in scientific realism debate. In this respect, I examine UD and PMI with its relevance to MN and CN.

Inferences from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories remain central to the most influential arguments for scientific realism. Challenges to such inferences, however, based on radical discontinuities within the history of science, have motivated a distinctive style of revision to the original argument. Conceding the historical claim, selective realists argue that accompanying even the most revolutionary change is the retention of significant parts of replaced theories, and that a realist attitude towards the systematically retained constituents of our scientific theories can still be defended. Selective realists thereby hope to secure the argument from success against apparent historical counterexamples. Independently of that objective, historical considerations have inspired a further argument for selective realism, where evidence for the retention of parts of theories is itself offered as justification for adopting a realist attitude towards them. Given the nature of these arguments from success and from retention, a reasonable expectation is that they would complement and reinforce one another, but although several theses purport to provide such a synthesis the results are often unconvincing. In this paper I reconsider the realist's favoured type of scientific success, novel success, offer a revised interpretation of the concept, and argue that a significant consequence of reconfiguring the realist's argument from success accordingly is a greater potential for its unification with the argument from retention.

Mokslinis realizmas yra filosofinis požiūris tvirtinantis, kad mokslo teorijos teigia tiesą apie pasaulį. Šis požiūris nebūtų filosofiškai įdomus, jei jo nesiektų paneigti įvairūs filosofiniai, istoriniai ir sociologiniai kontrargumentai. Šiame darbe analizuojami Paulo Feyerabendo, Arthuro Fine‘o, Thomo S. Kuhno, Larry Laudano, Baso van Fraasseno bei socialinio konstruktyvizmo prieš mokslinį realizmą nukreipti argumentai. Vertinama, kaip šie argumentai atsilaiko prieš naujausius argumentus mokslinio realizmo naudai, pateiktus Philipo Kitcherio, Jarretto Leplino, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Stathiso Psillos ir kitų mokslinių realistų darbuose. Darbe teigiama, kad mokslinis realizmas yra nuoseklus, savo teiginius gerai pagrindžiantis, geriausiai mokslo sėkmę paaiškinantis mokslo teorijų aiškinimas ir todėl laikytinas teisingu teorinis požiūris. Mokslinis realizmas yra nuoseklus teorinis požiūris, kadangi pagrįsdamas dvi prielaidas, kad egzistuoja nuo mąstymo nepriklausomas ir tam tikrą struktūrą turintis pasaulis (ontologinė prielaida) bei kad mokslas yra pajėgus šį pasaulį pažinti (episteminė prielaida), daro išvadą apie mokslo teorijų semantiką, jog teorijos parodo, koks yra pasaulis. Mokslinis realizmas gerai pagrindžia savo teiginius ir prieš jį nukreipti argumentai nepajėgia jo paneigti. Savąjį episteminį optimizmą mokslinis realizmas pagrindžia neigdamas galimybę nubrėžti griežtą ribą tarp stebimų ir negalimų stebėti esinių ir reiškinių bei tvirtindamas abdukcijos (geriausio... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Scientific realism is a philosophical approach that claims the literal truth of scientific theories. This approach would not be philosophically interesting if there were not ample philosophical, historical and sociological arguments that would argue against it. In this thesis we evaluate the arguments of Paul Feyerabend, Arthur Fine, Thomas S. Kuhn, Larry Laudan and Bas van Fraassen as well as the challenge of social constructivists. All the counterarguments are weighed against the most up-to-date arguments for scientific realism – notably, Philip Kitcher, Jarrett Leplin, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Stathis Psillos and others. We claim that scientific realism is a consistent and soundly substantiated account of scientific theories which best explains the empirical success of scientific theories and which, therefore, is justly believed to be a truthful theoretical attitude. Scientific realism is a consistent theoretical attitude because it starts from the two premises that there is a mind independent world of a particular structure (an ontological premise) and that science is able to know this world (an epistemic premise) and concludes with a semantic thesis that scientific theories represent what the world is like. Scientific realism is a sound and well substantiated theoretical attitude because the arguments against it do not succeed to refute it. It grounds its epistemic optimism in the denial to draw a rigid line between the observable and unobservable aspects of the world and in... [to full text]