In his Outlines of Skepticism, Sextus Empiricus claims that the Pyrrhonian Skeptic can live without holding beliefs. According to the 'Rustic' interpretation of this claim, Sextus holds that the Skeptic lives without beliefs of any kind. According to the 'Urbane' interpretation, Sextus' claim concerns only a restricted category of beliefs. I discuss each interpretation in the context of Sextus' broader philosophical stance, and argue for an Urbane interpretation. On this view, Pyrrhonism represents a practicable stance towards the world. / Master of Arts

Friedrich Nietzsche thought that philosophers were deeply mistaken about the nature and sources of philosophical activity. Where others took themselves to be motivated by a desire to know the truth, Nietzsche charged that his fellow philosophers, motivated by a pathological set of psychological and physiological characteristics, did little more than sublimate and rationalize their own prejudices. In this thesis, I sketch out in further detail and defend the plausibility and significance of this Nietzschean diagnosis of philosophers. I argue that since Nietzsche’s view of philosophers both offers a compelling explanation of some phenomena in contemporary philosophical practice and, were it true, would have significant upshot for how and even whether philosophy should be practiced, we philosophers ought to begin taking it seriously.

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Text in Afrikaans / Die verhaal wat hier vertel word is die van 'n jongeling wat sy ouerhuis verlaat om vir homself te sorg. Dit is die verhaal van die postmodernistiese wetenskaplike wat na 'n tydperk van modernistiese adolessensie moet afstand doen van die geborgenheid van sy kosmiese bestaan om 'n volwasse selfaangewesenheid nate streef. Maar wanneer hy homself (be)vind as die ek wat elke psigo-fisiese en rasioneel-empiriese werklikheid voorafgaan, is dit net om te ontdek dat hierdie ek nog ervaring nog wese is, dat hy hier niks anders (is) nie as 'n verwantskap van hierdie lewe met die dood. Om iets hiervan te begryp moet hy homself as 'n Lacaanse fallus aanskou. Hy is die beeld van die lewensvloed wat sy rol slegs in versluiering kan speel. Sy konstruksie verg altyd alreeds sy destruksie. Al wat (is) is sy masker, 'n persona, 'n vertolkte karakter waaraan die vertolking onttrek en 'n onbeslisbaarheid gepredikeer word · 'n bepaalde/bepalende dekonstruksie. / The story told here is one of a lad who leaves his parental home to take care of himself. It is the story of the postmodern scientist who after a period of modernistic adolescence must give up the safe security of his cosmic existence in the quest for an adult self reliance. But when he finds himself as the I who precedes every psychophysical and rational-empirical reality, it is only to discover that this I is neither experience nor being, that here he (is) nothing but the relationship of this life with death. In order to grasp something of this, he has to see himself as a Lacanian phallus.He is the image of the vital flow that can play its role only when veiled. His construction always already requires his destruction. What (is) is his mask, a persona, an interpreted character from whom the interpretation is being withdrawn and an undecidability predicated- a determinated/determinating deconstruction. / Psychology / D. Phil (Sielkunde)

本篇之研究目的有兩個層次：首先是探討三民主義之人類進化論與人性論。其次是研究三民主義之人類進化論與人性論的關聯。以見三民主義的人類進化論，是以其人性論為基礎。 　　本研究認為，三民主義的人性論肯定人性為：「人皆有之的自覺認識、自覺實踐能力。但各人所稟程度不同。此一能力是本之生元，源之於生物進化。並使人異於萬物，優於萬物。」 　　三民主義的人類進化論則是：「主張人類及其所創造物逐漸滿足人類互助圖存的目的之變化過程的理論。」 　　由人性論與人類進化論的關聯可知，三民主義的人類進化論在其人性論的主導貫串下，成為「人本的人類進化論」。即人類進化乃是人性自然發抒、自我完善的外顯現象。人類進化乃是發於人性，亦為人性所成就。是以人類進化的意義，在於其符合人性。人類進化的一切製作，皆必須有助人性發展。 　　此外，本研究認為三民主義欲在實際作用中豁顯其正面意義，必須先由學術上加以揚棄、重建，方可修整出可資運用、認知的體系。因此，傳承前賢的研究，將三民主義更加學術化、理論化，應具有為人類未來找尋出路的意義。這是本研究的未來展望所在。

Since the 1970s multiculturalism has emerged as an important area of scholarship within both academic and applied psychology. Scholars have offered a range of theories to assist psychologists in understanding the ways cultural context impacts psychological development and well-being with the aim of moving the field towards an affirming position on psychological differences that depart from the Eurocentric mainstream. One prominent example is the Multiple Dimensions of Counseling Competency (MDCC) by D. W. Sue (2001) which enjoins psychologists and counselors to acquire knowledge, awareness, and skills (KA&S) for five different racial and ethnic groups to promote culturally affirming work in a variety of professional and societal contexts. KA&S approaches like the MDCC remain the primary mode for conceptualizing multicultural competence today. This dissertation begins with a critical analysis of the extant multicultural competency literature which yields three important areas of concern. First, theorists face a dilemma regarding the definition of culture itself. Race and ethnicity receive stronger emphasis in the multicultural discourse which marginalizes other oppressed voices and perpetuates the invisibility of their unique struggles. In turn, attempts to expand the definition of culture to a non-hierarchical approach to all social identities and contexts draws attention away from race, an area already too easily avoided. Currently, no solution has balanced these two poles in the treatment of the word culture. Second, current models draw no limits to cultural relativism leaving questions of intragroup oppression unanswered. Third, models inadequately conceptualize the multiple social and cultural identities within the same person and offer insufficient guidance to professionals when intrapersonal identities conflict. Each of these three concerns is addressed by drawing from interdisciplinary scholarship in anthropology, political philosophy, and social psychology. These answers yield a new model for work with diverse social identities, Recognition Competency Theory (RCT). This new approach to competency with diverse populations has implications for the ways the psychology of oppression is conceptualized, taught, and treated as a focus of professional policy. Strengths of this new model, its relationship to the MDCC, its limitations, and implications for future research are discussed. / text

Text in Afrikaans / Die verhaal wat hier vertel word is die van 'n jongeling wat sy ouerhuis verlaat om vir homself te sorg. Dit is die verhaal van die postmodernistiese wetenskaplike wat na 'n tydperk van modernistiese adolessensie moet afstand doen van die geborgenheid van sy kosmiese bestaan om 'n volwasse selfaangewesenheid nate streef. Maar wanneer hy homself (be)vind as die ek wat elke psigo-fisiese en rasioneel-empiriese werklikheid voorafgaan, is dit net om te ontdek dat hierdie ek nog ervaring nog wese is, dat hy hier niks anders (is) nie as 'n verwantskap van hierdie lewe met die dood. Om iets hiervan te begryp moet hy homself as 'n Lacaanse fallus aanskou. Hy is die beeld van die lewensvloed wat sy rol slegs in versluiering kan speel. Sy konstruksie verg altyd alreeds sy destruksie. Al wat (is) is sy masker, 'n persona, 'n vertolkte karakter waaraan die vertolking onttrek en 'n onbeslisbaarheid gepredikeer word · 'n bepaalde/bepalende dekonstruksie. / The story told here is one of a lad who leaves his parental home to take care of himself. It is the story of the postmodern scientist who after a period of modernistic adolescence must give up the safe security of his cosmic existence in the quest for an adult self reliance. But when he finds himself as the I who precedes every psychophysical and rational-empirical reality, it is only to discover that this I is neither experience nor being, that here he (is) nothing but the relationship of this life with death. In order to grasp something of this, he has to see himself as a Lacanian phallus.He is the image of the vital flow that can play its role only when veiled. His construction always already requires his destruction. What (is) is his mask, a persona, an interpreted character from whom the interpretation is being withdrawn and an undecidability predicated- a determinated/determinating deconstruction. / Psychology / D. Phil (Sielkunde)

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-05-23T19:34:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 lucascarneirodelimaesilva.pdf: 1915858 bytes, checksum: 5836be114eca696e3f624250c537c45a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-07-02T11:23:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 lucascarneirodelimaesilva.pdf: 1915858 bytes, checksum: 5836be114eca696e3f624250c537c45a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-02T11:23:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 lucascarneirodelimaesilva.pdf: 1915858 bytes, checksum: 5836be114eca696e3f624250c537c45a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-24 / FAPEMIG - Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais / Esta dissertação aborda o problema endêmico de unidade que a psicologia atravessa desde seu nascimento como ciência moderna até os dias atuais. Esse problema pode ser caracterizado pela falta de consenso em relação aos pressupostos ontológicos, epistemológicos e metodológicos adotados pelas diferentes abordagens psicológicas e a crescente fragmentação do campo em diversas teorias e práticas totalmente distintas. Dentro dessa temática mais ampla, tem-se como objeto específico a descrição e análise crítica de como essa problemática vem sendo tratada por teóricos na psicologia brasileira. Pretender-se-á aqui mapear o debate e descrever os aspectos básicos que caracterizarão a discussão sobre o problema da unidade da psicologia na literatura nacional para que, posteriormente, possa-se avaliá-los e discuti-los. Por fim, concluiu-se que a produção nacional apresenta três características principais: presença hegemônica do que chamamos de Teóricos da Dispersão (conjunto de teóricos que avaliam a dispersão do campo psicológico como irremediável e sua unificação impossível e adotam uma estratégia cética ou valoração positiva); a falta de sistematicidade na discussão do tema e o pouco desenvolvimento institucional. Com relação às teses e aos argumentos utilizados por estes teóricos para sustentar seus posicionamentos, concluímos que estes são, na sua maioria, filosoficamente inconsistentes e não oferecem obstáculos significativos ao trabalho teórico necessário para uma possível unificação da psicologia. / This dissertation addresses the endemic problem of unity that Psychology goes through from birth as modern science to the present day. This problem can be characterized by a lack of consensus regarding the ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions adopted by different psychological approaches, and the growing fragmentation of the field in various completely different theories and practices. Within this broader theme, it has the specific purpose of being a description and critical analysis of how this problem is being addressed by brazilian theorists in Psychology. Here we are going to map the debate and describe the basic aspects that characterize the discussion of the unit problem in the national literature in order to subsequently evaluate it and discuss it. Lastly, it was concluded that the brazilian production is characterized by three main features: hegemonic presence of what we call theoreticians of dispersion (set of theoreticians that evaluate the dispersion of the Psychological field as irremediable and its unification impossible, adopting a skeptical strategy or positive valuation), the lack of systematic in the argumentation of the theme and poor institutional development. Regarding the theses and the arguments of these theoreticians to support their thesis and positions, we concluded that these are mostly philosophically inconsistent and under no circumstances they hinder a possible unification of Psychology, or even less, definitely settle the subject.

Centrée sur la thématique de la « fureur héroïque » développée dans le dernier ouvrage écrit en langue italienne par Giordano Bruno, De gli eroici furori (1585), cette recherche explore une double problématique suivant deux perspectives. D’une part, du point de vue historique, quels sont les schèmes philosophiques qui peuvent être considérés comme des conditions de possibilité de l’émergence de la figure du Furioso, le philosophe-poète dont les poèmes et leur commentaire philosophique nous font suivre l’itinéraire affectif et cognitif dans sa poursuite d’une union naturelle et rationnelle avec le principe infini du réel ? Suivant une méthode archéologique, il s’agit de retrouver dans les strates de la culture philosophique des traces précises et exemplaires de la mise en place, de la transmission et de la transformation de ces schèmes fondamentaux chez des auteurs de l’Antiquité, du Moyen Âge ou de la Renaissance. D’autre part, du point de vue conceptuel, comment une expérience psychologique telle que cette rencontre noético-amoureuse, qui n’est jamais totalement aboutie en raison de la disproportion entre « le sujet » et « l’objet », et qui se présente, néanmoins, comme une dissolution de soi dans la disparition de la distinction entre sujet et objet, met-elle en oeuvre, paradoxalement, une constitution de soi ? / Focused on the theme of the “heroic frenzy” developed in Giordano Bruno’s last opus written in Italian language, De gli eroici furori (1585), this work explores a double issue from two perspectives. On the one hand, from an historical point of view, what are the philosophical schemes that may be considered as conditions of possibility for the emergence of the Furioso’s figure, the philosopher-poet whose poems and their commentary lead through a path of affects and knowledge in his own intellectual pursuit of a natural and rational bonding with the infinite principle of reality? Following an archeological method, specific and exemplary traces of these fundamental schemes are found within layers of philosophical culture, throughout works of authors of Antiquity, Middle Ages or Renaissance who set, relayed and modified them. On the other hand, from a conceptual point of view, the process of the Furioso’s psychological experience is studied. His both noetic and loving encounter with the Principle is never completely fulfilled because of the disproportion between “the subject” and “the object”. Nevertheless, it is presented as a dissolution of self by ending the distinction between the subject and the object. How does this experience paradoxically implements a constitution of self?