Vadovaujantis nuostata, kad antikos filosofijos tekstai radosi siekiant užrašyti ne vien teorinės veiklos rezultatus, buvo mėginta naujai perskaityti Platono dialogų apie sielą tetradą – Faidoną, Puotą, Faidrą bei Valstybę. Pritariant kai kurių antikos tyrinėtojų nuomonei, kad filosofavimas yra antikos išminčiaus gyvenimo būdas, buvo siekiama surasti konkrečias sąsajas tarp antikos filosofo veikimo ir kalbėjimo (mąstymo). Tarus, kad antikos filosofui pamatinis dalykas yra gyvenimiška veikla, buvo mėginta filosofavimo siekius ir turinius rekonstruoti atsižvelgiant į tos veiklos specifiką. Vartojant postmodernistinius terminus, į Platono dialogus buvo žvelgiama kaip į tai, kas pasakyta, o jų turinius buvo mėginama perskaityti rekonstruojant antikinio sakymo aplinkybes. Minėtuose dialoguose Platonas aiškinosi filosofavimo prigimtį ir paskirtį, todėl neišvengiamai aptarė filosofijai pamatines – būties, pažinimo bei vertybių problemas. Siejant antikos filosofavimą generuojantį sakymą su rapsodiškuoju bylojimu, o Platono samprotavimus su kai kurių ikisokratiškųjų antikos filosofų ištaromis, buvo pelnytos savitos išvados apie platoniškuosius pamatinių filosofijos problemų sprendimus bei antikinio filosofavimo pradžią. Kadangi Platono dialogai buvo interpretuojami išreikštai remiantis postmodernistinėmis nuostatomis, tai taip pat buvo aptarti ir modernistinio mąstymo pradininko Descartes‘o pagrindiniai tekstai – Proto vadovavimo taisyklės, Samprotavimai apie metodą bei Metafiziniai... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / This is an attempt to read anew the 4th tetralogy of Plato’s dialogues on the soul (Symposium, Phaedrus, The Republic and Phaedo) in the light of the viewpoint that the texts of Greek philosophy appeared not just an outcome of the effort to write down the results of theoretical thinking. In accordance with the view of some historians of philosophy that philosophizing should be treated as a way of life of Greek philosophers, an interrelation between the latter’s acting and talking (thinking) is sought. It is attempted to reconstruct the aims and contents of philosophizing from the point of view that life activity was the fundamental for a Greek philosopher. In the post-modern terms, Plato dialogues are treated as the said (le dit) and their contents are read by means of reconstructing the circumstances of the Greek saying (le dire). Plato made an effort to elucidate the origin and vocation of philosophy in the aforesaid dialogues and consequently dealt with the fundamental problems of philosophy, namely, with the problems of being, knowledge and values. The saying, that presumably generated Greek philosophy, was related to rhapsodic telling while Plato’s reasoning – to the utterances of some pre-Socratic philosophers, thus some original conclusions concerning Plato’s solutions of the fundamental problems of philosophy and the origins of Greek philosophizing are reached. As Plato’s dialogues are interpreted from the position of post-modern thinking, the position itself needs to... [to full text]

Submitted by JOSÉ CARLOS MENDONÇA null (jcfilos.mendonca@gmail.com) on 2016-03-30T02:56:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Texto final da Tese (arquivo único).pdf: 2259324 bytes, checksum: 12dc1240f9a6225b5620dfb9e489be64 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Juliano Benedito Ferreira (julianoferreira@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-04-01T13:03:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 mendonca_jc_dr_mar.pdf: 2259324 bytes, checksum: 12dc1240f9a6225b5620dfb9e489be64 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-01T13:03:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 mendonca_jc_dr_mar.pdf: 2259324 bytes, checksum: 12dc1240f9a6225b5620dfb9e489be64 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-01 / Outra / Cette recherche a pour objectif d'analyser la problématique formative de l'activité philosophique à la lumière de la notion “travail sur soi-même” du philosophe Ludwig Wittgenstein, afin de repenser un sens autre que celui “philosopher éduque”. Dans cette direction, Wittgenstein sera pris comme référence, autant que le propre témoin des mouvements que sa notion renvoie à l'acte de philosopher. Tout particulièrement l'exercice de soi sur soi, témoignages des carnets d'annotations et les observations de Remarques mêlées, qui finisse par caractériser sa philosophie le rapprochant des entraînements que Pierre Hadot nommait “exercices spirituels”; lesquels, sur tel point de vue, finissent par caractériser l'acte de philosopher comme une expérience formative, ce qui déplace le sens de l'activité philosophique par le contexte d'un art d'apprendre á vivre” et non “d'enseigner à vivre”. Raison pour laquelle on peut dire qu'il y a dans sa proposition philosophique un “tournant formatif”, car, principalement avec la notion de “travail sur soi-même”, il est exigé de l'activité philosophique d'autres mouvements que ceux strictement conceptuels discursifs. Sous ce “nouveau” point de vue, attaché au vivant, (l'acte de) philosopher se montre comme “l'art d'apprendre à vivre” – à travers “des exercices” et “une manière de vivre” qui prend soin – consiste dans cette action liée á la “première personne”. De cette forme, si philosopher “travesti comme manière de vivre qui exerce” vise à la constitution d' un “discours interne” avec comme fin d'opérer la transformation de soi, l'activité philosophique se voit comme face à une “nouvelle” proposition, dont le “jeu de la vérité” – de base éthique et non épistémologique – finit par demander l'actualisation de son sens éducatif. Ainsi, à partir des références mentionnées et de l'objectif proposé, et marquée par une recherche bibliographique de méthodologie théorico-philosophique, le travail prend pour axe les trois mouvements qui s'imposent comme variables d'analyse sur la question formative présupposée dans la notion wittgenstienne – “si la philosophie est-elle un travail sur soi-même, qu'est-ce qu'on travaille sur soi quand on philosophe?” – dont les principaux mouvements font que le propre sens formatif de l'activité soit repensé :1) expérience de soi dans la pratique de l'exercice ou de l'exercice comme pratique de soi ; 2) expérience de soi dans la langage; 3) expérience éthique de soi comme pratique de la vérité de soi-même. / Esta pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar a problemática formativa da atividade filosófica à luz da noção “trabalho sobre si-mesmo” do filósofo austríaco Ludwig Wittgenstein, no intuito de repensar um sentido outro ao “filosofar que educa”. Nessa direção, Wittgenstein será tomado como o referencial, bem como a própria testemunha dos movimentos a que a sua noção faz remeter o filosofar. De modo particular o exercício de si sobre si, testemunhado pelos cadernos de anotações e as observações de Remarques mêlées, que acaba por caracterizar o seu filosofar aproximando-o de uma exercitação que Pierre Hadot denominou de “exercícios espirituais”; os quais, sob tal viés, acabam por caracterizar o filosofar como uma experiência formativa, o que desloca o sentido da atividade filosófica para o contexto de uma “arte de aprender a viver” e não “ensinar a viver”. Razão pela qual pode-se dizer que há em sua proposta filosófica um ‘giro formativo’, pois, principalmente com a noção de “trabalho sobre si-mesmo” é exigido da atividade filosófica movimentos outros que não o estritamente conceitual discursivo. Sob este ‘novo’ viés, atrelada ao viver, o filosofar se mostra como “arte de aprender a viver” porque a prática, via “exercício” e “maneira de viver” que cuida, consiste nesta ação vinculada à “primeira pessoa”. Dessa forma, se o filosofar “travestido como maneira de viver que exercita” visa à constituição de um “discurso interno” com o fim de operar a transformação de si, a atividade filosófica se vê diante de uma “nova” proposta, cujo ‘jogo da verdade’ – de base ética e não epistemológica – acaba por demandar a atualização de seu sentido educativo. Assim, a partir dos referenciais mencionados e ao fim proposto, e pautado por uma pesquisa bibliográfica de metodologia teórico-filosófica, o trabalho toma por eixo três movimentos os quais se impõe como variáveis de análise à questão formativa pressuposta na noção wittgensteiniana – “Se a filosofia é um trabalho sobre si-mesmo, o que se trabalha sobre si quando se filosofa?” –, cujos principais movimentos fazem com que o próprio sentido formativo da atividade seja repensado: 1) experiência de si na prática da exercitação ou do exercício como prática de si; 2) experiência de si na linguagem; 3) experiência ética de si como prática da própria verdade. / This research aims to analyze the formative problem of philosophical activity in the light of the notion "work about itself" of the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, in order to rethink a sense other to "philosophize that educates." In this way, Wittgenstein will be taken as the reference, as well as the very witness of the movements that its notion does refer philosophizing. Particularly, the exercise about itself, witnessed by notebooks of Notes mêlées, which ultimately characterize your philosophy approaching it from a Pierre Hadot´s practice called "spiritual exercises"; which ones, under such bias, characterize the philosophy as a formative experience, that shifts the philosophical activity senses to the context of an "learning to live science" and do not "teaching to live science". Reason why it can be said that is in its philosophical proposal as a 'formative turning' because, mainly with the "work about itself" notion is required from philosophical activity movements other than strictly discursive conceptual. Under this 'new' bias, linked to live philosophizing shown as "learning to live science" because the practice, through the "exercise" and "way of life" that cares, it consists in this linked action to the "first person". Thus, if the philosophizing "disguised as a way of living that exercise" aimed at the establishment of an "inner speech" in order to operate the transformation of the self, philosophical activity is faced with a "new" proposal, whose 'game the truth '- ethics and not epistemological basis - ultimately require updating its educational sense. Thus, from the aforementioned references and the proposed end, and guided by a literature review of theoretical and philosophical methodology, the work takes axle three which movements is imposed as analysis variables to the question formative presupposed in Wittgenstein's notion – “If the philosophy is a work of self, which works on itself when it philosophizes” –, whose main movements cause the formation direction of the activity itself to be rethought: 1) experience of itself in the practice of drilling or exercise as practice itself; 2) experience in the language itself; 3) ethical experience itself as a practice of truth itself.

This thesis explores Friedrich Nietzsche's use of history for philosophical purposes, focusing on two central themes in Nietzsche's writings: the genealogical methodology, and perspectival epistemology. My aim is to demonstrate how Nietzsche's concept of "historical philosophizing" is intricately connected to his moral philosophy. Using a genealogical methodology, Nietzsche traces the historical development of moral concepts back to their foundations, unveiling the underlying power structures and complex mechanisms that underpin moral discourse. Additionally, perspectival epistemology challenges conventional notions of truth and objectivity, serving as a critique of moral semantics. I argue that these elements are interconnected and should be studied as parts of a unified whole. By providing insights into an overlooked theme in Nietzschean methodology, this essay may enrich our understanding of his philosophy as well as contribute to broader debates within contemporary philosophy.