This thesis is an investigation into the simplest material entities recognised by Aristotle's theory of nature. In general, the position I defend is that the four 'so-called elements' fire, air, water, and earth are, for Aristotle, genuine elements, i.e., the simplest material constituents, of bodies. In particular, I deal with two problems, the first concerning the relationship between the four 'so-called elements' and the primary contraries, hot-cold, dry-wet; and the second concerning the nature of the matter from which the latter come to be. Responses to these problems in the secondary literature tend to conclude that the contraries (usually together with 'prime matter'), are constitutive of the so-called elements. I reject this conclusion. In the first part of this thesis I consider, and dismiss, the alleged evidence that Aristotle denies to fire, air, water, and earth the status of genuine elements, and I argue that the status of the contraries as the differentiae of the elements effectively rules out the possibility that they could be the constituents of the latter. In the second part of this thesis I attempt to unpack Aristotle's assertion at De Gen. et Cor. II. 1 that the matter of the perceptible bodies is that from which the so-called elements come to be. I argue that the matter of the perceptible bodies, although it is that from which the elements come to be, is not the 'matter of the elements', in the sense of a matter that composes the elements. On the contrary, the 'matter of the perceptible bodies', i.e., the constitutive matter of composite bodies, is itself composed of the elements: it is a mixture of the four elements. Thus the latter can be said to come to be 'from' the 'matter of the perceptible bodies', but this must be understood in a non-constitutive sense of 'from'.

Orientador: Lucas Angioni / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T02:14:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Terra_CarlosAlexandre_D.pdf: 1626782 bytes, checksum: feb64d7b26a19056d1444d2b74012727 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: Pretendemos averiguar como Aristóteles concebe a passagem do nosso conhecimento prévio do mundo ao conhecimento científico, avaliando os pressupostos e consequências de sua resposta ao paradoxo de Mênon e atentando para a metodologia científica defendida nos Segundos Analíticos. Quanto ao conhecimento preliminar necessário à edificação da ciência, procuraremos caracterizar seus tipos e também os meios pelos quais ele pode vir a ser adquirido por nós. Buscaremos estabelecer também as propriedades que o conhecimento científico deve possuir em relação à sua necessidade, universalidade e caráter explanatório. Buscaremos marcar, com precisão, a natureza da conclusão científica segundo a teoria científica aristotélica, argumentando que, nas conclusões, o atributo demonstrado, em relação com seu substrato, representa uma propriedade por si concomitante. Pretendemos averiguar como os diferentes tipos de demonstração e definição respondem a diferentes estágios de organização do saber prévio e a diferentes estágios na estruturação das demonstrações propriamente científicas, e, por conseguinte, como esses se organizam de modo a responder as quatro perguntas que toda investigação científica deve abarcar em seus dois estágios. / Abstract: Our aim is to understand how Aristotle conceives the transition of our previous knowledge of the world to our scientific understanding of it and we will do that by means of judging the presumptions and consequences of his answer to the Menon's paradox and focusing on the scientific methodology found in the Posterior Analytics. In relation to the necessary preliminary knowledge to the edification of science, we will try to characterize its types and also the means by which it can be reached by us. We will also try to settle the properties that the scientific understanding must have in relation to its necessity, universality and explanatory nature. We will mark the precise nature of the scientific conclusion according to the Aristotelian scientific theory, arguing that the attribute demonstrated in the conclusions represents a per se concomitant in relation to its substrate. We want to verify how the different types of demonstrations and definitions correspond to different stages in the organization of the previous knowledge and to different stages in the setting of the proper scientific demonstrations and hereby we will try to understand how these different demonstrations and definitions are related to themselves in order to make the scientist answer the four scientific questions that the scientific investigation must contemplate in its two stages. / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em História da Filosofia Antiga

This dissertation is generally concerned with Plato's conception of philosophy, as the conception is ascertainable from the Republic and certain ‘post-Republic' dialogues. It argues that philosophy, according to Plato, is multi-disciplinary; that ‘philosophy' does not mark off just one art or science; that there are various philosophers corresponding to various philosophical sciences, all of which come together under a common aim: betterment of self through intellectual activity. A major part of this dissertation is concerned with Plato's science par excellence, ‘the science of dialectic' (he epistêmê dialektikê). The science of dialectic is distinguished in Plato by being concerned with Forms or Kinds as such; the science of dialectic, alone amongst the philosophical sciences, fully understands what it means for Form X to be a Form. I track the science of dialectic, from its showcase in Republic VI and VII, and analyze its place in relation to the other philosophical sciences in certain post-Republic dialogues. Ultimately, I show that, whilst it is not the only science constituting philosophy, Plato's science of dialectic represents the intellectual zenith obtainable by man; the expert of this science is the topmost philosopher. In this dissertation I also argue that Socrates, as variously depicted in these dialogues, always falls short of being identified as the philosopher par excellence, as that expert with positive knowledge of Forms as such. Yet I also show that, far from being in conflict, the elenctic Socrates and the philosopher par excellence form a complementary relationship: the elenctic philosopher gets pupils to think about certain things in the right way prior to sending them off to work with the philosopher par excellence.

The Philosophers such as ibn-Sina had maintained that time and space were co-eternal with Allah, emanating by necessity from His Attributes, and not being the results of a deliberate act of creation. This must be the case, for otherwise nothing would have been present to induce Him to create the world after a period of non-existence. Al-Ghazali's refutation of this is that Allah had decreed in pre-eternity that the world would materialize at a future, predetermined date, selecting an instance for its birth from a myriad like-instances by exercising His Free Will and manifesting therewith a cause with a delayed effect. The Philosophers' explanation of local phenomena as resulting from the perpetual motion of the spheres is flawed, since perpetual celestial motions would result in perpetual, not transient phenomena. Time, the measure of motion, does not extend beyond the physical realm. Time, and hence motion, is finite. / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Ancient Languages & Cultures)

The Philosophers such as ibn-Sina had maintained that time and space were co-eternal with Allah, emanating by necessity from His Attributes, and not being the results of a deliberate act of creation. This must be the case, for otherwise nothing would have been present to induce Him to create the world after a period of non-existence. Al-Ghazali's refutation of this is that Allah had decreed in pre-eternity that the world would materialize at a future, predetermined date, selecting an instance for its birth from a myriad like-instances by exercising His Free Will and manifesting therewith a cause with a delayed effect. The Philosophers' explanation of local phenomena as resulting from the perpetual motion of the spheres is flawed, since perpetual celestial motions would result in perpetual, not transient phenomena. Time, the measure of motion, does not extend beyond the physical realm. Time, and hence motion, is finite. / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Ancient Languages & Cultures)