<p>I analyze Deleuze’s concept of temporality in terms of its ontology and axiological (political and aesthetic) aspects. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in the senses that it is modified throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works that were co-authored with Félix Guattari — and that it is developed through reference to a dizzying array of concepts, thinkers, artistic works, and social phenomena. </p><p>I observe that Deleuze’s concept of temporality involves a complex ontology of difference, which I elaborate through reference to Deleuze’s analyses of Ancient Greek and Stoic conceptualizations of time. From Plato through to Chrysippus, temporality gradually comes to be identified as a form that comprehends the variation of particulars. Deleuze modifies the ancients’ concept of time to suggest that time obtains as a form of ceaseless ontological variation. Through reference to Deleuze’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, I further suggest that Deleuze tends to conceive of temporality as an ontogenetic force which participates in the complex process of individuation. </p><p> A standout feature of this dissertation involves an analysis of how Deleuze’s concept of temporality is modified in his works on cinema. In <i>Cinema 1: The Movement-Image </i>and <i>Cinema 2: The Time-Image, </i>temporality comes to be characterized as something other than the measure of the movement of existents. In his detailed analyses of Bergson — in <i>Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Cinema 2: The Time-Image</i>, and <i>Bergsonism </i>— Deleuze suggests that time involves an actualization of aspects of a virtual past as contemporaneous with the lived present. While not an outright denial of the relation of temporal succession, Deleuze’s claim implies a diminishment of this relation’s significance in an adequate elaboration of the nature of temporality. </p><p>Further, I observe —through reference to Deleuze’s readings of Marx, Kierkegaard, and Spinoza — that (the explicitly temporal) change of societal forms of economic organization is non-reducible to that suggested by linear evolution. The claim is that putatively discrete modes of economic organization do not enjoy temporal displacement with respect to one another. This suggests that linear evolutionary models of societal development are inadequate. This further implies that temporality is non-reducible to the relation of temporal succession. In concrete terms, societal change is characterized as immanent temporal variation.</p><p>Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that Deleuze tends to conceive of the nature of temporality as involving the ongoing realization of multiple — non-identical, sometimes contrary — aspects of a stochastic process of creation that is expressed in ontogenetic circumstances, social evolution, literary works, and filmic works. </p>

<div>Compelled by converging research in the natural sciences suggesting the stratigraphic nature of time, I argue for a temporal approach to the venerable problem of synthesis in evolutionary theory. Geneticist and pioneer of the Modern Synthesis (MS), Theodosius Dobzhansky (1900-1975), constructed one of the most powerful synthesis arguments in the history of evolutionary biology in the classic “Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution” (1973). I argue that nothing in evolution makes sense except in the light of time, such that the problem of evolutionary time plays a powerful role in making sense of the conceptual architecture of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES). The EES offers a strong alternative to the temporal and causal idealizations operating at the hardened core of the MS. I create the philosophical concept of stratigraphic time to strengthen connections between the four problem agendas or “causal catchalls” structuring the new synthesis: (1) developmental plasticity, (2) developmental bias, (3) inclusive inheritance, and (4) niche construction (Laland 2015 et al.). The dissertation is driven by two critical arguments (Chapters 1-3) concerning the subordination of time to process, and two constructive arguments (Chapters 4 and 5) concerning the nature of evolutionary time, which together attest to the conceptual strength of a temporal approach to the multiplicity of evolutionary problems pursued by the EES, and especially the connections between them. </div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 1, “Embracing the Problematic Structure of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis,” explicates and evaluates the core assumptions of the EES in contrast with those of the MS, which has served as the dominant conceptual framework for evolutionary science and theory since the early twentieth century. Chapter 2, “Deep Time: The Forgotten Frontier,” critically argues that evolutionary time has been subordinated to evolutionary process, that the problem of evolutionary time must be revived after its eclipse at the origin of evolutionary theory, especially due to Darwin’s unnecessarily strict commitments to gradualism, adaptationism, and to the preeminence of natural selection. Chapter 3, “The Chronometric Subordination of Time to Movement in Philosophy, Science, and Society,” critically argues that the subordination of evolutionary time to process is primed by the chronometrically facilitated subordination of time to movement, what mathematician, physicist, and philosopher of science Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) called an unconscious opportunism in philosophical and scientific thought. The constructive arguments unfolded in Chapter 4, “The Continuous Variation of Evolutionary Contingency,” and Chapter 5, “Stratigraphic Time: The Synthesis of Deep and Developmental Rhythms,” attempt to respect causal thinking while conceptualizing evolutionary processes not according to causal laws but rather according to passive and active temporal syntheses (or modes of repetition), effectively delimiting causal thinking to a provisional conceptualization. Stratigraphic time enables conceptualization of the multiplicity of evolutionary process, driven by a new concept of evolutionary contingency. I argue that the roles of chance and causation in the EES are strengthened by concepts of difference and repetition, akin to the conceptual roles played by arrows and cycles of time in the formation of geological and evolutionary thought. These critical and constructive arguments are guided by Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of time, which he conceptualizes under the rubric of repetition. The three passive and active temporal syntheses, or modes of repetition, Deleuze creates to think the nature of repetition provide conceptual tools for evolutionary synthesis through stratigraphic time. </div><div><br></div>

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Throughout the procreation sonnets and those numerous sonnets that promise immortality through verse for Shakespeare's beloved young man, the poet personifies time as an agent of relentlessly destructive change. Yet Shakespeare's approach to the personification of time, as well as his reactions to time, changes over the course of the sequence. He transforms his fear of and obsession with time as a destroyer typical of most sonnets to an attitude of mastery over the once ominous force. The act of contemplating time's power by personification provides the speaker with a deeper awareness of time, love, and mutability that allows him to form several new philosophies which resolve his fear. By the end of the sequence, the poet no longer fortifies himself and the beloved against time's devastation because his new outlook fosters an acceptance of time that opposes and thus negates his previous contention with this force.

El pensament religiós de Joan Maragall no havia estat objecte fins ara de cap estudi ampli i sistemàtic. Aquesta tesi pretén oferir una sistematització d'aquest pensament en el marc d'una biografia intel·lectual que permeti visualitzar-ne l'evolució i el desenvolupament. Expositivament, s'ha perioditzat la biografia intel·lectual en quatre etapes: 1) la religió romàntica de la bellesa (1860-1890); 2) de l'exaltació positivista dels forts a la cristianització de l'excelsior (1890-1901); 3) un neoespiritualisme modernista (1901-1906), i 4) l'últim Maragall (1906-1911). És en l'últim període quan Maragall dota el seu pensament d'una terminologia específica i li dóna una forma travada i coherent. Des d'una posició clarament antiascètica no, però, antimística , Maragall detecta l'existència en el temps de moments de suspensió de la temporalitat els «moments d'eternitat» la vivència dels quals permet superar la distinció entre vida terrenal i ultraterrenal. / Until now Joan Maragall's religious thought has not been the object of an extensive and methodical study. This thesis aims to offer a systematization of his religious thought within the framework of an intellectual biography which allows for the visualization of its evolution and development. For the purpose of this analysis, the intellectual biography has been divided in four stages: 1) the romantic period of the religion of beauty (1860-1890); 2) the positivist period, from the exaltation of the strong to the Christianization of the excelsior (1890-1901); 3) the modernist neo-spiritualist period (1901-1906), and 4) the last period (1906-1911). Maragall develops a specific terminology for his thought and gives it a coherent and unified form in the last stage. From a clearly anti-ascetic position though not anti-mystic , Maragall detects the existence of moments when temporality is suspended «moments of eternity» , the experience of which allows for the overcoming of the distinction between earthly and otherworldly.