Emerging donors, such as India, Brazil and South Africa, have provided assistance to other developing countries for many decades. However, the creation of dedicated aid agencies in emerging donor countries is a relatively new feature. The establishment of these aid agencies is often motivated by the objective of better coordinating and managing the increasing volume and scope of their development assistance activities. Since many of these emerging donors are also recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from traditional donors, this institutionalization and professionalization of their development assistance raises some difficult questions. How do traditional donors perceive this new development in beneficiary countries and how do they respond to it in terms of aid allocations and co-operation arrangements? Do traditional donors still perceive beneficiary countries that are in a position to provide development assistance to other countries as being eligible to receive aid? These are the fundamental questions that this research study aims to answer. This research study is based on the hypothesis that the creation of dedicated aid agencies in beneficiary countries prompts traditional donors to either freeze, reduce or terminate ODA and rethink their development cooperation strategies. It argues that traditional donors perceive beneficiary countries with dedicated aid agencies as no longer in need of foreign assistance. In order to test this hypothesis and identify changes in the flow of aid, the research study compares official aid flow data for five selected traditional donors (France, Germany, the UK, the US and EU Institutions) to three emerging donor countries (India, Brazil and South Africa) before and after the establishment of dedicated aid agencies. The research further investigates whether other factors, such as beneficiary countries' socioeconomic performance and compliance with DAC norms and standards, play a role in traditional donors' aid allocation decisions. Alongside the quantitative analysis, the research uses semi-structured elite interviews with representatives of the five traditional donors as well as development cooperation experts to solicit qualitative responses. The findings of the quantitative and qualitative analysis suggest that the establishment of dedicated aid agencies in emerging donor countries does not have a negative impact on traditional donors' aid allocations. Other factors, such as the economic status of beneficiary countries, domestic debates and the strategic interests of traditional donors', seem to play a much more important role in this regard. In fact, traditional donors welcome the creation of such aid agencies and actively support beneficiary countries in this endeavour. Traditional donors expect that such aid agencies will promote transparency and accountability and increase the effectiveness of aid.

In this dissertation scientific theory is investigated in order to show its socio-ethical aspects. An historical approach shows that prevailing historical conditions influence the development of scientific theory. These conditions are also created by the theories that they influence. Thus there is a continual interaction between theory and practice, pointinig to the socio-ethical aspects of theory. An investigation of scientific theory including biological theory also shows this continual interaction. Efforts to derive moral precepts from biological theory, e.g., Darwinism, sociobiology and genetic theory reveal the influences and prejudices of the particular historical periods in which the theories are developed. These aspects of scientific theory show that the scientific enterprise is not characterised by objectivity and disinteredness. The community aspect of scientific practice also shows that scientists are dependent on one another and that theories are interrelated. These spects of scientific theory show the transcultural and transnational nature of theory and lays a foundation for the basis of ethics and for scientific responsibility. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1987.

My dissertation offers an advancement of the Marxian theory of money, motivated by a methodological critique of monetary theory in general. As such, my dissertation is located within the philosophy and methodology of economics and the history of monetary thought, in addition to Marxian political economy. This intermingling of fields reflects both my research interests and my argument with respect to the current state of scholarship on Marx and money. Despite increasing acceptance of the compatibility of non-commodity money and Marxian political economy, a dualist social ontology has stunted attempts to theorize the relationship between money, value, and class. I base my development of a Marxian theory of money in a rejection of this dualism. In other words, I contribute a theoretical analysis of the relationship between money, value, and class informed by a critique of these dualist notions of economic reality. Accepting criticism, leveled by Keynesians among others, of the tendency to reduce money to the status of a mere veil, I further argue that the ontological privileging of a real economy over its monetary moments is prevalent across time and paradigms. This dichotomy between real economy and less-real money, which I call the \emph{realist dualism}, is thus more general than the classical dichotomy. As such, even fervent opponents of the classical dichotomy may reproduce their own ontological dualism between the real and merely monetary. After outlining the basic features and theoretical consequences of the realist dualism, I present examples of how this philosophical tendency shapes monetary theory and debate, both ancient and modern. Within the Marxian tradition, dependence on such a dualism has impeded attempts to theorize money in its relation to both (1) the economy in general and (2) its own manifold forms and functions. The distinction between real and less-real on a macroeconomic scale is repeated within the conceptualization of money itself, privileging real commodity money over symbolic and imaginary forms. I provide an alternative to this tendency, based on an overdeterminist understanding of the relationships between so-called imaginary, symbolic, and real/material aspects of money. This alternative ontology informs a critical and deconstructive reading of money within the Marxian tradition and a reframing of the problem of non-commodity money. In lieu of deriving a theory of non-commodity money from a logically and historically privileged notion of real commodity money, my general Marxian theory of money takes as its object the interaction between (1) the imaginary, symbolic, and real/material dimensions inherent to money in general and (2) class processes of value production, appropriation, and distribution. This project accepts that a specifically Marxian theory of money is not produced from the logic of supposedly real commodity money, but through the entry point of class.

A recent movement within political philosophy called luck egalitarianism has attempted to synthesize the right’s regard for responsibility with the left’s concern for equality. The original motivation for subscribing to luck egalitarianism stems from the belief that one’s success in life ought to reflect one’s own choices and not brute luck. Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the decision procedures that they propose, but they share in common the general approach that we ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck so that differences in distribution are only a consequence of the responsible choices that individuals make. I intend to show that through the application of its own distributive procedures, the luck egalitarian approach actually undermines its original motivation by making the lives of individuals subject to brute luck.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-02-04T15:55:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Henrique Joner_.pdf: 500896 bytes, checksum: 5481fff29acfc7436dcb7c0cf14cd70d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-02-04T15:55:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Henrique Joner_.pdf: 500896 bytes, checksum: 5481fff29acfc7436dcb7c0cf14cd70d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-09-03 / Milton Valente / UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos / Este estudo explora a necessidade de compreender a economia e seus problemas a partir de uma perspectiva moral, para assim conseguir adequadamente avaliar os acontecimentos econômicos, e então promover o desenvolvimento humano. Nosso intendo é demonstrar, através das diversas observações dos escolásticos do século XVI: Luis de Molina, Juan de Mariana e Leonardo Lessio, a impossibilidade de universalizar a definição de monopólio e ao mesmo tempo manter seu conceito sob a luz da razão. Demonstramos a influência e a importância das observações econômicas dos filósofos gregos: Hesíodo, Xenofonte e Aristóteles, assim como dos filósofos medievais: Agostinho de Hipona, Pedro de João Olivi e Tomás de Aquino, no entendimento contemporâneo das ciências sociais e econômicas. Para o estudo dos pensadores da Segunda Escolástica, utilizamos as obras: De iustitia et iure, de Luis de Molina, De monetae mutatione, de Juan de Mariana e De iustitia et iure de Leonardo Lessio. Realizando um comparativo do entendimento de monopólio desses autores, com relação ao que compreenderam como monopólio os modernos: Adam Smith, David Ricardo e Augustin Cournot, assim como os austríacos: Carl Menger, Israel Kirzner e Friedrich Hayek. Concluímos que a necessidade de analisar os problemas econômicos a partir dos fins humanos é impreterível para uma análise econômica racional, destacando esta postura nos doutores da Segunda Escolástica, que demonstram claramente a necessidade de julgar moralmente todas as circunstâncias que englobam a ação monopolística antes de defini-la como justa ou injusta. Estas observações nos apontam, principalmente, a necessidade de compreender que os problemas econômicos são indissociáveis dos problemas da justiça. Dessa forma, se pretendemos perseguir o desenvolvimento econômico social, é necessário percebermos a realidade através dos fins humanos, para então determinarmos, como homens prudentes, qual caminho devemos seguir. / This study explores the need to understand economics and its problems from a moral perspective, so as to be able to properly assess economic developments and promote human development. Our purpose is to demonstrate, through the various observations of the scholastics of the sixteenth century: Luis de Molina, Juan de Mariana and Leonardo Lessio, the impossibility of the universalization of monopoly definition and at the same time maintain its concept under the light of reason. We demonstrate the influence and the importance of economic observations of the Greek philosophers: Hesiod, Xenophon and Aristotle, as well as the medieval philosophers: Augustine of Hippo, Peter John Olivi and Thomas Aquinas, in the contemporary understanding of the social and economic sciences. For the study of the Second Scholastic thinkers we used the works: De iure et iustitia, of Luis de Molina, De monetae mutatione of Juan de Mariana and De iure et iustitia, of Leonardo Lessio. In this regard we compared the monopoly concept as understood by these authors and by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Augustin Cournot, as well as the austrian economists: Carl Menger, Israel Kirzner and Friedrich Hayek. We conclude that the need to analyze the problems of economics from the human ends is imperative for a rational economics analysis, highlighting this position in the doctors of the Second Scholastic, which clearly demonstrate the need for morally judging all circumstances that include the monopolistic action before setting it as just or unjust. These observations demonstrate, principally, the need to understand that economic issues are inseparable from justice issues. Thus, if we are to pursue the social economic development, it is necessary to perceive reality through human ends, and then we can determine, as prudent men, which way we should go.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

The prevalence of intra-state conflicts and state failures in Africa since the end of the Cold War has made Africa the epicentre of threats to human, national and international security. The inability of African states to combat the insecurities in their respective countries reinforces the discourse on the role of the African Union (AU) in enhancing peace and security across the continent. Since its establishment in 2002, the AU has responded to some security challenges in Africa. In situations of armed conflicts, especially where diplomatic and mediatory efforts fail, the AU has adopted military interventionist mechanisms to protect civilians and to restore peace and security in accord with Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. Drawing from the cases of Somalia, Sudan and Libya, this research evaluates the capacity of the AU to operationalize the idea of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ and enforce peace and security especially through its military interventionist mechanisms. Limitations in terms of resources, expertise and funds as well as the poor commitment of member states constitute setbacks to the AU’s effort at conflict management. For the AU to perform effectively in conflict situations, it is imperative for the regional body to develop the required supranational capacity to compel obedience from member states as well as warring parties. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2014.

In this work we will look at a particular example of investment and sacrifice, where investment originates in science and sacrifice in myths, but they both meet. The question is what exactly is what they are describing. Is investment and sacrifice similar or to grasp full understanding of this phenomenon we need both approaches? There can be found characteristics of rites in investment, similar structure and symbolism as well as economic incentives incorporated in the sacrifice. However investment is not perceived as rite and communication with divinity and sacrifice is not pure cost and benefit analysis. This paper tries to answer these questions and clarify the line between the two. It was Walter Benjamin who was first to notice the similarities between religion and economics and we would like to continue with the discussion. This topic is not much discussed further in literature, therefore by this paper we would like to fill the gap and contribute to the topic.

In some parts of the African continent, colonialist left a long time ago but the legacy they left exist to this day. In one way or the other they ensured that their legacy lives on even beyond independence of the African people. This is the case also in Southern Africa and particularly in South Africa. The legacy of white settlers who came into the country in the early colonial days is still evident in the characteristics of the contemporary South African society. The racially skewed distribution of land started centuries ago and up until today, such disproportionate in land distribution has not been corrected. At the end of apartheid, the newly elected democratic government placed on top of its agenda the issue of addressing the land question. Land reform programme was drawn and deadlines for achieving certain goals were set. But since then, land reform has been slow and fallen short of its targets. Main contributors to the slow progress of land reform were the policies and mechanism with which the government seeks to implement the programme and achieve its objectives. There has been a plethora of laws enacted with the aim of improving the implementation of the land reform programme in South Africa, but progress has remained slow. Many questions and concerns have been raised as to whether land reform is necessary or not in a democratic South Africa. This thesis argues that land reform is indeed necessary if South Africa is interested in rectifying the injustices and the inequalities of past land distribution. The thesis also argues that a properly implemented land reform would not only bring justice but it will also help in the reduction of poverty which is rife in the South African society and particularly the rural poor. But both the latter and the former will be realizable if the society is aware and have a full understanding of the ever developing laws which guides land reform programme and the acquisition of land in general. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

La microéconomie conventionnelle présente le concept de rationalité de manière univoque et étroite comme maximisation de l'utilité espérée. On sait les critiques qui ont été adressées à ce concept tant du point de vue de l'économie comportementale que de celui de la sociologie. Notre objectif est de proposer une lecture de certaines de ces critiques afin de montrer que, pour l'essentiel, elles mettent en évidence la diversité des modes de rationalité. Le problème est, dès lors, de savoir si le constat de cette diversité conduit nécessairement à la récusation du modèle standard. Cette thèse s'inscrit dans la double perspective de la théorie du choix rationnel et de la théorie des jeux. À partir des critiques de l'économie comportementale, nous soutenons que le principe de maximisation constitue un mode de raisonnement local et évaluable au regard du contexte d'action. Mais une telle régionalisation implique une profonde révision de la théorie des jeux standard. La récusation de l'équilibre général, fondé sur le présupposé de la maximisation de l'utilité espérée, comme modèle univoque appelle un nouveau type de formalisation. En ce sens, nous montrons que la modélisation multi-agents permet de penser, de manière contrefactuelle, des interactions entre agents économiques rationnels et situés. Cette méthode nous autorise ainsi à élaborer des scénarios rationalisants qui dessinent des mondes possibles sans trancher entre ces mondes. / Standard microeconomics displays the concept of rationality as the maximisation of expected utility i.e. in a narrow and unequivocal sense. The criticisms against this concept made by behavioural economics or sociology are well known. I aim at providing an analysis of some of them in order to emphasise the fact that they mainly highlight the diversity of reasoning modes. But the issue is to know whether the diversity of reasoning modes necessarily leads to reject the standard model. My intention falls into two fields : the theory of Rational Choice and the Game Theory. From the point of view of behavioural economics, I assume that the maximisation is nothing more than a local reasoning mode that can be assessed in relation to the context of action. But this assumption implies correcting the standard Game Theory as well. The fact that the general equilibrium, based on the maximisation of expected utility, cannot be used anymore as an unique model calls a new kind of formalisation. So, I point out that agent-based modelling allows us to conceive, in a counterfactual way, interactions between rational economic agents in their context. Therefore, in this respect, rational patterns of actions and interactions design possible worlds without having to choose between them.