Chance, in the sense of the incalculable, the indeterminable, names the limit of every estimation of the truth. Whereas traditional philosophical discourses aspire to transcend this limit, deconstruction affirms on the contrary its necessity; not as a higher principle that relativizes truth and renders all our calculations futile, as is commonly suggested by flippant appropriations of Derrida's work, but as a structural property within every event and every concept, every mark. Rather than a mere impediment to the pursuit of truth then, the incalculable forms a necessary correlative of the pursuit itself. Deconstruction effectively attests to and exemplifies the dependence of every philosophical discourse on its irreducible, inherent limitation. With reference to numerous commentaries on Derrida's work, Chapter 1 shows that the unconditional indeterminability of a deconstructive, methodological identity is indissociable from deconstruction's critical import. And as Chapter 2 verifies in turn, focusing now primarily on Derrida's lecture ‘My Chances/Mes Chances' and the performative aspects of his writing, deconstruction's appeal to the accidental and the idiomatic is not a call to irresponsibility and a turning away from theory; it is what ensures its remarkable theoretical consistency. Through close readings of Aristotle, Freud, Richard Rorty and William James, Chapter 3 demonstrates that any attempt to regulate chance cannot help but put chance to work instead. Not even fiction can arrest its contaminating force. Reading Derrida alongside Edgar Allan Poe, Chapter 4 posits that the commonsensical conception of chance as a deviation from the truth is bound up with an uncritical notion of literary writing as sheer untruthfulness, and hence as the site of pure chance. The constitutive pervasiveness of chance bears out, in the first place and above all, the instability of the limit that separates fiction from non-fiction, truth from non-truth.

This study aims to search for patterns that demonstrate power relations. It specifically seeks to identify patterns in the power relations in the Rohingya conflict and understand the established power relations at different levels in society, which could provide a picture of the social world within the context of historical, ethnic, cultural, religious and political circumstances. Moreover, this study illustrates the Rohingya population’s experience with relations of power. The ongoing conflict in Myanmar, which is based on religion, ethnicity and politics, is seemingly without any solution. Myanmar is depicted as a country that has lost both hope and legitimacy for the political system and has reduced chances to establish a society in which all the minorities are included across the spheres of society. Finding a bright future for the Rohingya population might be difficult; nevertheless, this study seeks to enhance the understanding of the ongoing conflict and the underlying power relations.

In this essay I examine if naturalism can be a reasonable worldview to embrace for well-informed and reflective people. The rationality of naturalism will be concentrated on whether a naturalistic ontology, that holds that the ultimate reality is impersonal and material, can incorporate our self-conception as rational, free, meaning-creating and evaluative creatures. One objection against naturalism is that a materialistic worldview that holds that reality primarily - and for some exclusively - consist of mindless, meaningless, unfree, and non-rational brute physical facts, is uncapable of grounding or incorporating our self-conception as mentioned above. To redeem naturalism from this problem it would have to postulate the existence of subjects in addition to physical entities. I will therefore examine the possibility whether it is possible for a naturalistic position to incorporate the existence of mind or mental phenomena in their ontology. The challenge with incorporating mental phenomena in naturalism is that naturalists give high priority to material objects in their ontology, they also tend to treat science as the most important source of knowledge that we have. This is a challenge because we cannot locate subjects in objects, nor can we verify subjects with science.

Studiens syfte är att inom ramen för livsåskådningsvetenskapen undersöka om handarbete upplevs som en meningsfull aktivitet. Detta har undersökts via kvalitativa intervjuer baserade på fenomenologisk grund. Fem personer deltog som informanter och intervjuerna var semistrukturerade. Resultatet delades upp tematiskt utifrån innehållet i deltagarnas svar och visade att handarbete upplevs som meningsfullt av samtliga deltagare, men att vad som utgjorde meningsfullhet skiljer sig åt mellan deltagarna. De teman som resultatet delats upp i fick rubrikerna ”Den skapande processen och slutprodukten”, ”Att ge till sig själv och andra” samt ”Avslappning”. Deltagarnas svar kopplades i studiens analys samman med välbefinnande som en viktig aspekt i upplevelsen av meningsfullhet vid handarbete, vilket också är  studiens slutsats.

This thesis assesses the Amartya Sen's Capability Approach as a theory of global justice. Sen proposes a new paradigm for human development, having expansion of human capability as the moral norm for individual and institutional actions. Sen's paradigm-shifting theory is tested first as a theory of social ethics; and then as a theory of global justice, taking into account globalization’s challenges to theories of justice. The theory's known application – UNDP's Human Development Index and other initiatives – is also scrutinized, aiming to determine whether this application is an accurate translation of the capability approach into reality. On a theoretical point of view, the thesis reveals that what started as a simple interpersonal comparison method can be considered as an efficient theory of global justice, provided that minor proposed amendments are taken. On a practical point of view, the thesis points out that the application of Sen's capability approach is a weak normative representation of the theory, which urges to be reengineered. The thesis calls for a radical expansion of HDI, both in the components of the index (it should urgently have a component for political freedom) and in its unit of comparison. Rather than comparing just nations, human development indexes should target most actors in the global scenario: organizations, NGOs, institutions of global governance and so on.

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De senaste decennierna har det i samhällsvetenskapliga och humanistiska discipliner funnits stark tendens till relativism. Wikforss skriver att "de senaste decennierna har en form av skepticism vad det gäller möjligheten att uppnå objektiv kunskap fått fäste, både inom delar av universitetsvärlden och samhället i stort". Relativism innebär ungefär att uppfattningen om sanning och falskhet, rätt och fel samt hur man resonerar och motiverar sin uppfattning är produkter av olika konventioner som utgör ramar för hur man bedömer studieobjekt. Detta innebär att uppfattningens auktoritet är begränsad till de sammanhang som gett upphov till den.  Vi har inte alltid sett empirisk bevisning som avgörande för kunskap. Eftersom samhällen konstruerat olika fakta speglar de vår konvention och våra intressen. En kunskapsteoretisk relativist vill poängtera att det finns flera system för att hantera kunskap. De bevis vi använder idag har inte nödvändigtvis använts historiskt, utan andra kunskapskällor har varit lika giltiga. Boghossian inleder med en nyhet från The New York Times, om en konflikt mellan den arkeologiska teorin och Sebastian LeBeau, företrädare för en indianstam i South Dakota. Arkeologerna blev kluvna, deras respekt för indianernas kultur var stor, men samtidigt var de engagerade i sin arkeologiska metod. Arkeologerna hade kommit närmare en kunskapsrelativism i sin förståelse för indianernas kultur och vetenskap. Relativisten ser inte från början något rationellt och icke rationellt som två skilda klasser med olika kvalitet. Ingenting är kontextfritt, menar relativisten. Egenskaperna kan därför inte vara rationella utan blir relativistiska antaganden. Boghossians tes är att undersöka relativismens roll i vad som i förhållande till konstruktion till vad som berättigar vad, och poängtera sociala faktorers roll för det vi tror oss tro. När vi bedrivit vetenskap finns har vi alltid haft bakomliggande intressen till vår verksamhet. Dessa intressen är centrala i Boghossians resonemang. Hans teser är det han huvudsakligen behandlar både med kritik och med försvar, och det är konsekvenserna från teserna jag följer i min frågeställning. Hans teser berör vilka fakta vi är berättigade att tro på, vilka fakta vi bör tro på, och vilka fakta vi faktiskt tror på. [1]   Carlshamre, Staffan. Recension Fear of Knowledge s. 1. Filosofisk tidskrift. No 1 (2013) [2]   Wikforss Åsa; Rädsla för kunskap s. 13,  Fri Tanke förlag, Oxford University Press, 2016 [3]     Boghossian Paul; Rädsla för kunskap s. 23-24,  Fri Tanke förlag, Oxford University Press, 2016 [4]   Boghossian (2016) s. 28,  Fri Tanke förlag, Oxford University Press, [5]   Boghossian(2016) s. 21,  Fri Tanke förlag, Oxford University Press, [6]   Wikforss (2016) s. 17,  Fri Tanke förlag, Oxford University Press,

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This essay answers the question Why does Hedvig Lagercrantz (a woman from the wealthy uperclass in the late 19th century Sweden ) get enrolled as one of it's first social officers in the (Workingclassmovement) Salvation Army? What resources does she bring to the movemnt and what does the membership do for her identity as a Christian, wife and mother?