No description available.

This thesis examines the theme of secrecy and silence in the philosophy of Plotinus. This philosopher is known for the innovative use he made of Platonic and Aristotelean materials in constructing a thought-world which posits a totally transcendent first principle, the one or the good, from which all other entities are derived. The Plotinian one is ineffable by its very nature, and Plotinus expounds at length the claim that it cannot be comprehended, either by speech or thought. The paradox of a philosopher writing extensive discourses about a reality which is said to be ineffable is the main topic of this thesis, which seeks to answer the question: what is Plotinus doing when he tells us that he cannot, or will not, reveal the nature of the one? Partial answers to this question have been given in previous scholarship through study of the philosophic background which led Plotinus to posit such an ineffable reality, and through analysis of the arguments in which he upholds the doctrine of the one’s ineffability. Building on this body of work, this thesis gives a more compre- hensive answer to this question by analysing the tropes of silence and secrecy which were developed in Middle Platonism, derived especially from Plato’s writings, and by locating Plotinus in a broader philosophic tradition which interpreted canonical thinkers as esoteric writers. In this way, the thesis provides a historical context for Plotinus’ treatment of the ineffable one. Plotinus’ discourse of ineffability is present- ed not just as a response to purely philosophical issues, but also an enactment of a tradition of philosophic silence, which determined in part how a Platonist philoso- pher articulated in written form ideas about concealment and the limits of discourse. Through a combination of close reading of a number of Plotinian texts and full dis- cussion of the wider context, this thesis aims to integrate analytical and cultural approaches to Plotinus’ philosophy. It aims also to bring out the significance of the theme of philosophical silence for late antique philosophy both as a discipline and as a socially-embedded part of Græco-Roman civilisation.

No description available.

The surviving fragments of Numenius' On the Good show the progression of a discernable argument; the dialogue as a whole deals with the search for a deeper understanding of the Form of the Good that is discussed in Plato's Republic. Fragment 1a provides a statement of method that governs Books 1-3. Book 1 attempts to use dialectical reasoning to reconstruct the "arguments" (logoi) of Pythagoras. Book 2 attempts to find confirmation of these arguments in the Platonic dialogues. Book 3 attempts to find further confirmation in the traditions of the "peoples of good repute." Fragment 9, taken from Book 3, gives a novel telling of the Jewish story of the Exodus, and is carefully constructed so as to be in conformity with Plato. It is best read as an allegory for the interaction of God and Matter. Book 4 is lost, but likely treated the necessity of a lower creator god beneath the highest god who is "free of labor." Book 5 introduces the Three Gods, who should be understood as the highest god, and two aspects of the lower god: a contemplative aspect and a creative aspect. Book 6 ties together the themes of the dialogue as a whole, and concludes that the Good is God.

No description available.

While most scholars know, or think they know, what Plato says about the soul, there is less certainty regarding what he says about the self. Some scholars even assert that the ancient Greeks did not possess the concepts of self or person. This dissertation sets out to examine those passages throughout Plato's dialogues that most clearly require some notion of the self or the person, and by doing so to clarify the logical lineaments of these concepts as they existed in fourth century Athens. Because Plato wrote dialogues, I restrict myself to analyzing the concepts of self and person as they appear in the mouths of various Platonic characters and refrain from speculating whether Plato himself endorses what his characters say. In spite of this restriction, I find a number of striking ideas that set the stage for further philosophical development. After an introductory chapter, in Chapters 2 and 3 I argue that the identification of the person with the soul and the identification of the human being with the composite of soul and body make possible a conceptual split between person and human being. In Chapter 4, I argue that the tripartite account of the soul suggests an ideal identification of the person with the rational aspect of the soul rather than the lower aspects of one's psychology. Finally, in Chapter 5 I argue that the analogical link between rationality in us and the rational order of the cosmos leads to the conclusion that the true self is, in some sense, divine.

Neste trabalho argumento que o Teeteto é um diálogo sobre a relação entre o conceito de razão, entendido como uma potência específica da alma, e a sensação, compreendida como um processo inconsciente do corpo. No primeiro capítulo examino a análise platônica da epistemologia protagoreana. Tento mostrar que nesta seção Platão não está argumentando uma tese platônica sobre o mundo sensível. Ele está explicando e criticando os princípios fundamentais da epistemologia protagoreana. No final da seção Platão explica a distinção entre razão e sensação. Na análise da segunda parte defendo que a massa de argumentos dessa seção formula uma tese platônica sobre a essência do conhecimento. Por fim, no comentário da terceira definição examino o conceito de logos da teoria do sonho e o significado da tese de que os elementos são perceptíveis. / In this work I argue that the Theaetetus is a dialogue about the relation between the concept of reason, understood as a kind of power of the mind, and perception, viewed as an unconscious process of the body. In the first chapter I examine Platos analysis of Protagorean epistemology. I try to show that in this section Plato is not arguing his own view about the sensible world. He is, rather, explaining and criticizing the fundamental principles of the protagorean epistemology. At the end of this section Plato explains the distinction between reason and perception. In my analysis of the second part, I argue that the mass of arguments of this section formulates a platonic thesis about the essence of knowledge. Finally, in my commentary of the third definition, I examine Dreams concept of logos and the meaning of the thesis that the elements are perceivable.

Cette étude prétend explorer les liens entretenus par l’œuvre et la pensée de Nerval d’une part, et le platonisme d’autre part. On s’attachera à envisager le platonisme autant dans la perspective des idées et représentations caractéristiques de la philosophie de Platon que dans la perspective du déploiement d’une tradition platonicienne protéiforme. L’œuvre de Nerval illustre sous de multiples aspects la continuité reliant le romantisme au platonisme, en matière d’imaginaire comme de conception du monde. La pensée de tradition platonicienne apparaît en effet constamment en filigrane de l’écriture de Nerval. Les paysages métaphysiques se succédant dans l’œuvre, ainsi que les grands champs de l’imaginaire de Nerval en portent le signe. L’auteur a constamment puisé dans l’ensemble du fonds de ce savoir érudit, tantôt philosophique, théologique ou ésotérique, pour nourrir sa propre pensée à la manière d’une immense architecture foisonnante mêlant lieux, temps, figures et motifs en une poésie intime. Cette étude se portera successivement sur des questions liées au rapport de Nerval à l’Histoire, à une série de motifs caractéristiques d’un imaginaire platonicien, et des interactions entre l’activité littéraire et la vie réelle. / This study claims to explore the relationships between Nerval's work and thought on one hand, and Platonism on the other. We will consider Platonism both in terms of the distinctive ideas and representations in Plato's philosophy, and evenly so in terms of a platonic tradition that has unfolded in many forms. Nerval's work reveals in abounding ways the continuity linking romanticism to Platonism, both in the realms of the imaginary and in the understanding of the world. Indeed, a platonic mindset constantly appears between the lines of Nerval's writing. The metaphysical landscapes succeeding one another in the oeuvre, along with Nerval's fields of imagination carry its trace. The author has constantly drawn upon the sources of this erudite knowledge, be it philosophical, theological, or esoteric, to nourish his own thought, adding to it as to a rich and immense architecture where places, times, characters and patterns mingle into an intimate poetry. This study will successively address questions bearing to Nerval's relation to History, to a series of motifs characteristic of a platonic imagination, and to interactions between literary activity and life in its reality.

Some three decades ago, post-positivists working in International Relations rejected the positivist separation of the knowing subject and the object known. In doing so, they established a new ‘critical’ paradigm in which truth has been understood primarily in terms of social and political practices and norms rather than the Archimedean detachment of the scientist. This new paradigm is typically thought to have brought a new theoretical pluralism to IR. However, focusing on the work of Critical Theorists and poststructuralists, this thesis shows that the work of post-positivist IR scholars has in fact been defined by responses to a specific set of questions which emerge from the ‘socialisation’ of truth. It demonstrates, moreover, that both Critical IR Theorists and poststructuralists have addressed these questions by understanding truth as a matter of intersubjective epistemic practices and idealisations about the conditions in which they take place. This ‘epistemic’ understanding of truth is the source of significant problems for Critical Theorists and poststructuralists in IR, especially in their accounts of political practice and proposals for international political transformation. The thesis considers whether the work of Critical Realists in IR, who have advocated the scientific pursuit of objective truth, might offer a solution. However, whilst they rightly reintroduce the subject-object relationship to critical IR, Critical Realists lapse into a scientism as a result of which they reject legitimate post-positivist claims about the inherent normativity and practicality of truth. The thesis introduces Theodor Adorno’s materialist theory of truth as a way of combining post-positivists’ normative concerns with the realists’ emphasis on the subject-object relationship. On this view, truth is a matter of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity because it is matter of the needs and practices of partly objective human subjects. It is, therefore, both objective and normative.

This dissertation concerns two aspects of Plutarch’s ethics that have received relatively little attention: the link between his metaphysics and ethics, and Plutarch’s use of diatribe, a rhetorical style primarily associated with Stoics and Cynics, as a means of targeting a wider audience of educated elite for his philosophy. I argue that Plutarch’s De virtute morali links his ethics with his understanding of Platonic metaphysics. De virtute morali also serves as model for Plutarch’s ethical treatises on specific topics. I analyze the following works: De curiositate, De garrulitate, De vitando aere alieno, De vitioso pudore, and De superstitione. In these, Plutarch identifies a vicious behavior (κρίσις) and suggests methods of self-training to eliminate the vicious behavior (ἄσκησις). Self-training always involves the subordination of emotions to reason (μετριοπάθεια), rather than the elimination of emotions (άπάθεια) advocated by the Stoics. Plutarch uses diatribe, in which the author adopts a conversational tone and addresses the reader in second person, both in κρίσις and ἄσκησις, as well as in his arguments against Stoic άπάθεια. Since Stoicism was the most popular philosophical adherence among educated elites during the time when Plutarch began to write, I argue that Plutarch adopts rhetoric associated with the Stoics as a means of promoting Platonism, and himself as its interpreter, in a culture where intellectuals required the patronage of the educated elite for their personal livelihood and the livelihood of their schools.