Le symbolisme, d’abord inféodé à la conception idéaliste de la vérité et du beau, expose en réalité, dans sapratique et dans ses oeuvres une position ambiguë. Le symbole compris comme le médium par lequel sedévoilerait une vérité idéale semble en fait valoir en et pour lui-même, indépendamment de tout principesupérieur. L’image de la femme, est, chez les symbolistes, le point nodal du basculement de la théorie de lavérité. De la Femme dans l’Art ! dit Charles Maurice, Elle en est l’objet et le but… L’image de la femme, loinde conforter la conception idéale de la vérité, manifeste au contraire une certaine forme de subversion. Lessymbolistes vénèrent la femme. Non pas parce qu’elle est « le signe du vrai », selon la formule de Plotin, maisparce qu’elle est le symbole même de la superficialité de la représentation. Chez les symbolistes, c’est donc parla représentation de la femme (fuyante, fardée, fatale…) que s’accomplit le renversement de l’idée même devérité. A cet égard, le symbolisme est donc bien davantage un anti-platonisme qu’un idéalisme. La vérité,débarrassée de son substrat s’affirme pour elle-même, dans sa complète autonomie. Ce renversement de lanotion de vérité ne peut s’effectuer, cependant, sans une remise en question radicale du sujet et sans unquestionnement fondamental sur le rôle de l’artiste dans le dévoilement de la vérité. C’est la raison pourlaquelle le symbolisme, au tournant du XIXème et du XXème siècle se tournera vers de nouvelles expériences(affirmation du moi, surréalisme, abstraction…) dont l’objectif sera d’éprouver les limites du moi et derenouveler ainsi le perpétuellement questionnement de l’art sur le réel. / Symbolism, first subservient to the idealistic conception of Truth and Beauty, actually exposes in its practiceand in its works an ambiguous position. The symbol seen as the medium unveiling an ideal truth appears to beindeed an autonomous object, giving up reference to any higher principle. The image of woman is among thesymbolists, the node of the failover of the theory of Truth. Women in Art! Charles Maurice said, she is theobject and the purpose of art... The image of woman, far from strengthening the ideal conception of Truth,rather shows some form of subversion. The symbolists worship women. Not because her beauty is "the sign ofTruth," to quote Plotinus, but because woman is the very symbol of the superficiality of representation. Withthe symbolists, the representation of women (evasive, fake, fatal...) accomplishes the reversal of the idea ofTruth. In this regard, the symbolism is much more an anti-Platonism than an avatar of idealism. Truth, strippedof its substrate, asserts itself in its full autonomy. This reversal of the notion of Truth can’t be done, however,without a radical rethinking of the notion of subjectivity and without a fundamental questioning on the role ofthe artist in the pursuit of Truth. That is why Symbolism, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century,will experience new artistic ways (self-assertion, surrealism, abstraction...) with an objective to test the limitsof self and to renew the perpetual questioning of art on reality.

By framing his deconstruction of Plato’s Phaedrus and Timaeus as a response to Platonism, Jacques Derrida overlooks the possibility of a Platonic philosophy beyond dogma and doctrine. This thesis argues that Derrida’s deconstructions target a particularly Platonist abstraction of the dialogues, and thus, his critique relies on the underlying assumption that Plato defends the metaphysics of presence. Derrida attempts to show how the thesis that Being is presence undermines itself in both dialogues through hints of différance like pharmakon and khôra. To answer the Derridean critique, I analyze the hermeneutics of Derrida’s deconstruction of Plato and identify what in the dialogues lies beyond the limits Derrida’s reading, for example Derrida’s notable exclusion of ἔρως.

In this thesis, I aim to motivate a particular philosophy of mathematics characterised by the following three claims. First, mathematical sentences are generally speaking false because mathematical objects do not exist. Second, people typically use mathematical sentences to communicate content the truth of which does not require mathematical objects to exist. Finally, in using mathematical language in this way, speakers are not doing anything out of the ordinary: they are performing straightforward assertions. In Part I, I argue that the role played by mathematics in our scientific explanations is a purely expressive one, merely allowing us to say more than we otherwise would be able to about, or yielding a greater understanding of, the physical world. Mathematical objects to not need to exist for mathematical language to play this role. This proposal puts a normative constraint on our use of mathematical language: we ought to use mathematically presented theories to express belief only in the consequences they have for non-mathematical things. In Part II, I will argue that what the normative proposal recommends is in fact what people generally do in both pure and applied mathematical contexts. I motivate this claim by showing that it is predicted by our best general means of analysing natural language. I provide a semantic theory of applied arithmetical sentences and show that they do not purport to refer to numbers, as well as a pragmatic theory for pure mathematical language use which shows that pure mathematical utterances do not typically communicate content that implies the existence of mathematical objects. In conclusion, I show the hermeneutic fictionalist position that emerges is preferable to any alternative which interprets mathematical discourse as aimed at describing a domain of independently existing abstract mathematical objects.

It is apparent that what is characterized as Christian Apophatic Theology has been poorly related to its antecedents existing in Greco-Roman philosophy. This study proposed the following research hypothesis: Greco-Roman philosophy exerted a structural and terminological influence upon Christian apophatic theology. To prove or disprove this hypothesis, apophatic terminology and textual structures in Greco-Roman philosophical texts were compared to classic Christian apophatic texts, primarily from the Apostolic and Cappadocian Fathers. Throughout this process, Michael Sells' clasic definition of apophatic language, consisting of the apearance of the metaphor of emanation, dis-ontological language, and dialectical language of immanence and transcendence, was used as a benchmark for the occurrence of apophatic language in the texts examined. It was found that Greco-Roman pagan apophatic philosophy exerted significantly less structural than terminological influence. Thus, this research will strengthen claims that Platonic and Neo-Platonic terminology was simply overlaid atop a pre-existing Semitic-Christian apophatic framework.

This study offers a reinterpretation of the direct tradition of medieval Platonism on the basis of new evidence from the Meno and the Phaedo translated into Latin by Henry Aristippus between 1154 and 1160. In particular, it provides an edition of interlinear and marginal annotations and glosses of the Meno and the Phaedo: the manuscript tradition is particularly useful for understanding which aspects of these two Platonic dialogues were particularly studied during the Middle Ages, as it preserves the considerations of various readers on Platonic philosophy. In the most fortunate cases, it is precisely the manuscript tradition that offers new perspectives that can be used to redesign the networks of reception of the two Platonic texts examined in this study in the centuries following their translation, with particular reference to the 13th and 14th centuries. The research was carried out on unpublished material and manuscript testimonies, with the help of two strategies. First, the medieval sources were submetted to a doxographic analysis, through a bottom-up approach consisting in the identification of the terms ‘Plato’, ‘Meno’, ‘Phaedo’ (or ‘Fedrone’ according to medieval usage). This allowed to understand in which contexts and in relation to which themes the references to the three terms appeared and to provide a list of authors who, between the 13th and the 14th century, had the opportunity to read the Meno and/or the Phaedo in Henry Aristippus’ translation. The second strategy, which we could perhaps describe as ‘inside-out’, was applied in the editing phase of the interlinear and marginal annotations and glosses of the two translations. As an especially important paratextual element, the ‘marginal’ writing proves to be particularly useful for deriving the constituent elements of the two dialogues (inside) that were commented, re-written, re-elaborated and interpreted in the margins of the two texts (outside). By employing both strategies, it is possible to reveal the core concepts of Platonic philosophy that, to a greater or lesser extent, caught the attention of medieval readers of the Latin Meno and the Phaedo.

Ambitionen med denna uppsats är att skapa en översikt över hur modern forskning ser på den hierarkiska indelning av de kristna änglarna som Dante redogör för i Den Gudomliga Komedin, samt vad som ligger till grund för rangordningen. Dessutom analyseras sambandet mellan hierarkin och änglarnas kosmologiska funktioner och deras betydelse för upprätthållandet av världen. En viktig faktor för förståelsen av Dantes änglalogi är dess relation till senmedeltidens filosofi och kristna tro; hur den påverkades av – och i sin tur påverkade – sin kontext, vilken sedan bidrog till utvecklingen av den moderna västerländska synen på världen. Den teologiska diskurs som sträcker sig ända tillbaka till de första århundradena når nämligen en höjdpunkt i Dantes änglahierarki, där tron slutligen förenas med filosofin. I Dante möts således den kristna ängladoktrinen, med utgångspunkt i Bibeln, med den neo-platonska emanationsläran och Aristoteles kausalitetslära, vilka tillsammans utgör fundamentet för det senmedeltida västerländska sättet att se på verkligheten. I denna uppsats redogörs följaktligen för Dantes änglahierarki och änglarnas kosmologiska betydelse genom att analysera den assimilation av tro och filosofi som utgör dess metafysiska grund. / The ambition with this essay is to create a general idea of how modern research estimates the hierarchic division of the Christian angels, as Dante accounts for in The Divine Comedy, as well as the hierarchy it is based on. In addition to that, the connection between the hierarchy and the cosmological functions of the angels, and the subsequent task to uphold the world, is analyzed. An important factor for the comprehension of Dante’s angelology is its connection to the philosophy and Christian faith of the late medieval period; how it was affected by – and at the same time affected – its context, which eventually contributed to the generation of the modern Western world view. In fact, the theological discourse that expands from the first centuries of Christianity reaches a summit in Dante’s angelic hierarchy, where faith and philosophy finally consolidate. Thus, Christian angelic doctrine, with starting point in the Bible, meets in Dante the neo-platonic doctrine of emanation and Aristotle’s principle of causality, which together count for the foundation of the Western late medieval view of reality. The aim of this essay is consequently to investigate Dante’s angelic hierarchy and the cosmological functions of the angels, by investigating the assimilation of faith and philosophy that constitutes their metaphysical base.

In this thesis I explore the emergence of the Christian triad with reference to two contemporary movements: Middle Platonism and Gnosticism. The earliest Christian writer to enumerate the three constituents of what would become the Christian Trinity is Justin. In addition to his three extant works, Justin’s triadology can be diagnosed from those he directly influenced – Tatian and Athenagoras – who I have (somewhat artificially) grouped under the heading the “school of Justin”. The ontological triad adopted by these Christian thinkers is compared with the triads of Middle Platonism and Gnosticism, both in terms of their structure and in terms of the function and ontological status of the individual constituents of these triads. In this thesis I propose that a liturgical triad of primitive Christianity, the trine baptismal formula, was conflated by the “school of Justin” with the ontological triad of Middle Platonism, resulting in three referents of the baptismal formula being embued with new functions and ontological status. Whilst emerging as a hierarchical triad, the logic of Platonic ontology when combined with Christian tradition required the sharp distinction between God, as Being, and all other things resulting in a Christian triad that was also a unity. This new triad became fixed as a central tenet of Christianity. I find no plausible connection between any known Gnostic triad and the triad of the “school of Justin”. There is some interaction between Gnostic and Platonic thought during this period. It is possible that the Triple-Powered One pre-empted the Being-Mind-Life triad of Neoplatonism.

La présente étude aborde une œuvre de Théophile Gautier, Arria Marcella, au regard de la thématique de l’imagination créatrice. L’analyse se concentre sur la nouvelle elle-même, mais prend largement en compte aussi l’ensemble des œuvres narratives, et au-delà, du polygraphe – critique d’art, critique dramatique, récit de voyages et dans une moindre mesure poésie. Ce travail s’organise en trois temps : la première partie expose les différentes composantes de la nouvelle, montre la manière dont Gautier organise sa narration à partir d’un matériel intertextuel, et d’un objet transitionnel qui lui permet de mettre en scène l’aventure rétrospective d’un jeune homme du xixe siècle dans l’antiquité, à la rencontre de son idéal féminin. Arria Marcella est d’abord le récit d’un parcours, diurne, puis nocturne ; réel, puis mental. La seconde partie traite de l’imagination créatrice, donc de l’image et de sa restitution fécondante par l’écriture, à travers le travail descriptif d’un regard qui prend position. Il ne s’agit pas de restituer, mais d’enchanter le réel en le passant au révélateur du fantastique, de la survivance et de la figurabilité. La troisième partie analyse Arria Marcella à travers le prisme de lectures complémentaires qui entendent montrer la richesse de l’œuvre, laquelle occupe une position stratégique permettant d’éclairer la production de Gautier dans son ensemble. L’approche procède en trois temps : esthétique ; philosophique, par le biais d’un examen approfondi de la composante platonicienne et néoplatonicienne, fondamentale bien que filtrée, dans Arria Marcella et plus largement dans les œuvres narratives de l’auteur; générique enfin, puisqu’il s’agit de montrer comment la nouvelle pompéienne atteint au Gesamtkunswerk en mêlant les genres créatifs. / The subject of this PhD is a short story by Théophile Gautier, entitled Arria Marcella, as seen through the theme of creative imagination. Although the present dissertation focuses on this particular short story, it also takes into consideration the author’s entire works – fiction, art criticism, travel literature and to a lesser degree, poetry. The 3-part study begins by describing the different sections of the short story, and the way Gautier organized his narration. The story is based on different literary sources and a transitional object (a museum artefact) through which he staged the adventures of a nineteenth-century young man encountering his female ideal in ancient times. Arria Marcella is the story of a walk at daytime then nighttime, in reality and in the character’s mind. The second part deals with creative imagination: image and the way it is transformed and enriched in literature through descriptive work as seen through the writer’s eye. Rather than remaining faithful to reality, it is a matter of enchanting reality through the fantastic genre, survival and figurability. The third part is devoted to an analysis of Arria Marcella through further readings so as to highlight its complexity. Thus, this work, which holds a strategic position among Gautier’s works, can help explain his writings. The viewpoint is threefold: aesthetic, philosophical, through a close examination of the Platonism and Neoplatonism features – essential though filtered, and finally generic since it shows how the Pompeian short story reaches Gesamtkunswerk by combining different creative genres.

Os historiadores da filosofia parecem quase todos de acordo ao atribuir a Parmênides o início da reflexão a respeito do ser. Mas no Poema encontramos também um discurso a respeito do não-ser. A deusa, a voz de Parmênides, diz que o caminho do não-ser é caminho impercorrível e que ademais, o não-ser não pode nem ser dito e nem ser pensado como origem da geração e da corrupção das coisas. Melisso aparentemente leva esse preceito à últimas conseqüências, pois se não há geração e corrupção, para ele o mundo é infinito, eterno, uno e imutável. Além disso, Melisso nega totalmente os fenômenos, julgando-os um engano dos sentidos. Surge a pergunta: eles estarão falando do mesmo não-ser? Este trabalho tem por objetivo estabelecer as noções respectivas de não-ser em Parmênides e em Melisso. Verificadas as noções de não-ser, elas são comparadas de forma a evidenciar as diferenças: a noção de não-ser de Parmênides aponta para a contradição (noção ontológica); a noção de não-ser de Melisso aponta para o nulo (noção lógica). O trabalho conclui que Melisso transgride o preceito da deusa parmenidiana, usando o não-ser no discurso e no pensamento, pois para ele já não era um conceito contraditório, mas um conceito de ausência, próximo ao nosso conceito de zero. Como complemento, a pesquisa aponta que na seqüência histórica, o conceito de não-ser criticado pelos filósofos posteriores é mais o conceito de Melisso do que aquele de Parmênides. Esse apontar complementar é obtido com um rápido sobrevôo nas filosofias de Górgias e de Platão, com o intuito de abrir a problemática dos próximos passos da pesquisa. Nosso trabalho confirma também o isolamento histórico de Parmênides, tendo sido um inovador sem seguidores. / Almost all the philosophy historians seem to agree attributing to Parmenides the beginning of the reflection about being. In the Poem, however, we also find a speech about not being. The goddess, voice of Parmenides, says that the way of not being is a non accessible way and furthermore not being cannot be said nor thought as the origin of coming-to-be and passingaway of all things. Melissus seems to convey that precept to its boundaries, for if there is no coming-to-be and no passing-away, the world is infinite, eternal, one and immutable. Furthermore, Melissus denies the entire world of experiences, considering it a mistake of senses. There arises a question: are they speaking about the same? This work aims to set up the notions of not being in Parmenides and Melissus. Once examined that notions, they are confronted to make evident he difference: the notion of not being in Parmenides points towards a contradiction (ontologic notion); the notion of not being in Melissus points towards the null (logic notion). The work reaches the conclusion that Melissus transgresses the precept of the parmenidian goddess, using not being in saying and thinking, for it wasnt, in his vision, a contradictory concept, but a concept of absence, close to our concept of zero. In order to complement, our inquiry indicates that, in the historical sequence, the concept of not being rejected by subsequent philosophers is more the Melissus concept than Parmenides one. The direction given is obtained in a quickly overflying in Gorgias and Platos philosophies, with the aim of opening the problematic to next steps of inquiry. Our work confirms also the loneliness of Parmenides, for he was a renovator without followers.

Os historiadores da filosofia parecem quase todos de acordo ao atribuir a Parmênides o início da reflexão a respeito do ser. Mas no Poema encontramos também um discurso a respeito do não-ser. A deusa, a voz de Parmênides, diz que o caminho do não-ser é caminho impercorrível e que ademais, o não-ser não pode nem ser dito e nem ser pensado como origem da geração e da corrupção das coisas. Melisso aparentemente leva esse preceito à últimas conseqüências, pois se não há geração e corrupção, para ele o mundo é infinito, eterno, uno e imutável. Além disso, Melisso nega totalmente os fenômenos, julgando-os um engano dos sentidos. Surge a pergunta: eles estarão falando do mesmo não-ser? Este trabalho tem por objetivo estabelecer as noções respectivas de não-ser em Parmênides e em Melisso. Verificadas as noções de não-ser, elas são comparadas de forma a evidenciar as diferenças: a noção de não-ser de Parmênides aponta para a contradição (noção ontológica); a noção de não-ser de Melisso aponta para o nulo (noção lógica). O trabalho conclui que Melisso transgride o preceito da deusa parmenidiana, usando o não-ser no discurso e no pensamento, pois para ele já não era um conceito contraditório, mas um conceito de ausência, próximo ao nosso conceito de zero. Como complemento, a pesquisa aponta que na seqüência histórica, o conceito de não-ser criticado pelos filósofos posteriores é mais o conceito de Melisso do que aquele de Parmênides. Esse apontar complementar é obtido com um rápido sobrevôo nas filosofias de Górgias e de Platão, com o intuito de abrir a problemática dos próximos passos da pesquisa. Nosso trabalho confirma também o isolamento histórico de Parmênides, tendo sido um inovador sem seguidores. / Almost all the philosophy historians seem to agree attributing to Parmenides the beginning of the reflection about being. In the Poem, however, we also find a speech about not being. The goddess, voice of Parmenides, says that the way of not being is a non accessible way and furthermore not being cannot be said nor thought as the origin of coming-to-be and passingaway of all things. Melissus seems to convey that precept to its boundaries, for if there is no coming-to-be and no passing-away, the world is infinite, eternal, one and immutable. Furthermore, Melissus denies the entire world of experiences, considering it a mistake of senses. There arises a question: are they speaking about the same? This work aims to set up the notions of not being in Parmenides and Melissus. Once examined that notions, they are confronted to make evident he difference: the notion of not being in Parmenides points towards a contradiction (ontologic notion); the notion of not being in Melissus points towards the null (logic notion). The work reaches the conclusion that Melissus transgresses the precept of the parmenidian goddess, using not being in saying and thinking, for it wasnt, in his vision, a contradictory concept, but a concept of absence, close to our concept of zero. In order to complement, our inquiry indicates that, in the historical sequence, the concept of not being rejected by subsequent philosophers is more the Melissus concept than Parmenides one. The direction given is obtained in a quickly overflying in Gorgias and Platos philosophies, with the aim of opening the problematic to next steps of inquiry. Our work confirms also the loneliness of Parmenides, for he was a renovator without followers.