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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisors: Stephen White and David Sosa. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

In this dissertation, I formulate and solve four philosophical puzzles on Aristotle's conception of pleasures and pains by using the Aristotelian dialectical method. The first puzzle concerns the nature of pleasure. In the Nicomachean Ethics book VII, Aristotle describes pleasure as an unimpeded activity of our natural state. In book X, however, he states that pleasure is something that supervenes on activity. I reconcile these two descriptions of pleasure by drawing on Aristotle's scientific works and his works in ethics. By offering this holistic view, I argue that pleasure is a passion or a way of being affected unimpededly. The second puzzle concerns the nature of pain. I develop a perceptual model to understand Aristotle's conception of pain. I also propose a mirroring method to understand pain by utilizing Aristotle's theory of contrariety. I argue that (1) like pleasure, pain is a passion; but (2) unlike pleasure, pain is a way of being affected impededly. Aristotle observed that there are two seemingly conflicting ways of thinking about the nature and significance of pain. On the one hand, perhaps all kinds of pain are evil and must be categorically avoided. On the other hand, perhaps some pains are intrinsically good and necessary in a virtuous life. In the third puzzle, I explore these apparently competing conceptions of pain. I argue that the solution to the puzzle is to affirm the common intuition that all pains are intrinsically bad, but at the same time to reject the claim that pain must always be avoided at all costs. Finally, I formulate a puzzle that comes from the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who entertains two opposing ethical intuitions concerning pain. The first intuition is that not all pains are bad, while the second intuition is that all pains are intrinsically bad. To solve the puzzle, I argue that pains are good insofar as they are a type of alienation. Furthermore, using Aristotle's theory of contrariety, I argue that even though all pains are intrinsically bad, it is not the case that all pleasures are good.

How do sex practices get constructed as normal? This research evaluates discussions of pegging, a gender non-conforming sex practice within heterosexual sex whereby women anally penetrate men. Data were collected from the website Reddit and its subreddit r/sex. 3,485 comments posted to 30 discussion threads were analyzed for common themes. Findings suggest that pegging confuses gendered expectations for “having sex”. Additionally, heteronormativity and homophobia were found to structure heterosexual interactions, including the ways in which gender and sexual identities, desire, and bodies are understood. This is illuminated by findings supporting “gender accountability” or the idea that we “do gender” because people anticipate how others will perceive their actions based on gender expectations. Finally, an examination of homophobia reveals ways in which homophobia operates in a hate-free zone. Homophobia was found to encourage heterosexuals’ treatment of homosexuals as distinctly different kinds of people than heterosexuals, including frequent boundary setting between what is gay and straight. Overall this project reveals that pegging is a culturally unintelligible sex act that causes a great deal of confusion, anxiety, and sometimes pleasure for those who partake.

This dissertation explores a number of interrelated metaphysical and epistemological issues regarding pleasure, suffering and their apparent value and disvalue, thematically tied together by the broad idea that pleasant and unpleasant experiences are, respectively, experienced as good and bad. More specifically, I try, firstly, to advance the debate regarding the nature of pleasure by arguing for what I shall call the "Self-Experiential View" - the view that pleasant experiences are pleasant in virtue of being experienced as good. Secondly, I assess the merits of the "Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis" - the natural conjecture, expressed by a number of authors, that our especially intimate experiential relationship ("acquaintance") with the evaluative features of our hedonic experiences grounds a particularly robust kind of epistemic status enjoyed by our hedonic-evaluative beliefs, which makes them less vulnerable to sceptical doubt. In chapter 1, I lay some groundwork for the ensuing discussion, by introducing a number of background claims which help to motivate these two theses. Moreover, I isolate two specific important ways of unpacking the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis and clarify some central concepts which feature prominently in the subsequent chapters. In chapter 2, I defend the "Self-Experiential View." I proceed by addressing a number of objections which have been levelled against the view in the literature, and locate it in relation to the views which currently dominate the debate regarding the nature of pleasure. In chapter 3, I assess and ultimately reject the first important version of the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis singled out in chapter 1, the "Naïve Realist Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis," which states that Naïve Realist acquaintance with pleasure's evaluative nature grounds a distinctive, especially robust kind of epistemic status enjoyed by our hedonic-evaluative beliefs. In chapter 4, I assess the "Introspective Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis", the attempt to vindicate the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis by extending an acquaintance account of phenomenal introspective justification to the hedonic-evaluative case. By carefully unpacking a range of different candidate conceptions of introspective acquaintance, I home in on what I consider the most appealing acquaintance account of phenomenal introspection, and argue that it should not be extended to the hedonic-evaluative case, which means that this proposal also fails. A brief concluding chapter summarises the key conclusions of the dissertation and highlights some questions raised in the course of my discussion which would seem to warrant further investigation.

There have been many studies of keywords in Paradise Lost. Over the last fifty or so years words such as �wander�, �lapse�, �error�, �fruit�, �balmy�, �fall�, �hands�, among others, have attracted critics� attention. The present enquiry brings under scrutiny three linked keywords which have up to now escaped notice. These are the words �bliss�, �delight�, and �pleasure�. The fundamental proposition of the thesis is that Milton does not use these words haphazardly or interchangeably in his epic poem (though in other of his poetic productions he is by no means as fastidious). On the contrary, he self-consciously distinguishes among the three terms, assigning to each its own particular �theatre of operations�. Meant by this is that each keyword is selectively referred to a separate structural division of the epic, thus, �bliss� has reference specifically to Heaven (or to the earthly paradise viewed as a simulacrum of Heaven), �delight� to the earthly paradise in Eden and to the prelapsarian condition nourished by it; while �pleasure�, whose signification is ambiguous, refers in its favourable sense (which is but little removed from �delight�) to the Garden and the sensations associated with it, and in its unfavourable one to postlapsarian sensations and to the fallen characters. Insofar as the three structural divisions taken into account (Hell is not) are hierarchically organized in the epic, so too are the three keywords that answer to them. Moreover, in relating keywords to considerations of structure, the thesis breaks new ground in Paradise Lost studies.

<p>Smärta har en historisk tradition av att uppfattats som njutningens motsats. Smärtans ställning som alltigenom negativ ses ofta som en ”sanning” som inte kan motsägas. Dock finns det individer som njuter av smärta på ett sexuellt plan, så kallade masochister. I denna studie undersöker författaren hur masochisterna själva beskriver relationen mellan smärta och njutning. Den tidigare forskningen fokuserar mestadels på den dominante partens problematiker och upplevelser i en sadomasochistisk situation och utelämnar därmed masochistens syn på smärta, njutning och risker.</p><p>Genom att använda sig av Grundad Teori försöker författaren att förutsättningslöst kartlägga den masochistiska upplevelsen av smärta och njutning och utarbetar en teori om masochistens syn på sin egen avvikelse och utveckling, på förstärkning av känsla och den personliga förhöjningen och känslan av att befinna sig i ett ”tillstånd” i den masochistiska leken, den fullständiga tilltron till partnern och på den ömsesidiga kommunikationen, de egna avvägningarna och gränsdragningarna och hur de ser njutning och smärta som i symbios. Alla dessa aspekter leder fram till en känsla av frihet. I diskussionen används Mays teorier om frihet och öde tillsammans med Eberhards teorier om riskbedömningar, vilka bägge innefattar tankar kring ”negativa” förnimmelser som ångest, rädsla och vrede.</p><p>Det blir klart att alla negativa förnimmelser har både ”skadliga” och ”normala” former. Det masochisterna upplever i leken är en form av ”normal smärta” som inte har några negativa beståndsdelar utan som fungerar som en utvecklingsmekanik och en språngbräda för att uppnå frihet.</p>