In the first chapter, the underlying argument of the thesis indicates that Smith was very familiar with the Bible. His written work that reflects the scriptural nature of the Bible and is today canonized by Mormons is argued that it "extends the Bible's text and fills [many of] its [doctrinal] silences." A complete reading of this thesis could make some readers think that the doctrine of a plurality of Gods is integral to the sense of the Bible and a novel explanation for the existence of the universe. The second chapter indicates that many have grappled with the summary doctrine of the Mormon Godhead, the plurality of Gods teaching, as taught by Joseph Smith (1805-1844) in last weeks of his life. This doctrine was accepted by members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon) during the lifetime of those who knew Joseph Smith personally. First Presidency leader Franklin Richards championed the teaching in his writings. Church president John Taylor is quoted supporting the teaching. At the beginning of the twentieth-century, leaders felt uneasy with the plural Gods doctrine. The teaching began to be left out of the Mormon discourse and to this day is not mentioned in official writings, meetings, and conferences of the church. The final two chapters contain a detailed listing of and commentary on the concepts within Joseph Smith's unique explanation for the nature of God. While Smith said that he had ever been teaching the ideas relative to this final doctrine throughout his ministry, their summary presentation in two final discourses caused his listeners to find his teachings surprisingly unconventional. Two sermons contain Smith's teachings, the better known "King Follett Discourse" and the lessor known "Sermon in the Grove." While the first discourse is familiar to many, the complete doctrine cannot be understood without the supplementary information in the second lessor known sermon. In his last discourse, Smith taught of a hierarchal progression of Gods, indicating endless Gods. The nature of the Gods is for the Son to become a Father and produce a new God the Son, who will in turn become a Father. Smith explained, "Hence if Jesus had a Father, can we not believe that He had a Father also?" Smith further paraphrased the concept by saying, "where was there ever a son without a father? And where was there ever a father without first being a son?"

The purpose of this thesis is to develop a critical reading of Badiou&rsquo / s theory of truth. Contemporary popular trends such as postmodernism and anti-philosophy champion the principles of pluralism and contingency. They use these against Hegel&rsquo / s conception of history and theory of &lsquo / relational totality&rsquo / . Badiou agrees with these trends. But he criticizes their relativist theory of truth. He wants to provide an &lsquo / objective&rsquo / foundation for &lsquo / truth&rsquo / . The question I wish to explore in this thesis is then to analyze critically Badiou&rsquo / s work to find out whether he succeeds? To do this I am presenting Badiou&rsquo / s philosophical sources in ancient and modern philosophy and his main concepts he relies on. I am analyzing in particular in depth Badiou&rsquo / s understanding of ontology and phenomenology. To explain his concept of truth, I am analyzing his concepts of &lsquo / void&rsquo / , &lsquo / plurality&rsquo / , &lsquo / infinity&rsquo / . However, to make sense of his theory of truth more fully, I am looking also at his conceptions of &lsquo / event&rsquo / and subject&rsquo / , which are the main components of his theory of truth. After having analyzed his theory of of truth, I am looking at his conception of emancipatory politics, to see how his conception of truth works in his practical philosophy.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Texas, Dec., 2007. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

Com o intento de fundar a metafísica rumo ao conhecimento certo, Descartes rejeita a história precedente da filosofia. Com efeito, esta carrega consigo uma pluralidade de opiniões e disputas, o que é inaceitável face à unidade da verdade e da razão. Por isso, o progresso da filosofia em direção ao futuro só pode se dar mediante uma ruptura com o passado, ruptura que se opera por meio da dúvida metódica. Leibniz, ao contrário, defende que o avanço do conhecimento rumo à descoberta de novas verdades pode e deve retomar o que já foi anteriormente estabelecido. Isto porque, à diferença de Descartes, o autor da Monadologia possui uma outra concepção da relação entre pluralidade e unidade, o que se pode constatar de maneira privilegiada na sua tese de que cada mônada ou ser criado representa o universo inteiro de uma determinada perspectiva. Ora, como todas as representações possuem o mesmo referente o mundo , todas são verdadeiras e harmônicas entre si, de modo que o que varia é a maneira como o mundo é representado, isto é, os graus de distinção presentes na representação. Deste modo, a pluralidade dos sistemas filosóficos redunda em diferenças (de modo que uns são mais perfeitos do que outros e que haja determinadas partes mais relevantes do que outras dentro de um mesmo sistema), mas não em uma heterogeneidade radical. Ora, justamente sem a consideração de que há alguma conveniência subjacente na diversidade das filosofias, não é possível a tentativa de conciliação do que haveria de melhor entre elas, isto é, se há uma heterogeneidade irredutível, como Descartes considera, não há qualquer ponto de transigência. Assim, a fim de dar conta de como este projeto de conciliação das filosofias é possível, examinar-se-á nesta dissertação a tese de que cada mônada representa o universo inteiro de uma determinada perspectiva, exame no qual se enfatizará as noções leibnizianas de espírito, de conhecimento e de sistema / Willing to found metaphysics toward right knowledge, Descartes denies the preceding Philosophy history on the basis that the plurality of opinions and disputes this Philosophy holds is not acceptable under the unity of true and reason. As a result, Philosophy cannot evolve toward the future unless by breaking up with the past, a rupture that operates by way of the methodic doubt. Leibniz, in contrast, advocates that the evolution of knowledge toward the discovery of new truths can and should resume what was established antecedently. This is so because, unlike Descartes, the author of Monadology conceives the plurality-unity relationship in a different way, which one has the privilege to infer from his thesis that each monad or created being represents the entire universe from a certain perspective. Now, since all representations have the same referent the world , all are true and harmonic in relation to each other, and thus what varies is how the world is represented, i.e., the degrees of distinction in the representation. Therefore, the plurality of philosophic systems results in differences (where one is more perfect than another and certain parts are more relevant than others within a system) but not in a radical heterogeneity. Indeed, precisely without considering that some convenience underlies the diversity of philosophies, one cannot attempt to conciliate them in what would be the best in them, i.e., if an irreducible heterogeneity does exist, as Descartes proposes, then there is no point of convergency. Therefore, in order to apprehend how this project of conciliation of philosophies is possible, this paper will address the thesis that each monad represents the entire universe from a certain perspective, with an emphasis on Leibnizs notions of spirit, knowledge, and system

My own experiences of disjuncture sparked questions related to how practical nursing education is situated within the larger nursing disciplinary landscape. On acute care nursing units, work relationships are changing between RNs and LPNs as new collaborative care models are introduced, creating ambiguity and confusion with increasingly overlapping scopes of practice. Gaps remain in knowing how RNs and LPNs experience changes in these intra-professional team contexts, and how patient care, nursing work, and nursing education may be influenced by these new collaborative models. This has been the foundation for the journey towards graduate study and this dissertation work. In this dissertation I address the overarching research question: How are registered and practical nurses’ experiences of learning to work together being organized by educational and work contexts? This question consists of two sub-questions: 1) What are the experiences of pre-licensure health professional students and educators learning to work in intra-professional teams? and, 2) How are institutional texts organizing post-licensure nurses’ experiences of learning to practice on intra-professional teams? The first sub-question is addressed using the Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI) qualitative systematic review methodology to reveal what is currently known about how pre-licensure health professional students learn to work on intra-professional teams. The second question is approached using an institutional ethnographic analytic lens to explore how post-licensure nurses’ (RNs and LPNs) work is socially organized via educational, union, health authority, and regulatory texts and how this social organization impacts intra-professional relationships. Taking a plural approach to knowledge construction allows for a multi-perspectival view of RNs and LPNs experiences and the role of educational and work contexts in shaping how they learn to work together. Incorporating methodologies as diverse as a JBI systematic review and institutional ethnography raises methodological tensions. Each has its own philosophical assumptions, reflecting particular strengths and limitations in the production of knowledge. The challenges of employing a plural approach are explored alongside new knowledge and possibilities for exploring and understanding how best to care for patients and educate students within complex, collaborative environments. / Graduate / 2018-08-29

This dissertation examines the potential dependence of praxis upon poiesis. The relation between praxis and poiesis, or action and work, is complicated by the conflicting qualities and principles of each. This tension, however, illuminates the human being as free and worldly. It is therefore concluded that praxis and poiesis form an interdependent tension that is potentially mediated by the faculty of judging and care for the world. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the framework and significant elements of Arendt's overall project. It begins with an elucidation of the philosophical bias against politics that Arendt critiques. The rest of the chapter explores the unique characteristics and principles that Arendt attributes to each respective activity of the vita activa. This chapter enables the reader to grasp the significance of the differences that Arendt accentuates between activities, as well as the specific characteristics and principles of action and work. Chapter 2 introduces the potential dependence of action upon the capabilities of the work activity. It centres on the relationship between action, the condition of plurality, the public space of appearance, and the durable, fabricated world. The durable world provides both a shared context and shared concern for potential action and the realisation of plurality. But this is problematic considering the extent to which the durable world arises through fabrication. This suggests that action is subordinate to the faculty of work. The problematic implications of such a relationship are further analysed, with a focus on the principles that inform homo faber's view of the world in general, and the relation between this sensibility and public spaces of appearance in particular. The contradictory principles of work and action, and yet the significance of work in building a durable world, will come to light. Chapter 3 explores further the extent of the relationship between action and world. The aim is to provide an exegesis of Arendt's notion of amor mundi, or love for the world, coupled 132 with her emphasis on the frailty of action. Amor mundi illuminates actors' concern with the world as a space for appearance and as a durable world. However, the extent to which political actors may effectively care for the world is brought into question. The faculties of promisemaking, forgiveness, and remembrance are examined as 'solutions' to the frailty of action. But remembrance once again suggests a dependence of action on work. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the relationship between praxis and poiesis in light of the role of remembrance and the tension between freedom and permanence. Chapter 4 builds on the claim that praxis and poiesis must be rethought in terms of an interdependence that reflects the nature of human being as free and worldly. It is argued that it is specifically in the faculty of judgment that this interdependence is mediated. The role of the disinterested spectator is therefore introduced and its relevance in both praxis and poiesis investigated. This faculty emphasises the importance of spectators who judge all appearances on the basis of beauty and meaning, and out of a concern for the world as a durable public space. The relation between judgment, action, and work also illuminates the condition of the human being as free and worldly, and the capacity to care for the world through the activities of both beginning and preserving. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Philosophy / unrestricted

This dissertation studies how different voter characteristics and electoral rules affect the incentives and decisions to seek political office. The focus is on generalizing standard approaches to observed differences in the runoff rule and incorporating more accurate descriptions of voter behavior which may not be fully rational. In each chapter, I consider a model of strategic entry by candidates for office in democratic elections. In the first chapter, I incorporate the observed differences in thresholds for first-round victory in a model of runoff elections. The set of equilibria varies substantially with the threshold, indicating that the 50 percent threshold used in most models is not innocuous. The set of equilibria immediately contains equilibria that were thought to exist only under plurality rule, whereas for thresholds above 50 percent, there is no change in the set of equilibria. Additionally, for any threshold under one half, there exist equilibria in which a candidate who loses with certainty still chooses to run. The set of two candidate equilibria is invariant to all thresholds under one third, and the set of multicandidate equilibria is invariant to all thresholds above one half. In the second chapter, I introduce aggregate uncertainty by making candidates unsure of the distribution of voter preferences in the electorate. The set of three candidate equilibria expands and equilibrium platforms become more diverse. This provides a theoretical basis for Duverger’s Hypothesis. Equilibria also feature two common empirical phenomena. For instance, some candidates choose to enter despite losing with certainty in equilibrium. Also, in some equilibria, a Condorcet winning candidate (a candidate who would win every pairwise election) fails to win the election. In the third chapter, I generalize the citizen-candidate model to a multidimensional setting and characterize the set of equilibria. I later incorporate two well-documented violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference in a model of plurality elections: the compromise and attraction effects. Entry by an extreme candidate may shift the frame of reference for some voters in ways which favor particular moderate candidates. Incorporating these preferences generate equilibria in which extremist candidates enter plurality elections in order to attractively frame their preferred moderate, even if the extremist has probability zero of obtaining office themselves.

[pt] Fomos capazes de criar um mundo de coisas para dar alguma estabilidade e segurança aos eternos processos da natureza que sempre colocaram a vida humana em alerta. Desde simples utensílios até casas, tudo o que fizemos que compõe o artifício humano foi feito com o objetivo de preservar e proteger a vida da espécie humana. Arendt propõe pensarmos o que estamos fazendo e como a quebra com o fio da tradição pode representar um grande risco ao mundo e à eternidade da vida não individual. A partir da compreensão de alguns conceitos-chave nas obras de Arendt, mais especificamente em seu A Condição Humana, buscamos conhecer os resgates históricos propostos pela autora para compreender as ideias de mundo, alienação do mundo, pluralidade e ação. / [en] We were capable of creating a world of things to give some stability and safety to the eternal processes of nature that have always put human life on alert. From some utensils to houses, everything we did that made up the human artifice was made with the objective of preserving and protecting the life of the human species. Arendt proposes for us to think about what we are doing and how the breaking with tradition could represent a great risk to the world and to the eternity of the non individual life. Through the comprehension of some key concepts in Arendt works, more specifically The Human Condition, we search to get to know the historical references proposed by Arendt to understand the ideas of world, alienation from the world, plurality and action.

No description available.