By the year 2050, about three quarters of the world’s population will live in cities. Most cities are developed by state or federal governments; however, some cities are developed for the purpose of private interests that plan the city. While the concept of private companies planning and sometimes even owning cities is not a new development, there seems to currently be a rise in this trend, with communication corporations such as IBM, Google, Intel, and Cisco now taking advantage of this growing market. Known as “smart” or “wired” cities, this new privatized way of planning communities allows major communication corporations to play an important role in shaping the future of our communities. Google, IBM, and Intel are all playing a role in planning the future of Portland, Oregon. By analyzing documents such as planning ordinances, financial reports, and government transcripts, as well as conducting interviews with city planners and corporate employees, this study found that many of the “smart” city efforts being undertaken by these communication corporations are intimately tied to their efforts to bring the Internet of Things (IoT) to fruition. Ultimately, the main goal of these efforts is to utilize urban communication technologies (UCTs) to gather data about community members by tracking their activities. In this emerging personal data economy, identities are the main commodity being fetishized.

Thesis advisor: Fabio Ghironi / This dissertation is a collection of three essays which examine issues at the intersection of international economics, political economy, and macroeconomics. A common theme which emerges in the subsequent chapters is a reliance on intuitive models of economies populated by rational agents engaging in both political and economic decisionmaking. Each chapter also presents empirical evidence using aggregate data to highlight new angles on issues related to macroeconomic development policy. Concurrent cross-country political change, such as the recent ``Arab spring" revolutions in the Middle East, the experience of South American military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, and political transition in former Soviet-bloc countries at the end of the Cold War, suggests that global forces impacting multiple countries can serve as a trigger for intrastate conflict. A common conjecture is that economic forces have been a primary impetus for such episodes. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of worldwide commodity price fluctuations in generating political conflict in developing countries. I develop a simple model to show that shocks to both the level and uncertainty of commodity export prices can elicit conflict events in developing countries. Econometric evidence from a dataset combining major intrastate political resistance campaigns and global food commodity price data lends support to this hypothesis. In the second chapter, I examine whether corruption within one country affected by corruption within another. Understanding the interactions between political-economic culture across countries can allow us to better grasp the implications of greater global and regional integration in recent history. Until now, few studies have examined this question in detail due to the difficulty of measuring corruption and paucity of consistent data over an adequate time span. I use a panel dataset of countries in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East over a span of fifteen years to examine how domestic corruption reacts to the culture of corruption in the region in which the country is located. Contrary to the results of past literature, I find evidence that a reduction in regional corruption can actually lead to a worsening of corruption within a country, and vice versa. If in an open economy, regional graft lowers the level of income that a rent-seeking government can tax, a reduction in regional corruption can increase the marginal benefit of imposing a more extractive domestic policy by increasing the pool of exploitable funds. My results offer an economic reason for why corruption will be an enduring institution in a more interconnected world. Finally, are less democratic governments more apt to intervene in the prices of imported goods than exported goods? In the third chapter of this dissertation I offer an explanation for why this might be the case, focusing on a government's choice between two alternative interventionist trade policies: import tariffs and export subsidies. If governments have incentives to exploit their political power to extract rents from citizens, they can achieve this by taxing imports rather than subsidizing exports. However, if citizens are able to discipline their governments through elections, the extent of this rent-seeking behavior can be constrained. I present a model that captures this behavior, distinguishing between the level of electoral accountability of a government and the level of bargaining power that citizens have in negotiations. Preliminary empirical evidence is presented which suggests that more authoritarian countries spend greater amounts on import tariffs than on export subsidies. These findings give insight into some of the challenges in establishing free trade amongst countries with different attitudes toward democratic institutions, both on a bilateral basis and within multilateral organizations. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

La thèse part du postulat central selon lequel le processus d'intégration européenne est étroitement lié à la généralisation de la production à grande échelle et de sa forme organisationnelle, le « big business ». Cela implique que son déploiement est calqué sur les stratégies de développement des grandes firmes. La période 1945-1985 est analyséecomme la première période du processus, celle de la transition vers l'Europe du « big business » à travers le déploiement dans chacun des États-membres de politiques visant à construire des champions nationaux. La thèse se concentre sur la deuxième période de l'intégration, la période post-champions nationaux durant laquelle les grandes firmes s'européanisent. Au moyen d'une approche interdisciplinaire, la thèse examine la façon dont les stratégies et les préférences, souvent hétérogènes, des grandes firmes françaises ont façonné le processus d'intégration dans ses diverses manifestations : constitution d'une « corporate élite » européenne, centralisation des politiques microéconomiques et macroéconomiques et construction d'un système financier paneuropéen. / The basic premiss of the thesis is that the process of European integration is closely linked with the generalisation of large-scale production and of its organisational form, i.e. big business. This implies that the process unfolds in a pattern that can be traced to the development strategies of large firms. The 1945-1985 period is analysed as the first of twostages in the integration process, that of the transition towards the Europe of big business through the policy of building in each of the member states national champion firms. The thesis concentrates on the second stage, the “post-national champions period” during which large firms europeanise their operations. Using an interdisciplinary approach, the thesis examines the ways in which the often heterogeneous strategies and preferences of large French firms have shaped the integration process in its various manifestations: the emergence of a European corporate elite, the centralisation of microeconomic and macroeconomic policies and the building of a pan-European financial system.

O primeiro artigo analisa quantitativamente a importância relativa dos fatores que determinam o desempenho econômico dos países. Em especial, é incorporada à análise a possibilidade do capital ser heterogêneo. Estimativas da qualidade do capital são feitas para cada país, resultantes de um modelo teórico, e a importância de cada um dos componentes é analisada. Mesmo depois do ajuste, a qualidade do capital físico não explica grande parte da experiência de crescimento dos países. Além disso, é feita uma análise para o caso brasileiro com o arcabouço desenvolvido durante o período que vai de 1970 até 2003. Conclui-se nesta análise que a heterogeneidade do capital não explica grande parte da experiência de crescimento do Brasil. O segundo artigo apresenta um modelo que relaciona crescimento econômico, educação, investimento e regimes políticos. Para isto, propõe-se um modelo de gerações sobrepostas em que existem dois grupos de agentes: os capitalistas e os trabalhadores. Além disso, uma democracia é definida como um governo em que todos votam e, pelo fato do eleitor mediano ser também um trabalhador, os trabalhadores podem então taxar o investimento e redistribuir na forma de capital humano. O principal resultado é que a democracia desestimula o investimento de capital físico e estimula o aumento de capital humano. O terceiro artigo busca explicar o aumento do consumo após a redução da inflação causada por um controle de preços. O foco é direcionado para o consumo de bens duráveis e a dificuldade dos domicílios de se protegerem dos efeitos da inflação. Uma redução súbita na inflação reduz o preço efetivo dos bens duráveis, levando a uma expansão destes. Todos os modelos são calibrados para a experiência brasileira do Cruzado, em meados da década de 80, e dois arcabouços básicos são apresentados: um em que os domicílios não possuem acesso ao mercado de crédito e outro em que possuem acesso parcial. Além disso, é apresentada a possibilidade de reduções permanentes e temporárias da taxa de inflação. As principais conclusões do artigo são que o modelo em que os domicílios não possuem acesso a crédito e são heterogêneos nas preferências é o que mais se aproxima com os dados apresentados da experiência do plano Cruzado. / The first article analyzes quantitatively the relative importance of the factors that determine economic performance of the countries. Mainly, the empirical exercise incorporates the possibility of heterogeneous capital. Estimates of the quality of the capital are made for each country from results of a theoretical model and the importance of each one of the components is analyzed. Even after the adjustment in the quality of capital, the quality of physical capital does not explain too much of the growth experiences. Furthermore, the Brazilian experience is analyzed with the developed framework from 1970 to 2003. The main conclusion is that the heterogeneity of capital inserted in the model does not explain too much of the Brazilian growth experience. oindent The second article presents a model which relates economic growth, education, investment and political regimes. In order to do that, is presented a model of overlapping generations with two groups of agents: capitalists and workers. Furthermore, a democracy is defined as a government where everybody votes and, by the fact that the median voter is also a worker, the working class then can tax more heavily the investment and redistribute through human capital investment. The main result of the article is that democracies undermine investment in physical capital and enhances the growth of human capital. oindent The third article seeks to explain consumption booms after inflation stabilization plans centered on price controls. The focus is directed to durable goods and the difficulty for households to protect themselves from inflation. A sudden decrease in the inflation rate reduces effective consumption price of durable goods, leading to a boom. All the models are calibrated for mid-80\'s Brazil and two base simulations are presented: one in which none of the households have access to the credit market and one where households have partial access to the credit market. Other than that, it is also presented the possibility of permanent and temporary stabilization of inflation. The main conclusion of the article is that the model in which households do not have access to the credit market and are heterogeneous in preferences is the one that better explains the Brazilian experience of Cruzado.

Essa dissertação pressupõe a existência de um trade-off enfrentado pelos políticos em anos de eleição. Se por um lado a possibilidade de realizar ciclos da política econômica em ano eleitoral pode refletir em aumento da probabilidade de reeleição, por outro lado é razoável supor que o político incorre em algum tipo de custo ao realizar ciclos. A partir dessa suposição, essa dissertação investiga se os ciclos políticos são menores em situações em que o político incumbente possui, ex-ante, uma alta probabilidade de se reeleger. Essa investigação é feita a partir da análise da despesa dos municípios brasileiros no período de 1997 a 2007. Os resultados mostram que existem evidências de que em anos eleitorais os gastos são distorcidos em favor das despesas com transferências. Os resultados também indicam que em situações em que o candidato possui, ex-ante, uma grande probabilidade de ser reeleito, os ciclos são menores, o que parece de acordo com a hipótese de existência de custos para a realização de ciclos. / This dissertation assumes the existence of a trade-off faced by politicians in election years. On one hand the possibility of cycles in election years may reflect in increased probability of re-election. On the other hand it is reasonable to assume that the politician incurs in some kind of cost to do political cycles. From this assumption, this paper investigates whether political cycles are smaller in situations where the incumbent politician has, exante, a high probability of reelection. This research is done by analyzing the expenditure of Brazilian municipalities in the period 1997 to 2007. The results shows that there is evidence that spending in election years are distorted in favor of spending on transfers. The results also indicate that in situations where the candidate has, ex-ante, a high probability of being reelected, the cycles tend to be smaller, which seems to be in line with the hypothesis postulated in this dissertation.

O objeto da tese é o significado das questões econômicas da economia, plano econômico da realidade, e da Economia Política, conhecimento econômico - no pensamento de Proudhon entre 1838-1847. Situada no campo da História Intelectual e considerando os textos do autor no período como partes constitutivas de um corpus, a tese tencionou demonstrar o importante papel que o autor atribuiu à economia tanto na preservação quanto na transformação da ordem social e como a Economia Política foi usada, criticada e transformada por ele para efeitos de análise e transformação dessa mesma ordem. / The object of the thesis is the meaning of the economic questions - of economy, economic realm of reality, and the Political Economy, economic knowledge - in the thought of Proudhon between 1838-1847. Situated in the field of Intellectual History and considering the texts of the author in the period as constituent parts of a corpus, the thesis intended to demonstrate the important role that the author attributed to the economy both in the preservation and in the transformation of the social order, and how the Political Economy was used, criticized and transformed by him for the purpose of analysis and transformation of this same order.

Esta tese consiste em três estudos que investigam os impactos políticos do investimento em ajuda externa, assim como as estratégias de alocação interna por parte dos líderes dos países receptores. Explorando diferentes níveis de análise e conjuntos de países, eles buscam contribuir com o entendimento de escolhas estratégicas feitas por parte dos países doadores e por parte dos países recipientes. O capítulo 1 explora como líderes locais utilizam recursos de ajuda externa para se perpetuar no poder. Os resultados mostram que, em eleições competitivas, líderes direcionam recursos com o objetivo de ampliar sua base para além dos core voters. Quando as eleições não são competitivas, os líderes têm menos motivos para duvidar de sua sobrevivência eleitoral e direcionam recursos para distritos de sua etnia. A disponibilidade de informações sobre ajuda externa em nível sub-nacional é rara, e esse estudo toma proveito da liberação de novas bases de dados que sistematizam os investimentos chineses na África. O capítulo 2 adota um nível de análise mais tradicional nos estudos de ajuda externa. Utilizando-se dados de 155 países entre 1960 e 2011, ele investiga se o investimento em ajuda externa tem efeitos heterogêneos em países com regimes democráticos e autoritários. Os resultados demonstram que países democráticos alocam ajuda de maneira mais efetiva do que países autoritários, mas as estimativas apresentam volatilidade. O capítulo 3 investiga o possível impacto da ajuda externa sobre a intensidade de conflitos civis. Em países com menor grau de institucionalização, investimentos em ajuda externa podem ser utilizados como uma ferramenta para fortalecer facções que estão no poder. O trabalho usa uma estimação em dois estágios para calcular o impacto dos fluxos de ajuda sobre a probabilidade de intensificação do conflito. Os resultados mostram que a ajuda externa pode contribuir para transformar pequenos conflitos em conflitos maiores, mas não dão evidência de que ela cria conflitos em países anteriormente pacíficos. / This thesis consists of three studies that investigate the political impacts of foreign aid investment, as well as the internal allocation strategies by the leaders of the recipient countries. Exploring different levels of analysis and sets of countries, they seek to contribute to the understanding of strategic choices made by donor countries and recipient leaders. Chapter 1 explores how local leaders use foreign aid resources to perpetuate themselves in power. The findings show that in competitive elections, leaders direct resources to broaden their base beyond core voters. When elections are not competitive, leaders have less reason to doubt their political survival and direct resources to their ethnic districts. The availability of foreign aid information at the sub-national level is rare, and this study takes advantage of the release of new databases that systematize Chinese investments in Africa. Chapter 2 adopts a more traditional level of analysis in foreign aid studies. Using data from 155 countries between 1960 and 2011, it investigates whether investment in foreign aid has heterogeneous effects in countries with democratic and authoritarian regimes. The results demonstrate that democratic countries allocate aid more effectively than authoritarian countries, but the estimates present robustness problems. Chapter 3 investigates the possible impact of foreign aid on the intensity of civil conflict. In countries with a lower degree of institutionalization, foreign aid investments can be used as a tool to strengthen factions in power. The paper uses a two-stage estimation to calculate the impact of aid flows on the likelihood of conflict escalation. The results show that foreign aid can contribute to turning small conflicts into major conflicts, but they do not give evidence that it creates conflicts in previously peaceful countries.

This thesis examines the Skills Strategy for England under New Labour as a contested project to govern workplace high(er) skill aspiration and behaviour. It analyses differentiated state strategies to promote and (re)produce responsible skills ambitions; the engagement of employer and employee representatives with these strategies to stretch and reshape, and resist and restate the project; and the implications for skills provision. The research involved interpretive analysis of policy documents, and in-depth interviews with policy-making elites; strategic representatives of business and worker/learner interests; and skills providers. To support my empirical focus this thesis is located within theories of the changing form and function of the state. Adopting a ‘cultural political economy’ approach, and drawing on critical governance studies, to illuminate the interplay between meaning production and practice, I challenge the conclusion that mechanisms for skills creation in England are premised on a misunderstanding of the skills motivations of employers and employees. Instead I expose state work through policy to produce and export a skills logic; constituting and positioning governable subjects in relation to their internalisation of these logics; and the role of differentiated policies to manoeuvre subjects towards preferential skills behaviours. The findings highlight that what is presented as a coherent ‘partnership’ approach to producing enhanced skills can be better understood as three distinctive state strategies, (demand-led; leading demand; circumventing lack of demand) , which are aimed at differently imagined and constructed workplaces, (enlightened; inert; or deviant), depending on their demonstrable degree of responsible skills ambition. I therefore term this project ‘state-steered voluntarism’. However, I also expose the limitations and limits of this project. Attempts to present policy coherence lacquers over latent tensions and contradictions between the different skills strategies, creating policy ‘opacities’ which serve as spaces for the strategic voices of employer/employee representation to talk back; disorganising the practices and processes of skills delivery.

"Development on the basis of extraction and export of natural resources is a dynamically complex problem. Empirical evidence shows that while some nations have been successful to translate natural resource wealth into long-term development but many have failed too. In this dissertation a system dynamics approach is taken to understand why this is happening and what strategies could facilitate a resource-based development process. In this regard, Mashayekhi’s model of oil-dependency of Iranian economy as one of the few relevant system dynamics examples is updated and revalidated. The results show that despite its capability in showing the dynamics of the problem from an economic perspective it lacks socio-political features that are necessary to address the most fundamental issues of resource-based development. It is shown that Katouzian’s theory of “arbitrary state and society” could fill this gap. The theory is, thus, translated into a system dynamics model so that it could be tested for internal consistency and used for policy analysis. The model is able to explain long-term socio-political-economic instability of a resource-dependent society. On the basis of Mashayekhi’s model, Katouzian’s theory, and other fundamental explanations of natural resource dependency that are available from the literature, a generic eclectic model is developed. The model has gone through a comprehensive list of confidence-building tests. Controlled experimentation through Monte Carlo simulations show that, on the contrary to the current belief, it is unlikely that natural resource wealth be harmful for social welfare. Results also revealed that rule of law is a crucial factor that affects trajectory of the socio-political-economic development. Other findings are as follow. Civil resistance (disobedience) can be harmful for the system in the long-run. While sanctions could affect the economy it has barely an impact on socio-political settings of a society. Finally, wage stabilization, facilitation of social mobility, and privatization of natural resource revenues within certain limits) could help the resource-based development to achieve better outcomes."

"Development on the basis of extraction and export of natural resources is a dynamically complex problem. Empirical evidence shows that while some nations have been successful to translate natural resource wealth into long-term development but many have failed too. In this dissertation a system dynamics approach is taken to understand why this is happening and what strategies could facilitate a resource-based development process. In this regard, Mashayekhi’s model of oil-dependency of Iranian economy as one of the few relevant system dynamics examples is updated and revalidated. The results show that despite its capability in showing the dynamics of the problem from an economic perspective it lacks socio-political features that are necessary to address the most fundamental issues of resource-based development. It is shown that Katouzian’s theory of “arbitrary state and society” could fill this gap. The theory is, thus, translated into a system dynamics model so that it could be tested for internal consistency and used for policy analysis. The model is able to explain long-term socio-political-economic instability of a resource-dependent society. On the basis of Mashayekhi’s model, Katouzian’s theory, and other fundamental explanations of natural resource dependency that are available from the literature, a generic eclectic model is developed. The model has gone through a comprehensive list of confidence-building tests. Controlled experimentation through Monte Carlo simulations show that, on the contrary to the current belief, it is unlikely that natural resource wealth be harmful for social welfare. Results also revealed that rule of law is a crucial factor that affects trajectory of the socio-political-economic development. Other findings are as follow. Civil resistance (disobedience) can be harmful for the system in the long-run. While sanctions could affect the economy it has barely an impact on socio-political settings of a society. Finally, wage stabilization, facilitation of social mobility, and privatization of natural resource revenues within certain limits) could help the resource-based development to achieve better outcomes."