This paper compares political dynamics in Sweden and societal outcomes inFinland with regard to the implementation of Universal Basic Income (UBI).While Sweden still largely remains in theoretical discussion, Finland hascarried out practical experimentation, and the results are shifting. Theevidence suggests that the recent Finnish UBI experiment resulted in mixedfindings: it neither improved nor hurt employment, but increased the wellbeing of participants in terms of mental health and feelings of financialsecurity. The debate in Sweden is quite the opposite, with politicalpolarization and a caution stemming from the worry about economicfeasibility. This paper thus brings out the different cultural, economic, andsocial contexts that could harbor the acceptance and possible impact of UBIin the two Nordic countries.

O paradigma neoinstitucional assumiu, no fim do século XX e no começo do XXI, um papel de preponderância na Ciência Política, ditando as epistemologias e os métodos de se produzir conhecimento na disciplina. Suas duas principais correntes – institucionalismo da escolha racional e institucionalismo histórico – constituem marcos distintos de explicação dos fenômenos políticos, sendo os principais referenciais teóricos nas análises políticas institucionais. Porém, ambas correntes apresentam diversos problemas epistemológicos, fundados principalmente no caráter estático de suas abordagens sobre a fenomenologia política. Embora tal postura teórica fosse outrora suficiente para explicar a política, no mundo dinâmico atual, uma nova teoria que capte o dinamismo dos fenômenos políticos faz-se necessária. Neste sentido, o objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar uma proposta heurística para a análise das mudanças institucionais, denominada institucionalismo evolucionário. Esse modelo heurístico dialoga com a teoria evolucionária, o neoinstitucionalismo e a teoria dos jogos. Além da proposição desse modelo, este trabalho exemplifica sua aplicação por meio da análise da evolução das dinâmicas de segurança nas relações entre Polônia e Rússia no pós-Guerra Fria. / At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the neoinstitutionalist paradigm assumed a preponderant role in Political Science, dictating the epistemologies and methods for producing knowledge in the discipline. Its two main theoretical streams – rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism – constitute distinct approaches to explaining political phenomena, and are the main theories for analysing politics under the framework of the paradigm. Nevertheless, both theories present many epistemological problems, based mainly in their static approach to political phenomenology. Although these theories have once managed to explain reality, our current dynamic world demands a new theory capable of analysing the dynamics of political phenomena. Therefore, this work aims to present a heuristics capable of understanding institutional change, known as evolutionary institutionalism. This heuristics dialogues with evolutionary theory, neoinstitutionalism and game theory. Other than this theoretical model, this work applies it in the analysis of security dynamics in the context of Polish-Russian relations in the post-Cold War period.

O paradigma neoinstitucional assumiu, no fim do século XX e no começo do XXI, um papel de preponderância na Ciência Política, ditando as epistemologias e os métodos de se produzir conhecimento na disciplina. Suas duas principais correntes – institucionalismo da escolha racional e institucionalismo histórico – constituem marcos distintos de explicação dos fenômenos políticos, sendo os principais referenciais teóricos nas análises políticas institucionais. Porém, ambas correntes apresentam diversos problemas epistemológicos, fundados principalmente no caráter estático de suas abordagens sobre a fenomenologia política. Embora tal postura teórica fosse outrora suficiente para explicar a política, no mundo dinâmico atual, uma nova teoria que capte o dinamismo dos fenômenos políticos faz-se necessária. Neste sentido, o objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar uma proposta heurística para a análise das mudanças institucionais, denominada institucionalismo evolucionário. Esse modelo heurístico dialoga com a teoria evolucionária, o neoinstitucionalismo e a teoria dos jogos. Além da proposição desse modelo, este trabalho exemplifica sua aplicação por meio da análise da evolução das dinâmicas de segurança nas relações entre Polônia e Rússia no pós-Guerra Fria. / At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the neoinstitutionalist paradigm assumed a preponderant role in Political Science, dictating the epistemologies and methods for producing knowledge in the discipline. Its two main theoretical streams – rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism – constitute distinct approaches to explaining political phenomena, and are the main theories for analysing politics under the framework of the paradigm. Nevertheless, both theories present many epistemological problems, based mainly in their static approach to political phenomenology. Although these theories have once managed to explain reality, our current dynamic world demands a new theory capable of analysing the dynamics of political phenomena. Therefore, this work aims to present a heuristics capable of understanding institutional change, known as evolutionary institutionalism. This heuristics dialogues with evolutionary theory, neoinstitutionalism and game theory. Other than this theoretical model, this work applies it in the analysis of security dynamics in the context of Polish-Russian relations in the post-Cold War period.

O paradigma neoinstitucional assumiu, no fim do século XX e no começo do XXI, um papel de preponderância na Ciência Política, ditando as epistemologias e os métodos de se produzir conhecimento na disciplina. Suas duas principais correntes – institucionalismo da escolha racional e institucionalismo histórico – constituem marcos distintos de explicação dos fenômenos políticos, sendo os principais referenciais teóricos nas análises políticas institucionais. Porém, ambas correntes apresentam diversos problemas epistemológicos, fundados principalmente no caráter estático de suas abordagens sobre a fenomenologia política. Embora tal postura teórica fosse outrora suficiente para explicar a política, no mundo dinâmico atual, uma nova teoria que capte o dinamismo dos fenômenos políticos faz-se necessária. Neste sentido, o objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar uma proposta heurística para a análise das mudanças institucionais, denominada institucionalismo evolucionário. Esse modelo heurístico dialoga com a teoria evolucionária, o neoinstitucionalismo e a teoria dos jogos. Além da proposição desse modelo, este trabalho exemplifica sua aplicação por meio da análise da evolução das dinâmicas de segurança nas relações entre Polônia e Rússia no pós-Guerra Fria. / At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the neoinstitutionalist paradigm assumed a preponderant role in Political Science, dictating the epistemologies and methods for producing knowledge in the discipline. Its two main theoretical streams – rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism – constitute distinct approaches to explaining political phenomena, and are the main theories for analysing politics under the framework of the paradigm. Nevertheless, both theories present many epistemological problems, based mainly in their static approach to political phenomenology. Although these theories have once managed to explain reality, our current dynamic world demands a new theory capable of analysing the dynamics of political phenomena. Therefore, this work aims to present a heuristics capable of understanding institutional change, known as evolutionary institutionalism. This heuristics dialogues with evolutionary theory, neoinstitutionalism and game theory. Other than this theoretical model, this work applies it in the analysis of security dynamics in the context of Polish-Russian relations in the post-Cold War period.

In the period from 2009-2020, South Africa has witnessed the rise of "lawfare". Lawfare is understood as the judicialisation of politics - turning to the courts and the use of the law to resolve broadly political matters. This thesis explores the unfolding implications of the judicialisation of politics for judicial legitimacy. In the displacement of the political into the judicial the reach of the courts is expanded and the legitimacy of courts engaging in a "political" role is questioned. Situated in the field of judicial-political dynamics, the interplay between law and politics is observed through the adoption of a historical-institutionalist model. This thesis identifies the causes of the judicialisation of politics and then traces its consequences for broader constitutional stability and the impact on the judicial institution. Guidelines for the Court to navigate lawfare to achieve institutional resilience and maintain judicial legitimacy are then proposed. Judicialisation of politics is caused primarily through the failures of the other branches of government to fulfil their assigned constitutional role. Institutional imbalance in a dominant party democracy means that opposition parties and civil society organisations are left with little recourse but to appeal to the Court to be a constitutional bulwark. The Court is then compelled to step into the breach and fill the accountability vacuum. In identifying the causes of judicialisation, a fuller understanding of Lawfare emerges, expanding current scholarship beyond its traditionally abusive characterisation. It posits a duality to Lawfare in that it can be both an abuse of law and a last line of defence. Through observing the judicial political interactions, a trajectory from the judicialisation of politics to the politicisation of law is mapped. The politicisation of law sees political power refocused on the courts, exposing them to political aggression and attack by the dominant party. The judicialisation of politics that seeks accountability from recalcitrant political actors asks much of the courts, at a time when ensuring executive oversight is the most dangerous, because of the ease with which a hostile executive in a dominant party democracy can implement measures that may undermine the independence of the judiciary. The Constitutional Court has shown a remarkable ability to navigate this era of Lawfare, remaining resolute under fire. However, the more successful the Court is in holding the line against executive abuse of power, the more the judicial route is identified as a powerful weapon to achieve more abusive political objectives. The relationship between Lawfare and legitimacy is identified as a wicked problem that demands expanding boundaries to observe the courts influence on the political environment, and the political environment's influence on the judicial role and its legitimacy. Through advancing a multi-dimensional paradigm of judicial legitimacy, the dialectics of judicial legitimacy are shown to be aggravated by the judicialisation of politics. In this respect it is argued that where the foundations and assumptions on which legitimacy is predicated shift, legitimacy must be re-examined. It is therefore argued that in a culture marked by an impunified disregard of non-judicial regulatory enforcement and increasing non-compliance with judicial orders, the impulse to preserve legitimacy through a detached, formalist stance will not be sufficient. Judicial legitimacy must be relocated in the ability of the Court to be responsive. Pulled into the role of judicial statesmanship, the Court must adopt a robust approach to assertively uphold the rule of law. In tracking the unfolding consequences of the judicialisation of politics, the Court is asked to resolve matters beyond its institutional capabilities. Absent the normative commitment to the rule of law, the internationalisation of constitutional norms, and the political interest to implement remedial orders, the Court is unable to effect workable relief. In tracing the dangers of the continued trend of Lawfare, the thesis sketches a downward spiral of reputational strength of the Court and a decline in democratic responsibility. This leads to an inability to achieve effective reform that ends in disenchantment, questioning the faith placed in the Constitution. It depicts how the Constitutional Court as 'constitutional saviour' can unravel into constitutional blame. The Constitutional Court has been able to hold the line in this era of Lawfare and repel assaults on its integrity and efforts to undermine its independence. However, without a broader culture of commitment to the rule of law, civil education and a suffusion of constitutional responsibility beyond the judiciary, the Court will not be able to continue to shoulder the weight of what is asked of it. This research depicts a circular model of Lawfare and legitimacy, where Lawfare is predicated on judicial legitimacy, but an overreliance on Lawfare will destroy judicial legitimacy.

This thesis provides a framework for viewing socio-political contexts and how these relate to interventionist projects. The framework draws on and combines strands from international relations and sociological perspectives of social interaction. The central question becomes how intervention and existing social contexts interact to produce unintended outcomes. It applies the analysis to two separate wider contexts: Afghanistan and Somalia, with a particular focus on the self-declared independent Somaliland as an internally generated and controlled transformational process. Unlike abstract directions of theoretical development the framework seeks to provide a platform that sets aside ideological assumptions and from which interventionist projects can be observed and evaluated based on literature, field observations and interviews. Drawing on such diverse influences as fourth generation peace and conflict studies, Morphogenetics, and social forces theory, the framework explores conditions and interest formations to capture instances of local agency that are part of a continuity of local realities. It views social interaction without imposing Universalist value assumptions, but also without resorting to relativism or raising so many caveats that it becomes impractical. It exposes the agency of local interest formations hidden beneath the discourses of ideologically framed conflicts. These social agents are often dismissed as passive victims to be brought under the influence of for example the state, but are in reality able to subvert, co-opt, constrain or facilitate the forces that are dependent on them for social influence. In the end, it is the modes of mobilisation that emerge as the most crucial factor for understanding the relevant social dynamics.

Decentralization leads to functional and financial devolution of authority, induces more transparency in the system and puts emphasis on local needs. It creates platforms to voice and institutionalize the interests of various groups, and comes nearer to the public by making all tiers of government accountable directly to the people. However, several complexities govern this effort in India. First, implementation involves several official agencies, creating administrative gaps, lack of coordination and fiscal complexities. Second, Indian society is largely agrarian and rural marked by divisions of religion, caste and economic class. Third, the socially vulnerable and poor are often trapped in interlocking economic transactions with affluent landlords making it difficult for them to go for collective change. This research critically evaluates these dynamics taking the case example of the Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGREGS). We followed a threefold methodology in order to understand the policy dynamics, namely, stakeholders’ interviews, primary survey data analysis and secondary data analysis. Case studies were useful in understanding policy implementation dynamics through field observations. The multi-level regression results reflected co-existence of agriculture and MGREGS dynamics, with their own rules and objectives, apparently contradictory, but leading to social and economic equilibrium. Searching explanations for these contradictory results led us to two larger understandings: 1) Actors are seen to take rational decisions based on local socio-politico-economic understandings of the world. 2) These decisions are, however, at multiple levels and at multiple action spaces. Institutional rational choice perspective proposed by Ostrom (1999) corroborated these findings. Latent variable path analysis results indicated the dynamics of civil society and administrative bureaucracy as a negotiated equilibrium that has the potential to transform governance. The process of institutional evolution was through endogenous institutional change process as proposed by Grief and Laitin (2004). Furthermore, the effect of socio-structural factors on institutional structures was observed. The results indicated two major understandings: 1) the formation and effectiveness of institutional structures were dependent on social capital and in turn on social structures and networks 2) the influence of formal institutional structures on local governance and social dynamics affect the governance network formation (Hertting, 2001). Scenario-wise regression analyses results revealed that the effort to improve social capital of the groups through governance procedures need to be mediated through ‘local’ social structures. Agent based model results indicated the following: 1) regulatory dynamics need not necessarily follow the trend of socio-economic dynamics. Instead, they were in line with advocacy dynamics (Sabatier, 1988), which in turn depend on the social structures and networks. 2) regulatory strategies were endogenous institutional rational choices, given the existing socio-economic structures and networks of the society. Hence, Institutional theories were observed to be instrumental in understanding the policy implementation dynamics in democratic decentralization setup.