This thesis argues that the North Korean model of government is a unique model that is influenced, to varying degrees, by extreme leftist and rightist doctrines, including Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism, fascism, and Nazism; and shares at least some similarities with all these established models. Rather than being a mere political model, the North Korean model is a political religion that incorporates traits of each of the above-noted models with Korean mythology, Confucianism, extreme militarism, and traditional Korean xenophobia, isolation, and fierce nationalism. The resulting system, identified in this thesis as Kimilsungism, combines with North Korea's unique juche ideology of national self-reliance and self-actualization to absolutely subordinate the needs of the citizenry to the will of the state. It further serves to deify the founder of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, and his son — and current ruler — Kim Jong-il, via a pervasive propaganda apparatus and cult of personality that has successfully created an alternate reality that the regime can exploit and manipulate as it sees fit. / Master of Arts

Today it is common to describe fascism and communism as totalitarian and/or political religions. Conceptual history, often associated with the German historian Reinhart Koselleck, is together with the historiographical perspective, defining for this study. This thesis investigates the scientific use of the concepts totalitarianism and political religion by studying the works of important scholars of the 20th and 21st centuries to explain how the concepts have been described and understood. This paper also seeks to explain why the concepts have been so influential over such a long time and with a renewed focus during the 1990s. The thesis pays particular focus to the 1990s when political religion as a concept grew inpopularity among scholars who had to determine the relation between political religion and totalitarianism. The works of leading scholars of political religion, Emilio Gentile, Hans Maier and Michael Burleigh have been studied to show how a renewed discourse of political religion has been created during the 1990s. The results show that there are many interpretations of totalitarianism and political religion, but the leading scholars of political religion also present a high degree of consensus on how the relation between the concepts should be defined and what their relation to each other are. The results also show that the influence of the concepts can be linked to their role as liberal, ideological concepts and the struggle of Western liberalism during the 20th and 21st centuries to define a common core between fascism and communism and to clarify these dystopian alternatives to a liberal democracy.

Raymond Aron is widely recognised as France's greatest twentieth-century liberal, but the specifically liberal quality of his thought has not received the detailed historical analysis that it deserves. His work appears to fit so well within widely accepted understandings of post-war European liberalism, which has been defined primarily in terms of its anti-totalitarian, Cold War orientation, that its liberal status has been somewhat taken for granted. This has been exacerbated by an especially strong perception of a correlation between liberalism and anti-totalitarianism in France, whose late twentieth-century renaissance in liberal political thought is viewed as the product of an 'anti-totalitarian turn' in the late 1970s. While the moral authority accumulated through decades of opposition to National Socialism and Soviet communism made Aron into an anti-totalitarian icon, his early contribution to the rediscovery of France's liberal tradition established his reputation as a leader of the renaissance in the study of liberal political thought. Aron's prominence within this wider renaissance suggests that an historical treatment of his thought is overdue, but while the assumptions underpinning his reputation are not baseless, they do need to be critically scrutinised if such a treatment is to be credible. In pursuit of this end, two main arguments are developed in the present thesis. These are, first, that Aron's liberalism was more a product of the inter-war crisis of European liberalism than of the Cold War and, second, that his relationship with the French liberal tradition was primarily active and instrumental rather than passive and receptive. The first argument indicates that Aron's liberalism developed through a dialogue with and partial integration of important strands of anti-liberal crisis thought during these inter-war years; the second that earlier liberals with whose work he is frequently associated - notably Montesquieu and Tocqueville - had no substantial formative influence on his political thought. These contentions are interrelated in that Aron's post-war interpretation of his chosen liberal forebears was driven by a need to address specific problems arising from the liberal political epistemology that he formulated before the Second World War. It is by establishing in detail the link between Aron's reading of Montesquieu and Tocqueville and these earlier writings that the thesis makes its principal contribution to the existing literature on Aron, but several other original interpretations of his work are offered across its four thematic chapters on 'Political Epistemology', 'Anti-totalitarianism', 'The End of Ideology' and 'Instrumentalizing the French Liberal Tradition'. Regarding Aron's relationship with the wider late twentieth-century recovery of liberal political thought in France, it contends that the specific liberal renaissance to which he contributed most substantially emerged not as part of the anti-totalitarian turn, but in hostile reaction to the events of May 1968. This informs a broader argument that French liberal renaissance of these years was considerably more heterogeneous than is often assumed.

This paper aims to examine the development of political thinking of Heathenry and the factors that determine the political identity of particular heathen groups, namely their tendency to right-wing radicalism. The first chapter (after introduction) consists of four case studies; each one represents a different type of group in regard to where and under which circumstances they emerged, to the context that has been shaping their religious and political beliefs, and to the way they legitimize their possible political activism. The following two chapters analyze the historical influences that marked the difference in the ideological development of the two main types of Heathenry, Ásatrú and Odinism, in two distinct cultural milieus - Europe and the US. The final chapter is a synthesis of the case studies in relation to their historical background. The outcome of this synthesis offers a possible interpretation of the process of radicalization of the heathen groups. KEY WORDS: New religious movements, Germanic neopaganism, religious racism, political religion, nationalism, extremism, Asatru, Odinism

This diploma thesis is focused on the relation between values and politics in the western societies of Europe and The USA. It points out the status and role of religion in the society and compares the current secularization tendencies in Western Europe against the role of traditions in American society determined by civil religion. The study maps the influence of enlightenment on the forming of democracies, then the totalitarianisms of the 20th century and both the secularization and de-secularization in the last decades. It analyses the discussion about the role of values and civil society in secularized Europe. Finally, it describes the importance of religion for American citizens and its penetration of their entire lives both socially and culturally.

Depuis la fondation de la République Turque en 1923, la laïcité constitue le principe le plus discuté et controversé, notamment car le rejet d’un des autres principes n’a jamais été perçu, comme c’est le cas pour la laïcité, comme impliquant un rejet de la République elle-même. Que signifie la laïcité pour la Turquie ? Le renforcement de l’autorité des élites ? Ou le sens de la République ? Aujourd’hui, comment comprenons-nous la laïcité, et avons-nous besoin de la redéfinir ? Sans réaliser une analyse poussée des fondements socio-religieux du pays, les travaux étudiant la laïcité turque ont tendance à se borner à des descriptions formelles et rigides. La laïcité est le principe juridique exprimant la neutralité de l’État envers toutes les croyances religieuses, et sa purification de toutes références religieuses. Néanmoins dans les faits, nous n’avons jamais vu une telle application de laïcité, si pure et théorique. Ce qui fait de la laïcité un instrument d’oppression est en réalité, un ensemble de symboles et de mythes encerclant le sens de la laïcité. Cet ensemble de symboles et de mythes constitue une religion politique, rigide et incontestable. Pour cette raison, les travaux étudiant l’application du principe de laïcité ont perçu les symboles de la religion politique comme une laïcité distincte et particulière. Dans notre travail, nous allons étudier les bases historiques et philosophiques de la laïcité en Turquie. Notre but est de mettre en relief les origines de la laïcité et son évolution en tant que religion politique, opposée à l’Islam traditionnel et politique. Dans la dernière partie de notre travail, nous allons étudier la laïcité en Turquie dans le contexte de la démocratie, à la lumière de la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, afin de savoir s’il est nécessaire de la redéfinir. / Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 the secularism « la laïcité » is discussed much more than any other topic and its denial meant the denial of Turkish Republic. However, what does secularism mean for Turkey? Is it the reinforcement of elite’s authorities? Or is it the definition of Republic? Nowadays, how do we understand secularism and do we need to redefine it? In Turkey most of the academic works about secularism are still not brining any additional value rather than staying as another description of secularism. The dictionary description of secularism « la laïcité » is that, the state must be natural against all religious beliefs and do not stand as a reference point for any religion. But in practice, the secularism cannot be defined as straight as its definition, it never appears with those sharp borders and in that purity. The factors, which are transforming secularism from a legitimate view to a control mechanism, are its symbols and myths that are considered as part of secularism. Actually, these myths and symbols are forming an undeniable political religion. For that reason most of the previous academic works which are analyzing secularism by considering these myths and symbols as an add-on to the term of secularism, pushed us to look and create a new definition of this concept. In this work, we will analyse the historical and philosophical basis of secularism. We will also trace the origin and the formation of secularism as a political religion opposite to the traditional and political Islam. In this work, we will analyse the historical and philosophical basis of secularism. We will also trace the origin and the formation of secularism as a political religion opposite to the traditional and political Islam.The final part of work will observe secularism in the light of the jurisprudence of the European Convention of Human Rights and, the democracy in order to understand if the notion of secularism in Turkey requires redefinition.

A significant and growing number of authors and commentators have proposed that ecologically enlightened (‘greened’) religion is the solution or at least a major part of the solution to the global ecological crisis. These include Birch, 1965 p90; Brindle, 2000; Callicott, 1994; Gardner, 2002, 2003, 2006; Gore Jr., 1992; Gottlieb, 2006, 2007; Hallman, 2000; Hamilton, 2006b, a, 2007b; Hessel & Ruether, 2000b; Hitchcock, 1999; King, 2002; Lerner, 2006a; McDonagh, 1987; McFague, 2001; McKenzie, 2005; Nasr, 1996; Oelschlaeger, 1994; Palmer, 1992; Randers, 1972; Tucker & Grim, 2000; and White Jr., 1967. Proponents offer a variety of reasons for this view, including that the majority of the world’s and many nations’ people identify themselves as religious, and that there is a large amount of land and infrastructure controlled by religious organisations worldwide. However, the most important reason is that ‘religion’ is said to have one or more exceptional qualities that can drive and sustain dramatic personal and societal change. The underlying or sometimes overt suggestion is that as the ecological crisis is ultimately a moral crisis, religion is best placed to address the problem at its root. ¶ Proponents of the above views are often religious, though there are many who are not. Many proponents are from the USA and write in the context of the powerful role of religion in that country. Others write in a global context. Very few write from or about the Australian context where the role of religion in society is variously argued to be virtually non-existent, soon to be non-existent, or conversely, profound but covert. ¶ This thesis tests the proposition that religion is the solution to the ecological crisis. It does this using a case study of mainstream religion in Australia, represented by the Catholic, Anglican, and Uniting Churches. The Churches’ ecological policies and practices are analysed to determine the extent to which these denominations are fulfilling, or might be able to fulfil, the proposition. The primary research method is an Internet-based search for policy and praxis material. The methodology is Critical Human Ecology. ¶ The research finds that: the ‘greening’ of these denominations is evident; it is a recent phenomenon in the older Churches; there is a growing wealth of environmentalist sentiment and ecological policy being produced; but little institutional praxis has occurred. Despite the often-strong rhetoric, there is no evidence to suggest that ecological concerns, even linked to broader social concerns (termed ‘ecojustice’) are ‘core business’ for the Churches as institutions. Conventional institutional and anthropocentric welfare concerns remain dominant. ¶ Overall, the three Churches struggle with organisational, demographic, and cultural problems that impede their ability to convert their official ecological concerns into institutional praxis. Despite these problems, there are some outstanding examples of ecological policy and praxis in institutional and non-institutional forms that at least match those seen in mainstream secular society. ¶ I conclude that in Australia, mainstream religion is a limited part of the solution to the ecological crisis. It is not the solution to the crisis, at least not in its present institutional form. Institutional Christianity is in decline in Australia and is being replaced by non-institutional Christianity, other religions and non-religious spiritualities (Tacey, 2000, 2003; Bouma, 2006; Tacey, 2007). The ecological crisis is a moral crisis, but in Australia, morality is increasingly outside the domain of institutional religion. The growth of the non-institutional religious and the ‘spiritual but not religious’ demographic may, if ecologically informed, offer more of a contribution to addressing the ecological crisis in future. This may occur in combination with some of the more progressive movements seen at the periphery of institutional Christianity such as the ‘eco-ministry’ of Rev. Dr. Jason John in Adelaide, and the ‘Creation Spirituality’ taught, advocated and practiced by the Mercy Sisters’ Earth Link project in Queensland.