Diss. : Philosophie : Augsburg : 1979. - Bibliogr. p. 197-206. Index. -

Erlangen-Nürnberg, Universiẗat, Magisterarbeit, 2008.

This study is an interpretation of the social and political thought and methodology of Karl Popper, one of the most heralded yet controversial philosophers of our time. The goal has been to provide a more coherent, accurate, and systematic account of Popper's thought and of its relevance to students of politics and society than currently exists by, first, emphasizing certain historical and contextual factors in connection with the structure and development of his ideas which rule out certain contemporary misunderstandings of his thought, and secondly, by allowing Popper's own formulations to take precedence over those of his commentators, regardless of their sympathies and estimate of Popper's massive intellectual legacy. It is my principal argument that the unity of Popper's philosophy lies in its moral dimension, his life long determination to conserve the intellectual foundations of hope and progress that human autonomy requires--the distinctively Kantian belief that mind can and should be decisive in practical affairs no less than in the struggle with nature, the twin pillars of the Enlightenment and modern liberalism alike. Given the nature of our times--a century of "total" wars, endless crises, and one intellectual revolution after another--such an endeavour is no small achievement. I have tried to capture the propositional cutting-edge of my interpretation of Popper's thought in the keywords of the subtitle of this study: that, without the belief in the possibility of objective truth--knowledge that is independent of whether we wish to acknowledge its existence or not, there is little hope in the future prospects of the "open societies" of the Western world, and that one of the gravest errors of the liberalism of the past was its underestimation of the need to institutionalise its best interests against the threat of many forms of illiberal power known in our time, particularly of the "unintended" variety. I accordingly argue that Popper's vision is best characterised as a combat-toughened conception of reality, and of the corresponding rationality necessary to survive, let alone to live well, as the Western tradition of political theory has held to be desirable. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía

Topotactic routes have been used to produce new materials with tunable electronic and magnetic properties. The host materials were the single and triple layered Ruddlesden-Popper compounds, NaLnTiO4 (Ln = La and Gd) and A2La2Ti3O10 (A = Li and K). These compounds consist of [LnTiO4]- and [La2Ti3O10]2-, respectively, perovskite layers interleaved with two alkali metal ion strata. The topotactic routes used in this research were ion exchange and intercalation. Ion exchange was used to replace the cations in the interlayer space with a cationic unit: vanadyl or the transition metal ion, nickel. This ion exchange route opens the structure to further chemistry because each alkali metal ion is replaced by a divalent ion and a vacancy. In these vacancies other atoms can be inserted. Reductive intercalation with alkali metals is of special interest due to their propensity for forming mixed valence compounds. Mixed valency is usually correlated with semiconductive, metallic or superconductive behaviors, and unusual magnetic properties (CMR). Na0.1(VO) Na0.1(VO) 0.45LaTiO4, Na0.05(VO)0.48GdTiO4 and Li0.3Ni0.85La2Ti3O10 have been obtained by ion exchange reactions. Also, the reactivity of Na0.05(VO)0.48GdTiO4, (VO) La2Ti3O10 and Li0.3Ni0.85La2Ti3O10 is probed by an intercalation reaction with n-BuLi. Lithium insertion between the perovskite blocks reduces the titanium in the perovskite sheets and produces new mixed valence titanates. Lithium intercalation in the vanadyl compounds, Na0.05(VO)0.48GdTiO4 , as well as (VO)La2Ti3O10 gives rise to new magnetic properties. The crystal structures, thermal behavior, electronic and magnetic properties of these new compounds will be discussed.

余子恆. / 複印本. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988. / Fu yin ben. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 176-190. / Yu Ziheng. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988.

Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Ms. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 191-195). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / 序言 --- p.1-6 / 導言 --- p.7-12 / Chapter 第一章 --- 分界問題及歸納法問題之歷史淵源 --- p.13-42 / 前言 --- p.13-14 / Chapter （一） --- 康德三分界問題 --- p.15-27 / Chapter （二） --- 休謨之歸納法問題　 --- p.28-42 / Chapter 第二章 --- 分界問題及歸納法問題之解決 --- p.43-94 / 前言 --- p.43 / Chapter （一） --- 哲學是什麼及哲學家的責任　 --- p.44-47 / Chapter （二） --- 知識論的概念 --- p.48-53 / Chapter (i) --- 知識論是什麼 --- p.48-50 / Chapter (ii) --- 心理主義之消除 --- p.50-53 / Chapter （三） --- 分界問題 --- p.54-78 / Chapter (i) --- 波柏爾的分界標準 --- p.54-64 / Chapter (ii) --- 分界標準所引起的困難 --- p.64-68 / Chapter (iii) --- 邏輯實証論的分界標準 --- p.68-71 / Chapter (iv) --- 波柏爾對於邏輯實徵論的分界標準之批判 --- p.71-78 / Chapter （A） --- 可否証性與可檢証性 --- p.71-75 / Chapter (B) --- 意義問題 --- p.75-78 / Chapter （四） --- 归納法問題　 --- p.79-94 / Chapter 第三章 --- 客观知識論之原素　 --- p.95-156 / 前言 --- p.95 / Chapter （一） --- 形而上實在論 --- p.96-104 / Chapter （二） --- 科學的目的 --- p.105-115 / Chapter （三） --- 真理論 --- p.116-126 / Chapter （四） --- 三個世界´ؤ´ؤ沒有認知主體的知識論 --- p.127-147 / Chapter （五） --- 批判主觀知識論 --- p.149-156 / Chapter 第四章 --- 關於客觀知識論的討論 --- p.157-190 / 前言 --- p.157 / Chapter （一） --- 關於知識概念的討論　 --- p.160-170 / Chapter （二） --- 關於分界標準可否証性的討論 --- p.171-180 / Chapter （三） --- 關於歸納法問題的討論 --- p.181-183 / Chapter （四） --- 關於三個世界問題的討論 --- p.184-190 / 参攷書籍 --- p.191-195

Aquesta tesi discuteix la idea de propensió de Popper. La discussió té com a eix les crítiques dels autors. En particular l'enunciat de la teoria propensional del professor Fetzer: sistemes com els de la mecànica estadística o el llançament de la moneda són epistèmicament indeterministes però ònticament deterministes. Segons Fetzer, aquests sistemes no constitueixen propensions de cas singular.Aquesta assignació de probabilitats no realistes a aquests sistemes és rebutjada en la nostra tesi: la teoria propensional de Fetzer és contraria a l'autèntica naturalesa de la idea de propensió i, a més, és destructiva de tota teoria propensional. El capítol segon (Probabilitats ontològiques. La interpretació freqüencial, pàgs.35-67) s'ocupa de la interpretació freqüencial, i qüestions derivades en la 'explicació científica'. En el capítol tercer (La interpretació propensional, pàgs.69-114) es mostra el concepte de propensió i els seus trets. En el quart capítol (Distàncies bàsiques entre propensions com a tendències causals i el càlcul de probabilitats, pàgs.115-144): l'associació realista de la causalitat i la probabilitat es mostra en les vàries qüestions (per exemple, les probabilitats condicionals) derivades de les característiques de l'aparell propi matemàtic. La qüestió originària i central, el que semblava un punt de discrepància dins la visió propensional entre Fetzer i Popper, apareix establerta en el capítol cinquè (Sistemes ònticament deterministes i epistèmicament indeterministes, pàgs.145-167). El capítol sisè (Plantejament determinista d'explicació. Objeccions a la proposta propensional, pàgs.169-189) afronta la naturalesa que tenen les crítiques a la interpretació propensional. El capítol setè (Resposta a les crítiques, pàgs.191-208) (com també el capítol vuitè (El problema de la connexió entre propensions i freqüències: raons del concepte propensional, pàgs., 209-247), més reconcentrat en el problema original de l'ambigüitat de la proposta popperiana) recull, emmarca i dimensiona les afirmacions de Popper que ja contenien la resposta a les futures crítiques. La segona part (capítols nou (Irreversibilitat i direcció temporal, pàgs.263-312) i deu (Interpretació de la probabilitat i mecànica estadística, pàgs.313-361)) s'ocupa dels resultats de l'observació de la mecànica estadística. Aquesta àrea conté qüestions que tenen continguts propis. Per últim, la part tercera (els dos capítols finals: onze (Atzar objectiu, pàgs.381-421) i dotze (Realitat de la informació, pàgs.423-460)) és un afegit més especulatiu, on s'intenta projectar la idea d'una realitat indeterminista des del tema de discussió a la tesi, amb l'assaig de nocions no suficientment precisades. Al cap i a la fi, l'extensió amb aquests dos capítols mostra l'abast que en el fons té la matèria que s'ha de discutir.La presència del capítol primer (Conceptes elementals de probabilitat, pàgs.21-34) és més aviat una formalitat que part de l'argumentació, si bé correspon als continguts de la tesi. El mateix cal dir del apèndixs: A1(Menció de la teoria dels universals de David Malet Armstrong exposada en 'Universals and Scientific Realism', pàgs.477-480) A2 (Remarca sobre termodinàmica, pàgs.481-483) A3 (El "canvi conceptual" rere recents desenvolupaments en dinàmica, pàgs.485-490) A4 (Informació i perspectiva subjectivista, pàgs.491-504) A5 (Nota sobre reducció, pàgs.505-508).Aquest treball inclou Notes per a cada capítol (pàgs.509-577), Índex de matèries i autors, (pàgs.579-593) i Bibliografia (pàgs.595-602); també, tres resums o conclusions: part primera (pàgs.249-259), part segona (pàgs.363-378), part tercera (pàgs.461-473). / This thesis discusses the idea of propensity postulated by Popper. The discussion has authors' critique as its core. In particular, a statement in the propensity theory suggested by professor Fetzer: systems as those of the statistical mechanics or coin tosses are epistemically indeterministics but ontically deterministics. According to Fetzer, those systems are not single case propensities. This attribution of non-realistic probabilities to these systems is rejected in our thesis: Fetzer's propensity theory is opposed to the genuine nature of propensity idea, and, besides, his proposal is destructive of the whole propensity theory.Second chapter (Ontological Probabilities. The Frequency Interpretation, pages, 35-67) concerns to questions in frequency interpretation and derivate questions in 'scientific explanation'. In third chapter (The Propensity Interpretation, pages, 69-114), we deal to propensity concept and its characteristics. In fourth chapter (Basics Gaps between Propensities as Causal Tendencies and Probability Calculus, pages, 115-144): a realistic association of causality and probability shows several questions (for example, it pays attention in conditional probabilities) derivates of the characteristics which are proper to mathematical calculus. There is a central question: it is a point of disagreement in propensity theory between Fetzer i Popper, it appears in fifth chapter (Ontically Deterministic Systems and Epistemically Indeterministic Systems, pages, 145-167). Sixth chapter (Determinist Approach to Explanation. Objections to Propensity Proposal, pages, 169-189) displays the nature of criticism against propensity interpretation. We frame and spread Popper's statements, which hold already the reply to objections raised by criticism in after years, in seventh chapter (Reply to Criticism, pages, 191-208) (also in eight chapter (The Problem of the Connection between Propensities and Frequencies: Reasons of Propensity Concept, pages, 209-247) more devoted to original problem in 'popperian proposal's ambiguity').Second part (chapters nine (Irreversibility and Time's Arrow, pages, 263-312) and ten (Probability's Interpretation in Statistical Mechanics, pages, 313-361) gives an account of the report about statistical mechanics. This area contains questions with specific contents. Finally, third part (last two chapters: eleven (Objective Chance, pages, 381-421) and twelve (Reality of Information, pages, 423-460)) is an addition more speculative, where we try to do a projection along of the idea about indeterminist reality from themes of discussion in thesis, with the essay of non-sufficient developed notions. After all, this extension with two chapters shows us the extent of matter in discussion.Presence of first chapter (Probability's Elemental Concepts, pages, 21-34) is more a formality than part in line of argument, although it is suitable to contents developed in thesis. The same case for presence of appendixes: A1 (Reference to David Malet Armstrong's Universals Theory according to 'Universals and Scientific Realism', pages, 477-480) A2 (Remark about Thermodynamics, pages, 481-483) A3 ("Conceptual Change" in Recently Developments in Dynamics, pages, 485-490) A4 (Information and Subjective Perspective, pages, 491-504) A5 (Note about Reduction, pages, 505-508).This thesis included Notes for every chapter (pages, 509-577), Index of Subjects and Names, (pages, 579-593) and Bibliography (pages, 595-602); also, three summaries or conclusions: first part (pages, 249-259) second part (pages, 363-378) third part (pages, 461-473).

Habil.-Schr.--Innsbruck--Universität, 1998. / Bibliogr. p. 655-673.

Thesis--M. Phil., University of Hong Kong.