According to a prominent thought, in one’s practical reasoning one should rely only on what one knows (Fantl and McGrath 2002; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; Williamson 2000, 2005a, 2017). Yet for many choices, the relevant information is uncertain. This has led Schiffer (2007, 189) to the following objection: oftentimes, we are fully rational in reasoning from uncertain premises which we do not know. For example, we may decide to take an umbrella based on a 0.4 credence that it will rain. There are various ways proponents of a knowledge norm for practical reasoning can respond. One option is to say that the right way of dealing with uncertain information requires knowledge of probabilities (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, 581–85). Another option is to say that credences can be knowledge because they really are beliefs with an unusual kind of content that consists of a set of probability spaces (Moss 2018, chap. 9). Mixed accounts are possible as well (Weisberg 2013). On neither of the accounts in the literature, however, can reasoning from uncertain premises be taken as reasoning based on a graded attitude, a credence, toward an ordinary proposition. To make room for this possibility, I argue that reliance comes in degrees. The knowledge norm is only plausible when taken to be concerned with full reliance.Partial reliance, on the other hand, goes hand in hand with credence.

Ce mémoire porte sur l’articulation de la morale en droit. Il soulève la question de l’objectivité de la morale dans la théorie du droit de Ronald Dworkin. Celui-ci doit pouvoir établir les critères de justification de la morale pour asseoir son autorité en droit. Il conteste la validité de la règle de reconnaissance de Hart qui exclue la morale comme source et comme justification inhérente au droit. Dans son dernier livre, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin présente sa thèse de l’unité de valeur entre le droit, la morale personnelle et la morale politique. Pour réussir à intégrer la morale au droit, il doit en défendre l’objectivité. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique et de la vérité propre à la morale. Sa conception de la rationalité pratique est rapprochée de celle d’Alasdair MacIntyre. Celui-ci rejette la prétention issue des Lumières d’une rationalité pratique universelle et neutre. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique fondée sur le concept de tradition d’investigation. Il fait l’histoire des principales traditions d’investigation depuis l’antiquité jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il considère la tradition aristotélicienne supérieure, celle-ci réussissant mieux à donner objectivité et intelligibilité à la morale. Des points de convergence ou de divergence sont identifiés dans les conceptions de la morale de Dworkin et de MacIntyre. Ce rapprochement porte sur leurs positions respectives face aux principaux fondements théoriques en philosophie morale, leurs conceptions de la rationalité pratique et leurs définitions des notions de droit et de justice. / The subject of this thesis is the relation between morals and law. It raises the question of the objectivity of morals in Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law. Dworkin has to set sound justification criteria of morals in order to establish its authority in law. He disputes the validity of the rule of recognition of Hart which negates that morality is an inherent part of law. In his last book, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin present his thesis on the unity of value between law, personal morality and political morality. To succeed in integrating morality into law, he has to defend its objectivity. He develops a particular concept of rationality and truth applicable to morality. His concept of practical rationality is drawn together with Alasdair Macintyre’s own concept of rationality MacIntyre rejects the Enlightment’s claim of a universal and neutral rationality. He develops a concept of practical reasoning based on the concept of traditions of enquiry. He makes the history of the most important traditions of enquiry from Ancient Greece to today. He considers that the Aristotelian tradition of enquiry is superior, since it gives objectivity and intelligibility to morality. Points of convergence and points of divergence are identified in the concepts of morality of Dworkin and MacIntyre. These common aspects are found in the theoretical fundamentals in philosophy, in their concepts of practical rationality and in their definition of the notions of law and justice.

Abstract Background: Small businesses are vital for the welfare of a country. Yet, they have trou-ble obtaining external financing and these difficulties are gathered under the umbrella concept the “Financial Gap”. The most common source of fund-ing for small businesses is bank loan, why the availability of bank financing is a critical factor for their success. Today, 31% of all Swedish companies argue that they have finance problems and for half of these, the problem is to obtain a bank loan. Purpose: The purpose of the study is to describe and explain the Financial Gap as a relational concept. That is to say that the study will contribute to the understanding of the Financial Gap by focusing on the perspectives of both small businesses and banks interactively. Method: The study views the concept of the Financial Gap from a practical stand-point, assuming that it expresses its existence in the interaction between small businesses and banks. To pursue this view, the study takes on an Eth-nomethodological research approach. This approach is necessary in order to come close to and understand small businesses‟ and banks‟ everyday prac-tises. In-depth interviews are used for obtaining this deeper understanding of both parties. In addition, a questionnaire was sent out to small businesses in order to verify the information gathered in the interviews. Conclusion: On the basis of the study, the authors have developed an Interactive Model which describes their understanding of the Financial Gap. The members of small businesses and banks deal with information differently, which in turn is a result of how they approach ambiguity. When ambiguity is present, small firms settle with making decisions under uncertainty, whereas banks prefer to calculate on probabilities, why their decisions are considered being made under risk. The differences mentioned become visible in their deci-sion-making process, where small businesses act pursuant to a practical rea-soning whereas banks employ an analytical reasoning. Consequently, it leads to a clash when these two shall interact and function in a transaction as partners. The study concludes that the Financial Gap can be explained by small firms and banks speaking different languages when presenting the same reality.

<p><strong>Abstract </strong></p><p><strong>Background: </strong>Small businesses are vital for the welfare of a country. Yet, they have trou-ble obtaining external financing and these difficulties are gathered under the umbrella concept the “Financial Gap”. The most common source of fund-ing for small businesses is bank loan, why the availability of bank financing is a critical factor for their success. Today, 31% of all Swedish companies argue that they have finance problems and for half of these, the problem is to obtain a bank loan.</p><p><strong>Purpose: </strong><em>The purpose of the study is to describe and explain the Financial Gap as a relational concept. That is to say that the study will contribute to the understanding of the Financial Gap by focusing on the perspectives of both small businesses and banks interactively. </em></p><p><strong>Method: </strong>The study views the concept of the Financial Gap from a practical stand-point, assuming that it expresses its existence in the interaction between small businesses and banks. To pursue this view, the study takes on an Eth-nomethodological research approach. This approach is necessary in order to come close to and understand small businesses‟ and banks‟ everyday prac-tises. In-depth interviews are used for obtaining this deeper understanding of both parties. In addition, a questionnaire was sent out to small businesses in order to verify the information gathered in the interviews.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: </strong>On the basis of the study, the authors have developed an <em>Interactive Model </em>which describes their understanding of the Financial Gap. The members of small businesses and banks deal with information differently, which in turn is a result of how they approach ambiguity. When ambiguity is present, small firms settle with making decisions under uncertainty, whereas banks prefer to calculate on probabilities, why their decisions are considered being made under risk. The differences mentioned become visible in their deci-sion-making process, where small businesses act pursuant to a practical rea-soning whereas banks employ an analytical reasoning. Consequently, it leads to a clash when these two shall interact and function in a transaction as partners. The study concludes that the Financial Gap can be explained by small firms and banks speaking different languages when presenting the same reality.</p>

Ce mémoire porte sur l’articulation de la morale en droit. Il soulève la question de l’objectivité de la morale dans la théorie du droit de Ronald Dworkin. Celui-ci doit pouvoir établir les critères de justification de la morale pour asseoir son autorité en droit. Il conteste la validité de la règle de reconnaissance de Hart qui exclue la morale comme source et comme justification inhérente au droit. Dans son dernier livre, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin présente sa thèse de l’unité de valeur entre le droit, la morale personnelle et la morale politique. Pour réussir à intégrer la morale au droit, il doit en défendre l’objectivité. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique et de la vérité propre à la morale. Sa conception de la rationalité pratique est rapprochée de celle d’Alasdair MacIntyre. Celui-ci rejette la prétention issue des Lumières d’une rationalité pratique universelle et neutre. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique fondée sur le concept de tradition d’investigation. Il fait l’histoire des principales traditions d’investigation depuis l’antiquité jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il considère la tradition aristotélicienne supérieure, celle-ci réussissant mieux à donner objectivité et intelligibilité à la morale. Des points de convergence ou de divergence sont identifiés dans les conceptions de la morale de Dworkin et de MacIntyre. Ce rapprochement porte sur leurs positions respectives face aux principaux fondements théoriques en philosophie morale, leurs conceptions de la rationalité pratique et leurs définitions des notions de droit et de justice. / The subject of this thesis is the relation between morals and law. It raises the question of the objectivity of morals in Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law. Dworkin has to set sound justification criteria of morals in order to establish its authority in law. He disputes the validity of the rule of recognition of Hart which negates that morality is an inherent part of law. In his last book, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin present his thesis on the unity of value between law, personal morality and political morality. To succeed in integrating morality into law, he has to defend its objectivity. He develops a particular concept of rationality and truth applicable to morality. His concept of practical rationality is drawn together with Alasdair Macintyre’s own concept of rationality MacIntyre rejects the Enlightment’s claim of a universal and neutral rationality. He develops a concept of practical reasoning based on the concept of traditions of enquiry. He makes the history of the most important traditions of enquiry from Ancient Greece to today. He considers that the Aristotelian tradition of enquiry is superior, since it gives objectivity and intelligibility to morality. Points of convergence and points of divergence are identified in the concepts of morality of Dworkin and MacIntyre. These common aspects are found in the theoretical fundamentals in philosophy, in their concepts of practical rationality and in their definition of the notions of law and justice.